Also, the relevancy of this area to international peace and security cannot be ignored. Names such as Tobruk and Bengasi have not been forgotten, and Egyptian and other Arab states are states entitled to a solution that does not again place them in jeopardy. The future of Libya, indeed, intimately affects the whole strategic position in the Mediterranean and the Near East.
—UN Ambassador John Foster Dulles, 1949
From the closing days of World War II until the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union finally imploded, the United States pursued a hostile policy toward its wartime ally along with the forces of international communism that Washington believed the Soviets controlled and directed. Soon after its creation in 1947, the National Security Council issued secret policy papers that called on the United States to wage economic, political, and psychological warfare to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union, the overthrow of the Soviet Communist Party, and the dismantling of the Soviet economic, military, and political order. Libya became a pawn in what came to be known as the Cold War even before World War II ended, and it remained in a highly dependent position for much of the next decade. In fluid circumstances, American policy toward Libya was often timid and uncertain as Washington vacillated between an idealistic policy of self-determination and the realistic need to deny the Soviet Union a toehold in northern Africa.
In World War II, the North African campaign, which set the stage for the eventual independence of Libya, consisted of three phases. The first opened in September 1940 when a large Italian army under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani invaded Egypt from Libya. There was little serious fighting until December of that year, when the British Army of the Nile, commanded by General Archibald Wavell, chased the Italians back five hundred miles into Libya. Phase two began in spring 1941, when Hitler dispatched the Afrika Korps, commanded by General Erwin Rommel, to assist his Italian allies. The fighting seesawed back and forth across the Libyan Desert for months until Rommel’s forces eventually advanced within seventy miles of Alexandria, Egypt. Phase three began in fall 1942, when American and British forces invaded Algeria and Morocco in the west while the British Eighth Army, commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, struck in the east at El Alamein and sent the Axis armies reeling back on one of the longest retrograde movements in history. At the end of its retreat, some 1,750 miles, a distance equivalent to marching from Moscow to Paris, the German army met the British First Army and American forces in the west. Allied forces under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower cornered the Afrika Korps in Tunisia, where the last Axis forces surrendered in May 1943.
Once the Axis armies had been routed, the British assumed responsibility for administering Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, initially as the Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory and later as the Military Administration, governing under the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention on the conduct of war. They would continue in this role until Libya eventually attained independence in 1951. France in turn administered the Fezzan until independence. While the French made half-hearted arguments for absorbing the province into their Algerian territories, they did not develop elaborate historical arguments to justify their position. Since Libya was considered occupied enemy territory, its government under international law was on a care and maintenance basis with the institutions and laws in effect at the time of occupation remaining operative. Early Allied diplomacy concerning Libya centered on Cyrenaica and Tripolitania as possible resettlement sites for European refugees, most of whom were Jewish.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the preparation, in early 1943, of a memorandum on the limits of land settlement in Libya to prepare himself for discussions with Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Third Washington Conference (12–25 May 1943). In response, the Department of State prepared a long and perceptive report that displayed an admirable understanding of the economy and geography of Libya. In a subsection entitled “Possibilities of Future Land Settlement,” the 22 May 1943 memorandum emphasized that the “Limits to future land settlement may be set by the technical aspects—the amounts of arable land available, the supply of water and the degree to which the land is already settled.” According to the report, the Italian government had acquired, by dispossessing Arab inhabitants, approximately 875,000 acres of land for settlement by 1938. Because large areas of this terrain consisted of rocky land, sand dunes, ravines, and eroded soil, only 360,000 acres, or less than half, were actually developed. The Italians settled 30,000 Italian agriculturists on this land in the 1922–38 period. From this evidence, the report suggested that the best land in Libya had already been used for settlement. While the memorandum concluded that additional settlement of European refugees in Libya was possible, it emphasized that such an effort would necessitate the displacement of existing Italian settlers, an extensive public works program, and prolonged subsidies until such time as the settlers were self-supporting.1
It addition to the physical and economic limits to land settlement, the memorandum to President Roosevelt also stressed the political considerations involved, emphasizing that the settlement in Libya of Jewish refugees would meet hostile opposition from local Arabs.
Should additional land be acquired for agricultural settlements, particularly for settlers to whom the Arabs are hostile, the present competition between pastoral Arabs for grazing land for increasing herds and flocks and agriculturists for cultivable land, is likely to break into open conflict. The basic struggle between the economy of the Arabs and of European Jews now existing in Palestine would thus be carried into Libya.2
In short, “Libyan Arabs would reject any settlement which would threaten their grazing land and facilitate the infiltration of European Jews into the cities.”3 The report also suggested that opposition to a resettlement program would not be restricted to Libyan Arabs but would undoubtedly extend to other Arab and Muslim countries.
