CHAPTER V — THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE

ON July 1, 1916, the battle of the Somme opened with a successful advance on the British right between Maricourt and Ovillers, and a check on the British left between Ovillers and Gommecourt. From that day on to the commencement of the battle of the Ancre, in November, no further attempt was made to push forward the British left, all available troops being required to maintain the forward movement of the right flank.

The ground which separates the rivers Somme and Ancre is split up into valleys by pronounced ridges, most of which form natural lines of defence for an enemy and could, in 1916, only be stormed after having been subjected to a heavy artillery bombardment. The ground had consequently become severely “trumped” in places; but as the weather, up to September 15, had been fine and dry, it offered no insuperable difficulty to the movement of the tanks, which were allotted to the Fourth and Reserve Armies as follows:

Fourth Army, XIVth Corps  — “C” Company (less 1 Section) — 17 tanks

Fourth Army, XVth Corps  — D” Company (less 1 Section) — 17 tanks

Fourth Army, IIIrd Corps  — 1 Section “D” Company — 8 tanks

Reserve Army Corps  — 1 Section “C” Company — 7 tanks

In G.H.Q. Reserve (all mechanically unfit) — 10 tanks

On September 11 operation orders were received from the Fourth Army, and on the 13th a conference was held, at which Lieutenant-Colonel Bradley attended, to discuss the forthcoming attack. During the 14th “A” Company arrived at Yvrench, and at 4.30 p.m. on that day the headquarters of “C” Company moved to the Briquetterie near Trones Wood, and the headquarters of “D” Company to Green Dump.

The frontage of the Fourth Army attack extended between the Combles ravine and Martinpuich, the intention being to break through the enemy’s defensive system and occupy Morval, Les Bœufs, Gueudeeourt, and Flers. Simultaneously with this attack the Reserve Army was to attack on the left of the IIIrd Corps, and the French on the right of the XIVth Corps. The attack was to be pushed with the utmost vigour, and was to be followed by the advance of the Cavalry Corps, which was to seize the high ground about Rocquigny-Villers au Flos-Rieneourt-lez-Bapaume.

The general idea governing tank movements, on this the first occasion of their use, was that they should be employed in sub-sections of two or three machines against “strong points.” Considerable apprehension existed as to the likelihood on the one hand of tanks, if they started too soon, drawing prematurely the enemy’s fire, and on the other of their reaching their objective too late to be an assistance to the infantry. It was finally decided that they should start in sufficient time to reach the first objective five minutes before the infantry got there, and thus risk drawing hostile fire. Our own artillery barrages, stationary and creeping, were to be brought down at zero, leaving lanes free from fire through which the tanks were to advance.

The tanks moved up from their positions of assembly to their starting-points during the night of September 14-15. Of the forty-nine machines allotted for the attack, thirty-two reached their starting-points in time for the battle, the remainder failing to arrive through becoming ditched on the way, or breaking down through mechanical trouble.

The tanks working with the Reserve Army and the IIIrd and XIVth Corps were not a great success; the operations of those with the XVth Corps were as follows:

The tanks allotted to this Corps assembled on the night of September 13-14 at the Green Dump, where the machines were tuned up for battle, and where stores of petrol and oil had been collected. On the night of the 14-15th the tanks moved up to their starting-points round Delville Wood. Every tank was given the route it had to follow, and the time it was to leave the starting-point; this was in most cases about half an hour before zero (dawn), and was intended to be arranged so that the tanks should reach the German trenches few minutes ahead of our own infantry. Briefly, the orders were for eight tanks to advance on the west of Flers, and six on the east of that village, their destination being Gueudecourt and the sunken road to the west of it. The tanks were to attack all strong points on their routes, and to assist the infantry whenever held up.

Of the seventeen tanks which moved off, twelve reached their starting-points; eleven of these crossed the German trenches and did useful work. One in particular gave great assistance where the attacking infantry were held up in front of the Flers line by wire and machine-gun fire; the tank commander placed his machine astride the trench and enfiladed it; the tank then travelled along behind the trench, and 300 Germans surrendered and were taken prisoners. Another tank entered Gueudecourt, attacked a German battery and destroyed one 77 mm field-gun with its 6-pounders; the tank was then hit by a shell and caught fire; only two of its crew got back to our lines.

This attack on September 15, from the point of view of tank operations, was not a great success. Of the forty-nine tanks employed, only thirty-two reached their starting-points; nine pushed ahead of the infantry and caused considerable loss to the enemy, and nine others, though they never caught up with the infantry, did good work in clearing up points where the enemy was still holding out. Of the remaining fourteen, nine broke down from mechanical trouble, and five became ditched.

