Outlining the general parameters of control-trust research
This chapter reviews research on control-trust dynamics by outlining how and why control and trust jointly constitute vital components of organizational effectiveness (Adler, 2001; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Long, 2010; Ross, 1994). Controls describe the actions that individuals and organizations take to direct others to achieve objectives by specifying, channelling attention and effort as well as measuring, monitoring and incentivizing/sanctioning work (Dekker, 2004; Fayol, 1949; Ouchi, 1979). When individuals foster trust they generate a level of confidence in them that encourages others to have positive expectations about their intentions and behaviours (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).
Scholars have focused their attention on control-trust dynamics for two primary reasons. First, because research indicates that, to the extent that trustees (e.g. managers, leaders decision-makers) generate appropriate levels of control and trust among their trustors (e.g. subordinates, followers, decision-recipients) in work environments, they are able to foster high levels of goal commitment, compliance and cooperation (Christ, 2013; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Williamson, 1975), an increased willingness to communicate and exchange information (Sitkin & Bies 1994; Coletti, et al., 2005), enhance the perceived legitimacy of their own and their organization’s actions (Blau, 1964), and increase levels of organizational performance (Cao & Lumineau, 2015).
The second reason that scholars have focused attention on control-trust dynamics is because control and trust direct, motivate and coordinate interdependent actors through distinctly different and often opposing psychological mechanisms such as the desire to increase intimacy and the desire to avoid vulnerability (Anderson, Christ, Dekker, & Sedatole, 2013; Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 2005; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Ross, 1994; Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009; Weibel, 2007). The key tension that exists is this: when managers rely too much on controls, they may compromise their subordinates’ desires for self-determination that are necessary to effectively foster their trust (Blau, 1964; Christ, Sedatole, Towry, & Thomas, 2008; Coletti, et al., 2005; Fox, 1974; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Shapiro, 1987: Weibel, 2007; Weibel & Six, 2013). Conversely, if managers focus too much on building trust by providing their subordinates autonomy and addressing their personal needs, they may fail to effectively control their subordinates in ways that motivate them to accomplish desired objectives (Dekker, 2004; Emsley & Kidon, 2007; Long, 2010; Shapiro, 1987; Spreitzer & Mishra, 1999). Thus, while important, it is often hard for managers and organizations who operate in complex and uncertain environments to establish and maintain the optimal balance between control and trust (Blau, 1964; Christ, 2013; Long, 2010; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Sitkin, 1995; Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Weibel, Wildhaber, et al., 2016).
Scholarly work examining these issues addresses a range of interpersonal and organizational/ institutional issues from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. By reviewing these viewpoints, this chapter aims to achieve three primary objectives. First, existing work on control-trust relationships is organized and reviewed in ways that distil and highlight its central contributions. Second, this review also draws attention to persistent and ongoing theoretical and empirical debates in this topical area. Third, an agenda for future research is presented towards the end of the chapter that charts a way forward and provides some suggestions for addressing persistent, theoretical dilemmas. By examining important scholarship in this area, a practical objective motivating this review is to provide managers and organizations with ways to more critically evaluate their own decisions regarding how they direct their subordinates and, at the same time, develop quality work relationships with them.
A distinctive feature about current control-trust research is that scholars have used a relatively wide variety of control, trustworthiness and trust concepts and measures in their theoretical and empirical work (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007). The control, trust and trustworthiness concepts most commonly used in this literature are summarized below.
Controls generally describe desired standards that managers use to direct employees’ work activities and apply rewards or sanctions according to their employees’ achieved performances on the dimensions they specify (Ouchi, 1979; Weibel, Den Hartog et al., 2016). Scholars in the control-trust domain have traditionally adopted broad definitions of controls that include a variety of mechanisms managers can use to ensure that individuals and organizational units ‘act in a coordinated and cooperative fashion, so that resources will be obtained and optimally allocated in order to achieve the organization’s goals’ (Lebas & Weigenstein, 1986: 259).
For example, differences in the content and effects produced by formal and informal controls comprise a key set of issues on which scholars have focused (Ouchi, 1977; Mintzberg, 1979; Roth, Sitkin & House, 1994; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Formal controls describe mechanisms that are institutionally sanctioned and generally manifest in codified rules and directives. These mechanisms include written contract parameters, hiring criteria, goal specifications, formal performance management HR practices or standard operating procedures. In contrast, informal control mechanisms describe a range of often unwritten but collectively understood values, norms and beliefs that guide employees’ decisions and actions. Examples of informal control mechanisms include culturally accepted norms for communicating, exchanging information, managing performance and enforcing contract agreements (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2010; Kirsch, 2004). Using the formal–informal distinction, scholars utilize a wide variety of control mechanisms, policies and procedures, control systems, as well as singular and multiple contract-based specifications in their work. As is described below, researchers have repeatedly demonstrated how controls that are applied using formal and informal means often generate distinctly different reactions from control recipients.
Another key distinction between types of controls used in this research describes the target of the control. A common distinction differentiates whether controls are targeted to the input (e.g. personnel, selection, training, values), process (e.g. action, behaviours, procedures, routines, practices) or output (e.g. outcome, results) portion of the production process (Merchant, 1985; Snell, 1992; Cardinal, et al., 2004, 2010; Long, Burton & Cardinal, 2002; Ouchi, 1977: 1979). Output controls (e.g. incentives, targets, goal-based standards) are applied to ensure the attainment of desired performance standards by comparing achieved outputs against results-based standards (Ouchi, 1977, 1979; Mintzberg, 1979). Process controls (rules, norms, SOPs) are applied to individuals performing organizational tasks to ensure that they employ prescribed methods in doing their work. Input controls in the form of selection, training and socialization mechanisms are applied to choose and ready human and material resources for their roles in production (Arvey, 1979; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979; Wanous, 1980).
