The

dradharma-
nibandha texts, especially the longer and more elaborate ones, by K



a

e

a, Kamal

karabha


a, Dinakarabha


a, and
G

g

bha


a, tend to follow a certain pattern in terms of topics covered. Since “

dradharma” means “
dharma pertaining to the


dra,” the broadest questions to be addressed in these texts and providing their organizational logic are: (1) Who is a


dra?
(2) What is his
dharma? Answering (1) means asking:
(i) What is
var
a and who has it?
(ii) What is

dra-
var
a and who has it?
To answer these questions, the texts generate long lists of types of persons who do
not have
var
a: these are the
antyaja category (last-born or outcaste), some of whom count as equivalent to


dra (

dra-
sam
na), while others are inferior. Women, notably, are

dra-
sam
na across the board, on account of the a priori parity between the woman and the


dra (
str
-
dra-
sam
nat
). Proposing definite answers to (i) and (ii) above entails a discussion of what
var
a is (
var
atva), and of the essence of the four
var
a categories –
br
hma
atva,
k
atriyatva,
vai
yatva, and

dratva.
Rules governing marriage (
viv
ha), endogamy (
savar
a-viv
ha), hyper- and hypogamy (
anuloma /
pratiloma), miscegenation (
sa
kara /
var
asa
kara /
j
tisa
kara), sexuality, and the status of women, as the constitutive elements of a patriarchal
caste system, must then be thoroughly explicated and debated. Taxonomies of mixed
castes, together with their male and female parentage, their alternative names, their proper as well as optional professions,
and any other typical characteristics are set out, usually in the very beginning of the

dradharma text. The taxonomies of miscegenation have a generative aspect (
utpatti) as well as a determinative or classificatory aspect (
nir
aya). The mechanical mixture of mixed
castes produces an almost uncontrollable proliferation of subgroups (
sa
k
r
asa
kara). Like women, those of mixed caste also have either parity or inferiority with respect to the


dra, and are designated

dra-
sam
na,
ati-
dra,
antyaja,
sat-
dra /
asat-
dra, and other micro-classifications.
Most
s
dradharma digests are devoted to question (2) above: What is the
dharma of the


dra? The answer lies in numerous dos and don’ts associated with the rituals a


dra must perform. In this sense, “
dharma” becomes synonymous with “
sa
sk
ra,” and the minutiae of the various daily, monthly, annual, periodic, and life-cycle rituals prescribed for the


dra extend
into pages and pages of text. These portions of the


dra archive are curiously static. On the one hand, we cannot tell if
we are looking into the
seventh or the seventeenth century, so suspended is this discourse in the timeless ether of
Brahmin normativity. On the other hand, it is marked historically, because modern Indians know immediately that what they
are looking at is the past, not the present. Apart from a few rites associated with major life events – birth, naming, marriage,
and death – few Indians of almost any
caste inhabit any longer a living, coherent social world wherein these rituals make sense.
To attempt to write the history of
dharma in the narrow sense of life-cycle rites (
sa
sk
ra) is premised on the apprehension of a lapse in cultural memory that is disquieting. Some epistemological break has occurred
in our history to inhibit us, indeed debar us, from entering in our imagination the universe where it might have mattered
to someone whether or not he had the capacity to perform a certain
ritual of

dradharma in a certain way. Of course, one may question whether the discourse of
Dharma


stra ever, at any point in time, had a strong and demonstrable relationship to how people lived, thought, and acted.
But suffice it to say that, from the vantage of the present, the sections of our texts dealing with

dra-
sa
sk
ra appear archaic, if not altogether fantastic. Sarma’s recent quasi-fictional autobiography,
The Last Brahmin (
2007), explores the aporia that characterizes our relationship to this once vibrant world of Brahmanical rituals.
In an exhaustive treatment of the


dra archive, I focus on the place of language in these texts, in order to elucidate what I call their “poetics of contempt.”
Language is key in two ways: First, the


dra is defined as a person who stands at a particular, exactly measured, and strictly
enforced distance from
Sanskrit; and second, the language used to describe, police, revile, punish, and exclude the


dra from realms of upper-
caste privilege is startling in its force. It should be noted that both these uses of language in the hierarchical world of
var

ramadharma (the
dharma of caste and life-stage) – as a measure of lowliness and as a weapon of humiliation – are as old as all of the phenomena
under study: the category of the


