Trust has long been recognized as having important societal effects (Fox, 1974; Lewis & Weigert, 1985, Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Zucker, 1986). Over the years, organizational scholars have studied trust at the interpersonal, organizational, and interorganizational levels (for reviews see Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). For trust researchers, core definitions, constructs, variables, and operationalizations have begun to converge.
In contrast, distrust research has been much slower to emerge, especially as a distinct area of study (Kramer, 1999; Rousseau, et al., 1998). Yet work on distrust has grown steadily and has more recently shown a dramatic increase in attention (for recent overviews, see Bijlsma-Frankema, Sitkin, & Weibel, 2015; Guo, Lumineau, & Lewicki, 2016; Saunders, Dietz, & Thornhill, 2014). In this chapter, we provide an overview of the ways in which distrust has been conceptualized and studied – both as a subset of trust and as a distinct phenomenon.
Distrust is generally defined in terms of negative expectations towards people’s intentions or behaviours (Van de Walle & Six, 2014). A well-known distrust description is offered by Lewicki and Tomlinson (2003: 5) when they characterize distrust (as contrasted with trust) in this way: “low trust signals low confidence in things hoped for, whereas distrust signals a sense of assurance regarding things feared.” Lewicki and his colleagues have used this framing to offer a widely used definition (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998: 439; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006): “Confident negative expectations and perception about the intentions and beliefs of another.” More recently Bijlsma-Frankema and her colleagues (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al, 2015; Bijlsma-Frankema, Wisse, Täuber, Sitkin, Sanders, & van de Brake, 2016) have built upon the widely cited Rousseau, et al. (1998) definition of trust to distinguish distrust as “A psychological state, comprising the unwillingness to accept vulnerability, based on pervasive negative perceptions and expectations of … motives, intentions, or behaviours.”
Distrust has been conceptualized in the literature as equivalent to low trust and, alternatively, as distinct from trust. Within the distrust-as-distinct camp, there have been two fundamentally different ways of theorizing about that distinction: distrust as a precluding precondition for trust, and distrust as orthogonal to trust.
Trust researchers for many years largely ignored distrust as a serious construct. Despite some early qualitative and quantitative studies of distrust (e.g., Constantinople, 1969; Fox, 1974; Wrightsman, 1974), nearly all trust research until quite recently simply did not call out distrust as meriting special consideration. As a result, terms like distrust, mistrust, and low trust were not distinguished in any systematic way. To the contrary, the terms distrust or mistrust were used interchangeably with references to low trust. More specifically, when it did explicitly reference distrust, this research typically conceptualized distrust as equivalent to very low trust or the absence of trust (Hardin 2004; Luhmann, 1979; Mayer, et al., 1995; Robinson, 1996; Rotter, 1980). Thus, distrust essentially was conceptualized as anchoring the low end of a single continuum and thus did not merit separate consideration (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007).
To some extent, this approach has been reflected in more recent work on trust repair (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; see also Bies, Tripp, Barclay, Kay, & Francisca Saldanha, this volume, on forgiveness). Trust repair studies (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, et al., 2009) have focused on repairing problematic trust situations, where actions that increase expectations of trustworthiness in one domain can enhance trust in other domains and the ability to address other problems (e.g., Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). As we will note, this approach does not fully reflect the distinct literatures.
In the early 1990s, distrust began to be conceptualized as distinct from trust (e.g., Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996); in terms of determinants, effects, and process models. As a result, a distinct cluster of research has emerged focusing on distrust.
Empirical research, including measurement construction and validation studies (Clark & Payne, 1997; Constantinople, 1969; Wrightsman, 1974), has supported differentiating trust and distrust as two distinct constructs. Specific contexts and methods in which the distinction has been found are as diverse as quantitative studies of electronic commerce customers (Benamati, Serva, & Fuller, 2006; Chang & Fang, 2013; Cho, 2006; Komiak & Benbasat, 2008; Ou & Sia, 2010), qualitative studies of judicial employees (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015), and neuro-imaging research (showing that trust and distrust activate different areas of the brain) (Dimoka, 2010; Patent & Searle, 2012; Patent, 2014).