Part of the Arab hostility to Jewish immigration into Palestine has been occasioned by fear that Jews desired to acquire domination of other Arab countries. The establishment of Jews in Libya with the aid of the United Nations would presumably be regarded by Arabs as an indication that those ambitions had received the support of the responsible United Nations, which already are believed by most Arabs to desire the creation of the feared Jewish State in Palestine.4
Earlier in the year, the United States chiefs of staff, under pressure from British authorities to establish a refugee camp in North Africa to which refugees in Spain escaping from France could move, had also recommended against the creation of resettlement camps. Citing a shortage of cargo and personnel shipping, the chiefs of staff stressed the additional burden such camps would place on theater commanders and “the possibility of Arab resentment to the influx of Jews which might cause disorder.”5 Nevertheless, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, dismissing the reasons given by the U.S. chiefs of staff as not very convincing, continued to press Churchill on the issue. As for the possibility that resettlement camps might cause Arab resentment, Eden naively opined that “this could surely be eliminated by putting the camp in a place sufficiently remote from important Arab centres.”6 Eventually, President Roosevelt responded to British pressure by agreeing to transfer some five to six thousand refugees from Spain to French North Africa, and from there to unidentified places of more permanent settlement for the duration of the war. At the time, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, in addition to Madagascar, remained under consideration as possible sites for the transfer of these refugees once they reached North Africa.7
The occupation of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania by British forces, together with Foreign Secretary Eden’s statement in the House of Commons on 8 January 1942 that the Sanusiya would not again fall under Italian domination, naturally raised the question of the future disposition of the Italian colonies. The Sanusi order, which had long resisted Italian domination, quickly allied itself with the British during World War II, forming the core of a small but symbolically important contingent known as the Libyan Arab Force. Although the ultimate implications of Eden’s statement in the House of Commons were not clear, his remarks suggested at the time that there might be separate arrangements in the postwar era for the different Libyan territories.8
In Washington, it was the August 1941 declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill known as the Atlantic Charter that best provided a broad definition of early U.S. policy intent in Libya. The Atlantic Charter pledged respect for the self-determination of peoples and progress toward global economic justice. In the new world order, the major powers would promote freer channels of commerce and fuller access to sources of raw materials but would not seek territorial changes that did not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. Beginning in 1942, President Roosevelt and other U.S. policy makers routinely referred to the Atlantic Charter as a global commitment. For this reason, even if many Europeans remained pessimistic about the immediate future, colonial subjects saw the moment as a highly propitious time to press for autonomy or even independence.9 The practical implementation of the ideals contained in the Atlantic Charter later left many of these early enthusiasts very disappointed.
The Division of Political Studies at the Department of State, in a memorandum dated 12 May 1943 prepared for the First Quebec Conference (14–24 August 1943), outlined four alternative approaches to the question of Libya. The first and preferred solution, according to this document, was the creation of an international trusteeship to govern Libya as part of a wider North African region. This proposal, put forward by a special subcommittee as early as 26 September 1942, was modified several times before May 1943. The idea was to place the administration of Libya in the hands of an international trusteeship with a governing council composed of Great Britain, France, and Egypt, with Ethiopia, Greece, and Turkey also considered for membership. According to the Department of State, opinion was against the participation of the United States in a trusteeship in this part of the world, although its memorandum was not clear as to exactly where such opposition was centered. In light of subsequent developments, it should also be noted that the State Department memorandum suggested that “in view of the rapid development of air-power . . . it was not important, from a security standpoint, who controlled Libya.”10 The position of the United States on this policy issue would change dramatically over the next few years.
The second alternative explored in the 12 May 1943 memorandum was to divide Libya, with Cyrenaica going to Egypt and Tripolitania to Tunisia. This proposal was opposed on the grounds that the poor administration of Egypt should not be extended to Cyrenaica while adding the Italians in Tripolitania to those already in Tunisia would further disturb the balance between French and Italians in Tunisia. The third alternative was the return of Libya to Italy. While there was little support for this approach, there was general agreement that whatever course of action was adopted should not preclude Italian migration into Libya or the enjoyment of equal opportunities by Italians in Libya. The final alternative discussed was the establishment of Libya as a refuge for Jews. This solution advocated the creation of a Jewish state in Cyrenaica and the settlement of Jewish refugees in villages and farms vacated by Italians as well as on additional land. As suggested earlier, an obstacle in the way of this approach was that little arable land was available in Libya beyond that already occupied by Italian colonists and indigenous cultivators. More to the point, the Department of State readily recognized that it would be extremely difficult to persuade Libyan Arabs to accept Jewish settlement. “An increase in Arab nationalism in Libya has been reported. An attempt to foster Jewish settlement in Libya might result in extending the area of Arab-Jewish conflict without offering any substantial relief to the Jewish refugee problem.”11