dra itself, the Sanskrit language, and the system of
Dharma


stra. There is no respite to be had from the contempt characteristically associated with the


dra when the new digests
are written between the fourteenth and the seventeenth century. Rather, they become reiterations of very ancient, sedimented
forms of social inequality that are inscribed into the language itself.
One may investigate the language through which
dharma is differentially apportioned to the twice-born and to the


dra in a variety of genres. However, the relationship of the


dra to Sanskrit and thence to entire realms of social prestige and political power, is most clearly and metonymically figured
in the relationship of the


dra to the
Veda. If we diagram a
paradigmatic speech situation, the


dra appears as a silent listener and indirect addressee, never as a speaker or a direct
addressee: a perfect image of the


dra’s exclusion from or marginal status with respect to
caste society as a whole. In the social world that we can project from the speech situation sketched in Sanskrit texts, the


dra, mostly shut out altogether, is, at best, the designated eavesdropper. The historical depth of this contempt for the


dra in the long life of Sanskrit is revealed in the sources cited by the
digest authors, primarily a small set of stories from the
upani
ads and interpretations of these stories in major Ved

nta commentaries (see Vajpeyi in press). It turns out that the figure
of the


dra haunts the Brahmanical literature from some of its earliest phases, and always at the heart of the othering of
the


dra lies a set of maneuvers whose locus is language.
In the context of current scholarship on India, the topic of the


dra and, more specifically, of the relationship between the


dra and language, immediately calls to mind the school of
Indian historiography we know as subaltern studies. Historians of this school have worked almost exclusively on
colonial India, particularly on peasant groups and their politics from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century.
While

dradharma as a subject of
Sanskrit systematic thought is strictly speaking a precolonial phenomenon, the


dra should be thought of as a kind of subaltern.
The question to ask of the


dra archive is: “Can the subaltern speak?” in or through these texts (Spivak
1988). The answer, for the seventeenth century as for the twentieth, appears to be the same – “No.” The

dradharma digests do not reveal anything about either the


dra as a historical agent or the constitution of any given


dra collectivity
as a class in a feudal society, nor do they entextualize what Guha would describe as “subaltern mentality” (R. Guha
1998). Rather, because
Brahmins, even when they write about the


dra, appear to write exclusively for other
Brahmins, the

dradharma digests they compose embody and convey “elite mentality” par excellence.

dradharma-

stra as an elite discourse successfully represses all traces of the subaltern it takes as its principal object. We may read and
re-read the


dra archive to try and find in it the historical conditions to which it responds; it remains almost completely unyielding.
There is a complex story behind why and how
Sanskrit discourses, especially those in the

stra mode, achieved this near-perfect repression of subalternity or indeed alterity of any kind – in other words, what the linguistic,
epistemological, and ideological features of Sanskrit discursivity are that make it so perfectly an idiom of domination. Suffice
it to say that the elision of
historicity from Sanskrit discourse is related to its repression of
subalternity – the two
reinforce one another to produce the total absence of subaltern speech, even in our texts that are entirely about the


dra.
In the study of precolonial India, the trace of subaltern subjectivity has traditionally been sought in
bhakti poetry and other sorts of radical texts, usually in the vernaculars rather than in
Sanskrit for obvious reasons. But records of legal disputes too, when these disputes were between subalterns and elites –
here,


dra groups and twice-born groups – ought to provide some insight into


dra mentality. A dispute, no matter how skewed its
historical record, must necessarily capture two (or more) sides in a given disagreement. Unfortunately, to the extent that
the modality of legal dispute resolution (i.e., law) in cases involving
j
tinir
aya,
j
tidharma, and
var

ramadharma was tied to legal disputation, precolonial
caste disputes too show a tendency to assimilate to the Brahmanical repression of


dra speech that characterizes the theory
and practice of all

stra. In this sense, the moment the


dra comes into the purview of
dharma, whether in

stra texts (disputation) or in Marathi
gr
ma
ya records (disputes), the answer to the question “Can the subaltern speak?” goes into the negative.
The evidence preserved in the documents recording the judgments given (
vyavasth
-
patra) indicates only that the