While Cardinal, Sitkin and Long (2010) argue that input, process and output controls can each be applied in either formal or informal ways, significant portions of the literature have yet to fully adopt this conceptualization. Instead, several scholars tend to combine control form and target by arguing that output and process controls constitute formal controls because they tend to be applied in ways that restrict subordinate autonomy (Das & Teng, 1998, 2001; Inkpen & Currall, 2004). They contrast these controls with clan or social controls which scholars sug gest comprise informal, normatively focused input control mechanisms that foster collegiality by placing fewer restrictions on individual autonomy and facilitate the development of shared norms and values (Ouchi, 1980; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979; Weibel, Den Hartog, et al., 2016).
Recently, control-trust researchers have begun to distinguish controls by the function they serve in monitoring or coordinating production activities (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Das & Teng, 2001; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Mallewigt, et al., 2007; Velez et al., 2008). When controls are used to ‘monitor’ work, they are applied in ways that facilitate the supervision, measuring and rewarding (i.e. or pushing) of work performances. Research to date has focused on how managers use the monitoring function of controls to reduce subordinate opportunism by providing managers with key indicators of aberrant performance and providing them with mechanisms to align superior-subordinate incentives. Alternatively, scholars suggest that controls can also be used to coordinate the work of interdependent actors in uncertain environments. In coordinating, managers use controls to enhance planning and decision-making by directing attention and transferring important information between distributed employees performing specialized tasks to enhance their learning, expertise and overall productive capacities.
Conceptualizations of trust vary in control-trust research with psychologists focusing on attributional processes that generate trust perceptions and attitudes, economists focusing on trustors’ calculations of the level of confidence they maintain in trustees, and sociologists focusing on trust as a product of social embeddedness. In addition, forms of trust have been identified at various levels of analysis with referents ranging from individuals to organizations and institutions (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012; Weibel, Den Hartog, et al., 2016).
Much research in the control-trust domain examines the development of a psychological state akin to interpersonal trust where individuals experience ‘the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another’ (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer, 1998: 395). Generally, this research attempts to identify if, how and to what extent trustors (those who trust/don’t trust) think, feel and act towards trustees (those who are trusted/not trusted) and how those factors influence various outcomes (e.g. performance, relationship quality, job satisfaction, employee commitment).
Research to date has tended to focus on how individuals generate these trust-based assessments from the attributions developed from observing their trustees’ words and actions. Much of this work has focused on the distinction between competence and goodwill trust because how controls are applied will differentially affect these forms of trust (Das and Teng, 1998, 2001; Mayer, et al., 1995; Sako, 1992). Competence trust develops when trustees are perceived to exhibit expertise and developed abilities to effectively perform important cognitive or technical tasks. Goodwill trust, on the other hand, is based on positive assessments of trustees’ manifest values, moral character, authenticity, credibility and consideration of others’ interests. Some control-trust research has further separated goodwill trust into two sub-dimensions of managerial trustworthiness that are consistent with the dimensions described by Mayer Davis and Schoorman (1995): their benevolence or interest in accommodating a trustor’s specific needs and their integrity or their willingness to fulfil promises and obligations made to trustors.
A growing amount of research has begun to more closely examine the target of trustors’ attributions. While much research already evaluates trust directed towards managers or exchange partners, researchers have recently begun to focus on the level trust that individual actors exhibit towards organizations, employers and other institutions (Weibel, Den Hartog, et al., 2016). This work builds from previous research by scholars such as Giddens (1990) who emphasizes how organizational policies and procedures that comprise abstract systems influence whether individuals develop trust in organizations and institutions (Cook and Wall 1980; Butler 1991; Tyler and Lind, 1992). Scholars suggest that this form of trust is based on aggregated assessments from multiple sources of evidence operating at various organizational levels (Rousseau et al. 1998; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone 1998). Often, what is crucial in determining organizational/ institutional trust are the decisions and performance management systems that a top management team or higher level organizational authorities put into place (Whitley 1999).
Conceptualizations of control and trust extend past basic definitional issues and continue to examine interrelationships between these two conceptual mechanisms. Some scholars conceptualize trust as a form of control (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Lebas and Weigenstein, 1986; Pennings and Woichesyn, 1987) and focus on how individuals make decisions to preserve forms of trust that develop around mutually beneficial, collegial and usually informal exchange relation ships. More recent research has emphasized the distinctiveness of control and trust with various authors (e.g. Das and Teng, 2001; Long and Sitkin, 2006; McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer, 2003; Nooteboom, 1996) arguing that control and trust constitute fundamentally different ways of managing interdependencies and uncertainties in organizations. These issues, however, remain unresolved with scholars such as Tomkins (2001) and Leifer and Mills (1996) suggesting that the existence of trust connotes the absence of control while others such as Möllering (2005) argue that control and trust comprise a ‘duality’ of omnipresent mechanisms that assume, create and refer (explicitly and implicitly) the existence of each other.
Critical theorists provide a related but distinct view on these matters by suggesting that the presence of both control and trust in organizations does not just happen but results from conscious efforts by authorities to subjugate their subordinates. For example, Jermier (1998), Reed (2001) and Roberts (2001) cite critical analyses describing how authorities force subordinate accountability using control and trust mechanisms embedded within complex organizational forms. Roberts (2001) discusses how higher authorities hold individuals accountable for complying with intricate networks of controls that foster forms of trust that are beneficial for them (Shapiro, 1987; Sydow and Windeler, 2003). They argue that when the inability or unwillingness of actors to exhibit desired forms of trust compromises performance within these systems, authorities assert their power by developing and implementing various forms of control that subjugate workers by overtly or covertly restraining their personal freedoms (Skinner and Spira, 2003; Walgenbach, 2001). Observations like these have given rise to a rather new branch of research that analyses the dark side of trust. This work specifies how trust can lead to unwanted (moral) obligations that force employees to think and act against their own interests and values (Skinner, Dietz, and Weibel, 2014).
An essential factor in control-trust dynamics is that controllees (those being controlled) cede at least some of their capacity for self-determination to their controllers (those trying to control) who specify their objectives, evaluate their performance, and provide them with both resources and remuneration in exchange for their work. This basic dynamic has been identified in relation ships at various levels of analysis (i.e. in superior-subordinate, peer, or interorganizational relation ships (IORs)). As controllees in these conditions feel more vulnerable to and dependent on their controllers, they are motivated to actively assess their controllers’ motivations and intentions towards them (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan 2004). These assessments manifest in attributional processes that controllees use to evaluate if and how they can trust their controllers to promote their values and interests if they comply with the controls that are being used to direct them in their work.
