A major US objective in Libya is to retain use of Wheelus Field after Libya becomes independent.
—Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 1950
We cannot afford to lose Libya.
—Vice President Richard M. Nixon, 1957
Granted independence in December 1951, Libya was the first African state to achieve independence from European rule and the first and only state to be created by the UN General Assembly. A fragile product of bargains and compromises, the United Kingdom of Libya was driven by a complex web of internal and external demands and interests. In the end, it was a genuine surprise to most observers that it lasted almost eighteen years, a period in which it brought a certain precarious stability to the eastern Mediterranean. From 1951 to 1969, eleven prime ministers and more than forty different cabinets demonstrated an unexpected resilience in dealing with a succession of domestic and international crises that increasingly involved Libyan vulnerability to the Arab nationalist currents sweeping the Middle East.
After World War II, the United States worked to clarify its strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Comprising Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, Israel, and Libya, the security of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was considered to be “of critical importance to the security of the United States.” Accordingly, it became U.S. policy to support the security of the region, including the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. President Harry S Truman articulated the American response to the Soviet threat at a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947. In what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, the president requested immediate aid for Greece and Turkey on the grounds that the United States must support free peoples resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. In implementing this policy, Washington later declared itself willing “to make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective.” Political and economic means were to be exhausted first, including resort to the United Nations, before turning to force. “Any resort to force should be in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and in cooperation with like-minded members of the United Nations in so far as possible [author’s emphasis].”1
Recognizing the pivotal role Arab-Israeli relations would play in the achievement of its regional objectives, the Department of State identified a number of fundamental propositions to guide its policy toward Israel and the Arab states. First, it recognized that the political and economic stability of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was crucial to the security of the United States. Therefore, the State Department concluded that it was in the national interest to enjoy the goodwill and respect of all peoples of the region, Arab and Jew alike, and to orient those peoples away from the Soviet Union. Third, the differences between the newly established Israeli state and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled, at least to the extent that the Arab states and Israel would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression. The best means to achieve this result, according to the Department of State, was for the United States to assert impartial leadership in the resolution of regional economic, social, and political problems. Finally, the close collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in evidence throughout the postwar period should continue wherever possible to achieve these core objectives.2
At the Department of State, the above appraisal of U.S. security interests in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East suggested the following strategic requirements. Washington must first deny any foothold in the region to a hostile power, that is, the Soviet Union. It must also maintain friendly relations with the countries involved, promoting and cultivating such relationships with economic and social assistance, together with military assistance as might be practical, to ensure the collaboration of the indigenous peoples in the common defense of the region. Third, the oil resources of the area must be developed by the United States and other countries with a friendly attitude toward the United States. Finally, the United States must take the steps necessary to ensure the right of American military forces to enter military essential areas upon threat of war.
In accordance with these four strategic requirements, the State Department recommended that the United States secure a series of air base facilities in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East that would be anchored in the east by the air base at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and in the west by the facility at Wheelus Field outside Tripoli. Concerning Wheelus Field, the State Department emphasized that it was “highly important that we be able to work out satisfactory arrangements for continuing our rights to use this important airbase when a solution in the UN has been attained as regards disposition of the Italian Colonies.” The same memorandum also reiterated the importance of British policy to American strategic interests in the region:
We have already undertaken and should continue to coordinate the handling of our common strategic interests in the area with the British as it would be unrealistic for the United States to undertake to carry out its policies unless the British maintained their strong strategic, political and economic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and they and we follow parallel policies in that area.3
While the British bases in Cyrenaica were not specifically mentioned in this memorandum, they had been the subject of earlier State Department memos and were clearly considered by Washington to be crucial to its strategic interests in the region. As early as 1947, the State Department had supported “arrangements for the establishment of permanent British bases in Cyrenaica” when the final disposition of that territory was decided.4
In the run-up to Libyan independence, the strategic interests of the United States remained largely unchanged. If there was a change, it was a growing recognition that British defense potential might prove inadequate to the needs of a region threatened by an adversary so formidable as the Soviet Union. American policy makers eventually concluded that U.S. actions seemed likely to be decisive in the long run here as well as elsewhere in the world. The United States joined the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey in proposing a Middle East Command whose principal efforts focused on bringing Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and developing a chain of strategic air bases under American control. At one point, American policy makers even considered including Libya in NATO on the grounds it might prove easier to address defense requirements through a multilateral arrangement of this kind as opposed to bilateral agreements, but the idea was quickly discarded as impractical.5
In early May 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, concerned there might be “misunderstanding and misinterpretation” concerning U.S. policy toward Libya, summarized that policy in a telegram to the U.S. consulate in Tripoli. He emphasized that the United States had two main objectives in Libya. First, in conjunction with the British, Washington sought to obtain the right to establish U.S. and UK military facilities in the area. And second, the United States looked forward to establishing an independent and sovereign Libya no later than 1 January 1952. “In achieving these objectives,” said Acheson, “US desires [to] have so far as possible friendship, understanding and respect peoples inhabiting Libya, of Arab states interested in Libyan problem, and of other members UN. We do not wish [to] have our true intentions, motivations or policy [the] subject of suspicion.”6
A number of related considerations, many of which were discussed at a North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference in Tangier on 2–7 October 1950, influenced U.S. policy toward Libya at this juncture. First and foremost were the security aspects of the region. “North Africa, that is, the area north of the Sahara, is of considerable strategic importance since it commands the southern approaches to Europe and the western approaches to the Middle East.” Arab nationalism, especially after the creation of Israel in mid-1948, was clearly recognized as a potent force and a future threat to security interests. “The conference concluded that nationalism is an important factor in North Africa but one which has been exploited by the Arab League and by intellectual opportunists. Despite these factors, it constitutes the real force of the future in this area [author’s emphasis].” “All these nationalist elements are strongly anti-French, and since our policies are frequently similar to those of the French because of our coinciding interests, they frequently oppose our policies as well.” The report added that the reservoir of goodwill that the United States enjoyed in Libya and elsewhere in North Africa as a result of World War II was receding because the United States was not assisting the nationalists to achieve their goals.7
Misreading the intent of many Arab nationalists, the Tangiers report, together with later U.S. policy statements, expressed concern about the potential for communist infiltration of the region, especially in the wake of Arab nationalist activities:
The strength of communism is negligible. We must have and we do have stability in this area against the possibility of military operations. If the Arab nationalist leaders were to attain power, it would inevitably create a situation of instability in this area which might last for years or decades, since there is little evidence that the nationalist leaders are less selfish than the French. Therefore, we cannot project any great advantage to the people of this area in the event that the Arab nationalists were to obtain power.8
George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, made the State Department’s view of the connection between Arab nationalism and communism explicit in a November 1950 memorandum to Secretary of State Acheson:
There continues to be a reservoir of goodwill and respect toward the United States throughout Northern Africa among all elements of the population. . . . There is impatience among the Arabs with our apparent reluctance to give concrete recognition to Nationalist aspirations, and our apparent willingness to side with France in order to buy temporary security against the Russian menace. Our prestige is probably higher in Libya than in any other part of the area, because of U.S. support of Libyan independence.