As noted above, there are two quite different conceptualizations of distrust as distinct or “mutually exclusive” (Bigley & Pearce, 1998: 414) from distrust. In the first, distrust was conceptualized as pervasive and, once evoked, obviating the possibility of trust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). In the second, trust and distrust are distinct but can co-exist such that both trust and distrust can be simultaneously high or low (Lewicki, et al., 1998). We will discuss each conceptualization below.
Building on Mayer, et al. (1995), most trust research has approached the relationship between trustworthiness and trust as linear, and most empirical studies (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin 2001, 2002) have found significant linear relations consistent with the distrust-as-low-trust conception. In addition, much of this work has viewed trust as domain specific (Mayer, et al., 1995) – where high trust in one domain, say financial acumen and advice, is unrelated to a willingness to trust in another domain, say how I might develop a better working relationship with my boss – and most empirical findings have been consistent with this view (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007) as well, indicating a lack of pervasiveness of trust (i.e., that it is unusual for trust to be equally strong across all domains).
In contrast with the domain-specificity reported in trust research, some have called for a different theoretical approach for distrust (Kramer, 1994, 1996; Mayer, et al., 1995; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Zand, 1972). From this perspective, distrust is theorized as a self-reinforcing cyclical process that pervades across domains (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Korsgaard, this volume; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). From this view, distrust is a negative psychological state regarding distrusted others, an all-encompassing negative lens through which distrusted others are perceived.
In this approach, distrust is conceptualized as involving a punctuated shift, a fundamental distinction from trust. Through this lens, once distrust has been evoked, the trustee shifts to a distrust frame such that it may be impossible to return to even considering a degree of trust (Robinson & Morrison, 2000; see also Bies, et al., this volume). Once a pervasive negative distrust lens is in place, it is argued, there are no domains of action that are distrust-free, thus blocking the capacity to gain a foothold to build trust in any domain so long as distrust remains present.
Once the distrust tipping point has been reached, there is a fundamental shift from loose to tight coupling among contextual conditions (domains, attributes, etc.). Under these conditions, a perceived violation in one domain negatively affects perceptions of other domains (Anderson & Pearson, 1999; Coleman, et al., 2007; Friedman & Currall, 2003; Perlow & Repenning, 2009), creating an integrated “lock-in” (Friedman & Currall, 2003) system with feedback loops that reinforce only the negative, and do not credit any effort at compensatory action (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Coleman et al., 2007). What this implies is that, once distrusted, every action is suspect and its motivation and value base questioned, no matter how well-intended it may be. In other words, once distrust is fully developed, otherwise highly trustworthy behaviour in one domain (e.g., financial advice) can have no implications for the level of trust in another domain (e.g., workplace politics). In other words, while trust and distrust have distinct antecedents, consequences, and processes, the pursuit of trust is not independent of the amelioration of distrust concerns. Unless distrust has been eliminated there is “no room for trust” because the presence of distrust leads the foundations of trustworthiness (shared values, integrity, benevolence, etc.) to be implicitly or explicitly undermined.
An alternative distrust theory proposed by Lewicki, et al., (1998) has been quite influential and posits a distinctive view of the trust/distrust relationship. Specifically, they posit that trust and distrust are not only distinct variables but are independent (orthogonal). They capture this idea in a 2x2 table in which they depict 4 cells (high/high, low/low, low/high, and high/low) to suggest that trust and distrust are independent and distinct, and thus can coexist. Their model is based on several key notions. First, that trust and distrust relations vary in the degree of interdependence between the parties. Second, that joint trust/distrust conditions are characterized as “highly segmented and bounded” (p. 445). Thus, this model of why distrust is distinct from trust is quite different in its assumptions (e.g., pervasiveness), key variables (e.g., value congruence), and basic conception of distrust (e.g., synoptic vs incremental) when compared with the “distrust as a precluding precondition” model. The orthogonal conception of distrust not only rejects (by definition) distrust as a precondition for trust, but also excludes, at least in the current model, pervasiveness as an essential feature of distrust (since pervasiveness would preclude the co-presence of trust). This has the advantage of facilitating the incorporation of ambivalence (e.g., when both trust and distrust are simultaneously present) and multiplex relationships (i.e., trust in some domains in a relationship and distrust in others). The key for our purpose is to recognize that while these two approaches share an important feature in conceptualizing trust and distrust as distinct, they are also fundamentally different in the other fundamental respects outlined here.
