I will prevent disease whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure.
―Hippocratic Oath
There is an odd defect in the human mind that allows people living under an enormous dam to suffer little anxiety as the reservoir behind it gradually fills to the brim and the concrete walls crack from the mounting force. In such circumstances, most people will go about their daily business. The specter of sudden catastrophe will remain unthinkable to them, if only because it has not yet happened―as if the ravages of time were positive evidence instead of something to worry about. In the aftermath, the same defect will cause survivors of disaster to blame it all on the trigger event, the unforeseen engineering flaw or earthquake or storm that finally burst the dam and brought the water crushing down. People naturally ignore that unhappy reality: all dams break sooner or later if they are not strengthened.
Like people living under a slowly failing dam, many observers of the Taiwan Strait flashpoint are convinced that disaster will not strike as long as no trigger event occurs. Of these, the most frequently mentioned is a formal Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence. Proximate causes of war, while dramatic and easily seen, are unimportant when the situation is structurally unstable and the political problems intractable. In situations such as this one, violent conflict may eventually become unavoidable no matter what Washington and Taipei do. Attempts to appease Beijing are at least as likely to encourage aggression as those aimed at providing Taiwan with international recognition. Sooner or later, the dam is probably going to surrender to the pressure and break.
The Taiwan Strait has separated two countries, China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC), since 1949. The fissures between them have grown over time and will continue to grow. For a long time, both Beijing and Taipei falsely claimed that there was only one China in the world and they were the sole legal representative of it. Only one side now maintains that position. To resolve the issue, China has engaged in an arms race on a vast scale, while the United States, distracted by events elsewhere in the world, has allowed its defenses to stagnate in the Pacific. American leaders have done little to address the fact that China’s main strategic objective is to conquer Taiwan, something that would give Beijing hegemony over East Asia and the Western Pacific. If nothing major changes, if the United States continues conducting business like everything was fine, the dangers will continue to rise. They will rise to the point where the slightest push could set off a chain of events that unleashes seven decades of pent-up aggression.
The trigger could very well be an accident or innocent act, something calculated as benign but perceived as hostile. It may go down in history as an infamous event, or it may not be understood what exactly happened. Like the case of World War I, the true cause may be debated for a century and still undecided. Defense plans are for times of madness like these, but they are of limited utility by themselves. It is important to be ready when the dam bursts―that is what this book so far has attempted to address―but far better would be to figure out how to strengthen the dam and lower the pressure. That is what this chapter is about.
While few are comfortable admitting it, the United States and China are firmly entrenched in what will likely be a long and intense strategic competition for dominance over the Pacific Rim.[502] American strategists Andrew Marshall, Robert Kaplan, and Aaron Friedberg each began foretelling of this great power struggle well over a decade ago.[503] They were quick to recognize that there are strong forces underpinning the U.S.-PRC rivalry. Events have proven their foresight. In February 2016, then Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, announced that great power competition has reemerged as the Pentagon’s top priority and would define the next twenty-five years.[504] That same month, the Commander of the Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that China seeks hegemony in East Asia.[505]
Their candid assessments came as a surprise to many. It has been taboo to speak of competition with China in an honest and open way in Washington power circles. What they said was nonetheless quite appropriate and strategically healthy. The first step of dealing with a highly sensitive global problem is admitting it exists. In the nuclear age, avoiding conflict between great powers is absolutely essential, and the weight of evidence suggests that nothing is more likely to invite war than covering up uncomfortable truths. Obsequiousness and silence in the face of coercion could only validate Beijing’s behavior.