There is uniform opposition to Soviet expansionism throughout the area, and an admiration for the vigor with which we have countered this threat in Korea and elsewhere. While the Arab Nationalist leaders have occasionally flirted with the Communists, they have done so not because of admiration for Communist tenets or as a reflection of ultimate solidarity with Communists, but opportunistically to achieve their own aspirations.9
The United States continued to take a jaundiced view of nationalist movements in Libya for much of the next two decades out of fear that such movements would encourage and facilitate the spread of communism. With the advantage of hindsight, this policy was doomed to failure from the outset. Opposition to Arab nationalist movements, especially when coupled to support for unpopular French policies in neighboring states, facilitated in the end the spread of the very movements it hoped to contain.
The core objectives outlined by Acheson in May 1950, coupled with the State Department’s regional assessment as reviewed above, led the United States to take three important interrelated decisions at the outset of the decade. First, the United States recognized that it must continue to coordinate its policies with the United Kingdom if it was to maximize its strategic position in the region. Second, Libya would clearly require ongoing support from the United States if it was to maintain its independence. The Tangier report put it succinctly, “Libya must be propped up with military and economic support if it is to become a viable state.”10 Finally, American policy makers concluded that it would be wise to negotiate a military base agreement before independence, if possible, because the negotiating position of the Libyan government would strengthen after independence and the opposition would be emboldened.
After largely demobilizing the air field at Mallaha in 1947, the European crisis in early 1948 caused the United States to reverse course and begin in mid-1948 to develop Wheelus Field into a major postwar base. That said, as late as September 1950 the United States still had no agreed upon policy for the negotiation with Libya of a long-term agreement to retain Wheelus as part of the strategic American base system. American reluctance to negotiate base-rights agreements on a quid pro quo basis in return for economic assistance from the United States was a particularly difficult obstacle. Andrew G. Lynch, the American consul general in Tripoli, proved clairvoyant when he observed in May 1950 that the linkage of base rights to financial aid could “lay us open to perpetual blackmail on [the] part [of] any new states, which may evolve, and introduce [a] source of constant friction, particularly on occasions when circumstances forced fluctuations in our direct financial aid.”11 The Libyans, of course, approached the issue from the reverse perspective. They viewed their geographic location as their most tangible—and most negotiable—asset.
Both the State Department and the Department of Defense agreed that providing financial assistance directly to Libya for the use of Wheelus Field could set a dangerous precedent that might well affect U.S. base rights in other parts of the world. In addition, the United States might want to retain the use of such bases for a longer period of time than it might grant economic assistance to Libya or any other country in which they were located. U.S. bomber bases in England were an example cited at the time in support of this rationale, as the intent was to retain them for the long term while Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) aid to the United Kingdom was scheduled to cease in 1952. James T. Hill, general counsel to the secretary of the air force, in a recently declassified Top Secret memorandum dated 11 July 1951, summarized U.S. policy at the time.
As you know, it is contemplated that in connection with negotiating United States requirements for bases in Libya, the United States will have to agree to make some contribution to the Libyan economy. Estimates indicate that Libya’s annual deficit will be in the nature of twelve million dollars and that one of their few assets is their strategic location [author’s emphasis]. The State Department estimates that in addition to funds which may be made available under the foreign aid program, the United States will have to pay between three-quarters of a million and one and one-half million dollars annually for base rights.
It has been informally agreed by Defense and State, with the knowledge and approval of Mr. [Robert A.] Lovett [deputy secretary of defense] and Mr. [George C.] McGhee [assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs], that there should be no formal connection between base rights and our financial contribution to the Libyan economy, although this will, of course, be a principal subject of discussion in the base negotiations. It has been further agreed that securing from Congress whatever sum may be necessary is the responsibility of Defense, and that this fund will be turned over to Libya in appropriate form by the State Department as economic assistance. There will be no attempt to disguise the fact that the United States is giving such assistance.12
How best to maintain a distinction between obtaining base rights and providing economic assistance to Libya remained a subject of debate within the U.S. government for months on end. With the Libyans approaching the issue from the opposite end, that their strategic location was their primary asset and one for which the United States should expect to pay, the distinction between base rights and economic assistance would prove impossible to maintain.