To review the models of distrust in the literature and how they have been studied, we will draw upon Mohr’s (1982) framework for characterizing basic theoretical models. Specifically, Mohr (1982) distinguished variance and process models as a useful way to understand what theories are being proposed and tested with respect to a given phenomenon.
In the case of distrust, variance models focus on how distrust varies across different determinants and effects.
Felt vulnerability is an antecedent common to both trust and distrust models. Two key and distinctive determinants of distrust have been identified in the literature: perceived value incongruence and negative attributions of motives (see Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015).
Perceived value incongruence has been defined as “the belief that others adhere to values that are perceived as incompatible with the actor’s core values” (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015: 1020). It signifies an interpersonal break based on a perceived incompatibility between the values of the trustor and the trustee. Sitkin and Roth (1993) proposed value incongruence as the signature and distinctive determinant of distrust, tainting trustor perceptions of the current and future motives and actions of the trustee (e.g., Martinko, Harvey, Sikora, & Douglas, 2011) a framing that has been studied and supported in qualitative and quantitative studies (e.g., Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2016; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996).
It has been theorized (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006) and observed (Chambers & Melnyk, 2006) that distrust is fostered by perceived value incongruence. Distrust arises as others come to be characterized as unpredictable and threatening, thus fostering a sense of uncertainty and vulnerability (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). As Tomlinson and Lewicki (2006, 222) note: “We expect that we have little in common with the other and that the other is a committed adversary who is out to harm us.” Under such conditions, these models suggest, distrust – the unwillingness to be vulnerable – arises.
The attribution of negative motives or incongruent values (Kelley, 1967; Tomlinson, this volume) can be a determinant of distrust when the motives or values in question are fundamental ones, and thus are pervasively relevant. In other words, when motives or values are seen as central to a person or organization’s motives, character, or worldview, they are likely to engender a distrust response (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).
Yet another approach to a variance model of distrust determinants is the contingency model proposed Lewicki, et al. (1998) in which trust and distrust are posited in a 2x2 table and later tested by Saunders, Dietz, and Thornhill (2014). In this frame, the key causal variables are degree of indifference, and level of positive versus negative prior experience. Saunders, et al. (2014) found mixed support with a small sample. So more robust and definitive direct tests of variables are still needed.
Variance models have also examined the effects of distrust, and one could argue that distrust has emerged as an important social phenomenon for researchers, in large part because of its significant negative consequences (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006). Studies have highlighted a wide range of severe distrust-related consequences for individuals, groups and organizations, such as problematic interpersonal (Chan, 2003; Cho, 2006), inter group (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Glynn, 2000; Kramer, 2004; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996) and organizational relations (Connelly, Miller, & Devers, 2012; Fox, 1974). More specific effects include avoidance of influence (Sheppard & Tuchinsky, 1996), avoidance of interaction (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; March & Olsen, 1975), lack of cooperation (Cho, 2006), conflict (Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Fiol, Pratt, & O’Connor, 2009; Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006), unwillingness to share views and preferences (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; March & Olsen, 1975), information distortion and disbelief (Kramer, 1994), stigmatization (Sitkin & Roth, 1993), paranoia (Kramer, 2004), and strong negative emotions, such as hostility toward distrusted others (Chambers & Melnyk, 2006).
Several interesting effects of distrust that have been examined over a number of decades of research and merit highlighting: seeking revenge for negative consequences, diminished cooperation, and reduction of negative consequences through shielding or avoidance (see Bies, et al., this volume). Revenge refers to negative reciprocity (Fox, 1974; Gouldner, 1960; Serva, et al., 2005), or “getting even” (McKnight & Choudhury, 2006; Tripp & Bies, 2010). Theories of both trust and distrust have recognized cooperation as a key consequence (Deutsch, 1971; Fox, 1974). The rationale for reduced willingness to cooperate as an effect of distrust is that it results from an accumulating and reciprocal diminished willingness to act fairly on the part of the other party as well as self-exhibited accumulating routines of uncooperative behaviour (see Lind, this volume). Avoidance is another documented effect of distrust (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; March & Olsen, 1975) and refers to attempts to reduce or prevent future harm (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Tripp & Bies, 2010; Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Deutsch, 1958; Lewicki, et al., 1998; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996). These studies consistently support the effect of distrust on avoidance behaviours.