The political systems and national interests of the United States and PRC stand in fundamental opposition to each other. America is an imperfect democracy, but it nonetheless is an inspiration to people everywhere who yearn for the freedom and dignity that come from having a representative government, independent legal system, and market economy. In contrast, all power in China is monopolized by the Communist Party, an unelected political organization which has a troubling history.[506] The State Department’s annual report on human rights makes it clear that China’s government is a deeply authoritarian regime, and one that continues to oppress the Chinese people.[507]
The CCP compounds its governance failures by forgoing moves toward a genuine market economy and stifling innovation. For all its much celebrated reforms, China’s economy is still largely run by CCP-controlled corporations, making it a mercantilist country, not a capitalist one.[508] China treats the American-led international economic order with contempt, bending or breaking all the rules when it comes to trade and finance, and stealing what it cannot create. According to authoritative studies, much of China’s economic power stems from its ability to lure foreign business elites with promises of access to an immense market. Once the hook is set, state industries routinely pocket American companies’ investments, siphon off their intellectual property, and undercut their market competitiveness.[509]
It is not China’s disquieting political or economic practices that will ensure sustained competition over the coming years. American presidents, pragmatic by nature, will generally seek to paper over ideological differences for expediency’s sake. It is the CCP that is at the root of the problem.[510] China’s leadership has recently stoked tensions with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, all American treaty allies; provoked border clashes with India, a democracy and security partner; and enabled nuclear missile proliferation amongst North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.[511] Track records tell a compelling story. That is why credit scores (remarkably accurate predictions of future financial behavior) rely entirely on historical data points. Beijing’s track record indicates that a growing number of geostrategic issues could result in a clash between America and China.
Washington’s attempts to cooperate with CCP leaders and shape China into a responsible stakeholder have foundered and will continue to achieve little. Elites in Beijing view the United States as hostile to their revanchist interests, and they will continue to compete regardless of foreign gestures of goodwill.[512] Anti-American pathologies have long plagued Chinese decision-making, but conditions have grown considerably worse under the current General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping.[513] His cognitive failures appear to include a paranoid reading into American actions, hawkish ideology, and departures from reality.[514] Making matters worse, Chairman Xi has engaged in a brutal campaign to purge his peers within the party elite. The collective leadership model cultivated in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, while profoundly flawed, at least had checks and balances for restraining radical decision-making. Those internal constraints are now gone, a development attended by immense risks.
The U.S. government has failed to develop and dedicate the resources needed for the broad collection, translation, analysis, and dissemination of Chinese writings and speeches. As a consequence, Washington has only a limited understanding of the official Chinese worldview, and even less knowledge of what is going on inside China’s halls of power. In the absence of understanding, too many Americans assume that the PRC operates basically like the United States, when in fact it is profoundly different in all the ways that matter: politically, economically, and militarily.[515] This is why Chinese behavior so often puzzles Western observers, and this is why, despite the long-time reluctance to officially admit it, strategic competition is here to stay.
To better see the shape of things to come, we must first look to the past. Prior to America’s entrance into World War II, the nation had much reason to fear Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, but isolationism meant there were few actual flashpoints. Only an enemy attack on American soil, realized at Pearl Harbor, could drag the country into war. In contrast, the Cold War featured a rapid expansion of American security commitments and interests abroad. Far-flung standoffs and proxy wars ranged from the Korean Peninsula to Berlin, from Cuba to Vietnam, and from Afghanistan to Grenada. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the world became a much safer place for the United States and other democracies. Great power conflict and the attendant specter of nuclear war no longer seemed threatening simply because no other country had the military wherewithal to compete. After a twenty-year military buildup, China now confronts America with a new rivalry and new flashpoints around which to organize strategic efforts.