Less than a year later, in spring 1944, the British chiefs of staff advanced a variation of alternative two, the division of Libya. Cyrenaica would become an autonomous principality under Egyptian suzerainty with adequate safeguards for United Nations military requirements, including air and naval facilities in the Benghazi area. Tripolitania would be restored to Italy subject to a guarantee of demilitarization and British retention of the right to use Castel Benito Airfield as a staging point. In response to this proposal, Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt, who was attending the Second Quebec Conference, arguing that the preferred disposition of Libya would be an international trusteeship over both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, to be administered by a commission of experts responsible to the United Nations. This approach, Hull added, would not preclude the establishment of an autonomous Sanusi Amirate. If it proved impossible to obtain British agreement to this solution, he suggested to Roosevelt that a feasible, albeit less desirable arrangement would be to establish Cyrenaica as an autonomous Sanusi Amirate under Egyptian (or possibly British) trusteeship, along the lines of the British proposal. Tripolitania could then be placed under an international trusteeship to be exercised by Italy.12
A little over a year later, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet Union complicated the question of the disposition of Italian colonies by pressing for a Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania. At the time, the British continued to advocate a British trusteeship over Cyrenaica with Italy assuming responsibility for Tripolitania.13 In support of the Soviet position, Moscow reportedly argued that Great Britain and the United States had plenty of bases around the world and therefore could take Soviet interests into account. When Stalin later suggested that the British appeared unprepared to trust the Soviets in Tripolitania, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin responded that “there was no question of lack of trust but a desire to avoid competition.”14
In a top-secret briefing book prepared for the 1945 Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August), U.S. representatives explored alternatives for the former Italian colonies but failed to propose a program for their disposition. Instead, the Truman administration indicated that it would support any one of three solutions, if proposed by another government, in the following order of preference. First, in a reversal of policy, the United States now expressed a preference for the return of Libya to Italian sovereignty, subject to such measures of demilitarization as were devised for Italy. Second, Washington supported partition of Libya into its historic parts, with Cyrenaica established as an autonomous Sanusi Amirate under British or Egyptian trusteeship and Tripolitania retained under Italian sovereignty. Failing either of these solutions, the United States would support the partition of Libya with Cyrenaica established as an autonomous Sanusi Amirate under Egyptian or British trusteeship and Tripolitania placed under international trusteeship exercised by Italy. The State Department report also evidenced a newfound appreciation of the strategic importance of Libya. “Libya is strategically important for control of the central Mediterranean because of its ports and air fields.”15
The disposition of the Italian colonies, in particular Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, was discussed at some length at the 1945 Potsdam Conference; however, no decision was reached and further discussion was relegated to the foreign minister level. In the course of this dialogue, President Truman indicated on more than one occasion that the United States had no interest in a trusteeship over Libya. Truman added in a humiliating, albeit characteristic aside, “We have enough poor Italians to feed in the United States.”16 Generalissimo Stalin, on the other hand, repeatedly expressed interest in the North African colonies of Italy to the point that Prime Minister Churchill finally—and firmly—stated that the British government had “not considered the possibility of Russia claiming territory in the Mediterranean.” On the issue of Jewish settlement, Churchill suggested that there was little enthusiasm among European Jews for resettlement in Libya.17
In the immediate aftermath of Potsdam, the respective positions of the major powers on the disposition of the Italian colonies in Libya were surprisingly close. The British favored sovereignty over the territories placed collectively in four powers; the Soviets favored three powers; and the United States appeared generally willing to follow the British lead. While everyone talked of international trusteeships, the Europeans in reality had old-fashioned big-power mandates in mind. Unfortunately, the Soviets had picked Tripolitania for their postwar experiment in tending a Mediterranean outpost, and this was totally unacceptable both to Britain and to a Eurocentric Department of State already bombarding the new president with dire warnings about the resurgence of communism in Europe. While the State Department did not offer specific trusteeship proposals in the months following the end of the war, the context in which suggestions were offered made international arrangements appear less and less attractive. “This was one of the fundamental results of the beginning of the cold war: the paralysis of the creative side of diplomacy out of fear that the Soviets would use any and all multinational entities to subvert order and reason.”18
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the agency for the work of the great powers was the Council of Foreign Ministers. Viewed by Italy and the Axis allies as a “society of victors,” the Council was approved at the 1945 Potsdam Conference and met from 1945 to 1948 in a series of long and spirited, albeit largely unproductive, sessions. Coexisting with the new United Nations, a promising new path for international planning, the Council of Foreign Ministers was a throwback to older patterns that increasingly reflected the disarray among the big powers. The Council successfully negotiated peace treaties with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania, but resolution of the colonial issue repeatedly eluded its grasp. Discussions related to the disposition of the Italian colonies, which occasionally offered tantalizing possibilities for compromise and accord, more regularly mirrored the bipolar character of the new world order which defined the postwar era.19
At the time, U.S. policy continued to be torn between divided counsels, as was evident when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London in September 1945. The issue of Italian colonies was not, and had never been, a vital one for U.S. policy makers except insofar as American security might be involved. Europe was the priority, and Italy was not a priority even in Europe. The Office of European Affairs, concerned about the future role of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, recommended that the Italian colonies, including Libya, be returned to Italy in the form of trusteeships. The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, on the other hand, was inclined to give free rein to the United Nations organization and to implement the principles of international administration.