Finally, affective responses to distrust have received attention, though much work is left to be done (see van Knippenberg, this volume). More specifically, trust and distrust have been depicted as engendering quite different emotional reactions (see Lewicki, et al., 1998 for a summary; see also van Knippenberg, this volume). Whereas low trust is portrayed as simply dampening positive feelings (such as feeling calm, secure, accepting, ambivalent, or confident) distrust is portrayed as engendering strong negative feelings of fear, betrayal, anxiety, wariness, even hostility, anger, or hate (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 1996, 2015; Kramer, 1996; Lewicki, et al., 1998; McKnight & Choudhury, 2006; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Tripp & Bies, 2010).
There is a long history of modeling distrust as a recursive, cyclical process sometimes referred to as “the spiral of distrust” (Fox, 1974; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Zand, 1972). Building on and extending this history, Bijlsma-Frankema and her colleagues (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2016) developed and tested several process models of distrust in which key variables serve as both determinants and effects of distrust. They posited and found evidence for specific process characteristics of previously hypothesized (but not previously empirically examined) self-amplifying cycles. In doing so, they built on, elaborated, and formalized previously published ideas about escalating cycles of distrust (Korsgaard, this volume; Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005) by examining self-amplifying cycles in which distrust intensifies and spreads across domains of the relationship. Central elements of their models include pervasiveness (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) and the intensification of negative perceptions and behaviours (e.g., Sherif, et al., 1961). Their depiction of the role of pervasive negative perceptions and expectations extended prior work by developing and testing a more precise and explicit conceptual description of how pervasiveness and self-amplification, the two commonly agreed-upon characteristics of distrust and its development (Cho, 2006; Dimoka, 2010; Fox, 1974; Kramer, 1994, 1996; Lewicki, et al., 1998; Sherif, et al., 1961; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Zand, 1972) manifest as steps in a distrust development process model. More specifically, they explored the cycle of negative reciprocity, amplifying attributions, and perceived value incongruence (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2016).
Drawing on commitment, learning conflict research (e.g., Meyer & Allen, 1991; Weick, 1995), Bijlsma-Frankema, et al.’s (2015) intergroup distrust process model was derived from a qualitative study of distrust development between judges and court administrators, high lighting the mutual reinforcing cycles of negative behaviours and perceptions which can result in distrust development and escalation (Becker & Geer, 1961; Blumer, 1969). In the Bijlsma-Frankema, et al. model of the distrust escalation process, negative perceptions foster negative behaviours, and once displayed these negative behaviours in turn foster matching negative perceptions and behaviours.
One interesting area of focus is the role of avoidance of interaction (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bies, et al., this volume; Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004; March & Olsen, 1975; Meyer & Allen, 1991), and negative attributions of motives and value incongruence (Chambers & Melnick, 2006; McKnight, Kacmar, and Choudhury, 2004; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006) as both determinants and effects of distrust. Overall, their model identifies four process “amplifying mechanisms”: pervasiveness, overmatching of negative behaviours, intensification of negative perceptions through negative reciprocity, and intensification of negative perceptions through within-group convergence (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2015).
In addition to tracing roots to early discussions of trust and distrust self-amplifying cycles (e.g. Fox, 1974), distrust researchers have proposed a punctuated threshold model of distrust (Roth, Sitkin, & House, 1994; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996) that goes beyond describing the variables or the processes involved in explaining the emergence and evolution of distrust and theorizes that the absence of distrust serves as a threshold that permits trust to be built. In other words, if distrust is present, factors that typically help to build trust will have no effect. But once distrust-related issues have been fully addressed, then trust-building processes can begin to engage. Thus, this punctuated threshold is not a matter of degree. Instead, it posits that on one side of the threshold the process works one way (distrust may strengthen but it remains pervasive and self-reinforcing), and on the other side of the threshold high and low trust can occur in pockets and can begin to accumulate both in depth and breadth.