The fundamental tension between control and trust that these relationships describe has given rise to one of the most enduring questions in the trust literature: whether control and trust are substitutes or complements (Costa and Biljsma-Frankema, 2007; McEvily et al. 2003; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Weibel, Wildhaber et al., 2016). It is important to note that researchers who examine the ‘nexus’ of control and trust (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005) have used the complementarity/substitution question to motivate two related but distinct streams of research. The first stream examines relationships between control and trust mechanisms to assess whether these factors are synergistically (i.e. are complements) or antithetically (i.e. are substitutes) related in the actions of controllers and the perceptions of controllees (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Sitkin, 1995) The second stream examines whether control and trust independently (i.e. are substitutes) or jointly (i.e. are complements) affect key performance outcomes (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007; Ferrin, Bligh, and Kohles, 2007). Each of these streams is discussed separately below.
Research to date on relationships between control and trust has primarily modelled if and how managers’ control applications influence various forms of trust. One theoretical maxim guiding much of this research is that when managers apply formal controls they discourage subordinate trust (Das and Teng 1998, 2001; Fox, 1974; Shapiro, 1987; Sitkin and Roth 2004). Scholars who examine both interpersonal and interorganizational relationships suggest that by prescribing and closely monitoring subordinates’ goals or behaviours, managers who apply more formal controls (i.e. usually output or process controls) express distrust in their subordinates’ reliability or competence. This leads subordinates to exhibit less confidence in managers who appear to be challenging their desires for autonomy, threatening their self-determination, and exhibiting an unwillingness to protect their personal or professional interests (Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005; Christ, Sedatole, Towry, and Thomas, 2008; Das and Teng 1998, 2001; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Jagd, 2010; Kruglanski, 1970).
While this relationship appears robust, other researchers highlight how the negative association between formal controls and trust looks different when the details of these relationships are closely examined. For example, Sitkin (1995) emphasizes that formal controls can foster trust when they reduce perceived levels of risk and uncertainty, or prevent authorities from encroaching on their personal freedoms. Consistent with this, Emsley and Kidon (2004) and Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) both observe that while formal controls tend to compromise goodwill trust, managers who astutely apply formal controls to codify key coordination mechanisms can help to foster competence trust between exchange partners. Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) and Lumineau (2015) suggest that this may be particularly important early in relationships where formal controls can help exchange partners coordinate their activities to foster knowledge-based or more calculative forms of trust and cooperation. Finally, McKnight and colleagues (1998) argue that formal control allows trusting relationships to grow even in difficult situations when those controls are perceived as important institutional safeguards.
Research within this stream also suggests that informal controls (e.g. social controls) encourage individuals to forge more positive, trusting relationships that foster mutually acceptable goals, norms and values. This is because individuals who encounter informal controls feel subjected to lower levels of explicit monitoring and, as a result, feel less scrutinized, more autonomous and more respected by authorities (Christ et al. 2008). In addition, because they see authorities affirming their values and protecting their sense of self-determination, these individuals have high confidence that their interests will be protected (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Das and Teng 2001; Inkpen and Currall 2004; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002).
It is important to note that descriptions of dynamics related to informal controls often describe how these forms of control emerge as asset specificity, uncertainty and interdependence render more formal mechanisms of control, obsolete, unnecessary or counterproductive (Bijlsma and Costa, 2005). In these situations, informal controls help facilitate useful exchanges between partners who develop common sets of norms and values that can encourage the development of mutual relational, identification-based, or goodwill trust (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Emsley & Kidon, 2004; Şengün & Wasti, 2007).
As research on relationships between forms (i.e. formal or informal) of controls and trust continues, a growing amount of scholarly work is examining how subordinate trust is affected by the ways managers apply controls (Christ, 2013; Christ, Sedatole, & Towry, 2012). Colletti and colleagues (2005), for example, suggest that controls stimulate trust when they are implemented in ways that attenuate employees’ relational risk perceptions and highlight the benefits of superior– subordinate cooperation. This can happen when managers apply controls in ways that affirm their subordinates’ interests for self-determination, communicate that they share their values, care about them and want to foster positive relationships with them (Chenhall, Hall, & Smith, 2010; Christ, 2013; Christ et al., 2012; Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooristra, 2009).
Whitener and colleagues’ (1998) work on managerial trustworthiness suggests that when managers apply controls in ways that are considerate of their needs, are consistent and effectively foster collaboration, they increase employee perceptions of trust (see also Dineen, Lewicki, & Tomlinson, 2007). Weibel (2007) argues that this happens when managers recognize their employees’ desires for self-determination by including them in the development and implementation of controls, by increasing their knowledge and expertise through training and feedback, and by helping them understand the importance of their work (Burke, Sims, Lazzara, & Salas, 2007; Connell, Ferres, & Travaglione, 2003; Dineen, Lewicki, & Tomlinson, 2006).
Several authors emphasize the importance of transparency and fairness in fostering trust through control (Aryee, Budhwar, & Chen, 2002; De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Whitener, 2001). Weibel and colleagues (2015), for example, demonstrate how controls elicit trust when they are applied fairly and consistently and that controls that are applied inconsistently or in opaque ways elicit subordinate distrust. Searle, et al. (2011), Korsgaard and colleagues (1995), and Bijlsma-Frankema and van de Bunt (2003) emphasize procedural fairness in observing how trust can be fostered through high involvement work practices that afford employees decision and process control. Lastly, Hartmann and Slapnicar (2009) and Mislin, Compagna and Bottom (2011) highlight the importance of interactional justice in control applications by outlining how managers should provide employees with relevant and timely performance feedback through formal and informal interpersonal interactions.
