CHAPTER II — THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP

IT is not proposed in this chapter to give an answer to the question: “Who first thought of the tank?” The idea of combining mobility with offensive power and armour, as the previous chapter has shown, is a very old one, so old and so universal throughout history that, when the Great War broke out in 1914, many soldiers and civilians alike must have considered ways and means of reintroducing the knight in armour and the battle car by replacing muscular energy by mechanical force—in other words, by applying petrol to the needs of the battlefield.

During August and September 1914, armoured cars had been employed with considerable success in Belgium and north-western France. This no doubt brought with it the revival of the idea. Be this as it may, in October of this year Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) E. D. Swinton put forward a suggestion for the construction of an armoured car on the Holt tractor or a similar caterpillar system, capable of crushing down wire entanglements and crossing trenches.

At the same time, Captain T. G. Tulloch, manager of the Chilworth Powder Company, was also devoting his attention to the possibility of constructing a land cruiser sufficiently armoured to enable it to penetrate right up to the enemy’s gun and howitzer positions. In November the idea was communicated by Captain Tulloch to Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton and to Lieutenant-Colonel (now Colonel Sir Maurice) Hankey, Secretary to the “Committee of Imperial Defence,” and later on to Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, who, in January 1915, wrote his now historic letter to Mr. Asquith:

“MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

“I entirely agree with Colonel Hankey’s remarks on the subject of special mechanical devices for taking trenches. It is extraordinary that the Army—in the field and the War Office should have allowed nearly three months of warfare to progress without addressing their minds to its special problems.

“The present war has revolutionised all military theories about the field of fire. The power of the rifle is so great that 100 yards is held sufficient to stop any rush, and in order to avoid the severity of the artillery fire, trenches are often dug on the reverse slope of positions, or a short distance in the rear of villages, woods, or other obstacles. The consequence is that the war has become a short-range instead of a long-range war as was expected, and opposing trenches get ever closer together, for mutual safety from each other’s artillery fire.

“The question to be solved is not, therefore, the long attack over a carefully prepared glacis of former times, but the actual getting across 100 or 200 yards of open space and wire entanglements. All this was apparent more than two months ago, but no steps have been taken and no preparations made .

“It would be quite easy in a short time to fit up a number of steam tractors with small armoured shelters, in which men and machine-guns could be placed, which would be bullet-proof. Used at night they would not be affected by artillery fire to any extent. The caterpillar system would enable trenches to be crossed quite easily, and the weight of the machine would destroy all wire entanglements.

“Forty or fifty of these engines, prepared secretly and brought into positions at nightfall, could advance quite certainly into the enemy’s trenches, smashing away all the obstructions and sweeping the trenches with their machine-gun fire, and with grenades thrown out of the top. They would then make so many points d’appui for the British supporting infantry to rush forward and rally on them. They can then move forward to attack the second line of trenches.

“The cost would be small. If the experiment did not answer, what harm would be done? An obvious measure of prudence would have been to have started something like this two months ago. It should certainly be done now.

“The shield is another obvious experiment which should have been made on a considerable scale. What does it matter which is the best pattern? A large number should have been made of various patterns; some to carry, some to wear, some to wheel. If the mud now prevents the working of shields or traction engines, the first frost would render them fully effective. With a view to this I ordered a month ago twenty shields on wheels, to be made on the best design the Naval Air Service could devise. These will be ready shortly, and can, if need be, be used for experimental purposes.

“A third device, which should be used systematically and on a large scale, is smoke artificially produced. It is possible to make small smoke barrels which, on being lighted, generate a great volume of dense black smoke, which could be turned off or on at will. There are other matters closely connected with this to which I have already drawn your attention, but which are of so secret a character, that I do not put them down on paper.

“One of the most serious dangers that we are exposed to is the possibility that the Germans are acting and preparing all these surprises, and that we may at any time find ourselves exposed to some entirely new form of attack. A committee of engineering officers and other experts ought to be sitting continually at the War Office to formulate schemes and examine suggestions, and I would repeat that it is not possible in most cases to have lengthy experiments beforehand.

“If the devices are to be ready by the time they are required it is indispensable that manufacture should proceed simultaneously with experiments. The worst that can happen is that a comparatively small sum of money is wasted.

“Yours, etc.”