Of all the powder kegs out there, the potential for a war over Taiwan is by far the largest and most explosive.[516] China has made clear that its primary external objective is attaining the ability to apply overwhelming force against Taiwan during a conflict, and if necessary destroy American-led coalition forces.[517] Chinese strategists focus on Taiwan because CCP elites are insecure. They view the island’s government as a grave threat to their grip on power. Taiwan is anathema to them because it serves as a beacon of freedom for ethnically Chinese people everywhere.[518] Consequently, the PLA considers the invasion of Taiwan to be its most critical mission, and it is this envisioned future war that drives China’s military buildup.[519]
Understanding any Taiwan Strait war scenario requires some myth-busting. It has become conventional wisdom that Taiwan will eventually be pulled into China’s orbit by cross-Strait trade entanglements.[520] In spite of the power disparity that exists, Taipei’s close ties with Washington means that it does not have to bow to coercion from the authorities in Beijing, economic or otherwise.[521]
Nor is America likely to sell Taiwan out, another remarkably popular myth.[522] The American commitment to Taiwan is articulated in U.S. Public Law 96-8, the Taiwan Relations Act.[523] This legal instrument is founded on bedrock judgments of national interest. While it is true that there are those in Washington who have convinced themselves that Taiwan cannot prevail in a protracted contest with its giant neighbor across the Strait, they are making an unwise assumption, both for Taiwan’s sake and the sake of America’s own security. Every professional strategist since Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur has recognized that Taiwan is a center of gravity in the Asia-Pacific.[524] The island sits astride the world’s busiest maritime and air superhighways, right in the middle of the first island chain, a defensive barrier keeping Chinese military power in check.[525]
America does not covet Taiwan as a base for its soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, but it does require that the island remain in the hands of a friendly government. If Taiwan were lost, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines would become vulnerable to naval blockades and air assaults. For this reason, and many others, any Chinese attempt to gain control of Taiwan would almost certainly be regarded as an attack on the vital interests of the United States, and therefore repelled by any means necessary, including the use of force.
While China’s expansionism in the South China Sea has dominated the discourse on the PRC’s rise and brought its naval threat into sharp relief, it is the threat to Taiwan that will most likely keep the Pentagon awake at night in the years ahead.[526] The RAND Corporation, the venerable defense think tank that helped guide America’s strategic competition with the Soviet Union, has repeatedly warned of the challenge PLA modernization poses to America, especially in a Taiwan conflagration.[527] The ROC military still maintains an array of potent capabilities, but its overall combat power risks being eclipsed by China’s rapid buildup, increasing the likelihood of future aggression.[528] Barring a dramatic reduction in Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities or a general reversal of American military power in Asia, the direct defense of Taiwan will remain a credible strategy for the foreseeable future―but only if leaders in Washington and Taipei can work more closely together.[529]
According to RAND, China’s investments into space and cyberspace weaponry, conventional ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and stealthy submarines and fighters all make it more conceivable that America could lose the next war, or at the very least fail to deter it, a strategic defeat in its own right. Maintaining a favorable balance of power in the Taiwan Strait will therefore be essential for the prevention of catastrophe.[530] The destructive potential of China’s growing military strength means that even though America and coalition partners are likely to emerge from any future war over Taiwan victorious, they would still wish more had been done to keep the conflict from occurring in the first place.
The question of how to best deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan will be hotly debated in the years ahead and rightfully so; peace and prosperity in Asia and beyond are riding on America’s ability to address this challenge. Some scholars have entertained notions of abandoning Taiwan, coldly trading it away for other ends as if it were a stack of poker chips.[531] Their views, however, will be ignored by policymakers in Washington who recognize that the dispute between China and Taiwan cannot be separated from the larger geopolitics of the region, and that there is an underlying confluence of U.S.-Taiwan interests.[532]
Taiwan is critical not only for its location, but also for its shared liberal values and its position as a key trading partner.[533] Chinese diplomats in Washington often assert that China is big and Taiwan is little, and therefore constructive relations with China matter more and it is in the American interest to compromise on Taiwan. When it comes to freedom, human rights, and quality of government, Taiwan towers over China. Experience has shown senior American policymakers time and time again that nations that share democratic values are the best partners and worth defending. Common values generate common interests, which are the basis for making a common cause in addressing global challenges.