An alternative perspective on the complementarity/substitution debate seeks to understand the joint impact of control and trust on key performance outcomes. Arguably, the most vibrant research in this area has examined IORs and has largely determined that issues of asset specificity, difficulties in measuring performance and uncertainties about a variety of exchange contingencies increase both the complexity of contracts and the use of relational governance mechanisms (i.e. informal controls and trust) (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Woolthius, HIllebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005; Zhou, Poppo, & Yang, 2008; Chapter 13 by Poppo & Zheng, this volume). Cao and Lumineau’s (2015) review and meta-analysis of contracting in interorganizational relation ships finds support for a complementary relationship between formal controls, informal controls, trust and performance. Specifically, they observe that these factors together reduce opportunism between exchange partners while increasing their partners’ perceptions of performance and relational satisfaction.
It is important to note, however, that while supporting the idea that formal and informal control produce complementary effects on performance, research also suggests that if char acteristics of exchanges (e.g. one-sided contracts) lead individuals to engage in self-interested behaviour, relational contracts become less effective (Poppo et al., 2008; Woolthius, et al., 2005). These concerns can, however, attenuate, and returns to trust through relational ties can increase if partners view their mutual relationship as strategically important or if asset specificity and low levels of uncertainty lead exchange partners to maintain both a positive track record as well as a desire to foster cooperation and continuity (Emsley & Kidon, 2004; Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007).
Individual studies continue to provide evidence that it is important to understand the exact nature of control and trust dynamics in IORs because they substantially influence the effects that are generated. Lui and Ngo (2004), for example, suggest that in non-equity alliances, competence trust and contractual safeguards produce complementary effects on project satisfaction and completion time while goodwill trust and contractual safeguards (formal controls) act as substitutes and produce independent and equivalent effects on these outcomes. Velez and colleagues (2008) observe, however, that when formal controls are used to coordinate actions between exchange partners, cooperation and the potential to foster both competence and goodwill trust over time increases (Cao & Lumineau, 2015).
Research on relationships between control, trust and performance within organizations has also afforded researchers with a close-up, more micro-level view of factors influencing partner cooperation and performance. Ferrin, Bligh and Kohles’ (2007) review highlights how monitoring and the extent to which one feels that one is trusted generates equivocal levels of cooperation. However, when partners apply controls in ways that are perceived as trustworthy, partners are more willing to cooperate with and commit to each other (Dirks, 1999; Ferrin et al., 2007; Neves & Caetano, 2006; Tyler, 2003).
A growing amount of research is now examining how control, trust and performance are influenced by a variety of contextual factors. In a recent paper, Mishra and Mishra (2013) use a case study to examine how particular actions do or do not foster interpersonal or institutional trust depending on the context within which they are enacted. Their findings align with other scholars who argue that the context surrounding organizations will significantly influence how control and trust manifest and influence key outcomes (Bijlsma-Frankema, Sitkin, & Weibel, 2015; Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995; Mishra & Mishra, 2013; Sitkin, 1995).
For example, over the span of the last 20 years, researchers have identified relationship length as an important contextual factor influencing control and trust dynamics (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997). O’Leary and colleagues (2002) undertake one of the most ambitious investigations of this factor in their case study of the Hudson Bay Company where they examine how this organization grew their use of informal control mechanisms over a 150-year period to establish effective levels of control and trust over the operations of a global organization. Fryxell et al. (2002) observed a similar trajectory with modern international joint ventures (IJVs) where organizations rely more on formal controls early before increasing their reliance on social control mechanisms as goodwill trust between exchange partners increase. Regarding these relationships, both Vlaar et al. (2007) and Cao and Lumineau (2015) highlight the path dependence of control-trust dynamics by accounting how levels of trust or distrust that occur early in the development of IORs influence the attributions that managers make about their exchange partners as relationships evolve and develop.
Research also highlights how various cultural and geo-political factors influence conceptualizations of control and trust manifest within and across organizations (Bachmann, 2001; Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Mizrachi, et al., 2007; Reed, 2001; Roberts, 2001). For example, Rus and Iglic (2005) show how Slovenian entrepreneurs base business agreements on trust because they trust the institutions that govern their economic activities; while, Bosnian entrepreneurs who do not trust their governing institutions do more business through formal contracts. Alternatively, Grey and Garsten (2001) describe how the uncertainty and institutional complexity surrounding modern organizations have increased the importance of using trust to manage employees while Pearce and colleagues (2000) argue that the universalistic control practices adopted by modern organizations have led to greater levels of employee trust and organizational commitment (Bijlsma & Costa, 2005).
What becomes clear from examining research on control-trust dynamics is that while scholars have identified some of the basic parameters of these relationships, many important questions remain to be investigated in this topical area. Emsley and Kidon (2007: 829), for example, suggest that ‘we are, however, a long way from understanding how trust and control coexist, and many basic issues remain unresolved.’ Several noted organizational scholars have made similar statements over the past two decades (Bachmann, 2001; Coletti, et al., 2005; Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005, 2010; Das & Teng, 1998; 2001; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Weibel, 2007).
The following section presents ways to address these issues by outlining an agenda for future research and highlighting a variety of topics that require further study. Notably, Grabner and Moers recently (2013) expressed concerns that organizational research evaluating control and trust as complements or substitutes is seriously deficient because trust researchers have largely ignored evaluating how managers (trustees) think and act to encourage others to trust them (Long & Sitkin, 2006; Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). As a result, scholars cannot currently explain how managers attempt to effectively balance and integrate their control and trust-building activities in ways that accurately describe subordinate reactions to the intentions and behaviours that managers actually exhibit (Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Long, 2010; Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009).
This acknowledgement should lead scholars to more directly examine how managers concurrently apply controls and take actions that are designed to foster subordinate trust (Chenhall, Hall, & Smith, 2013; Long, 2010; 2015; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Sitkin & George, 2005). Grabner and Moers (2013) encourage scholars to examine whether and how these activities constitute sets of ‘internally consistent’ control practices that managers use concurrently to motivate the achievement of a variety of performance objectives (Grabner & Moers, 2013; Merchant, Van der Stede, & Zheng, 2003; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Future research could, for example, examine both the composition of managers’ trust-building activities as well as how and why they manifest within various organizational environments. In addition, scholars could more actively examine how performance concerns stimulate managers to use control and trust-building initiatives independently and jointly to encourage their subordinates to work with them and accomplish key strategic and operational goals (Long & Sitkin, 2006; Long, 2010; Sitkin & George, 2005; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998).