In the end, on September 15 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes offered a plan for establishing United Nations trusteeships in all former Italian territories. His proposal included a ten-year administration over a unified Libya, after which time the territory would become independent. Meeting privately with his Soviet counterpart, Byrnes reiterated many of the themes expounded earlier in the Atlantic Charter, arguing that the Arabs expected the Allies to honor wartime statements favoring self-determination. The creation of UN trusteeships would demonstrate to the world that the big powers were not seeking to exploit their victory. British Foreign Secretary Bevin accepted the U.S. proposal, but the Soviets continue to oppose it, pressing their claim to Tripolitania. In consequence, the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers ended with little hope of rapid progress toward a final resolution of the colonial question.20
While the Council of Foreign Ministers deliberated in London, New York Times columnist James Reston published an article that accurately outlined the State Department’s internal dialogue over the colonial issue. According to Reston, the dispute was “essentially one of the relations among the great powers and how they intend to reorganize Europe.” Reston described the wrangling over African colonies as in reality a struggle for the mastery of Europe with fundamental issues over the character of a postwar world at stake. Reston’s column proved highly influential as it became a common referent for analysts arguing that the disposition of the Italian colonies was a test case of Allied resolve to confront the new world order, rejecting the flawed diplomacy of the past. The chief roadblock to international trusteeship was not the question of revived Italian rule but instead Western fears of Soviet involvement.21
One month after the Council of Foreign Ministers completed their first session in London, prolonged anti-Jewish rioting broke out in Tripoli on 4 November 1945. The period immediately following the end of World War II was characterized by a state of euphoria in Libya in which Jewish-Muslim relations, especially in smaller towns and rural areas, seemed to settle down, as both groups evidenced a sincere desire to work peacefully together. Jews joined the city of Tripoli police force, something that had not occurred under Italian rule, and patrolled together with Muslims. At the same time, the establishment of the British administration increased expectations and support for complete freedom from colonial rule. In a charged and uncertain atmosphere, the anti-Jewish riots that broke out in late 1945 left more than 130 Jews and one Muslim dead in several days of rioting in Tripoli and nearby communities. The definitive history of the 1945 pogrom has yet to be written. Nevertheless, most observers agree that the riots constituted, at least in part, a symbolic statement on the part of the Libyan majority claiming the restoration of the proper order of Muslim sovereignty. American officials saw the riots as a clear indication that events in the Near East could quickly deteriorate in this and other ways if the Big Four failed to reach a satisfactory agreement.22
After Secretary Byrnes presented a proposal for UN trusteeship at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the State Department continued to work on an agreement for the Italian colonies with drafts crossing and recrossing the Atlantic from October 1945 to early 1946. A twenty-page proposal, dated 4 April 1946, called for UN administration of a unified Libya. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations would appoint a chief administrator, neither an Italian national nor a citizen of one of the four members of the Council of Foreign Ministers, to a term of five years. He would have full authority over the internal and external affairs of Libya and would be assisted by an advisory committee composed in part of one representative each from Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The chief administrator would create an international corps of civil servants, who would declare loyalty to the United Nations, to administer Libya. In addition, he would establish an independent judiciary and a police force to maintain order. The proposal also stipulated that Cyrenaica would become an autonomous Sanusi Amirate headed by Sayyid Idris, who would derive his power from the chief administrator acting as UN high commissioner to the territory.23
The American draft was an ambitious undertaking, as it sought to implant political rights that had never existed in Libya while committing a UN corps to train native peoples for self-governance of a unified state. By restricting big-power involvement to an advisory group that had few powers, the proposal offered little opportunity for Soviet interference. Envisioning an experimental regime committed to gradualism and evolutionary change, the American proposal in the end came to nothing. The draft American agreement for UN trusteeship was never again formally considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers.
The Egyptian government from the start took a keen interest in the Italian colonies, in particular Libya and Eritrea, because of their geographic proximity and the historical ties between Egypt and these colonies. As soon as the Council of Ministers opened their discussions in London, Egypt submitted a memorandum, dated 12 September 1945, expressing its interest in Libya and Eritrea and requesting that Cairo be consulted on the final disposition of both colonies. Stating that Egypt and Libya were tied by common bonds, the memorandum suggested that a plebiscite be held in Libya to ascertain whether the population preferred independence or union with Egypt. If the Council of Foreign Ministers decided against a plebiscite but in favor of a trusteeship, the Egyptian note recommended that the trusteeship be entrusted to either Egypt or the Arab League. When no decision on Libya was reached at the initial meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Egyptian government later asked to be present at the upcoming Italian peace conference. Egypt was not invited to the peace conference as a participant, but it was given assurances that its representative would be allowed to submit Egyptian viewpoints as an interested party. The Egyptian government would continue to play an important, albeit often peripheral role in Libyan affairs for the next twenty-five years.24
Together with Egypt, the Arab League, formed by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen on 22 March 1945 also expressed great interest in the future disposition of Libya. A self-appointed custodian of Arab interests in general, the Arab League aimed to place Libya, if it was not granted independence, under the sole trusteeship of Egypt or the collective trusteeship of the Arab League itself. As early as September 1945, Secretary General Abdul Rahman Azzam circulated a memorandum to League members expressing views very similar to those expressed by Egypt to the Council of Ministers. The Libyan question first appeared on the agenda of the Council of the Arab League on 4 December 1945, at which time the Council supported either Libyan independence or a trusteeship under Egypt or the Arab League. The Council of the Arab League, in subsequent meetings, continued to express its support for Libya whenever the issue was raised.25
In the months before the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, the Italian government persistently but unsuccessfully lobbied for a postwar role in its former African colonies, expressing particular interest in a trusteeship. Despite these efforts, the draft peace treaty with Italy failed to meet Italian expectations, with article 17 calling for Italy to renounce “all right and title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e. Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland” with the final disposal of these possessions to be determined jointly by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France within one year of the peace treaty coming into force. Given the contents of this proposed article, the Italian ambassador to the United States asked Secretary of State Byrnes in August 1946 to support omission of the Italian renunciation clause with respect to colonies so that the status quo in North Africa could continue for another year. Secretary of State Byrnes responded positively to the Italian suggestion and later proposed to the Council of Foreign Ministers a one-year delay in the final decision on the Italian territories in Africa.26