dra disputants wanted to be recognized as not really being


dra at all, but instead as being
Brahmin,
K

atriya, Vai

ya, or
K

yastha. This is perhaps the most successful elision of


dra subjectivity: supposedly at the hands of the


dra agents themselves,
as it were. It would appear from the legal record that all the


dra ever wants is not to be one. The dispute then becomes
a contest between the presence and absence, or the assertion versus the denial, of


dra subjectivity, not a contest between


dra subjectivity and twice-born subjectivity over a set of rights and privileges. Even worse, the positive assertion – “This
group here consists of


dra individuals” – comes from the Brahmin side, while the denial – “We are not


dras” – comes from
the


dra litigants themselves. Thus even the body of legal disputes we can recover in a fragmentary fashion from sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century
Varanasi and in a more complete fashion from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Maharashtra does not assist us in moving from the philology of oppression to the practice of subaltern history.
1
Even as the


dra fails to speak through or in the
dharma-nibandha archive, the elephant in the room, as it were, is
caste. It does not matter whether we translate “
var
a” as “caste,” or “
j
ti” as “caste,” or both, or if the meaning of “caste” alternates between these two indigenous terms. The question of how to
translate “caste” in this context is beside the point. The fact is that within the sphere of
Sanskrit intellectual production in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, prior to the
colonial period,
G

g

bha


a and others like him were reflecting very deeply on the meanings of the category of the


dra, and a variety of
related categories that had to do with the place as well as the relative ranking of individuals and groups in a social structure.
This structure – with its axes of
ritual status, occupation, endogamy, power, and so on – cannot be understood except as caste society. Reflection on the subject
of the


dra, fittingly, was going on within the discourse of
dharma, and that too within the ambit of legal and juridical literature, the
Dharma


stra.
2
In reframing the large and variegated body of the
Dharma


stra within the relatively narrow genre of the
dharma-nibandha, and in taking the


dra as the overarching topic of discussion, jurists and scholars from 1550 to 1680
CE were engaging, precisely, in legal treatments of
caste. G

g

bha


a himself presided over and conducted caste-related rituals, for royals as well as laypersons; further, he
adjudicated caste disputes between
Brahmins and non-
Brahmins. We could say that he was active in the theory, practice, and politics of caste, in his capacity as both a scholarly
expert on and a respected practitioner of the law.
G

g

was, undoubtedly, a
precolonial figure, and as such he dramatizes the centrality of caste to precolonial intellectual life, legal practice, polity,
and statecraft. He was not alone in his interest in both caste and the law (via the disciplines of
Dharma


stra and M

m


s

) – he came from a family of scholars and jurists, the Bha


as of
Banaras. His father Dinakarabha


a began writing a text titled

dradharmodyota (“Elucidation of the
Dharma of the


dra”) that
G

g

himself completed. His uncle Kamal

karabha


a wrote possibly the most important
nibandha about the


dra, titled

drakamal
kara (“Kamal

kara’s Digest on the


dra”) sometime between 1610 and 1640
CE, a text still taught in
Sanskrit pedagogical environments today.
The Bha


as had moved to
Banaras from
Paithan, in
Maharashtra, in the fifteenth century. Paithan used to be a center of
Brahmin learning during Y

dava rule, but upon the fall of the Y

dava capital of
Devagiri between 1295/6 and 1325
CE, its intellectuals began to migrate north to
Banaras. By
G

g

’s lifetime,
Banaras had entirely replaced Paithan as the headquarters, in northern India, of Brahmin intellectualism, much of it diasporic.
Besides his own family, the

e

as of
Banaras, another family of migrants from Paithan, were also famous as legal scholars.
G

g

’s uncle Kamal

kara’s older contemporary

e

ak



a wrote yet another significant
digest on the


dra, titled

dr
c
ra
iroma
i (“Crest Jewel of


dra Conduct”) sometime in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century (Benke 2010).
G

g

bha


a participated in the institution of the
brahmasabh
, a council of
Brahmins called to adjudicate various sorts of disputes, including
caste disputes. Both late medieval
Banaras and, before that, early medieval
Paithan knew this institution, and it appears that local rulers, whether Hindu or
Muslim, would often direct disputing parties to these learned assemblies in order to have their issues settled according to
the rules of the
Dharma