A key issue that should be addressed by this research is how a manager’s trust in their subordinates influences their control decisions. Several authors have highlighted the importance of this issue and provided initial ideas about these relationships. For example, Woolthius and colleagues’ (2005) four-company qualitative study demonstrates how evaluations of trust between exchange partners in IORs often preceded the development of formal contracts. Gulati and Nickerson (2008) outline how these choices influence both the relationships between control and trust activities and the levels of performance that were achieved through formal and relational contracts. While other scholars have also observed similar phenomena of perceived trust influencing control decisions (Langfred, 2004; McAllister, 1995; Pearce, et al., 2002), what may be needed now is to develop a more fine-grained understanding of how managers’ perceptions of specific forms of trust and distrust influence their control-based actions and how those actions together influence subordinate cooperation, managerial legitimacy and organizational performance. Here the emerging literature on implicit followership theories could enlighten the control-trust research nexus by providing the means to map the general attitude of leaders towards their followers. Mapping these attitudes may show how managers classify certain employees as trustworthy – ‘prototypical’ and others as non-trustworthy – ‘anti-prototypical’ with the former perception leading to more positive control-trust dynamics (Sy, 2010).
Future research should also more closely examine the content and implications of trustors’ control perceptions as previous research has highlighted that this concern is important and significantly affects their subsequent actions (Ouchi, 1978). For example, Christ, Sedatole and Towry (2012) argue that how agents frame work contracts impacts their perceptions of how much trust principals have in them. Ferrin and Dirks (2003) show why this is important by demonstrating how whether subordinates perceive themselves to be in a competitive or a cooperative environment influences their subsequent motivations and perceptions.
To address this issue, control-trust scholars may draw on the extensive research examining perceived control in the psychological literature which examines the cognitive, emotional and motivational implications of individuals’ perceptions that they possess agency and maintain discretion over aspects of their environments (Bandura, 1977, 1982; Skinner, 1996; Thompson, 1981). While not generally utilized to examine subordinate perceptions in control-trust research, it has been applied in other contexts to predict the extent to which individuals adhere to norms, engage in impression management behaviours, as well as exhibit job satisfaction, work motivation and organizational commitment (Burger, 1987, 1989; Lee Ashford & Bobko, 1990).
A close look at issues related to perceived control could potentially assist scholars in understanding how subordinates formulate their perceptions of personal control through observations both of the controls their managers apply and the ways their managers demonstrate (i.e. or do not demonstrate) that they are trustworthy in applying those controls (Chapter 14 by Tomlinson, this volume). Alternatively, personal control theory could be used to evaluate managers’ reactions to factors in their operational environments. For example, perceptions of personal control may be found to be strong predictors of managers’ subsequent control and trust-building activities. Investigations that are directed in this way can begin to illuminate key issues surrounding why and how managers take actions to assert greater levels of control, significantly increase subordinate trust, combine certain control and trust-building activities, as well as foster the achievement of other performance goals.
Another way to further our understanding on how control, trust and possibly performance relate is to analyse new, and much more pervasive forms of controls. Of particular interest is the effect of electronic and growingly big-data-based formal controls on employee trust and performance. These types of controls differ from traditional controls in important ways as they can invade privacy through mechanisms that allow low-cost on-and-off-the-job tracking of employee behaviour (Ball, 2010). Alternatively, big-data-based controls can also be used to predict and govern future behaviour and performance through fraud-predicting computer programs that prominent financial institutions use to forecast the emergence of ‘rogue traders’ (Son, 2015).
Increasingly, these programs that rely on elaborate algorithms to generate and monitor standards against goals are challenging human managers as controllers (Hongo, 2015).
These controls challenge trust research in a number of ways that highlight the need for new referents of trust to be included in our research. Here, it is becoming increasingly important to understand whether the ways that these controls are selected and implemented influence trust and performance in organizations. For instance, the effectiveness of increasingly popular electronic controls might depend on the extent to which algorithms, machines and organizations are trusted by those being monitored. Complexity researchers argue that highly refined technological systems may be prone to more and more dramatic breakdowns that impact how big-data-based controls impact performance and overall trust perceptions (Perrow, 2011). Specifically, because the reliability and overall performance of these systems relies on the willingness of authorities to prevent, identify and remediate possible breakdowns, researchers need to recognize that employees in these highly controlled environments are impacted by the extent to which they trust the parameters of the systems of which they are a part. (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2008).
Previous research suggests that configurations of control mechanisms and systems are dynamic in that they affect and are affected by factors within organizational environments (Cardinal et al., 2004). Observations presented in previous research provide clear evidence that this dynamism extends to trust and trust-building activities and that researchers in this topical area should seek to understand how control-trust dynamics change and develop over time (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004; Vlaar, et al., 2007). Using a co-evolutionary perspective, scholars could begin to chart how a variety of factors surrounding managers both within and outside of their organizations directly influence the decisions that they make about how to manage through control and trust-building initiatives. These models could then show how the decisions that managers make about controlling and developing relationships with their employees influence and are influenced by relationships between managers and their environments (Lewin, Long, & Carroll, 1999).
Doing this effectively will require scholars to conduct much more finely tuned analyses of the key contextual factors surrounding managers, employees and their organizations. While research has begun to catalogue some broad institutionally based factors influencing control-trust dynamics (Cao & Lumineau, 2015), much more needs to be done in this area. Because the dynamics surrounding how control and trust manifest in organizations will vary with geopolitical conditions (Creed & Miles, 1996; Pearce et al., 2000; Rus & Iglič, 2005), scholars should take a close look at what those conditions are, how they are evaluated by managers and subordinates, how they influence individuals’ actions and perceptions, and how those responses evolve in dynamic environments.
Directed research in this area can help scholars begin to understand how managers determine the appropriate levels of control and trust in given work environments. This is important because managers do appear to carefully consider whether the actions they take are appropriate for a given organizational/institutional context and because managers are concerned with developing appropriate levels of trust (Chenhall, Hall, & Smith, 2013; Long, 2010, 2015; Long & Sitkin, 2006; Sitkin & George, 2005). Understanding how they do this effectively by navigating through complex and uncertain environments will help us understand what is needed to capitalize on opportunities to build cooperative relationships that can be empowerment-producing, personally enriching and value-enhancing (Wicks, Berman & Jones, 1999).