The optimum timing of base-rights negotiations complicated American policy. With Libyan independence scheduled for no later than 1 January 1952, there was a growing appreciation in policy-making circles that some form of provisional arrangement should be reached in advance of formal independence. Michael Wright, an assistant secretary of state in the British Foreign Office, noted in a September 1950 memorandum of conversation that it was U.S. policy to maintain strategic facilities in Libya; however, it was not yet clear how the Americans planned to accomplish this objective. George McGhee responded,
we would probably want to reach some agreement with the Provisional Government of Libya for obtaining our base rights at Wheelus Field and subsequently to have this agreement ratified by the Libyan state. The exact form the agreement would take was not yet certain and would depend largely on future constitutional developments in Libya.13
In the end, U.S. officials decided to press for an early independence date for Libya, with a provisional base agreement in place prior to independence, in the hope this strategy would minimize discussion and criticism in the United Nations of U.S. policy toward Libya.
The question of a base-rights agreement with Libya was further complicated by Washington’s ongoing desire to coordinate its policies with those of the British government. In this regard, it will be remembered that the British remained responsible for the administration of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania after World War II. As a result, the U.S. Air Force had been using Wheelus Field under permission from the British government since the end of the war. Anglo-American consultation and cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa worked well in the immediate postwar years, but American policy makers in the early 1950s began to voice concern about long-term British resources and capabilities in the region. The State Department in December 1950 justified in part a top-secret review of Middle East policy on the following grounds. “The UK, which has primary responsibility for the defense of the area, lacks both manpower and resources successfully to defend the area and has no plans for defense of the Saudi Arabian oil fields and the Dhahran Air Base.” The review later stated that any reliance on “the time-honored assumption that the U.S. can rely upon the UK to defend the Middle East is to indulge in wishful thinking: British capabilities are too small to be a sound basis for the defense of the U.S. interests in the area.”14
UN Commissioner Adrian Pelt submitted a report to the UN General Assembly on 17 November 1950 that called for the creation of a National Assembly in Libya no later than 1 January 1951, with the subsequent establishment of a Provisional Government by 1 April 1951. Interest in the report centered chiefly on the constitutional development plans that he prepared and thus went beyond the scope of this study. On the other hand, the debate stimulated by the report was relevant as the Soviet Union and its allies used the report to criticize the United States, United Kingdom, and France on the grounds they were impeding Libyan unity and independence and using their position in Libya for militaristic and aggressive purposes. In commenting on these charges, U.S. policy makers expressed concern that Pelt’s report appeared to set a timetable for independence that might limit freedom to maneuver in the future, and the report also put more emphasis on “unity” than did the original (21 November 1949) UN resolution.15
In late spring 1950, the National Security Council tabled a State Department progress report on the “Disposition of the Former Italian Colonies” that added considerable insight into U.S. policy for an independent Libya. The membership of the National Constituent Assembly of Libya, the document pointed out, consisted of twenty members each from Cyrenaica, the Fezzan, and Tripolitania which guaranteed that the Emir Sayyid Idris would “wield a preponderant influence in the formation of the new government.” Moreover, the Emir had said he would assume the kingship at the appropriate time, presumably after the establishment of a provisional government. In the interim, the British would continue to administer Cyrenaica and Tripolitania until Libya became independent. The first acts of the National Constituent Assembly were to declare that Libya should have a federal form of government and to invite Emir Idris to become the constitutional king of Libya. “The Emir, and his leading supporters, have indicated that they are ready and willing to reach suitable agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the continued use of military facilities by our respective armed forces.”16
Washington first broached the idea of reaching an accord on strategic facilities with King-designate Idris on 29 May 1951. The Emir agreed to open negotiations in July after the end of Ramadan. At the same time, he expressed concern in a telling comment that the U.S. negotiating team be limited to no more than two or three people. According to Consul General Lynch, “King designate and FonMin [foreign minister] emphasized Libya’s lack of experience in matters of this kind and FonMin [foreign minister] suggested that we might give them advance draft and adequate time to study it before opening conversations.” “Throughout conversation it was apparent that King designate and FonMin [foreign minister] fully expect receive money payments for strategic facilities.” “I suggest time now ripe to abandon make-believe of obtaining facilities in return for anything but annual cash payments.”17 In a subsequent meeting, the Emir reiterated to Lynch his apprehension over a “team of experts” arriving from the United States to negotiate, as Libya “had no corresponding experts to meet with such a group and took the line that two or three Americans might sit down with FonMin [Foreign Minister] in a friendly way to work situation out.”18
After much delay, Washington finally opened negotiations for a formal base-rights agreement with the Provisional Government of Libya in August 1951. Two months later the State Department prepared a draft treaty that called for an agreement to continue in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until such time as one of the signatories gave notice of termination. A long, involved document, the proposal was highly favorable to the United States in a number of key provisions; others clearly infringed on Libyan sovereignty. For example, article 7 provided for the Libyan government to “make all acquisition of land and other arrangements required to permit occupation and use of the agreed areas,” but the United States was not “obliged to compensate the Government of Libya or any Libyan national or other person for such occupation or use.”19 Article 16 permitted the United States to “bring into Libya members of the United States forces in connection with carrying out the purposes of the present Agreement” and Libyan law would “not operate or apply so as to prevent admission or departure into or from Libya of [any] member of the United States forces.” Article 19 of the draft agreement empowered the United States to make “engineering and other technical surveys in any part of Libya” without the consent of the Libyans as long as the United States notified the former that such a survey was to be made.
In the section governing the status of U.S. personnel and property, article 20 granted U.S. military personnel and their dependents, as well as other U.S. nationals and their dependents subject to U.S. military law, immunity “from the criminal jurisdiction of Libyan courts and in matters arising from the performance of their official duties from the civil jurisdiction of the courts of Libya.” Article 22 of the same section gave U.S. military personnel in Libya blanket permission to “possess and carry arms as required in the performance of official duties.” Finally, article 25 exempted a broad range of U.S. goods and materials, including construction material and equipment, together with personal effects, household goods, and private automobiles, from the normal purview of Libyan customs authorities.