In the end, the provisions concerning the colonies in the Italian peace treaty, signed on 10 February 1947, did not change from the early summer of 1946. The treaty required Italy to renounce all right and title to its former African possessions of Eritrea, Libya, and Somaliland, leaving the respective British military administrations in power. Annex 11 of the treaty stipulated that future arrangements regarding the former Italian colonies would be determined by the joint decision of the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and France. The latter four powers were obliged to arrive at a settlement within a year of the treaty’s coming into force, which occurred with an exchange of ratifications on 15 September 1947. Failing that, the big powers were to submit the question to the UN General Assembly. In the interim, the foreign ministers of the four powers were authorized to continue study of the issue, using such investigative commissions as might be required.27
While the Council of Foreign Ministers was not the only battleground of the early Cold War, its first and second sessions produced an ongoing and ever more acrimonious exchange that reflected new alignments in international affairs. In this sense, the work of the Council clearly reflected the concerns and limits of Cold War diplomacy. The second Council session in Paris was followed by the Paris Peace Conference and then by additional meetings in New York in late 1946 before the anticlimactic signing of the peace agreements in February 1947. At this point, discussion of the disposition of the Italian colonies was essentially complete. After Italy renounced all claims to its colonies, the territories continued under British administration pending their final disposition by the Council of Foreign Ministers within one year of the peace treaty going into effect. If the Council failed to reach an agreement within this time, the future status of the colonies would be decided by the United Nations.28
Libya at the end of 1946 was divided into three zones: a nascent Sanusi Amirate in Cyrenaica, a volatile mix of ethnic groups side by side with a more urbanized culture in Tripolitania, and the French-controlled oases in the Fezzan. Despite the plethora of proposals made during Council sessions, there was little reason at the time to believe that a unified Libya would emerge in the foreseeable future. Great Britain planned to continue its close ties with Cyrenaica but was not interested in overseeing Tripolitania and could see little chance of dislodging the French from the Fezzan. The United States, with no interest in assuming trusteeship responsibilities in Africa, promoted a collective trusteeship plan that had some ideological appeal but generated little real support even at the State Department. In turn, the French were determined to retain control in the Fezzan and see Italy restored in Tripolitania. The Soviets hoped to use the colonial issue first to improve their bargaining position in Europe and later to increase their appeal to the Italian electorate by sponsoring the restoration of Italian rule in its former colonies.29
Each of the four powers expressed a desire to reach a solution to the problem of the Italian colonies that ensured the welfare of native peoples and was in the best interests of the international community. Nonetheless, the fate of Libya and the other colonies would be dictated in the end by the character of the power relationships issuing from the diplomatic duel in progress in the eastern Mediterranean. The requirements of modern air warfare and the political adjustments in progress due to the new power relationships arising from World War II combined to give Libya a level of international importance that was unimaginable only a few years earlier.
The end of the war witnessed “the total eclipse of French influence in the eastern Mediterranean and its weakening elsewhere, together with the rapid subsidence of British power, once paramount in the area.” Fresh impetus was thereby “given to Zionism, Pan-Arabism, and local Arab nationalist movements, all of which must be taken into account to a degree not customary in the past. . . . At the same time, the recession of the British and French empires has breathed new life into ancient Russian expansionism, emboldened by recent victories and strengthened by the crusading gospel of the Soviets.” Finally, the United States, “formerly given to righteous aloftness from the struggles of empire in the Mediterranean and African theatres,” now allied itself with Great Britain against the Soviet Union, “for what are, in reality, the paramount stakes of national security.” In a word, the Italian colonies in general and Libya in particular had become vital elements in the Cold War balance of power.30
The run-up to the Italian general elections in 1948 had a heavy impact on events in Libya as the United States and its allies worried that appreciable numbers of Italian voters could be swayed by the colonial issue. The Soviets weighed in early, in an effort to influence Italian voters, when they announced in mid-February 1948 that they favored an Italian trusteeship over all former colonies. American and British policy makers took a more cautious approach, favoring the postponement of a decision until after the elections. As it turned out, the Italian elections came and went with the Gasperi-Sforza regime demonstrating that it could withstand a communist challenge when sufficiently bolstered by external aid. In Washington, the lesson learned was that there was no need to accept Italian demands for trusteeships over former colonies.31
Although strategic considerations had been paramount in the case of Libya since the end of World War II, it was the European crisis in early 1948 that galvanized Anglo-American defense plans. In the aftermath of the Italian elections, the State Department and the Foreign Office pledged not to make public statements about the colonies without first consulting each other. Later, the State Department instructed the American delegation to coordinate its strategy with both British and French colleagues. To avoid appearing obstructionist, American delegates were directed to accept “reasonable compromises” on procedural issues, but on matters of substance there were to be no more East-West compromises. “Those days were over, obliterated by the drumbeat of incidents, confusion, and cold war mobilization epitomized by crackling tension over Berlin and the fate of Germany.” A British aide-mémoire in June 1948 called for a full and frank exchange of views with Washington over the Italian colonies; and the French government was later included in the discussions.32
Throughout the period, Libya remained the key to the preservation of Anglo-American strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In January 1948 Sir Orme Sargent, British Permanent Under Secretary, had described Cyrenaica as the best aircraft carrier in Africa albeit one lacking manpower and resources. The American base in Tripolitania at Mallaha, better known as Wheelus Field, also took on new meaning at this point. Largely demobilized in 1947, plans for the revitalization of Wheelus as a major postwar base took place in mid-1948. In short, the United States by early 1948 had committed itself fully to British interests in Cyrenaica, and by the summer of 1948, to the development of a major American base at Mallaha. With the European crisis of 1948 serving as a catalyst for American aims, the strategic interests of the two powers were now interlocked.33
In concert with the provisions of the Italian peace treaty, the Council of Foreign Ministers dispatched a Commission of Investigation to Libya in spring 1948 to report on the internal conditions of the territories and to ascertain the wishes of the people. Composed of one representative from each of the Four Powers, the Commission was instructed to gather facts but to refrain from making recommendations on the final disposition of the territories. The Commission arrived in Libya on 6 March and departed on 20 May, spending forty days in Tripolitania, twenty-five in Cyrenaica, and ten in the Fezzan. In Tripolitania, rival political parties united to present a declaration of policy embodying three principal points: complete and immediate independence, the unity of Libya, and membership in the Arab League. While interviews with individuals outside the influence of political parties confirmed an almost unanimous desire for independence, the Commission later reported that Tripolitania was not ready for independence because it was not self-supporting with its future existence and economic development dependent on external assistance.