Some recent empirical studies of this model by Bijlsma-Frankema and colleagues (2015, 2016) have drawn upon and elaborated these punctuated threshold models. More specifically, these studies have modelled distrust establishment and escalation from the conflict escalation/ intractability literature to propose a two-stage escalation model (Anderson & Pearson, 1999; Coleman, et al., 2007; Coyle-Shapiro & Diehl, this volume; Friedman & Currall, 2003; Perlow & Repenning, 2009) with a threshold switch from the first to the second stage. These models suggest that “low trust processes differ fundamentally from distrust processes and that the switch from low trust to distrust is punctuated” (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al., 2015) and that this trigger feature is the key that distinguishes this approach from conceptualizations of distrust as equivalent to low trust and also from orthogonal models of distrust. In these models, the mere presence of distrust obviates the possibility of trust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Bijlsma-Frankema, 2015), thus challenging the notion that trust and distrust, although distinct, can co-exist (Lewicki, et al., 1998; Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003).
Despite a long history of treating distrust as an isolated subset of trust that did not require independent consideration, there is an accumulating body of theoretical and empirical evidence that supports the notion of two distinct constructs, with distinct determinants, effects, and processes. These tests include measurement construction and validation studies (Clark & Payne, 1997; Constantinople, 1969; Wrightsman, 1974) and, more recently, advanced construct discrimination tests (Benamati, Serva, & Fuller, 2006; Chang & Fang, 2013; Cho, 2006; Komiak & Benbasat, 2008; Ou & Sia, 2010), including one study that used neuro-imaging to show that trust and distrust activate different brain areas (Dimoka, 2010). One might suggest in a prescriptive way that this should be considered a settled scientific issue, though such a suggestion would probably be descriptively inaccurate and thus will be left to future work to settle.
The issue of domain- and context-specificity versus pervasiveness remains an area about which a consensus has not yet been achieved. While the historical focus on trust as domain- and context-specific (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Mayer, et al., 1995) is not under dispute, the concomitant assumption of a lack of pervasiveness has been disputed with respect to distrust (Bijlsma-Frankema, 2015; Lewicki, et al., 1998; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996).
Four key opportunities arise with respect to future studies of the pervasiveness issue. First is the question of whether pervasiveness does in fact distinguish trust from distrust. While some results appear to be supportive of this conclusion, the findings are still preliminary and require more examination. Second, we need a better understanding of the process by which pervasiveness is triggered, grows, stabilizes, and recedes. Third, when pervasiveness is part of our theories, what exactly do we mean by pervasiveness in terms of what domains are being subsumed? For example, is the issue that distrust crosses cognitive, affective, and behavioural boundaries for the trustor? Or does it refer to implicating the full range of contexts for which the trustee might be relied upon? Or does it involve the various aspects of the trustee’s trustworthiness? (For example, different competencies or benevolence in one area of competing interests and not another) (Six, Skinner, Searle, Weibel, Gillespie, & Den Hartog, 2016; see also Baer & Colquittt, this volume; Lyu & Ferrin, this volume; Lind, this volume.) Fourth, in comparing the two distrust-is-distinctive models, does pervasiveness preclude the building of trust, or can high trust and high distrust co-exist? Answers to such questions can help us narrow down the range of distrust theories, or can help us see that the descriptive value of different theories is contingent on specifiable situational factors. For each of these issues, there is some research that provides a springboard, but much work is yet to be done.
In addition, if distrust researchers can sort out these kinds of pervasiveness questions, it can provide an opportunity for distrust research to influence other areas of study that are not primarily about distrust, but do involve an element of distrust. For example, studies of conflicts between professionals and their organizations (e.g., Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974), peace and reconciliation, and intractable conflicts (Fiol, et al., 2009) have not yet explained why some conflicts become intractable and others do not. But as Coleman, et al. (2007) and Fiol, et al. (2009) have noted, pervasive distrust may characterize the intractable, whereas domain-specific low trust may make other conflicts more tractable. One explanation for this difference, which remains to be ex plored, is whether distrust and low trust elicit fundamentally different emotional responses (see van Knippenberg, this volume) and that these emotions may require quite distinct attention to achieve positive resolution. These questions may best be answered by distrust researchers to the benefit of those who study conflict and reconciliation (e.g., see Bies, et al., this volume; Lind, this volume).
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the volume of distrust research has grown at the interpersonal level. Yet, with few exceptions (e.g., Bjilsma-Frankema, et al., 2015; Glynn, 2000; Kramer, 2004; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996), little work has examined distrust at the inter group level. Thus, this area of focus offers ripe opportunities for future research. For example, research on peace and reconciliation efforts, and intractable intergroup conflicts (Fiol, Pratt, & O’Connor, 2009; Tomlinson & Lewicki, 2006) has discussed the potentially important role of distrust, but has not been subjected to close examination. Yet this phenomenon might well lend itself to comparing different models of distrust noted here to determine their relative explanatory power.