At about the time that the above letter was written, Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton again brought the matter forward and urged the desirability of action being taken, but as it was stated that the design and building of Captain Tulloch’s machine would take a year to complete it appears that this led to the proposals being shelved for the time being.

On June 1, 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton, who had then returned to France, submitted an official memorandum on the above subject to G.H.Q., which was passed to Major-General G. H. Fowke, Engineer-in-Chief, for his expert opinion. This memorandum may be summarised as follows:

The main German offensive was taking place in Russia; consequently, in order to attain a maximum strength in the east, it was incumbent on the Germans to maintain a minimum one in the west; and, in order to meet the shortage of men on the Western Front, the Germans were mainly basing their defence on the machine-gun.

The problem, consequently, was one of how to overcome the German machine-gunners. There were two solutions to this problem:

1. Sufficient artillery to blast a way through the enemy’s lines.
2. The introduction of armoured machine-gun destroyers.

As regards the second solution Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton laid down the following requirements: Speed, 4 miles per hour; climbing power, 5 ft.; spanning power, 5 ft.; radius of action, 20 miles; weight, about 8 tons; crew, 10 men; armament, 2 machine-guns and one light Q.F. gun. Further, he suggested that these machines should be used in a surprise assault having first been concealed behind our own front line in specially constructed pits about 100 yards apart. In this paper it was also pointed out that these destroyers would be of great value in a gas attack, as they would enable the most scientific means of overcoming gas to be carried.

The above memorandum was favourably considered by Sir John French, then Commander-in-Chief in France, and, on June 22, was submitted by him to the War Office with a suggestion that Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton should visit England and explain his scheme more fully.

While Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton and Captain Tulloch were urging their proposals, a third scheme was brought forward by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon in connection with which the Secretary of State, in January 1915, ordered trials to be carried out with a 105 h.p. Foster-Daimler tractor fitted with a bridging apparatus for crossing trenches. At about the same time similar trials were made with a 120 h.p. Holt caterpillar tractor at Shoeburyness in connection with Captain Tulloch’s scheme. Both experiments proved a failure.

The position, therefore, in June, so far as the Army was concerned, was as follows: Proposals had been put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton, Admiral Bacon, and Captain Tulloch, and submitted to the War Office. Certain trials had been made, the result of which, in the view of the authorities, was to emphasise the engineering and other difficulties to be overcome. It was only in June 1915 that Major-General Sir George Scott- Moncrieff, Director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, who, throughout the initial period, had shown a strong interest in the development of the idea, ascertained that investigations on similar lines were being carried out by the Admiralty; he at once proposed that a “Joint Naval and Military Committee” should be formed for the purpose of dealing with the subject generally. This Committee was constituted on June 15.

The work done by the Admiralty had so far been independent. In February 1915, Mr. Churchill sent to Mr. E. H. T. (now Sir Eustace) D’Eyncourt, Director of Naval Construction, a copy of the notes embodying the proposals set forth by Major T. G. Hetherington (18th Hussars), R.N.A.S., for a new type of war machine. This machine maybe described as a veritable Juggernaut, heavily armoured, highly offensive, and capable of moving across country.

It consisted of a platform mounted on three wheels, two driving wheels in front and the steering wheel behind. It was to be equipped with three turrets each containing two 4-in. guns and its motive power was to be derived from a 800 h.p. Sunbeam Diesel set of engines.

The problem of design was examined by the Air Department engineers and the following rough data, worked out at the time, are of interest:

Armament—3 twin 4 in. turrets with 300 rounds per gun.

Horse power—800 h.p. with fuel for 24 hours.

Total weight .—300 tons.

Armour—3 in.

Diameter of wheels—40 ft.

Tread of main wheels—13 ft. 4 in.

Tread of steering wheels. 5 ft. 0 in.

Overall length—100 ft.

Overall width—80 ft.

Overall height—46 ft.

Clearance—17 ft.

Top speed on good going 8 miles per hour.

Top speed on bad going. 4 miles per hour.

The cross-country qualities of the machine it was considered would prove good. It could not be bogged in any ground passable by cavalry; it could pass over water obstacles having good banks and from 20 ft. to 30 ft. width of waterway; it could ford waterways 15 ft. deep if the bottoms were good, and negotiate isolated obstacles up to 20 ft. high. Small obstacles such as banks, ditches, bridges, trenches, wire entanglements, and ordinary woodland it could roll over easily.