In mid-1951, France and the United States reached an agreement through which the United States would operate five air bases in Morocco, bases under construction since late 1950. About the same time, agreements with Saudi Arabia ensured continued use of the Dhahran base for a five-year period, with other bases planned or under construction in Crete, Cyprus, and Rhodes. In December 1951, the United States disclosed that it had secured permission from Libyan authorities to retain Wheelus Field, as well as other facilities throughout the country, in advance of the formal proclamation of Libyan independence. The terms of the agreement included payment by the U.S. to Libya of $1 million annually for twenty years in addition to reimbursing Libya with equitable rents for land use. Earlier in the month, Acting Secretary of Defense William C. Foster had told Secretary of State Acheson that the Department of Defense was “prepared to include in its budget the sum of $1,000,000 on a yearly basis for the twenty-year term of the agreement, in addition to any technical and economic assistance which may be provided by the Department of State under the Mutual Security Act.” When the United Kingdom of Libya proclaimed its independence on 24 December 1951, the United States government extended full recognition and elevated the American consulate general to the status of a legation. Henry S. Villard was appointed the first U.S. minister to Libya.20
An exchange of diplomatic correspondence only weeks before Libya attained its independence provided a vivid snapshot of the political climate prevailing in the country at the time. The U.S. consul general in Tripoli reported to the State Department on 30 October 1951 that he had just learned from the commanding officer of Wheelus Field that some 2,000 U.S. Air Force troops were scheduled to arrive in Tripoli over a one-month period beginning in early December. Since their arrival would coincide almost exactly with the achievement of Libyan independence, the consul general expressed concern that the troop deployment could have serious local political repercussions.
US now undergoing serious propaganda attacks in local anti-govt [government] Arabic press. We are being accused of being new imperialists who plan to take over all of Libya. . . . Opposition to govt [government] is strong and antiforeign line popular one.
The consul general added that a premature troop deployment would “play into [the] hands [of the] Soviet bloc and Arab League and might be “politically disastrous” to American friends in Libya. “It might also adversely affect chances ratification Libyan American defense agreement now under negotiation which will come before Parliament early 1952.” Shortly thereafter, the U.S. secretary of defense advised Secretary of State Acheson that the scheduled deployment, in view of the tense political situation in Libya, would be postponed.21
Less than a year later, the Central Intelligence Agency authored an assessment of Libya which emphasized that it was extremely poor and devoid of natural resources. “Because of its economic weakness, Libya is almost wholly dependent on foreign aid. Great Britain has been Libya’s main support since it occupied the area in World War II.” In return for various concessions, Britain was underwriting the major part of Libya’s budget deficit, which was currently about $3–5,000,000, as well as its adverse balance of payments. France was doing the same on a much smaller scale for its sphere of influence in the Fezzan. Six months of independence, the report added, had brought “little change in the fundamental disunity of the Libyan kingdom.” Tripolitania had accepted the concept of a united kingdom out of fear of renewed domination by Italy. Cyrenaicans remained largely separatist in outlook, fearing domination by the more populous Tripolitania. Time had only widened this breach while King Idris I, a reluctant head of state, constantly reasserted his preference for Cyrenaica.22
On the subject of external relations, the September 1952 CIA assessment emphasized the pro-Western orientation of the new Libyan government due to its need for foreign aid and the strong ties developed with Great Britain during the war. Since that time, British influence had been predominant in Libya with the British government providing the bulk of outside economic assistance and British advisers forming the backbone of the administration. At the same time, U.S. influence in Libya appeared to be growing. The assessment also suggested that Libya had “only slight relations, at present primarily cultural in nature, with Egypt and the Arab states. The King and most Cyrenaicans fear the ascendancy of adjacent Egypt and have shown little desire to join the Arab League.” The report also suggested that Egypt appeared to have ambitions to dominate the new kingdom although its influence had recently declined. “However, various Tripolitanian urban elements and a few politically conscious Cyrenaicans still regard Egypt as their champion against Sanusi conservatism and Western ‘imperialism’ and call for closer ties with the Arab world.” In two short paragraphs, this CIA assessment captured the essence of the conflict which was to confront and confound Libya for much of the next two decades.23
Less than a year later, a draft policy statement prepared for the National Security Council Planning Board articulated a post-independence policy for Libya that mirrored, if not guided, U.S. foreign policy until 1969. Calling on the United States to avoid actions that might weaken the British and French positions in Libya, the draft statement called on the United States to act in concert with its allies to the greatest extent practical. On the other hand, it called on the United States to be prepared to assume an increased share of responsibility toward Libya if that proved necessary to safeguard American interests. “The United States should be ready to provide promptly appropriate economic, technical and possibly military assistance, if necessary to prevent the development of any political vacuum that might result from failure or inability of the interested Western European powers to assure the Western orientation of Libya.” In addition, the NSC staff paper called on the United States to exercise its influence to prevent the weakening or disintegration of the unity of the Libyan state.24
The successful pursuit of the policy outlined in the 1953 NSC paper would prove to be a serious challenge for American diplomacy. On the one hand, as pointed out in an August 1954 National Intelligence Estimate, Libya after independence was unable to establish firm foundations for economic or political stability. “The poverty and economic underdevelopment of the country, the unresolved Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican differences, the weakness of the parliament and the bureaucracy, and the limited support for the ruling dynasty, all make for an unstable future.” On the other hand, Libya was almost totally dependent on foreign financial and technical assistance to carry out even a minimal development program. “The UK at present provides over ten million dollars annually to Libya, which also receives some technical aid from the UN and the US.”25