stra.
3 On matters of
dharma, including
var
a and
j
ti, non-specialist administrative and legal functionaries of regional courts, lacking in
Sanskrit knowledge, deferred to specialist
Brahmins living in places like Paithan and later
Banaras. Dalmia describes
Banaras as a “supra-regionally recognized” locus of juridical authority (Dalmia
1996: 322–3). The
brahmasabh
would issue a decision, recorded in a document called a
vyavasth
-
patra (“document [
patra] bearing the decision [
vyavasth
]”) or
vijaya-
patra (“document spelling out the victory [
vijaya] of the
authoritative claim [
siddh
nta]”).
4 The disputants would carry out the
injunctions of this document, and their local political authority would not object.
G

g

bha


a’s ancestor R

me

vara migrated from
Paithan to
Banaras in the early sixteenth century. S.
Pollock records the names of several
prominent Marathi scholars resident in seventeenth-century
Banaras (
2001a and
2001b).
G

g

lived in
Banaras but, nonetheless, probably because he spoke Marathi and had family ties with his ancestral homeland, he became involved
in a number of cases surrounding the
ritual status of a
caste belonging to coastal
Maharashtra, the C

ndrasen

ya
K

yastha Prabhu (CKP).
5 This caste, today referred to in Maharashtra’s caste politics as “CKP,” was traditionally a highly literate group associated
with scribal and accountancy work, and connected, therefore, with royal courts and their administrative divisions. One of
Shivaji’s closest ministers, B

l

j

Citnis, was a CKP.
The CKP is one of a group generically referred to in the
dharma literature as
K

yastha, a
caste, as already mentioned, of scribes and accountants. Like
Brahmins, historically K

yastha communities can be found in many parts of the subcontinent, and in different places they have
distinct
j
ti names, as well as localized stories about their origins, their proper work, their true status, their position relative to
other local
castes, and so on. In
Shivaji’s reign the CKP were politically powerful, and
G

g

was enlisted to establish, textually as well as through his judgments on particular cases, that the CKP shared characteristics
with the
Brahmin as well as the
K

atriya, both high
castes, but not with the lowly


dra. Sometime between 1669 and 1672
CE he presided over a case involving the CKP (Bendrey
1960). Probably in this same period,
G

g

wrote
K
yasthadharmad
pa (“Elucidation of the
Dharma of the K

yastha”), which is a
nibandha text about
k
yasthadharma. It closely resembles, in purpose as well as form, the digests about

dradharma written by
G

g

and other authors.
While
G

g

was clearly a
caste expert, living in
Banaras (then a late medieval university town), and regularly traveling to his hereditary place of origin,
Maharashtra, to pronounce on legal matters there, the biggest case of his long and illustrious career, surely, was that of
Shivaji. To crown
Shivaji king was quite a complicated legal problem, and one that
G

g

was given very little time – though rather a lot of money! – to solve to his patron’s satisfaction. In a scarce few days
in the summer of 1674
CE, he had to make one argument from genealogy, another one from
ritual, and yet another one from textual authority, to be able to transform Shivaji, a Maratha chieftain of the Bhosa

e clan,
heretofore deemed a


dra, into Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, a
K

atriya king (Vajpeyi
2005). In June 1674
CE G

g

hastily
composed a
Sanskrit text titled
r
ivar
j
bhi
ekaprayoga (“Manual for the Royal Consecration of Shivaji”).
G

g

’s interest and expertise in
j
tinir
aya (the
adjudication of
caste) notwithstanding,
r
jadharma,
dharma for kings, and
r
jy
bhi
ekapaddhati, technique for royal consecration, were nonetheless areas that he knew relatively less about, and perhaps never expected
to have to know for any practical purpose.
Banaras at the time fell within the vast sweep of Aurangzeb’s
Mughal Empire, and most of what is today
Maharashtra was portioned out to the various
Deccan Sultanates. Only when
Shivaji presented the actual historical possibility of establishing in Maratha country a kingdom that is today retrospectively
characterised as “Hindu” did the need arise for
G

g

to research the precedents for
K

atriya
kingship in the
dharma texts of the
Brahmin traditions. In order to write
r
ivar
j
bhi
ekaprayoga he had to hurriedly consult his friend and fellow Maharashtrian scholar Anantadevabha


a, who directed
G

g

’s attention to the
Vi
udharmottarapur
a (“Vi


u’s Lore on the Higher
Dharma”), the
locus classicus of discourse about royal
dharma, as well as to his own work on the same subject,
R
jadharmakaustubha (“Crest Jewel of Royal
Dharma”).
6 There is evidence to suggest that Anantadeva joined
G