Mr. D’Eyncourt considered this proposal, but coming to the conclusion that the machine would weigh more than 1,000 tons, it became apparent to him that its construction was not a practical proposition.

Mr. D’Eyncourt pointed this out to Mr. Churchill and suggested that Major Hetherington’s machine should be replaced by one of a smaller and less ambitious type. To this Mr. Churchill agreed, and to deal with this question a “Landships Committee” was formed consisting of the following gentlemen:

Chairman. — Mr. D’EYNCOURT.

Members. — Major HETHERINGTON, Colonel DUMBLE, Mr. DALE RUSSELL (appointed later).

Consultant. — Colonel R. E. CROMPTON.

Secretary (appointed later). — Lieutenant STERN.

Prior to the formation of this Committee another proposal had been set on foot. About November 14, 1914, Mr. Diplock of the Pedrail Company had put forward certain suggestions for the use of the pedrail for the transportation of heavy guns and war material over rough ground. After interviewing Lord Kitchener, who saw no utility in the suggestion, Mr. Diplock was referred to the Admiralty and there saw Mr. Churchill, who, taking up the matter with interest, suggested that a one-ton truck should be brought to the Horse Guards Parade for his inspection. Major Hetherington undertook to arrange this, and on February 12, 1915, a demonstration of the Pedrail machine took place.

This so impressed Mr. Churchill that he decided that a pedrail armoured car should be built .

The “Landships Committee” communicated with Messrs. William Foster, Ltd., of Lincoln, who were already making heavy tractors for the Admiralty, and Mr. (now Sir William) Tritton, their manager, was asked to collaborate in evolving two designs:

The first of the wheel tractor type.

The second of the pedrail type—the latter being the alternative recommended by the chairman and the Pedrail Company.

Both these designs seemed to have some promising features. The First Lord, on March 26, approved of an order being placed for twelve of the pedrail type and six of the wheel type.

The design of the pedrail machine was produced by the Pedrail Company; its length was 38 ft., its width 12 ft. 6 in., and height 10 ft. 6 in. The most interesting feature connected with this machine was that it was mounted on two bogies one behind the other, steering being rendered possible by articulating these bogies in the same horizontal plane, which gave an extreme turning radius of 65ft .

After Mr. Churchill’s resignation from the Admiralty the production of the twelve pedrail cars was abandoned in spite of the fact that the engines and most of the material had been provided.

The design work was, however, continued under the direction of the “Landships Committee,” and, a little later on, caterpillar tractors for experimental purposes were obtained from America. In the meantime the question of design was discussed with Mr. Tritton, and at the same time Lieutenant (now Major) W. G. Wilson, an experienced engineer, was brought in as consultant, and a design was evolved which eventually embodied the form finally adopted and adhered to for tanks. Thus it was through the “Landships Committee,” at a moment when the military authorities were inclined to regard the difficulties connected with the problem as likely to prove insuperable, that the landship or “tank,” as it was later on called, was first brought into being.

After the formation of the “Joint Naval and Military Committee” on June 15, it was agreed, as the result of correspondence between the Admiralty and War Office, that the experimental work on the landship should be taken over as a definite military service in the department of the Master-General of Ordnance. It was further agreed that the Director of Fortifications and Works should be president of the Committee, that the chairman and members of the existing “Landships Committee” should continue to serve as long as their assistance was required, and that the late First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill, should remain in touch with the design and construction of the machines during their experimental stage. The members nominated for the Committee by the War Office were Colonel Bird of the General Staff, Colonel Holden, A.D.T., and Major, Wheeler of the M.G.O.’s Department.

Early in July, Mr. Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions, discussed with Mr. Balfour, now First Lord of the Admiralty, the transference of the production of the machines from the Admiralty to the Ministry of Munitions. It was, however, subsequently decided that the Admiralty should be responsible for the production of the first trial machine, the Director of Naval Construction being responsible for the completion of the machine. This was strongly urged by Sir George Scott-Moncrieff.

In July 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel. Swinton returned to England to take over the duties of assistant secretary to the “Committee of Imperial Defence.” He at once took in hand the co-ordination of the various private and official efforts which were being made at this time in relation to the design of caterpillar tractors. Early in September he visited Lincoln and inspected a machine known as Little Willie, and on the 10th of this month wrote to Major Guest, Secretary of the “Experiments Committee” at G.H.Q., as follows:

“The naval people are pressing on with the first sample caterpillar...they have succeeded in making an animal that will cross 4 ft. 6 in. and turn on its own axis like a dog with a flea in its tail.... ”

In spite of its agility this machine was rejected in favour of Big Willie, a model of which was being constructed under the direction of the “Joint Committee” on the lines of the machine designed by Mr. Tritton and Lieutenant Wilson and the requirements of which had been outlined by Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton in his memorandum of June 1.