Taiwan has intrinsic value as a responsible member of the international community. It is also America’s tenth largest trading partner, ahead of Saudi Arabia, Italy, and Brazil.[534] The Taiwanese excel when it comes to researching, designing, and manufacturing the advanced technology that drives much of America’s economy. Integrated circuits (or microchips) are the brains of our handheld devices and computers. The global chip-making business as we know it was invented by Taiwan in the 1980s and the high-tech island nation still occupies a strong position on the global supply chain. Today China is rapidly catching up, something that poses a serious threat to the security of the world’s hardware.[535] America needs Taiwan as a “Silicon Shield,” keeping the technology of tomorrow from being controlled and corrupted by an adversary.[536]
Washington has long suffered from a lack of strategic clarity, unsure of what is needed to compete effectively against China or even whether there is a real competition underway. Ever since the early 1970s, many American foreign policy elites have taken it for granted that the PRC was of supreme importance and that Washington needed Beijing’s cooperation, first as a counterweight to the USSR, then for market access, and more recently as a partner on global issues ranging from North Korea to terrorism and from proliferation to climate change. This view is especially pronounced among those who embrace the notion that America is in decline and authoritarian China is going to prevail over the long run. From their perspective, the best the United States can do is make a “grand bargain” from a position of weakness that would limit China’s ascendency to its own sphere of interest, much like detente tried (and failed) to do with the Soviet Union.[537] American presidents, influenced by these defeatist views, have sometimes gone to great lengths to appease China’s communist leadership. The tendency to overvalue the strategic importance of U.S.-China relations is something that unnecessarily weakens Washington’s bargaining power with Beijing, and undermines efforts to formulate long-term strategy.
America’s relatively sanguine approach to China’s emergence as a strategic competitor is increasingly difficult to reconcile with events. Over the past decade the PRC has offered numerous indicators that trouble is lurking ahead, each of which has been minimized or ignored in the name of positive Sino-American relations. One of the first wake-up calls came on January 11, 2007, when China shot a ballistic missile into a target satellite in low earth orbit.[538] This missile test was followed by several others, all which clearly demonstrated China’s intention to weaponize space and neutralize the eyes and ears of American military power in a conflict.[539] Another warning came in 2010, when China deployed the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, a weapon apparently capable of targeting aircraft carriers, the queens of America’s fleet.[540] Many other unsettling developments, both diplomatic and military, followed over the course of the next several years.[541]
A startling number of American “China Hands” have turned a blind eye to these developments, and instead have clung to the false hope that mutual economic interdependence, military-to-military exchanges, and favorable diplomatic treatment could build trust and socialize China, enticing it into becoming a responsible stakeholder. They often emphasize the risks of inadvertent conflict and rapid escalation if their policy prescriptions are not followed. However, none of their recommendations, which have been tested to the limit of prudence in recent years, have dulled China’s ruthless competitive instincts. If anything, examples of American risk aversion and compromise have only emboldened Beijing to push farther and harder.[542]
Recognizing the gathering storm ahead, Kurt Campbell, then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, spearheaded the pivot to Asia strategy in the first years of the Obama administration.[543] The pivot, or “rebalance” as it became known, was warmly welcomed by America’s allies and partners in Asia. As part of the effort, the Pentagon publically rolled out its new Air-Sea Battle Office, which generated excitement among those who recognized fresh operational concepts were needed for dealing with China’s growing military threat.[544] The excitement was short-lived. Then-President Obama shuffled his cabinet in early 2013, and things began unraveling. The new foreign policy team, characterized by a strong focus on the Middle East, Europe, and climate change, allowed the much-anticipated strategy to gather dust on the drawing board. Asia policy, and especially Taiwan policy, fell to the wayside.[545]
In 2015, several major strategic setbacks occurred. First, the PRC created a giant archipelago of artificial islands in the South China Sea, claiming the entire area as a virtual province of China. This shocking development disrupted ongoing attempts to apply international legal mechanisms to settle disputes and weakened the defensive positions of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.[546] Next, it was revealed that Chinese intelligence agents had penetrated sensitive computer systems and compromised the identities (including fingerprints) of over twenty million Americans who either worked for the federal government or had family members who did. The military, intelligence, and contractor communities lost untold reams of confidential information on their most precious asset: people.[547] Not long after, Chairman Xi held a jingoistic military parade in Beijing, rolling out a number of new weapons systems, including an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of attacking the United States territory of Guam, a strategic hub in the Western Pacific.[548]
Actors: PRC, Taiwan, USA
China passes a law aimed to “legalize” a military attack on Taiwan (and the United States) if its vaguely defined “red lines” are crossed.