g

in presiding over the caste disputes involving
K

yastha and Brahmin groups in coastal Maharashtra.
The legacy of men like
G

g

and Anantadeva carried on through the unstable years of Maratha rule following
Shivaji’s death in 1680
CE, and continued well into the Peshwa period in the eighteenth century, when
caste disputes and their settlement became routine affairs in
Maharashtra. Examining the Peshwa archives, collectively called the Daftar, N. K. Wagle (
1970,
1980,
1982,
1987,
1998,
2005) has documented these disputes about the
ritual status of a variety of groups (a monumental task that is ongoing even today). These include
Brahmin, non-Brahmin, and
K

yastha litigants. In 1827
CE the CKP cited an old
Banaras
vyavasth
-
patra to bolster their claims to high-caste ritual privileges, specifically, the permission to recite
Vedic mantras during certain ceremonies, a privilege called “
vedokta” (literally: “the enunciation of
Vedic syllables”). Ultimately, by 1830
CE,
even the descendant and heir of Shivaji, the Chatrapati Bhosa

e of Satara, Prat

pasi

ha, was having to (re)claim and (re)establish
his
K

atriya credentials in the face of opposition that sought to demote him and his family back to the very


dra status that Shivaji had hired G

g

bha


a to consign to the past a good 150 years earlier.
Right from the first texts of the


dra archive, as early as 1350
CE, through to the difficulties of the Satara Chatrapati in 1830
CE, for 500 years before the establishment of the rule of the British Crown in India in 1857
CE, both before and after the arrival of the
colonial powers on the subcontinent,
caste, especially

dradharma, was the subject of intense intellectual, legal, and political activity. I have traced this history of the legal treatment
of caste, along with related intellectual and political developments, only in
Banaras and in
Maharashtra, through the figure of
G

g

bha


a who lived in both places and traveled constantly between them in connection with his work. But similar histories
can be discovered for medieval and late medieval
Mithil

,
Bengal, and large parts of the peninsular south, all of which had long-running traditions of
Dharma


stra scholarship, plenty of
Sanskrit intellectuals, a range of high, low, and middling
castes in fluctuating relationships with structures of political power, and historical memories if not continuing experiences
of “Hindu” rule of one sort or another.
True, it is difficult to find a monarch as charismatic as
Shivaji in any part of the subcontinent during or immediately after the high era of
Mughal rule (ending with Aurangzeb’s death in 1707
CE), or during Britain’s slow ascendancy, first through the Company in the eighteenth century, and then through the Crown in
the nineteenth century. But Shivaji, as pointed out earlier, was an exception, even for his personal
pandit,
G

g

bha


a. Apart from the individual and exceptional case of Shivaji, the larger trend that I have tried to sketch here,
of treating
caste as a matter of law, can and must be generalized over many parts of the subcontinent, throughout the medieval, late medieval,
and early
colonial periods. I say “must be generalized” by historians because there is every reason to believe that the


dra archive, which was generated along the full swath of the Gangetic Plain – from areas close to
Delhi in the west, to Almora in the Himalayan foothills, via
Banaras and Mithila, to
Bengal in the east – both reflected pan-regional concerns about the place of
j
tidharma in intellectual discourse, and fed back into legal practice as well as political activity on the ground.
7Whether or not


dra warlords had to be made into
K

atriya potentates, the status claims of a plethora of powerful or aspirant groups – entrenched
Brahmin elites as well as on-the-make
K

yastha,


dra, and other
castes – had to be adjudicated. When canonical
Dharma


stra texts did not provide specific enough indications, specialist
nibandha texts were written to address problems concerning the absolute and relative
ritual status, marriage,
inheritance,
property, occupations, nomenclature, diet, dress, worship,
punishments,
expiations, duties, and so on of the


dra, as well as other
castes. It is noteworthy that these

dradharma-
nibandha texts were produced entirely
before the Orientalizing and essentializing gaze of the European colonists encountered India with its numerous cultures, and set
out to comprehend
caste society through the multiple operations of Indology, linguistics, and the ethnographic state. The legal treatment of
caste was by no means the outcome exclusively of India’s long engagement with the colonizing Other.