As regards these requirements, on the day following the above letter the “Experiments Committee” G.H.Q. sent the following tactical suggestions, arising out of Colonel Swinton’s original proposal, to the secretary of the “Committee of Imperial Defence.” They are worth quoting as they embody several of the characteristics which were introduced in the Mark I tank.

1. The object for which the caterpillar cruiser or armoured fort is required is for employment in considerable numbers in conjunction with or as an incident in a larger and general attack by infantry against an extended front.
2. As a general principle, it is desirable to have a large number of small cruisers rather than a smaller number of large ones.
3. The armour of the cruiser must be proof against concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire, but not proof against artillery fire. The whole cruiser should be enclosed in armour.
4. The tactical object of the cruiser is attack, its armament should include a gun with reasonable accuracy up to 1,000 yards, and at least two Lewis guns, which can be fired from loopholes to flank and to rear.
5. The crew to consist of six men—two for the gun, one for each Lewis gun, and two drivers.
6. The caterpillar must be capable of crossing craters produced by the explosion of high-explosive shell, such craters being of 12 ft. diameter, 6 ft. deep, with sloping sides; of crossing an extended width of barbed-wire entanglements; and of spanning hostile trenches with perpendicular sides and of 4 ft. in breadth.
7. The cruiser should be capable of moving at a rate of not less than 2 ½ miles per hour over broken ground, and should have a range of action of not less than six hours consecutive movement.
8. The wheels of the cruiser should be on either the “Pedrail” system or the “Caterpillar” system; whichever is the most suitable for crossing marshy and slippery ground.

Most of these requirements had already been embodied in the wooden model of Big Willie, which, when completed, was inspected at Wembley on September 28. This model was accepted as a basis on which construction was to proceed, it was in fact the first “mock up” of the eventual Mark I machine.

Big Willie was about 8 ft. high, 26 ft. long, and 11 ft. wide without sponsons, and 3 ft. wider when these were added. His armament consisted in two 6-pounder guns and two machine-guns, and the crew suggested was 1 officer and 9 other ranks.

On the following day the “Joint Committee” assembled at the Admiralty and decided that the following specifications should be worked to: weight 22 tons, speed 31 miles per hour, spanning power 8 ft., and climbing power 41 ft.

On December 3, Mr. Churchill addressed a paper to G.H.Q., entitled “Variants of the Offensive,” in which he accentuated the necessity of concentrating more than we had done on “the attack by armour,” the chief purpose of armour being to preserve mobility. He suggested the combined use of the caterpillar tractor and the shield. The caterpillars were to breach the enemy’s line and then turn right and left, the infantry following under cover of bulletproof shields. It was further suggested that the attack might be carried out at night under the guidance of searchlights. The rest of this paper dealt with “Attack by Trench Mortars,” “Attack by the Spade,” and “The Attack on the First Line.”

On Christmas Day 1915, Sir Douglas Haig, who had recently taken over command of the Expeditionary Force in France, read this paper, and wishing to know more about the caterpillars mentioned, Lieutenant-Colonel H. J. Elles (later on G.O.C. Tank Corps) was sent to England to ascertain the exact position. On January 8 this officer reported in writing to G.H.Q., as follows:

“There are two producers of landships:

“(a) Trench Warfare working alone. {14 }

“(b) The Admiralty Land ship Committee working with the War Office.

“The first have not yet made a machine, but its proposed size is 10 ft. high, 14 ft. 6 in. wide, and 36 ft. long; the second was in process of being made” ( i.e. Big Willie).

Up to December 20, 1915, the whole cost of the experimental work had been defrayed by the Admiralty, which had also provided the personnel in the shape of No. 20 Squadron, R.N.A.S., for carrying out the work. The Admiralty had in fact fathered and been responsible for the landship since its first inception.

On December 24 the following recommendations were formulated at a Conference held at the offices of the “Committee of Imperial Defence”.