Actors: PRC, Russia
China and Russia stage their first joint military exercise since the Cold War, “Peace Mission 2005,” an event that appeared to simulate an assault on Taiwan.
Actors: PRC, USA, others
China successfully carries out test of an anti-satellite missile, creating massive debris cloud endangering the International Space Station and U.S. intelligence satellites.
Actors: PRC, USA
Chinese maritime forces harass an unarmed U.S. ocean surveillance ship in international waters.
Actors: PRC, USA
China’s strategic rocket force deploys the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, a weapons system designed for targeting ships, including U.S. aircraft carriers.
Actors: PRC, USA
China unveils stealth fighter prototype during visit of then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to Beijing.
Actors: PRC, USA, Philippines,
China illegally occupies a reef near the Philippines after failing to abide by U.S.-negotiated deal to end standoff in the area.
Actors: PRC, Japan, USA, Taiwan, South Korea
China declares an intrusive air defense identification zone in the East China Sea without prior notification of other parties.
Actors: PRC, USA
Chinese warship unsuccessfully attempts to collide with U.S. guided missile cruiser in international waters.
Actors: PRC, USA, others
Chinese naval intelligence-gathering ship arrives uninvited to U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific naval exercises near Hawaii despite participation of other PRC ships.
Actors: PRC, USA, others
China begins rapid buildup of artificial islands in the South China Sea, militarizing the international maritime sovereignty dispute.
Actors: PRC, USA
Chinese intelligence hack into security clearance files of over 22 million Americans revealed.
Actors: PRC
China conducts large-scale military parade in Beijing, unveiling DF-26 “Guam Killer” ballistic missile, and other advanced nuclear-capable delivery vehicles.
Confidence in American leadership has declined among allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific as a result of Beijing’s actions and Washington’s inactions. While the Bush and Obama administrations developed some excellent talking points, not enough was actually done to adapt to changing facts on the ground. Strong rhetoric and weak execution is a toxic mix. It hit Taiwan especially hard because Taipei has no other security partners to turn to for help, and its threat-environment is the most stressing. Taiwanese officials discovered to their chagrin that Washington was unwilling to sell them new fighter jets, tanks, drones, and destroyers.[549] Even diesel-electric submarine technology, promised in 2001, proved out of reach.[550] The White House, fearful of rousing Beijing’s ire, instead offered Taiwan equipment of the type provided to Mexico.[551] Adding insult to injury, the Taiwanese looked on in astonishment as U.S. Navy ships made port calls up and down the Chinese coast, then sailed around Taiwan at full steam as if it were a failed state, not a flourishing and friendly democracy.[552]
The landslide results of the 2016 presidential and legislative elections in Taipei are telling. The citizens of Taiwan chose Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, who is widely viewed as tough on China and friendly to America, and therefore more likely to secure a better future relationship with Washington.[553] At the same time, they also chose the Democratic Progressive Party whose policy platform calls for a more robust indigenous defense industry as a pragmatic hedge against continued American dysfunction.[554] Taiwan’s government wants to arm itself and will do so whether its long-standing ally feels it can help or not. Its resolve is likely to mean that the island, largely ignored for the past two decades, will soon be at the forefront of American geostrategic thinking. If the contest of the century is to be waged between the United States and China for primacy in the Pacific, Taiwan will be at the center of the action.
Taiwan’s location in the west Pacific