Adler, P. S. (2001). Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge economy and the future of capitalism. Organization Science, 12(2), 215–234.
Anderson, S. W., Christ, M. H., Dekker, H. C., & Sedatole, K. L. (2013). The use of management controls to mitigate risk in strategic alliances: Field and survey evidence. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26(1), 1–32.
Arvey, R. D. (1979). Unfair discrimination in the employment interview: Legal and psychological aspects. Psychological Bulletin, 86(4), 736.
Bachmann, R. (2001). Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations. Organization Studies, 22(2), 337–365.
Ball, K. (2010). Workplace surveillance: An overview. Labor History, 51(1), 87–106.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84(2), 191.
Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37(2), 122.
Bijlsma-Frankema, K., & Costa, A. C. (2005). Understanding the trust-control nexus. International Sociology, 20(3), 259–282.
Bijlsma-Frankema, K., Sitkin, S. B. & Weibel, A. (2015). Distrust in the balance: The emergence and development of intergroup distrust in a court of law. Organization Science, 26(4), 1018–1039.
Bijlsma, K. M., & Van De Bunt, G. G. (2003). Antecedents of trust in managers: a ‘bottom up’ approach. Personnel Review, 32(5), 638–664.
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. Transaction Publishers.
Bradach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural forms. Annual review of sociology, 97–118.
Cummings, L. L., & Bromiley, P. (1996). The organizational trust inventory (OTI). In Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research, (pp.302–330).
Burger, J. M. (1987). Increased performance with increased personal control: A self-presentation interpretation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23(4), 350–360.
Burger, J. M. (1989). Negative reactions to increases in perceived personal control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(2), 246.
Burke, C. S., Sims, D. E., Lazzara, E. H., & Salas, E. (2007). Trust in leadership: A multi-level review and integration. The Leadership Quarterly, 18(6), 606–632.
Butler, J. K. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust: Evolution of a conditions of trust inventory. Journal of Management, 17(3), 643–663.
Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015). Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Operations Management, 33, 15–42.
Cardinal, L. B., Sitkin, S. B., & Long, C. P. (2004). Balancing and rebalancing in the creation and evolution of organizational control. Organization Science, 15(4), 411–431.
Cardinal, L. B., Sitkin, S., & Long, C. (2010). A configurational theory of control. In Control in organizations: New directions in theory and research, edited by S. Sitkin, L. B. Cardinal and K. Bijilsma-Frankema. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (pp. 51–79).
Chenhall, R. H., Hall, M., & Smith, D. (2010). Social capital and management control systems: A study of a non-government organization. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35(8), 737–756.
Christ, M. H. (2013). An experimental investigation of the interactions among intentions, reciprocity, and control. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 25(1), 169–197.
Christ, M. H., Sedatole, K. L., & Towry, K. L. (2012). Sticks and carrots: The effect of contract frame on effort in incomplete contracts. The Accounting Review, 87(6), 1913–1938.
Christ, M. H., Sedatole, K. L., Towry, K. L., & Thomas, M. A. (2008). When formal controls undermine trust and cooperation. Strategic Finance, 89(7), 39.
Coletti, A. L., Sedatole, K. L., & Towry, K. L. (2005). The effect of control systems on trust and cooperation in collaborative environments. The Accounting Review, 80(2), 477–500.
Connell, J., Ferres, N., & Travaglione, T. (2003). Engendering trust in manager-subordinate relationships: Predictors and outcomes. Personnel Review, 32(5), 569–587.
Cook, J., & Wall, T. (1980). New work attitude measures of trust, organizational commitment and personal need non-fulfilment. Journal of occupational psychology, 53(1), 39–52.
Costa, A. C., & Bijlsma-Frankema, K. (2007). Trust and control interrelations new perspectives on the trust—control nexus. Group & Organization Management, 32(4), 392–406.
Creed, W. D., Miles, R. E. (1996). Trust in organizations. In Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research, edited by R. Kramer and T. Tyler. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (pp. 16–38).
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (1998). Between trust and control: Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 491–512.
Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (2001). Trust, control, and risk in strategic alliances: An integrated framework. Organization Studies, 22(2), 251–283.
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2007). The effects of trust in authority and procedural fairness on cooperation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(3), 639.
Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 27–49.
Dineen, B. R., Lewicki, R. J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2006). Supervisory guidance and behavioral integrity: relationships with employee citizenship and deviant behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(3), 622.
Dirks, K. T. (1999). The effects of interpersonal trust on work group performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(3), 445.
Dirks, K. T., & Ferrin, D. L. (2002). Trust in leadership: meta-analytic findings and implications for research and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 611.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.
Emsley, D., & Kidon, F. (2007). The relationship between trust and control in international joint ventures: Evidence from the airline industry. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(3), 829–858.
Falk, A., & Kosfeld, M. (2006). The hidden costs of control. The American Economic Review, 96(5), 1611–1630.
Fayol, H. (1949). General and industrial administration. New York: Pitman.
Ferrin, D. L., Bligh, M. C., & Kohles, J. C. (2007). Can I trust you to trust me? A theory of trust, monitoring, and cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup relationships. Group & Organization Management, 32(4), 465–499.
Ferrin, D. L., & Dirks, K. T. (2003). The use of rewards to increase and decrease trust: Mediating processes and differential effects. Organization Science, 14(1), 18–31.
Fryxell, G. E., Dooley, R. S., & Vryza, M. (2002). After the ink dries: The interaction of trust and control in US-based international joint ventures. Journal of Management Studies, 39(6), 865–886.
Fox, A. (1974). Beyond contract: Work power and trust relations. London: Faber.
Fulmer, C. A., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012). At what level (and in whom) we trust. Journal of Management, 38, 1167–1230.
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13–47.
Giddens, A. (1990). Structuration theory and sociological analysis. In Anthony Giddens: consensus and controversy, edited by J. Clark, C. Modgil and S. Modgil. London, New York, Philadelpia, PA: The Falmer Press (pp. 297–315).