“SUPPLY OF MACHINES

“(1) That if and when the Army Council, after inspection of the final experimental land cruiser, decide that such machines shall be entrusted to a small ‘Executive Supply Committee,’ which, for secrecy, shall be called the ‘Tank {15} Supply Committee,’ and shall come into existence as soon as the decision of the Army Council is made.

“(2) That this Committee shall be responsible for the supply of caterpillar machine-gun destroyers or land cruisers of the approved type; complete in every respect for action, including both primary and secondary armament. That it shall receive instructions as to supply and design direct from the General Staff, War Office, the necessary financial arrangements being made by the Accounting Officer, War Office.

“(3) That, in order to enable the committee to carry out its work with the maximum of despatch and minimum of reference, it shall have full power to place orders, and to correspond direct with any Government department concerned. To be in a position to do this, it should have placed to its credit, as soon as its work commences, a sum equivalent to the estimated cost of fifty machines, which sum should be increased later if necessary by any further amount required to carry out the programme of construction approved by the General Staff. The committee should also be authorised to incur any necessary expenditure in connection with experimental work, engagement of staff, travelling and other incidental expenses during the progress of the work.

“(4) That as the machines are turned out and equipped they shall be handed over to the War Office for the purpose of training the personnel to man them.

“(5) That the Committee be reconstituted with Lieutenant A. G. Stern as chairman.

“(6) That since the officers of the R.N.A.S. will cease to belong to that service as soon as the ‘Tank Supply Committee ‘is constituted, arrangements shall be made now for their payment from the same source that will bear the cost of constructing the land cruisers and for their appointment as military officers with rank suitable to the importance of their duties. ”

The experimental machine was completed towards the end of 1915 and its preliminary trials gave most promising results.

On January 30, 1916, Mr. D’Eyncourt, as head of the “Admiralty Committee,” entrusted with the design and manufacture of the trial machine, wrote to Lord Kitchener and informed him that the machine was ready for his inspection and that it fulfilled all the conditions laid down by the War Office, viz.—that it could carry guns, destroy machine-guns, break through wire entanglements, and cross the enemy’s trenches, whilst giving protection to its own crew. Mr. D’Eyncourt also recommended that a number should be ordered immediately to this model, without serious alteration, and that whilst these were being manufactured the design of a more formidable machine could be developed.

On February 2 the first official trial of the new machine was held at Hatfield and was witnessed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. McKenna, and various representatives of the War Office and Ministry of Munitions. Following this trial G.H.Q., France, on February 8 signified their approval of the machine and asked that the Army might be supplied with a certain number.

Arising out of the Hatfield trial it was decided to form a small unit of the Machine-Gun Corps, to be called the “Heavy Section,” and Lieutenant-Colonel Swinton was appointed to command it with his Headquarters in London, a training camp being first opened at Bisley and later on moved to Elveden near Thetford.

As the “Admiralty Committee,” with the Director of Naval Construction as chairman, had finished their work and produced an actual machine complete in all respects and fulfilling all requirements, it was then decided that the Ministry of Munitions should take over the production of the machines. On February 10 the Army Council consequently addressed a letter to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty requesting them to convey “the very warm thanks of the Army Council to Mr. E. H. T. D’Eyncourt, C.B., Director of Naval Construction, and his Committee, for their work in evolving a machine for the use of the Army, and to Mr. W. A. Tritton and Lieutenant W. G. Wilson, R.N.A.S., for their work in design and construction.”

Two days later, on February 12, the “Joint Committee£ was dissolved and a new committee, closely following the lines laid down at the Conference held in the offices of the “Committee of Imperial Defence,” was formed under the Ministry of Munitions, and known as the “Tank Supply Committee.”

Chairman.— Lieutenant A. G. STERN, R.N.A.S., Director of Naval Constructions Committee.

Members.— E. H. T. D’EYNCOURT, Esq., C.B., Director of Naval Construction.

— Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O., R.E., Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence .

— Major G. L. WHEELER, R.A., Director of Artillery’s Branch, War Office.

— Lieutenant W. G. WILSON, R.N.A.S., Director of Naval Constructions Committee.

— Lieutenant K. P. SYMES, R.N.A.S., Director of Naval Constructions Committee.

— P. DALE-BUSSELL, Esq., Director of Naval Constructions Committee, Contract Department, Admiralty.

Consultant. — Captain T. G. TULLOCH, Ministry of Munitions.