It was already clear in the early 1950s that British influence was in decline, which opened the prospect for a partial vacuum to develop in Western economic and political influence. In part for this reason, according to the August 1954 National Intelligence Estimate, King Idris had begun to express an interest in a closer relationship with the United States, with Washington becoming Libya’s chief benefactor and protector.26 Elsewhere, there was strong Libyan resentment over French influence in the Fezzan, French repression of Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist movements, and French policy in Algeria. Franco-American relations were under stress in part due to long-term differences over French policy in North Africa.27 The Soviet Union had not yet opened diplomatic relations with Libya; however, the latter had joined the Arab League in early 1953 although its membership had not yet resulted in any fundamental change in its pro-Western orientation. “Libya uniformly endorses the Arab League’s pronouncements on Israel and on North African nationalism, but plays only a secondary role in the League and has frequently adopted an independent attitude.” “However, growing Libyan political and cultural ties with Egypt constitute an increasing challenge to the Western position. Nevertheless, Libya will remain fearful of Egypt’s greater power.” The August 1954 National Intelligence Estimate concluded with a simple but powerful thought, one with enormous ramifications for U.S. policy in Libya and the region, “In the long run, however, Libya is likely to follow the lead of the other Arab states [author’s emphasis] .”28
Even though King Idris expressed interest in a closer relationship with the United States, this significant shift in Libyan foreign policy did not allay widespread criticism in Libya of the terms of the 1951 base rights agreement. Shortly after independence, the Libyan government began to signal its discontent with the pact hastily negotiated at the end of 1951; and in September 1952, it officially informed the U.S. legation that it wished to renegotiate both the duration of the agreement and the amount of financial compensation provided. Members of the Libyan Parliament, government supporters and opposition alike, charged that the treaty infringed on Libyan sovereignty and in effect constituted an occupation of Libya by the United States. Minister Villard reported in January 1953, for example, that Libyan deputies had recently approached the legation’s Arab secretary and “criticized [the] articles giving United States Forces freedom of movement throughout Libya and freedom from jurisdiction [in] Libyan courts.”29
At one point, Prime Minister Muntasir even charged that he had been pressured into signing the 24 December 1951 agreement, a charge emphatically denied by Andrew Lynch, chargé d’affaires in Tripoli at the time and U.S. signatory to the base agreement. The details of the renegotiation of the original base agreement, which were the focus of Libya-United States diplomatic relations for almost two years, will not be discussed here, as the talks themselves added nothing new to the issues and policies under discussion. Suffice it to say that the negotiations were long, tedious, and frustrating. Minister Villard, the senior U.S. diplomat in Libya throughout this period, later captured the strength of the U.S. commitment to a successful renegotiation of the 1951 agreement. “From our first glimpse of Wheelus to the last, the American stake in this fragment of foreign territory was to be a paramount concern of the Legation and one of the principal subjects of discussion in my daily dealings with the Libyan government.”30 The central question that prolonged the talks, the appropriate compensation to be paid to Libya by the United States, was complicated by other issues like the definition of the appropriate status of Americans residing on the base. On this subject, Minister Villard commented at one point, in an obvious note of exasperation, that the attitude of the Libyan government was “tantamount to blackmail and showing little change from [the] barbary pirate tradition.”31
A new agreement on base rights and economic assistance was finally reached in Washington on 20 July 1954, more than two and one-half years after Libya attained its independence. The new agreement granted the United States the use of Wheelus Field and other designated facilities in Libya for military purposes until 24 December 1970 or after that date until such time as one of the signatories gave notice of termination. In a quid pro quo for the use of Libyan military facilities, the United States agreed to pay $4 million annually for six years and $1 million annually thereafter to 1970. In addition, Washington offered $7 million in development assistance and 24,000 tons of grain for drought relief. While the State Department described the agreement as “an important contribution to the defense of the free world” and an instrument designed to “strengthen the ties of amity which bind together the people of the two countries,” Secretary of State Acheson later complained that there was little or no U.S. press coverage of the event. In the wake of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, American interest and concern at the time centered on the peace conference underway in Geneva together with the prospect of armed Chinese intervention in Vietnam. Libya in the summer of 1954 was simply not on the radar screen of most Americans.32 The formal agreement was signed in Libya on 9 September and entered into force on 30 October 1954. In his memoirs, Minister Villard described the agreement in the following terms. “The United States-Libyan Agreement of 1954, regulating the conditions under which American armed forces are stationed in Libya, is the keystone of the bridge between the two countries and the best example of Libya’s orientation toward the West.”33 On 25 September 1954, the United States announced that the legation in Libya had been elevated to the status of an embassy with John L. Tappin appointed the first U.S. Ambassador to Libya.
Less than four months after he presented his credentials, Ambassador Tappin, authored a glowing report in which he described Libya as “unequalled in the Near East and North Africa for the establishment not only of a secure bastion for defense of the area, but also of a springboard for swift and massive retaliation against any aggressor.” Suggesting that the twenty-year base agreement had the full consent of the Libyan people, he stated there was no “ascertainable internal opposition” in Libya that viewed the base agreement as a reason for attacking the ruling elite or for accusing it of supporting imperialism. Emphasizing that there was “no active or sizeable Communist Party in Libya nor is there in fact any Communist influence,” Tappin went on to say, “Our hands are, to date, completely clean in Libya.” Nowhere in the report did he mention the growing force of Arab nationalism in the Middle East, the developing relationship of the Libyan government with Egypt, or the potential impact Arab nationalist movements might have on an aging monarchy with transparent ties to the West. While the Libyan government, from the outset of independence, was on the defensive vis-a-vis pan-Arabism, the United States saw the real threat in Libya, not as Arab nationalism but as the Soviet Union. Ambassador Tappin’s report exemplified and highlighted a policy dichotomy that plagued American-Libyan relations for much of the next fifteen years.34
In his memoirs, Prime Minister Ben-Halim described a series of meetings with Egyptian President Nasser that began in June 1954, nine months before Tappin authored his report, in which Egypt and Libya moved to coordinate their respective policies. “From there [Ankara] I went straight to Cairo and had a long and comprehensive discussion with President Nasser in which we laid the foundations of an intimate friendship and honest understanding between us. The result was co-operation between Egypt and Libya which lasted for many years.” According to Ben-Halim, President Nasser encouraged him to cultivate diplomatic relations with the United States because it did not have a colonial policy, unlike Great Britain and France, and because it was a wealthy country that could assist Libya. The meetings between Ben-Halim and Nasser reportedly stretched from mid-1954, shortly after Ben-Halim took office, until his departure from office in mid-1957.35
When Libya announced on 25 September 1955 that it had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli sought to minimize the importance of an event it had worked actively to block since 1951.