Grabner, I., & Moers, F. (2013). Management control as a system or a package? Conceptual and empirical issues. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38(6), 407–419.
Grey, C., & Garsten, C. (2001). Trust, control and post-bureaucracy. Organization Studies, 22(2), 229–250.
Gulati, R., & Nickerson, J. A. (2008). Interorganizational trust, governance choice, and exchange performance. Organization Science, 19(5), 688–708.
Hartmann, F., & Slapničar, S. (2009). How formal performance evaluation affects trust between superior and subordinate managers. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(6), 722–737.
Hongo, J. (2015). Who’s the boss? Hitachi looks to promote artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/09/08/whos-the-boss-hitachi-looks-to-promote-artificial-intelligence/
Inkpen, A. C., & Currall, S. C. (2004). The coevolution of trust, control, and learning in joint ventures. Organization Science, 15(5), 586–599.
Jagd, S. (2010). Balancing Trust and Control. Society and Business Review, 5(3), 259–269.
Jermier, J. M. (1998). Introduction: critical perspective on organizational control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(2), 235–256.
Kirsch, L. J. (2004). Deploying common systems globally: The dynamics of control. Information Systems Research, 15(4), 374–395.
Korsgaard, M. A., Schweiger, D. M., & Sapienza, H. J. (1995). Building commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 60–84.
Kruglanski, A. W. (1970). Attributing trustworthiness in supervisor-worker relations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6(2), 214–232.
Langfield-Smith, K., & Smith, D. (2003). Management control systems and trust in outsourcing relationships. Management Accounting Research, 14(3), 281–307.
Langfred, C. W. (2004). Too much of a good thing? Negative effects of high trust and individual autonomy in self-managing teams. Academy of Management Journal, 47(3), 385–399.
Lebas, M., & Weigenstein, J. (1986). Management control: The role of rules, market and culture. Journal of Management Studies, 23(3), 259–272.
Lee, C., Ashford, S. J., & Bobko, P. (1990). Interactive effects of ‘Type A’ behavior and perceived control on worker performance, job satisfaction, and somatic complaints. Academy of Management Journal, 33(4), 870–881.
Leifer, R., & Mills, P. K. (1996). An information processing approach for deciding upon control strategies and reducing control loss in emerging organizations. Journal of Management, 22(1), 113–137.
Lewin, A. Y., Long, C. P., & Carroll, T. N. (1999). The coevolution of new organizational forms. Organization Science, 10(5), 535–550.
Lui, S. S., & Ngo, H. Y. (2004). The role of trust and contractual safeguards on cooperation in nonequity alliances. Journal of Management, 30(4), 471–485.
Long, C. P. (2010). Control to cooperation: Examining the role of managerial authority in portfolios of managerial action. Organizational Control, 365–395.
Long, C. P. (2015). How managers direct subordinates through applications of controls and demonstrations of their trustworthiness. Journal of Applied Business Research, 31(5), 1645–1666.
Long, C. P., Burton, R. M., & Cardinal, L. B. (2002). Three controls are better than one: a computational model of complex control systems. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory, 8(3), 197–220.
Long, C. P., & Sitkin, S. B. (2006). Trust in the balance: How managers integrate trust-building and task control. Handbook of trust research, edited by R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar (pp. 87–106).
Malhotra, D., & Lumineau, F. (2011). Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: The effects of contract structure. Academy of Management Journal, 54(5), 981–998.
Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2002). The effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(3), 534–559.
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84(1), 123.
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–734.
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 24–59.
McEvily, B., Perrone, V., & Zaheer, A. (2003). Trust as an organizing principle. Organization Science, 14(1), 91–103.
McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust formation in new organizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 473–490.
Mellewigt, T., Madhok, A., & Weibel, A. (2007). Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships: Substitutes and complements. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(8), 833–847.
Merchant, K. A. (1985). Control in business organization. New York: Prentice Hall.
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2007). Management control systems: performance measurement, evaluation and incentives. Pearson Education.
Merchant, K. A., Van der Stede, W. A., & Zheng, L. (2003). Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational incentive systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28(2), 251–286.
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the research. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Mishra, A. K., & Mishra, K. E. (2013). The research on trust in leadership: The need for context. Journal of Trust Research, 3(1), 59–69.
Mislin, A. A., Campagna, R. L., & Bottom, W. P. (2011). After the deal: Talk, trust building and the implementation of negotiated agreements. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(1), 55–68.
Mizrachi, N., Drori, I., & Anspach, R. R. (2007). Repertoires of trust: The practice of trust in a multinational organization amid political conflict. American Sociological Review, 72(1), 143–165.
Möllering, G. (2005). The trust/control duality an integrative perspective on positive expectations of others. International Sociology, 20(3), 283–305.
Nooteboom, B. (1996). Trust, opportunism and governance: A process and control model. Organization Studies, 17(6), 985–1010.
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., & Noorderhaven, N. G. (1997). Effects of trust and governance on relational risk. Academy of Management Journal, 40(2), 308–338.
O’Leary, M., Orlikowski, W., & Yates, J. (2002). Distributed work over the centuries: Trust and control in the Hudson’s Bay Company, 1670–1826. In Distributed Work, edited by S. Kiesler nd P. Hinds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (pp. 27–54).
Ouchi, W. G. (1977). The relationship between organizational structure and organizational control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 95–113.
Ouchi, W. G. (1978). The transmission of control through organizational hierarchy. Academy of Management Journal, 21(2), 173–192.
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms. In Readings in accounting for management control, edited by C. Emmanuel, D. Otley and K. Merchant. Boston, MA: Springer (pp. 63–82).
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(1), 129–141.
Pearce, J. L., Branyiczki, I., & Bigley, G. A. (2000). Insufficient bureaucracy: Trust and commitment in particularistic organizations. Organization Science, 11(2), 148–162.
Pennings, J. M., & Woiceshyn, J. (1987). A typology of organizational control and its metaphors. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 5, 75–104.
Perrow, C. (2011). Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707–725.