As for the Fezzan, sparsely populated with meager resources, the Commission quickly concluded that it was doubtful it could ever become an independent entity. In Cyrenaica, the last province to be visited, the Commission found strong support, especially among the tribes, for independence under whatever form of government Amir Idris might approve. At the same time, it was again clear that the province was not self-supporting and that foreign assistance would be required for many years to come. Torn by conflicting interests, the members of the Commission were eventually able to agree only on a few fundamentals. The people of Libya were virtually unanimous in their desire for freedom from foreign rule, although a mature understanding of the responsibilities of independence was clearly lacking. A corollary to the general aspiration for independence was the widespread lack of sentiment for a return to Italian rule. At the same time, due to the low level of economic development, the country was certainly not self-supporting; therefore, the Commission concluded it was not yet ready for independence.34
On 23 July 1948 President Truman approved National Security Council recommendation NSC 19/1 as the core policy statement for American negotiators. Abandoning any thought of collective administration of the ex-colonies, the document acquiesced in British interest in a trusteeship over Cyrenaica. British governance over Tripolitania was also preferred, and the French should evacuate the Fezzan, although this question was deemed not important enough to warrant serious discord. NSC 19/1 failed to resolve the fate of Libya and was immediately followed by a new State Department plan to postpone discussion of the issue for a year in the hopes of achieving a favorable decision in the United Nations. The document was noteworthy only because it again demonstrated the full extent to which the fate of Libya had become ensnarled in the Cold War. The U.S. government in NSC 19/1 opposed immediate independence for Libya on the grounds that creation of a weak state would invite infiltration and aggression on the part of the Soviet Union.35
At the final session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which opened in Paris on 13 September 1948, the Soviet delegate, in an astonishing shift of policy position, proposed placing the colonies under a UN trusteeship. The administration of the trusteeship, according to the Soviet plan, would then be responsible to a Trusteeship Council assisted by an advisory board that would include the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet initiative reproduced almost verbatim the 15 September 1945 proposal of Secretary of State Byrnes and thus returned the Council to its starting point. The American, British, and French representatives on the Council quickly rejected the Soviet plan as impractical, transferred responsibility for the Italian colonies to the United Nations, and ceased to function.36
The movement of the Libyan question from the Council of Foreign Ministers to the General Assembly of the United Nations was of decisive importance to the future of Libya. The General Assembly was a body in which no veto could prevail, as it consisted of fifty-eight members voting on the basis of equality and deciding important issues by a two-thirds majority. Resolution of the issue might not be made easier by the change of milieu, but the question in this forum would be addressed under very different rules. Unanimity was no longer a prerequisite; and all debates, with the exception of those in subcommittee, were in public. The net result was that the transfer of proceedings to the United Nations gave all parties involved a larger and more accessible forum in which to plead their case. At the same time, the diversity that marked the United Nations from the outset was quickly reflected in the plethora of formulas, propositions, and proposals put forth to determine Libya’s destiny.
The Libyan question was placed on the agenda of the third session of the UN General Assembly, scheduled to meet in Paris in September 1948; however, due to a crowded agenda and the limited time given delegates to consult their governments, the question was deferred to the second part of the third session, which opened in Lake Success in April 1949. It was placed initially on the agenda of the First Committee (Political and Security); the deliberations of the committee soon revealed that the divergent views that had prevailed in the Council of Foreign Ministers would be carried over in greater measure into the United Nations. The Soviet representative argued that peace and security in the area necessitated the withdrawal of British forces from Libya together with the establishment of a UN trusteeship. In turn, delegates from Great Britain and the United States suggested that regional peace could not be maintained through UN administration and instead necessitated the retention of British bases in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.