The Libyan decision to exchange diplomatic representatives with the USSR was not made because of any feeling of friendship for Communism or support of the Soviets. Rather it was based on (1) a desire to refute charges that Libya is subservient to the West and (2) the belief that Western aid to Libya would be increased if we felt that she might turn to the USSR for aid.36
In response to concerns expressed by Ambassador Tappin, Secretary of State Dulles suggested that Soviet policy in Libya was patterned after efforts elsewhere in the world to undermine independent countries. He added that Tappin could expect the Soviets to “arrive in large numbers, propose economic assistance,” and raise questions of base rights and related matters. The Secretary of State concluded as follows: “When one remembers that these steps [are] under [the] auspices of [Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav] Molotov, [the] same person who proposed that Libya be assigned as [a] trust territory to [the] Soviet Union, eventual goals of Soviet Union self-evident.37
While the goals of the Soviet Union might have appeared self-evident to Secretary of State Dulles, the appropriate response of the U.S. government was less clear. Ambassador Tappin spent the next two years locked in negotiations with Tripoli and Washington over the former’s repeated demands for increased economic assistance. Throughout these negotiations, the Libyan government exploited Washington’s fear of communism to the fullest extent possible to wring maximum economic concessions from the Eisenhower administration. Rightly or wrongly, Ambassador Tappin responded positively to the Libyan pressure, becoming an increasing vocal advocate for increased aid levels. He wrote Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Palmer on New Year’s Day 1957, for example, stressing that “her pressing needs makes [sic] Libya a veritable bargain basement, where extraordinary values can be had at a very low cost.”38 Increasingly frustrated with Washington’s failure to agree fully with his policy recommendations, Tappin cabled the Department of State three months later that “Libyans feel they have been good children and cannot understand why Santa Claus came with instruction to leave scooter when they needed and had asked for bicycle.”39
In February 1955, Turkey and Iraq concluded a mutual cooperation agreement that eventually became the Baghdad Pact after Iran and Pakistan, together with Great Britain, adhered to the treaty. Washington viewed the Baghdad Pact, which highlighted the fundamental continuity in the Middle East policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, as one more step in its policy of surrounding the Soviet Union with Western-controlled alliance systems. Nevertheless, the United States never formally adhered to the Baghdad Pact, largely out of fear of antagonizing revolutionary Arab states, particularly Egypt. Because it provoked a strong negative reaction in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, the pact proved counterproductive, causing a chain reaction that deepened the cleavage between Arab nationalists and the United States. By early 1956, the United States and United Kingdom had tired of Egyptian President Nasser’s incessant criticism of the Baghdad Pact as an instrument of Western imperialism and resolved to distance themselves from Cairo. In the wake of an Egyptian decision to purchase Soviet bloc arms from Czechoslovakia, American and British officials agreed to shelve plans to provide aid for the Aswan High Dam. Cancellation of Aswan High Dam aid prompted Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal Company in late July 1956, an action that provoked the so-called Suez Crisis. In a three-hour harangue in Alexandria on 26 July, the day he proclaimed the nationalization, Nasser denounced imperialism, alliances in general, and the Baghdad Pact in particular; he spoke of Britain as a mere satellite of the United States.40
After fighting broke out on 29 October, the United States imposed sanctions on both the United Kingdom and France because President Eisenhower believed the war threatened vital Western interests in the Third World. The crisis inflamed passions throughout the Arab world, liquidating much of the remaining British influence. The British after Suez were never again able to pursue a foreign policy in the Middle East independent of the United States. And in no Arab country were the effects of Suez more severe than in Libya, where a government allied with the British became an immediate target of Arab wrath. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, when the British signaled their intent to reduce financial assistance to Libya, the U.S. government finally agreed to assume a heavier financial burden. A May 1957 National Security Council memorandum captured President Eisenhower’s thoughts on the issue. “The President commented that in view of its strategic location, its proximity to Egypt, and the evident weakness of its economy, Libya would have to be helped. The United States would be ‘in an awful fix’ if we ever lost Libya.”41
With U.S. policy makers focused on the Soviet Union and the global communist threat, there was only occasionally some recognition in Washington of the challenge Arab nationalism posed for the Libyan monarchy and in turn for United States interests in Libya. Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., in a November 1955 letter to the secretary of defense, recognized that “Libya, as an Arab State and neighbor to Egypt, is obviously susceptible to the influence of Egypt and appears to be under strong temptation to adopt Egyptian tactics in the conflict between East and West.”42 In a similar vein, a National Intelligence Estimate, dated 19 June 1956, viewed Libya as “sympathetic with the anticolonial and anti-Western feelings of the Arab world, and subject to extensive Egyptian influence. Libyan leaders fear Egyptian domination and suspect Egyptian intentions, yet they will cooperate with Egypt in various policies, some of which are hostile to Western interests.”43 And in June 1957 a National Security Council statement of U.S. policy on Libya pointed out that Egypt had since 1951 continuously sought to bring Libya into the Egyptian orbit. “The Libyan Government and the King have become fearful of Egyptian motives and have initiated steps to counteract Egyptian influence.”44
Representatives of the U.S. government were especially concerned with the political influence of the several hundred Egyptian teachers then working in Libyan secondary schools. A related concern centered on the political doctrines and tactics that Libyan students studying in Egyptian universities might bring home upon graduation. The Office of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration summarized the situation in a 30 November 1956 memorandum to the White House.