On February 14, 1916, Mr. D’Eyncourt wrote the following letter, which we quote in full, to Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Churchill, commanding 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, B.E.F., France, whose initiative and foresight were the true parents of the tank as a war machine:

“DEAR COLONEL CHURCHILL,

“It is with great pleasure that I am now able to report to you that the War Office have at last ordered 100 landships to the pattern which underwent most successful trials recently. Sir D. Haig sent some of his staff from the front.

“Lord Kitchener and Robertson also came, and members of the Admiralty Board. The machine was complete in almost every detail and fulfils all the requirements finally given me by the War Office. The official tests of trenches, etc., were nothing to it, and finally we showed them how it could cross a 9 ft. gap after climbing a 4 ft. 6 in. high perpendicular parapet. Wire entanglements it goes through like a rhinoceros through a field of corn. It carries two 6-pounder guns in sponsons (a naval touch), and about 300 rounds; also smaller machine-guns, and is proof against machine-gun fire. It can be conveyed by rail (the sponsons and guns take off, making it lighter) and be ready for action very quickly. The King came {16} and saw it and was greatly struck by its performance, as was everyone else; in fact, they were all astonished. It is capable of great development, but to get a sufficient number in time, I strongly urge ordering immediately a good many to the pattern which we know all about. As you are aware, it has taken much time and trouble to get the thing perfect, and a practical machine simple to make; we tried various types and did much experimental work. I am sorry it has taken so long, but pioneer work always takes time and no avoidable delay has taken place, though I begged them to order ten for training purposes two months ago. I have also had some difficulty in steering the scheme past the rocks of opposition and the more insidious shoals of apathy which are frequented by red herrings, which cross the main line of progress at frequent intervals.

“The great thing now is to keep the whole matter secret and produce the machines altogether as a complete surprise. I have already put the manufacture in hand, under the ægis of the Minister of Munitions, who is very keen; the Admiralty is also allowing me to continue to carry on with the same Committee, but Stern is now Chairman .

“I enclose photo. In appearance, it looks rather like a great antediluvian monster, especially when it comes out of boggy ground, which it traverses easily. The wheels behind form a rudder for steering a curve, and also ease the shock over banks, etc., but are not absolutely necessary, as it can steer and turn in its own length with the independent tracks.”

“E. H. T. D’EYNCOURT.”

Between its institution in February and the following August the “Tank Supply Committee” underwent certain slight changes of organisation, the distribution of its duties rightly tending more and more towards centralisation. Shortly after its formation a “Tank Supply Department” was created in the Ministry of Munitions to work with the “Tank Supply Committee.” This Supply Department was concerned with and was responsible for the initial output of the tanks which figured in the Battle of the Somme .

On August 1, 1916, the following resolutions were come to by the “Tank Supply Committee,” and agreed to by the Minister of Munitions:

“That the ‘Tank Supply Committee’ should in future be named the ‘Advisory Committee of the Tank Supply Department.’

“That a Sub-Committee consisting of Mr. D’Eyncourt, Mr. Bussell, and the Chairman, should be appointed to decide in questions of design and policy.”

On August 22, the Committee was dissolved on the ground that the organisation for Tank Supply must be assimilated to that of the other Departments of the Ministry of Munitions, and the outcome of this was the formation of the “Mechanical Warfare Supply Department,” with Lieutenant Stern as Chairman. This department continued in existence from now on until the end of the war. Its powers were wide, embracing production, design, inspection and the supply of tanks, and its energy was unlimited .

Whilst all these changes were in progress the tanks were being produced, and the personnel assembled and trained, and on August 13, 1916, the first detachment of thirteen tanks, being the right half of “C” Company, left Thetford for France, to be followed on August 22 by twelve tanks to complete the complement of “C” Company. On August 25 the right half of “D” Company entrained at Thetford for France, and on August 30 the remainder of the company followed. Tanks on arrival in France were transported to Yvrench, near Abbeville, where a training centre had been established under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brough, who had proceeded to France on August 3, to make the necessary arrangements. On September 4, Colonel Brough, having organised the training, returned to England, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley took over command of the Heavy Section.

It was now decided by G.H.Q. that tanks should take part in the next great attack in the Somme battle on September 15, so, on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of this month, “C” and “D” Companies moved to the forward area, and established their headquarters at the Loop, a railway centre not far from the village of Bray-sur-Somme.