In outlining the U.S. position, the American delegate emphasized that a decision on the future of Libya should consider the interests of the inhabitants as “paramount” but also take into account concerns for international peace and security. “The inhabitants seem well advanced toward self-government and independence, and we believe any Assembly decision should put the primary emphasis on achieving early independence.” At the same time, he emphasized that “the relevancy of this area to international peace and security cannot be ignored. . . . The future of Libya, indeed, intimately affects the whole strategic position in the Mediterranean and the Near East.” While the Egyptian delegate once again took the view that Libya was ready for immediate independence, other delegates questioned the area’s preparedness for such a decisive step. When prolonged discussion in the First Committee identified no common ground for action on the Libya issue, a subcommittee was appointed to study and propose a resolution to the opposing viewpoints.37
The U.S. government by 1949 was reluctant to see any form of UN trusteeship in the area because it would threaten Washington’s plan to develop Wheelus Field into a strategic air base. Henry Serrano Villard, the first U.S. Minister to Libya, later pointed out that the administrator of a trust territory under the UN trusteeship system could not establish military bases except in the case of a strategic trusteeship such as that enjoyed by the U.S. at the time in the formerly Japanese islands of the Pacific. However, strategic trusteeships were subject to veto in the UN Security Council of which the Soviet Union was a member. If Libya passed under any form of UN trusteeship, it would thus become virtually impossible for it to play a role in the defense arrangements of the free world. As an independent entity, on the other hand, Libya could enter into treaties or other arrangements with the Western powers looking to the defense of North Africa and the Mediterranean.38
After the subcommittee had been formed, the British and Italian foreign ministers together suggested a compromise formula, often referred to as the Bevin-Sforza plan, which gave ten-year trusteeships to Britain in Cyrenaica, Italy in Tripolitania, and France in the Fezzan. At the end of this period, Libya would be established as an independent state if the General Assembly decided such a step was appropriate. Acknowledging Libyan aspirations for independence, the proposal also safeguarded, at least temporarily, American and British strategic interests in the region. The Bevin-Sforza plan received the support of France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Latin American states, but was opposed by the Arab, Asian, and Soviet blocs on the grounds it ignored the national aspirations of the Libyan people.
Less than six weeks after declaring the interests of the Libyan people to be paramount, the U.S. delegate justified support for the Bevin-Sforza plan on the grounds the approach offered a path to both independence and unity.
Independence will be attained in 10 years unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary at that time. Unity is arranged for in the recommendation that the powers charged with the administration of the three territories should take adequate measures to promote coordination of their activities in order that nothing should be done to prejudice the attainment of an independent and unified Libyan state . . . the truth is that the formula of the resolution contains ample provision for working out the necessary machinery to achieve a unified state at the time of independence.39
In the end, U.S. support for the Bevin-Sforza plan was simply another example of strategic concerns outweighing the articulated and recognized interests of the Libyan people. Eventually accepted by the First Committee, the plan was widely criticized by Third World delegates because it originated outside the United Nations, ignored the interests of the native population, and divided Libya into three entities after the principle of unity had been accepted. The Bevin-Sforza plan generated widespread protests in Tripoli and elsewhere in Libya before it was finally and overwhelmingly defeated by the Arab, Asian, and Soviet blocs in a May 1949 General Assembly vote.40
With the rejection of the trusteeship proposal, some agreement on independence for Libya became a foregone conclusion. Both the United States and Great Britain now declared themselves in favor of independence, despite what they considered to be the backwardness of the country, but argued that a preparatory period of three to five years was necessary to lay the groundwork for self-government. Championing the cause of colonial areas, the Soviet Union called for immediate independence, together with the withdrawal of foreign forces and the liquidation of military bases within three months. The Arab and Asian representatives, together with Italy, also favored immediate independence. In support of this objective, in late 1949 the First Committee adopted a draft resolution that called for Libyan independence no later than 1 January 1952. After considerable debate, the General Assembly approved a resolution on 21 November 1949 calling for Libya, comprised of Cyrenaica, the Fezzan, and Tripolitania, to become an independent and sovereign state no later than 1 January 1952.41
On 10 December 1949, the UN General Assembly appointed Assistant Secretary General Adrian Pelt as UN Commissioner for Libya with a charter to assist the inhabitants of Libya to draw up a constitution and to establish an independent state. The General Assembly also provided for a ten-member Advisory Council consisting of representatives of Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, together with four Libyan leaders appointed by Pelt, to assist the Commissioner to accomplish his tasks. The Egyptian and Pakistani members on what came to be called the Council of Ten often expressed dissenting opinions in the coming months on questions related to the role of the administering authorities and the constitutional form of the Libyan state. The Egyptian representative was especially forceful on the question of federalism versus unity as his government strongly preferred a unified form of government for Libya. In turn, the United States argued consistently, and in the end successfully, that federation was the form of unity best suited for Libya.42
The Soviet Union, to the surprise of many observers, largely disengaged from the Libyan issue in the years immediately after 1949. Intensely involved in the earlier Council of Foreign Ministers discussions, Soviet interest waned after the question passed to the United Nations and debate moved outside the central concern of Moscow, a military base in North Africa. If Soviet interest and involvement had continued in 1949–51 at the same level as before, the outcome of the UN mission would likely have been very different. Aggressive Soviet support for Arab League and Egyptian demands for a unitary Libyan state dominated by Tripolitania, for example, would have affected political attitudes in Cyrenaica and the Fezzan and possibly blocked the creation of a unified Libya.43
The Western governments, on the other hand, continued to view Libya within the context of the Cold War and related global strategies. The British government worked to consolidate diplomatic and political relations in Cyrenaica in order to establish a sound foundation for its military bases there.44 The French repeatedly expressed concern that independence in Libya would destabilize the region by encouraging similar movements elsewhere in North Africa. For strategic purposes, France hoped to retain and strengthen its position in the Fezzan to slow the westward spread of Arab nationalism. In the words of Minister Villard, “France alone was not eager to see the sudden rise of an independent country next door to the nationalistically inclined Arab peoples of the French North African territories.”45 The United States, while supporting independence for Libya, worked to solidify its strategic position at Wheelus Field near Tripoli before independence took place. At the same time, American diplomats remained concerned about the level of communist activity in Libya, a concern that in retrospect was more a barometer of American xenophobia than a recognition of a realistic threat.46 Finally, the Italians had reconciled themselves to independence for their former colony and now waited patiently for the opportunity to forge new agreements to protect their economic and financial interests in Tripolitania.