One of the most effective means of Egyptian penetration in Libya has been through the provision by Egypt of some 700 subsidized Egyptian teachers for Libyan schools. Recent events, culminating in civil disturbances led by Egyptian teachers, have brought home to the Libyan Government the seriousness of this problem, and it has closed the secondary schools of the Province of Tripolitania, requested that we help recruit Arabic-speaking, non-Egyptian teachers to replace the Egyptian teachers and is considering the withdrawal of the approximately 300 Libyans who are studying at the University of Cairo.45
In response to the Libyan government’s request, the U.S. government queried its diplomatic missions in India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey as to the availability of Arabic-speaking teachers willing to work in Libya. The response was disappointing, and the large number of Egyptian teachers in Libyan schools continued to represent a political challenge to Libya and the United States.
President Eisenhower, concerned with communist penetration of the Arab world in the aftermath of the Suez affair, Western disunity resulting from the Suez debacle, the attendant collapse of British influence in the area, and the resurgence of Arab nationalist hostility toward the West, addressed Congress on 5 January 1957, requesting a three-part grant of authority. In what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, the president asked for $200 million in economic assistance to preserve the independence of any nation or group of nations in the Middle East, military assistance for the same countries, and permission from Congress to use military force to protect any Middle East state requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. Aimed principally at the Arab world, the Eisenhower Doctrine complemented the Truman Doctrine enunciated ten years earlier since the latter had focused on the threat to the non-Arab Northern Tier. It differed from the Truman Doctrine in that the Eisenhower Doctrine committed American forces to defend the threatened countries.46
While the Eisenhower Doctrine appeared to be a logical corollary to earlier American policies and statements, it proved a poor fit for the political situation existing in the Arab world at the time. Direct Soviet aggression in the Middle East was a most unlikely scenario. Indirect Soviet penetration was most likely in places like Egypt and Syria, the very states most unlikely to request aid from the United States. In pro-Western countries, such as Lebanon, Libya, and Jordan, the main threat to independence came from the rising strength of Arab nationalism, as personified by Nasser, and not from international communism. The Eisenhower Doctrine in practice became simply another instrument of a status quo policy aimed as much at stopping militant pan-Arabism as preventing the Soviet Union and its agents from upsetting friendly and legally established regimes in the Arab world.47
Over the next few years, the U.S. government, continuing to view Libya largely in terms of its role as a strategic asset, remained concerned about the potential spread of communism. After Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited Libya in 1957, for example, he reported to President Eisenhower that Libya occupied “a key strategic position with respect to North Africa and the flank of NATO. We cannot afford to lose Libya.”48 Nonetheless, a memorandum of information drafted less than six months later by Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Charles B. Martell spoke of a “gradual deterioration” in U.S.-Libyan relations. The memo blamed the situation on the “weak and ineffectual” government of Prime Minister Abdul Majid Kubaar. While “not decidedly anti-American or anti-West,” Kubaar had reportedly adopted a more pro-Egyptian policy than his predecessor, one that encouraged other cabinet members, notably the defense minister, favoring closer ties with Egypt and a greater independence from Western affiliations. Seeing an opportunity, the Soviet Union had reportedly increased its activities in Libya with concerning results for U.S. policy objectives.
The Soviets have stepped up their activity in Libya and have registered definite gains among the populace. An Embassy was established recently in Benghazi. The Soviet Ambassador is the only chief of mission to state his intention of moving to Benghazi when the Federal Government moves there in October. Rumors of Soviet aid offers, including the equipping and training of men for the Libyan Army, are frequently heard, and may even be encouraged by the Libyan Government. The Soviet Union can be expected to encourage Libyan nationalism in an effort to increase the opportunities for Soviet military and economic aid. Such changes would serve the Soviets by compromising the security of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.49
Two years later, as the National Security Council discussed the development of the nascent Libyan oil industry, Nixon again emphasized the importance of Libya, alluding to the many political problems faced by the monarchy.50
There is ample evidence to suggest that the Eisenhower administration recognized the importance of Libya, albeit more as an air base than as a sovereign state. Therefore, it remains difficult to understand why the United States in this period repeatedly pressured the monarchy to take foreign policy positions that were unpopular in the Arab world and thus contributed to the widespread image of Libya as a Western dependency. In July 1958, for example, President Eisenhower wrote King Idris a personal note asking him to support publicly the U.S. intervention in Lebanon. Washington also pressured Libya on several occasions in this time frame to support U.S. policy in favor of a six-mile territorial sea when Libya, together with the Arab bloc, favored a wider exclusive zone. The Libyan government’s position on this issue at the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea rested firmly on Libyan domestic law, which made it an especially sensitive domestic political issue. Both issues, in particular the width of the territorial sea, would be resurrected a decade later following the monarchy’s overthrow.51
Major oil deposits were discovered in Libya in 1959, when American prospectors confirmed their location at Zelten in Cyrenaica. The policy ramifications of this development, once the extent and magnitude of the oil fields became known, were manifold, complex, and long-lasting. The Libyan government sensed the possibility of eliminating foreign aid, and this prospect affected its attitude toward continued American presence at Wheelus Field and other installations in the country. The development of oil production also had widespread domestic political effects, as it placed a premium on economic power and affected central-provincial government relations. In addition, the discovery of oil aggravated socioeconomic problems in Libya and thus contributed to the crisis in the monarchical system. Petroleum development affected international relations as the countries in the region, most especially Egypt, increased their efforts to control the Libyan government. Compounding this problem, the oil companies competed for skilled and trainable labor, which was in short supply in Libya; consequently, large numbers of expatriates, including many Egyptians, were imported to handle technical jobs. All this took place in a country which the State Department continued to view as a “weak reed” politically. In short, the discovery of oil in exportable quantities improved the economic situation in Libya but radically complicated the political situation.52
A secret National Security Council report entitled “Implications of Petroleum Developments on U.S. Operations in Libya,” dated 23 September 1959, did an excellent job of outlining the internal and external challenges Libya would face as oil revenues increased. Rightly viewing oil production as a major catalyst for change, the report concluded with an unwarranted optimism as to the impact of petroleum developments on U.S.-Libyan relations.