The casualties amongst the tank personnel were insignificant. Of the machines ten were hit in action and temporarily rendered useless, and seven were slightly damaged, but not sufficiently so as to prevent them returning in safety.

The next occasion upon which tanks were used was during the attacks of September 25 and 26, five being allotted to the Fourth Army, and eight to the Reserve Army. Of these thirteen tanks nine stuck in shell-holes, two worked their way into Thiepval, and after rendering assistance to the infantry met a similar fate, and one, working with the XVth Corps, carried out the first “star” turn in the history of tank tactics, which in the report of the XVth Corps is described as follows:

“On September 25, the 64th Brigade, 21st Division, attack on Gird trench was hung up and unable to make any progress. A footing had been obtained in Gird trench at N.32 d.9.1, {18} and our troops held the trench from N.26 c.4.5, northwards. Between these two points there remained approximately 1,500 yards of trench, very strongly held by Germans, well wired, the wire not having been cut. Arrangements were made for a tank (female) to move up from here for an attack next morning. The tank arrived at 6.30 a.m. followed by bombers. It started moving south-eastwards along the Gird trench, firing its machine-guns. As the trench gradually fell into our hands, strong points were made in it by two companies of infantry, which were following in the rear for that purpose. No difficulty was experienced. The enemy surrendered freely as the tank moved down the trench. They were unable to escape owing to our holding the trench at the southern end at N.32 d.9.1. By 8.30 a.m. the whole length of the trench had been cleared, and the 15th Durham Light Infantry moved over the open and took over the captured trench. The infantry then advanced to their final objective, when the tank rendered very valuable assistance. The tank finally ran short of petrol south-east of Gueudecourt. In the capture of the Gird trench, eight officers and 362 other ranks were made prisoners, and a great many Germans were killed. Our casualties only amounted to five. Nearly 1,500 yards of trench were captured in less than an hour. What would have proved a very difficult operation, involving probably heavy losses, was taken with greatest ease entirely owing to the assistance rendered by the tank.”

The last occasion upon which tanks were used during 1916 was on November 13 and 14, in the battle of the Ancre, which completed the Somme operations for the year. Heavy rain had fallen, and the difficult ground along the river Ancre had been converted into a morass of mud. For this attack complete tank preparations were made, reconnaissances were carried out, and a tankodrome (Tank Park) was established at Acheux.

On account of the bad weather the original plan, namely, to use twenty tanks, was abandoned, and a much more modest scheme was evolved. Three tanks were to operate with the 39th Division opposite St. Pierre Divion. On November 13 these moved forward, and eventually all three stuck in the mud. North of the river Ancre two tanks were sent against Beaumont Hamel; these also became ditched. Next morning three more tanks were sent out to clear up a strong point just south of the last-named village. One of these was hit by a shell, and the remaining two, on reaching the German front line, became ditched. These two tanks were, however, able to bring their 6-pounders and machine-guns to bear on the strong point, and their fire proved so effective that after a short time the Germans holding it surrendered, and 400 prisoners were rounded up by the tank crews-2 officers and 14 other ranks.

From the point of view of the general observer it might be said that, except for one or two small and brilliant operations, the tank during the battle of the Somme had not proved its value. The general observer, however, is seldom the best judge, and when the actual conditions under which tanks were used, during the autumn of 1916, are weighed and the lessons sorted, history’s verdict, it is thought, will be, that they had so far proved their value that September 15, 1916, will in future be noted not so much for the successes gained on that day, but as the birthday of a new epoch in the history of war.

What were these lessons?

1. That the machine in principle was absolutely sound, and that all it required were certain mechanical improvements.
2. That it had not been given a fair trial. It had been constructed for good going and fine weather; it had been, unavoidably, used on pulverised soil, often converted by rain into a pudding of mud.
3. That, on account of the secrecy it was necessary to maintain, commanders had little or no conception of the tactics to apply to its use.
4. That sufficient time had not been obtainable wherein to give the crews a thorough and careful training.
5. That tank operations require the most careful preparation and minute reconnaissances in order to render them successful.
6. That tanks require leading and controlling in battle, and consequently that a complete system of communication is essential.
7. That tanks, like every other arm, require a separate supply organisation to maintain them whilst fighting.
8. That tanks draw away much fire from the infantry, and have as great an encouraging effect on our own troops as they have a demoralising one on the enemy’s.

These are the main lessons which were learnt from the tank operations which took place during the battles of the Somme and the Ancre, and the mere fact of having learnt them justifies the employment of tanks during these operations. Further it must be remembered that, whatever tests are carried out under peace conditions, the only true test of efficiency is war, consequently the final test a machine or weapon should get is its first battle, and until this test has been undergone, no guarantee can be given of its real worth, and no certain deductions can be made as to its future improvement.