Another potential opportunity for distrust research concerns the role of distrust in ingroup/ outgroup relations and issues of intergroup cognitive separation and negative perceptions (Brewer, 1999; Friedman & Currall, 2003; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Labianca, et al., 1998; Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Recent populist and nationalist movements around the world, including anti-immigration initiatives, often provide examples of this phenomenon.
Future distrust research should employ more multi-method approaches as well as more longitudinal approaches. While experiments and in-depth case studies have begun to emerge, along with physiological studies of distrust, it would be useful to add several methodological features to the mix. First, comparative and multiple case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989) and surveys would be helpful as we continue to expand our understanding of the best ways to model distrust and to assess the generalizability of our findings. Second, the use of multiple methodologies with our research papers would be helpful in triangulating results and nailing down distrust – related mechanisms more precisely. Finally, recent work has suggested the benefits of longitudinal studies of distrust to better understand the trajectories by which distrust is triggered, evolves (or doesn’t), and resolves (or persists) (Bijlsma-Frankema, et al, 2015; Solinger, Hofmans, Bal, & Jansen, 2016; Solinger, van Olffen, Roe, & Hofmans, 2013)
Distrust research has many opportunities for important current organizational applications. For example, the recent financial crisis provided one such context (e.g., Gillespie & Hurley, 2013) and will surely continue to provide many future opportunities, as will the apparent fracturing of democratic political coalitions across the world. The more general level of distrust in societal institutions across the globe (Edelman, 2016) suggests that similar issues can be found with disappointing ease, and with mounting evidence of detrimental consequences. The energy, health, and food sectors, and political organizations are obvious examples. Across the globe, refugee and immigration crises, tribal and religious conflicts, scandals within religious organizations, and even questions being raised about the fundamental values and practices of basic science itself can be informed by using a distrust lens.
Though slower to emerge than trust research, distrust research has taken on a distinct and rapidly growing profile. It is a robust area of study with new theoretical contributions, qualitative and quantitative empirical studies, and research syntheses. New methodologies (e.g., physiological) and new field contexts provide technological and logistical bases for potentially important new developments that can not only advance our understanding of distrust in organizations and society, but also can feed back and inform our more voluminous extant research on trust.
Anderson, L. M., & C. M.Pearson. (1999). Tit for tat? The spiraling effect of incivility in the workplace. Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 452–471.
Becker, H. S., & Geer, B. (1961). Boys in white: Student culture in medical school. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Benamati, J., Serva, M. A., & Fuller, M. A. (2006). Are trust and distrust distinct constructs? An empirical study of the effects of trust and distrust among online bank users. Proceedings of the 39th Hawaiian International Conference on System Sciences. Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Society Press.
Bies, R. J., & Tripp, T. M. (1996). Beyond distrust: “Getting even” and the need for revenge. In R. Kramer, T. Tyler, (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 246–260.
Bigley, G. A., & Pearce, J. L. (1998). Straining for shared meaning in organizational science: Problems of trust and distrust, Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 405–421.
Bijlsma-Frankema, K. M., Sitkin, S. B., & Weibel, A. (2015). Distrust in the balance: The emergence and development of intergroup distrust in a court of law. Organization Science, 26(4), 1018–1039.
Bijlsma-Frankema, K., Wisse, B., Täuber, S., Sitkin, S., Sanders, S., & van de Brake, J. (2016). Distrust of supervisors: Towards a dynamic approach. Under review.
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic interactionism: Perspectives and method. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 429–444.
Chambers, J. R., & Melnyk, D. (2006). Why do I hate thee? Conflict misperceptions and intergroup mistrust. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1295–1311.
Chang, Y. S., & Fang, S. R. (2013). Antecedents and distinctions between online trust and distrust: Predicting high- and low risk internet behaviors. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 14(2), 149–166.
Cho, J. (2006). The mechanism of trust and distrust formation and their relational outcomes. Journal of Retailing, 82(1), 25–35.
Clark, M. C., & Payne, R. L. (1997). The nature and structure of worker’s trust in management. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 18, 205–224.
