{1}
Previously a Tank Corps engineer officer in France.
{3}
Previously Brigade Major, 2nd Tank Brigade, in France.
{4}
Previously G.S.O.2, Intelligence Headquarters, Tank Corps.
{5}
German bayonet tassels.
{6}
Certain chapters of this history originally appeared in a privately circulated series of papers entitled
Weekly Tank Notes.
{7}
How to make Railways Pay for the War,
p. 6. By Roy Horniman.
{8}
The arrow was the means of immobilising the knight by forcing him to dismount. Horse armour was never very satisfactory. Regarding the maces, a chronicler writes of their
use
by the archers at Agincourt: `° It seemed as though they were hammering upon anvils.”
{9}
The idea of a mobile fortress or battle car is very old: chariots are known to have existed in Assyria as far back as the year 3500 B.C. The Egyptians and Israelites both adopted them from this source. In Biblical times their tactical utility was considerable, as the Book of Judges relates. The Chinese, as early as 1200 B.C., made use of war cars armoured against projectiles.
{10}
Much of the following information is taken from an article entitled “The Forerunner of the Tank,” by H. H. Manchester, published in
The American Mechanist,
vol. 49, No. 15.
{11}
“The Forerunner of the Tank,” by H. H. Manchester.
{12}
For Edgeworth’s invention and the short summary of the footed-wheel, etc., which follows see
The Engineer,
August 10, 1917, and following issues.
{14}
The machine constructed by the Trench Warfare Department was the double bogey car designed by the Pedrail Company, of which it will be remembered twelve were originally ordered by the “Landships Committee“ and eventually abandoned. The resuscitation of this machine arose as follows:
During the summer of 1915 the Trench Warfare Department approached the Pedrail Company concerning the design of a flame projector with the capacity of 12,000 gallons of petrol. In order to carry this weapon the Pedrail Company suggested their original design, which, though it was not approved of by the “Landships Committee,” was accepted by the Trench Warfare Department. One machine was placed on order and built at Bath by Messrs. Stothert and Pitt, the pedrails being manufactured by the Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co., Ltd., and the frame by Messrs. William Arrol. The machine when built weighed 32 tons unloaded, was equipped with two 100 h.p. Astor engines, and when tested out on Salisbury Plain attained 12, speed of 15 miles an hour. Only one of these machines was made, as eventually the idea of using mechanically driven flame projectors was abandoned.
{15}
This is the first appearance of the word “tank” in the history of the machine. Up to December 1915, the machines now known as "tanks" were, in the experimental stage, called “landships” or “land cruisers,” and also “caterpillar machine-gun destroyers.” On December 24, whilst drafting the above report of the Conference it occurred to Colonel Swinton that the use of the above names would give away a secret which it was important to preserve. After consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel W. Dally-Tones, assistant secretary of the “Committee of Imperial Defense,” the following names were" suggested by Colonel Swinton—“cistern,” “reservoir,” and “tank,” all of which were applicable to the steel-like structure of the machines in the earlier stages of manufacture. Because it was less clumsy and monosyllabic the name “tank” was decided on.
{16}
On February 8, 1916.
{17}
The sponsons of the Mark I were only 10 mm. armour and not proof against A.P. bullets.
{19}
The original order was for 100, this was later on increased to 150.
{20}
The lighter form of tank was called “medium” because the French, by now, had produced the light Renault tank (see Plate III).
{21}
Major O. A. Forsyth-Major (Second in Command of the Egyptian Tank Detachment), on whose report this chapter is based, lost all his documents and maps at sea in May 1918 when the ship on which he was returning to England was torpedoed and sunk, consequently some of the dates are missing.
{22}
“It is not some familiar spirit which suddenly and secretly discloses to me what I have to say or do in a case unexpected by others; it is reflexion, meditation.”—NAPOLEON.
{23}
This chapter is extracted from a project submitted by Headquarters Tank Corps on June 11, 1917. It correctly visualised the Third Battle of Ypres, and the German artillery tactics adopted during it.
{24}
At this time the German reserves totalled about 750,000 men.
{25}
Breakdowns in the past had for the most part been due to bail ground, not defective mechanism.
{26}
The statement made in the daily press that General Elles’ order ran—“England expects every tank to do its damnedest,” was a pure journalistic invention and one in very bad taste.
{27}
“Battle Notes” were issued from time to time by Tank Corps Headquarters to all tank crews. Their object was to stimulate “esprit de corps and moral.” They were human documents for the most part, referring not only to the tank but also to other arms.
{28}
From this it must not be deduced that the officers and men of the Tank Corps would not obey orders, but that the officer in command of the Supply Companies was a student of human nature. Why order when a simple act like this will do the ordering?
{29}
The German reports published in April asserted that tanks were used against the British Army on March 21. As nothing is definitely known of their effect they probably failed to come into action.
{30}
General de Bourgon was a great friend of the Tank Corps; he presented its Headquarters mess with a charming trophy.
{31}
Nine heavy battalions with 324 machines and two medium battalions with 96. Besides these tanks, there were 42 in mechanical reserve, 96 supply tanks, and 22 gun-carriers. In all, and not counting the machines of the 9th Tank Battalion, there were 580 tanks.
{32}
This was borne witness to by British troops near by.
{33}
Captain of the company to which this tank belonged.
{34}
This was contrary to Tank Corps “Standing Battle Orders.”
{35}
This report was written by Lieut. Arnold after his return from Germany. The tank was eventually found close to the railway on the eastern side of the Harbonnières-Rosières road.
{36}
A supply tank is armed with one Lewis gun.
{37}
See “The Tactics of Penetration,” by Captain J. F. C. Fuller,
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution,
November 1914. This article was written in April 1914.
{38}
During the war the normal system of detecting new gases was to examine captured respirators, and from the chemicals they contained inversely deduce the gases they would protect their wearers against. In peacetime no such means of detection will be possible.