Reed, M. I. (2001). Organization, trust and control: a realist analysis. Organization Studies, 22(2), 201–228.
Roberts, J. (2001). Trust and control in Anglo-American systems of corporate governance: The individualizing and socializing effects of processes of accountability. Human Relations, 54(12), 1547–1572.
Ross, A. (1994). Trust as a moderator of the effect of performance evaluation style on job-related tension: A research note. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(7), 629–635.
Roth, N. L., Sitkin, S. B., & House, A. (1994). Stigma as a determinant of legalization. The legalistic organization, edited by S. B. Sitkin and R. J. Bies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (pp. 137–168).
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A crossdiscipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393–404.
Rus, A., & Iglič, H. (2005). Trust, governance and performance the role of institutional and interpersonal trust in SME development. International Sociology, 20(3), 371–391.
Sako, M. (1992). Price, quality and trust: Inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan (No. 18). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, R., Den Hartog, D. N., Weibel, A., Gillespie, N., Six, F., Hatzakis, T., & Skinner, D. (2011). Trust in the employer: The role of high-involvement work practices and procedural justice in European organizations. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 22(5), 1069–1092.
Şengün, A. E., & Wasti, S. N. (2007). Trust, control, and risk a test of Das and Teng’s conceptual framework for pharmaceutical buyer-supplier relationships. Group & Organization Management, 32(4), 430–464.
Shapiro, S. P. (1987). The social control of impersonal trust. American Journal of Sociology, 623–658.
Skinner, D., & Spira, L. F. (2003). Trust and control-a symbiotic relationship? Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 3(4), 28–35.
Sitkin, S. B., & Bies, R. J. (1994). The legalistic organization. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sitkin, S. B., & George, E. (2005). Managerial trust-building through the use of legitimating formal and informal control mechanisms. International Sociology, 20(3), 307–338.
Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic ‘remedies’ for trust/distrust. Organization Science, 4(3), 367–392.
Skinner, E. A. (1996). A guide to constructs of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(3), 549.
Skinner, D., Dietz, G., & Weibel, A. (2014). The dark side of trust: When trust becomes a poisoned chalice. Organization, 21, 206–224.
Snell, S. A. (1992). Control theory in strategic human resource management: The mediating effect of administrative information. Academy of Management Journal, 35(2), 292–327.
Son, H. (2015). JPMorgan algorithm knows you’re a rogue employee before you do. Retrieved from http://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–04–08/jpmorgan-algorithmknows-you-re-a-rogue-employee-before-you-do
Spreitzer, G. M., & Mishra, A. K. (1999). Giving up control without losing control trust and its substitutes’ effects on managers’ involving employees in decision making. Group & Organization Management, 24(2), 155–187.
Sy, T. (2010). What do you think of followers? Examining the content, structure, and consequences of implicit followership theories. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 113(2), 73–84.
Sydow, J., Windeler, A. (2003). Knowledge, trust, and control: Managing tensions and contradictions in a regional network of service firms. International Studies of Management & Organization, 33(2), 69–100.
Thompson, S. C. (1981). Will it hurt less if i can control it? A complex answer to a simple question. Psychological Bulletin, 90(1), 89.
Tomkins, C. (2001). Interdependencies, trust and information in relationships, alliances and networks. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26(2), 161–191.
Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 115–191.
Van Maanen, J., & Schein, E. H. (1979). Toward a theory of organizational socialization. Research in Organizational Behavior, 1, 209–264.
Vélez, M. L., Sánchez, J. M., & Álvarez-Dardet, C. (2008). Management control systems as inter-organizational trust builders in evolving relationships: Evidence from a longitudinal case study. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7), 968–994.
Vlaar, P. W., Van den Bosch, F. A., & Volberda, H. W. (2007). On the evolution of trust, distrust, and formal coordination and control in interorganizational relationships toward an integrative framework. Group & Organization Management, 32(4), 407–428.
Vosselman, E., & van der Meer-Kooistra, J. (2009). Accounting for control and trust building in interfirm transactional relationships. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(2), 267–283.
Walgenbach, P. (2001). The production of distrust by means of producing trust. Organization Studies, 22(4), 693–714.
Wanous, J. P. (1980). Organizational entry: Recruitment, selection and socialization of newcomers. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Weber, J. M., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2004). Normal acts of irrational trust: Motivated attributions and the trust development process. Research in Organizational Behavior, 26, 75–101.
Weibel, A. (2007). Formal control and trustworthiness shall the twain never meet? Group & Organization Management, 32(4), 500–517.
Weibel, A., Den Hartog, D. N., Gillespie, N., Searle, R., Six, F., & Skinner, D. (2016). How do controls impact employee trust in the employer? Human Resource Management, 55(3), 437–462.
Weibel, A. & Six, F. (2013). Trust and control: the role of intrinsic motivation. Handbook of advances in trust, edited by R. Bachmann and A. Zaheer. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar (pp. 57–81).
Weibel, A., Busch, T., Leicht-Deobald, U., Schank, C., & Wildhaber, I. (2016). ‘Big Brother’ in Swiss companies? Trust, data and personal privacy of employees. Grant proposal (and granted) for National Research Programme 75 ‘Big Data’. Berne, Switzerland: Swiss National Science Foundation.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2008). Organizing for high reliability: Processes of collective mindfulness. Crisis Management, 3(1), 81–123.
Whitener, E. M. (2001). Do ‘high commitment’ human resource practices affect employee commitment? A cross-level analysis using hierarchical linear modeling. Journal of Management, 27(5), 515–535.
Whitener, E. M., Brodt, S. E., Korsgaard, M. A., & Werner, J. M. (1998). Managers as initiators of trust: An exchange relationship framework for understanding managerial trustworthy behavior. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 513–530.
Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent capitalisms: The social structuring and change of business systems. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
Woolthuis, R. K., Hillebrand, B., & Nooteboom, B. (2005). Trust, contract and relationship development. Organization Studies, 26(6), 813–840.
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science, 9(2), 141–159.
Zhou, K. Z., Poppo, L., & Yang, Z. (2008). Relational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in China. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(3), 526–534.