Coleman, P. T., Vallacher, R. R., Nowak, A., & Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2007). Intractable conflicts as attractor: A dynamical systems approach to conflict escalation and intractability. American Behavioral Scientist, 50, 1454–1475.
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust propensity: A meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking and job performance, Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4), 909–927.
Connelly, B. L., Miller, T., & Devers, C. E. (2012). Under a cloud of suspicion: Trust, distrust, and their interactive effect in interorganizational contracting, Strategic Management Journal, 33, 820–833.
Constantinople, A. (1969). An Eriksonian measure of personality development in college students, Developmental Psychology, 1, 357–372
Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), 265–279.
Dimoka, A. (2010). What does the brain tell us about trust and distrust? Evidence from a functional neuroimaging study. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 373–396.
Dirks, K., & Ferrin, D. L. (2001). The role of trust in organizational settings. Organization Science, 12(4), 450–467
Dirks, K., & Ferrin, D. L. (2002). Trust in leadership: Meta-analytical findings and implications for research and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(4), 611–628.
Dirks, K., & Ferrin, D. L. (2009). Repairing relationships within and between organizations: Building a conceptual foundation. Academy of Management Review, 34, 68–84.
Edelman, R. (2016). Beyond the grand illusion, accessed 28/01/2016 www.edelman.com/p/6-a-m/beyond-grand-illusion/
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theory from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14, 532–550.
Ferrin, D. L., Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2007). Silence speaks volumes: The effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and denial for responding to integrity- and competence-based trust violations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 893–908.
Fiol, C. M., Pratt, M. G., & O’ Connor, E. J. (2009). Managing intractable identity conflicts. Acadademy of Management Review, 34(1), 32–55.
Fox, A. (1974). Beyond contract: Work, power and trust relations. London: Faber and Faber.
Friedman, R. A., & Currall, S. C. (2003). Conflict escalation: Dispute exacerbating elements of e-mail communication. Human Relations, 56(11), 1325–1347.
Fulmer, C. A., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012). At what level (and in whom) we trust: Trust across multiple organizational levels, Journal of Management, 38(4), 1167–1230.
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). From superordinate goals to decategorization, recategorization and mutual differentiation. International Journal of Psychology, 35(3–4), 193.
Gillespie, N., & Hurley, R. (2013). Trust and the global financial crisis. In R. Bachmann & A. Zaheer, (Eds.), Handbook of Advances in Trust Research, 177–203. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Glynn, M. A. (2000). When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity within a symphony orchestra. Organization Science, 11(3), 285–298.
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161–178.
Guo, S.-L., Lumineau, F., & Lewicki, R. J. (2016). Revisiting the foundations of organizational distrust, Foundations and Trends in Strategic Management, 1(1), 1–88.
Hardin, R. (2004). Distrust: Manifestations and management. In R. Hardin, (Ed.), Distrust. New York: Sage, 3–34.
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.) Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., & Cooper, C. D. (2009). The repair of trust: A dynamic bilateral perspective and multilevel conceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 34(3), 401–423.
Komiak, S. Y.X., & I. Benbasat. (2008). A two-process view of trust and distrust building in recommendation agents: A process-tracing study. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 9(12), 727–747.
Kramer, R. M. (1994). The sinister attribution error – Paranoid cognition and collective distrust in organizations. Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 199–230.
Kramer, R. M. (1996). Divergent realities and convergent disappointments in the hierarchic relation: Trust and the intuitive auditor at work. In R. M.Kramer and T. R.Tyler, (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 216–245.
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 569–598.
Kramer, R. M. (2004). Collective paranoia: Distrust between social groups. In R. Hardin, (Ed.), Distrust. New York: Russell, 136–167.
Labianca, G., Brass, D. J., & Gray, B. (1998). Social networks and perceptions of intergroup conflict: The role of negative relationships and third parties. Academy of Management Journal, 41(1), 55–67.
Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust: New relationships and realities. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 438–458.
Lewicki, R. J., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2003). The effects of reputation and post violation communication on trust and distrust. 16th Annual Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management. Melbourne, Australia.
Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a social reality. Social Forces, 63(4), 967–985.
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and power: Two works. New York: Wiley.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1975). Uncertainty of past – Organizational learning under ambiguity. European Journal of Political Research, 3(2), 147–171.