On 2 December 1950 the National Assembly of Libya approved a fundamental law that provided for a constitutional, democratic, and representative form of government based on federal and monarchical systems. The assembly offered the throne to Amir Idris of Cyrenaica on the same day, but the Amir preferred to wait until a constitution was promulgated before accepting the throne. On 7 October 1951 the National Assembly proclaimed the Libyan constitution; independence was declared on 24 December 1951. The Libyan constitution established a hereditary monarchy under Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi with a federal state divided into the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan. It also provided for executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government with a parliament consisting of a senate and a house of representatives. Parliamentary elections were held in early 1952, and the first session of the new parliament opened on 25 March 1952.
The negotiations over the disposition of the Italian colonies in general, and Libya in particular, were complex, intense, and prolonged. At stake in the decisions were a myriad of convoluted aims and interests. Military and strategic considerations included American and British plans to maintain Libya as a Western base area as well as to keep it out of Soviet hands. The British also hoped to buttress the sagging bulwarks of their imperial system in Africa and the Middle East. The French rightly worried that any decisions taken on Libya or the other Italian colonies might generate nationalist sentiment and unrest in the neighboring French territories in North Africa. The Soviets hoped to gain access to the Mediterranean shore, and when that proved impossible they moved to deprive the British of their strategic foothold. Other considerations included Italian prestige, the British pledge to the Sanusiya of Cyrenaica that they would not be returned to Italian rule, and Arab interests in the Muslim populations of the region. Of course, there were also the expressed interests of the Libyan people themselves, defended by those members of the United Nations that supported the aspirations of colonial peoples, and exploited by Moscow once it became clear the Soviet Union would not gain a position in Tripolitania. And even this complicated list of interests and objectives by no means exhausts the multitude of cross currents and ramifications involved in reaching a decision on the disposition of Libya.
Given the circumstances, it was not surprising that the United States government shifted policy positions frequently in an effort to find a solution that would, from the viewpoint of policy makers in Washington, both guarantee the security of the region and protect American interests. Primary among those interests was the shorter term, tactical need to utilize Wheelus Field near Tripoli as a link in the supply chain for American occupation troops in Europe together with the longer term, strategic need to maintain a position on the Mediterranean coast as a base for the southern flank in the event of a European war. Wheelus Field was soon seen as the essential western anchor in an arc of strategic bases stretching from Libya to Saudi Arabia. Consistent with these objectives, the fundamental aim of American policy was to broker an agreement in Libya, any agreement, as long as it served and supported core American interests.
In the process, the U.S. government, less than a decade after the issuance of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, compromised and very nearly abandoned its pledged respect for the self-determination of peoples. This conscious redirection of American policy took place despite a clear understanding in Washington as to the interests and wishes of the Libyan people. The work of the 1948 Commission of Investigation, undoubtedly the most systematic effort of its kind conducted in the first half of the twentieth century, went well beyond anything conceived of by the League of Nations under its mandate system. Consequently, the U.S. government, together with the other members of the Council of Foreign Ministers, had a clear picture of existing economic, social, and political conditions in Libya at the end of the decade. In particular, the Commission confirmed in Libya the widespread existence of an exuberant form of nationalism among disparate and mostly illiterate peoples, together with a general preference for immediate independence. Policy decisions made in Washington in this time frame mark the outset of a long-term underestimation of the strength and importance of national aspirations and nationalism in Libya and elsewhere in the Arab world.
The issue of the Italian colonies was never a vital one for the United States government, but Soviet interest in Tripolitania eventually made the disposition of Libya a key strategic issue. Where State Department memoranda drafted at the beginning of the 1940s could suggest that control of Libya was unimportant from a strategic standpoint, the situation had changed completely less than a decade later. The provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, peopled with outspoken nationalistic groups, assumed an exaggerated strategic value in the immediate postwar world. The fact that the two provinces were loosely linked historically, despite geographic, demographic, and religious divisions, only made their disposition that much more difficult. Consequently, the conflicting policies of the big powers soon became Libya’s strongest ally in achieving unity and independence. There was discord within Libya, but there was even more discord in the world outside.
In the end, Libya started down the road to independence because the foreign powers with the most interest in its future could develop no consensus on what that future should be. In this regard, the decision to turn the issue of Libya over to the United Nations marked the total failure of the Big Four to resolve among themselves the question of the disposition of the Italian colonies. And the celebrated decision of the United Nations to give Libya independence, while it reflected the wishes of the Libyan people as confirmed by the Commission of Investigation in 1948, was in fact a stage-managed compromise on the part of three of the Big Four powers—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to achieve a solution they were unable to negotiate with the Soviet Union through the Council of Ministers. Libya had become an arena for the interplay of great power rivalry, a contest that predated the outset of the Cold War and was exacerbated by it. More than Iran or other rimland controversies, Libya was center stage in the East-West conflict in the immediate postwar period, and it would remain so for many years to come.