Martinko, M. J., Harvey, P., Sikora, D., & Douglas, S. C. (2011). Perceptions of abusive supervison: The role of subordinates’ attribution styles. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(4), 751–764.
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 709–734.
McKnight, D. H., Kacmar, C. J., & Choudhury, V. (2004). Dispositional trust and distrust distinctions in predicting high and low-risk internet expert advice sites perceptions. e-service journal, 3(2), 35–58.
McKnight, D. H., & Choudhury, V. (2006). Distrust and trust in e-commerce: Do they differ? Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Electronic Commerce, 482–491.
Mohr, L. B. (1982). Explaining organizational behavior. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Ou, C. X., & Sia, C. L. (2010). Consumer trust and distrust: An issue of website design. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 68(12), 913–934.
Patent, V., & Searle, R. (2012). Measuring trust propensity. First International Network on Trust Workshop, 13th–15th June 2012, Milan. Conference Paper, Milan.
Patent, V., (2014). The role of trust perceptions and propensity to trust in applicants’ experience of recruitment and selection (PhD Thesis). Psychology. Milton Keynes, UK: The Open University.
Perlow, L. A., & Repenning, N. P. (2009). The dynamic of silencing conflict. Research in Organizational Behavior, 29, 195–223.
Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (2004). Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, settlement. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.
Robinson, S. L. (1996.) Trust and the breach of the psychological contract. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(4), 574–599.
Robinson, S. L., & Morrison, E. (2000). The development of psychological contract breach and violation: A longitudinal study, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21(5), 525–546
Roth, N., Sitkin, S., & House, A. (1993). Stigma as a determinant of legalization. In S. Sitkin & R. Bies, (Eds.), The legalistic organization. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 137–168.
Rotter, J. B. (1980). Interpersonal trust, trustworthiness and gullibility. American Psychologist, 35(1), 1–7.
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. F. (1998). Introduction to special topic forum: Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393–404.
Saunders, M. N.K., Dietz, G., & Thornhill, A. (2014) Trust and distrust: Polar opposites, or independent but co-existing? Human Relations, 67(6), 639–665.
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (2007). An integrative model of organizational trust: Past, present, and future. Academy of Management Review, 32(2), 344–354.
Serva, M. A., Fuller, M. A., & Mayer, R. C. (2005). The reciprocal nature of trust: A longitudinal study of interacting teams. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(6), 625–648.
Sheppard, B. H., & Tuchinsky, M. (1996). Interfirm relationships: A grammar of pairs. In B. M.Staw, L. L.Cummings, (Eds.) Research in organizational behavior. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 331–373.
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robbers cave experiment. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma.
Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic “remedies” for trust/distrust. Organization Science, 4(3), 367–392.
Sitkin, S. B., & Stickel, D. (1996). The road to hell: The dynamics of distrust in an era of quality. In R. M.Kramer, T. R.Tyler, (Eds.), Trust in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 196–215.
Six, F., Skinner, D., Searle, R., Weibel, A., Gillespie, N., & Den Hartog, D. (2016). Trusting your organization: the role of respectful behaviours. Under review.
Solinger, O. N., Hofmans, J., Bal, P. M., & Jansen, P. G.W. (2016). Bouncing back from psychological contract breach: How commitment recovers over time. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 37(4), 494–514.
Solinger, O. N., van Olffen, W., Roe, R. A., & Hofmans, J. (2013). On becoming (un)committed: a taxonomy and test of newcomer onboarding scenarios. Organization Science, 24(6), 1640–1661.
Sorensen, J. E., & Sorensen, T. L. (1974). The conflict of professionals in bureaucratic organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19, 98–106.
Tomlinson, E., & Lewicki, R. J. (2006). Managing distrust in intractable conflicts. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 24(2), 219–228.
Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2010). “Righteous” anger and revenge in the workplace: The fantasies, the feuds, the forgiveness. In M. Potegal et al. (Eds.), International Handbook of Anger. Berlin: Springer Science, 413–431.
Van de WalleS., & Six, F. E. (2014). Active trust and active distrust as distinct concepts: A comparative approach to why studying distrust is important. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 16(2), 158–174.
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. London: Sage.
Wrightsman, L. S. (1974). Assumptions about human nature: A social-psychological analysis. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2), 229–239.
Zucker, L. G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–1920. Research in Organizational Behavior, 8, 53–111.