The economic and political ferment discussed above probably will accelerate present Arab nationalist trends in Libya. Coupled with reduced dependence on our assistance, this will tend to make the Libyans more uncooperative regarding those matters which may be at issue between us, such as the use of Wheelus Air Base, particularly if it becomes expedient to use the U.S. as a scapegoat for any Libyan mishandling of oil revenues. At the same time, realization of their dependence on Western petroleum marketing arrangements and anticipated unwillingness to share their wealth with their Arab brethren may help to balance these trends. While the effects of large petroleum assets may be politically and economically unsettling, and create difficult problems for U.S. operations, new opportunities also are being created for the achievement of U.S. objectives and should be capitalized on wherever possible.53
Given the swiftly changing milieu, American policy toward Libya at the end of the 1950s appeared due for a major reevaluation; unfortunately, it concluded the decade exactly where it had begun. A National Security Council Report dated 15 March 1960 described the underlying political situation in Libya as “unstable,” with the death of King Idris likely to precipitate a “chaotic free-for-all.” While there were no political parties in Libya, “Pan-Arab nationalism has considerable appeal,” especially among younger urban elements. The influence of the United Kingdom had declined while that of the United States had increased. Egypt continued to have designs on Libya, “at a minimum for paramount political influence,” and had “demonstrated a capacity for fomenting trouble there.” Soviet influence, on the other hand, had never been significant, and had declined since the coolness between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Bloc. In light of the above, according to the NSC report, American policy in Libya had two related objectives: first, continued availability and use of U.S. and allied military facilities in Libya, and second, a stable central government. The latter objective was defined as a central government able and willing to do three things: (1) permit Western access to Libyan oil reserves; (2) minimize communist and other anti-Western influence in Libya; and (3) cooperate generally with the United States and its allies. These policy objectives, with the addition of access to Libyan oil reserves, were identical to those outlined by Secretary of State Acheson in 1950.54
President Eisenhower, in his televised farewell address to the nation on 17 January 1961, spoke of war and peace, of police states and of freedom, in a speech whose theme was the Cold War. He told Americans they were locked in a global conflict that “absorbs our very beings” and “promises to be of indefinite duration.” Consequently, the U.S. government was “compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions” together with large and costly armed forces. Three days later, President John F. Kennedy proclaimed in his Inaugural Address that the torch had “passed to a new generation” that had been “tempered by war” and “disciplined by a hard and bitter peace.” Unfortunately, the generational change touted by Kennedy lacked clear definition. Although his youth was striking, Kennedy turned to elders like Dean Acheson and Clark Clifford for counsel and advice. Moreover, the notion of a torch passed in itself presumed continuity.55
In the end, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations largely followed the same course as their predecessors in and outside the Arab world. Familiar arguments about the communist menace were recast to fit the conditions of the moment, and the Soviets continued to be portrayed as aggressive and menacing. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations most feared “not communism, which was too fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which was too committed to detente, or even China, which was too impotent, but rather the threat of embarrassment, of humiliation, of appearing to be weak.”56
To say that little had changed in U.S. policy is not to say that little had happened in Libya. As Confucius once observed, the only constant is change, and this was never more true than in the United Kingdom of Libya. At the beginning of the 1960s, economic, social, and political conditions in Libya were changing rapidly; and these developments put new pressures on the Libyan government. Oil revenues reached a level that assured future income for the government, while the combination of new long-range aircraft and reduced international tensions meant that Libyan air bases were no longer central to Western defense strategies. A briefing paper prepared for President Kennedy in October 1962 described the primary mission of Wheelus Air Base as being the operation of a weapons training center for forces assigned to the U.S. Air Force command in Europe. “In brief, the Center provides and supervises a program of gunnery, rocketry and training in special and conventional weapons delivery techniques for tactical fighter and fighter-interceptor squadrons.” The report continued to describe Wheelus as “the only currently available facility of its type in that part of the world” and suggested that much of its value derived from the year-round good flying weather conditions that prevailed in Libya. Wheelus Air Base, together with associated firing ranges and support facilities, totaled 27,245 acres at the time with a total population of 10,536 military and civilian personnel.57
At the same time, growing oil revenues, accompanied by improved economic conditions and greater social mobility, increased demands, especially among younger Libyans, for a coherent and comprehensive ideology that would satisfy new, albeit vaguely understood, political and spiritual yearnings. The United Kingdom of Libya under the conservative traditional monarchy of King Idris I attempted to respond to these needs but failed to understand and accommodate them, just as it failed to satisfy the growing demands of Arab nationalists in and outside Libya. A distinctive feature of the absolutist system in place continued to be its isolation from society at large. Detached and remote, King Idris preferred to remain in Cyrenaica, where he was secluded from the daily pressures of government.58
An overview of the policies of the Libyan government in the 1960s highlights the rapidly changing landscape faced by successive administrations. Muhammad Bin Uthman, a self-made man and prominent Fezzan politician, took office in October 1960. Recognizing the need for foreign capital and expertise, he tried to dispel the widespread belief that the foreign oil companies attracted to Libya were only interested in exploiting the resources of the country to their own advantage. Bin Uthman also worked to sustain good relations with the Western powers together with Egypt and the Maghrib states. On the other hand, his administration provided only lukewarm support for a 1961 unity plan with Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. During his tenure, King Idris moved his administrative capital to the remote location of al-Bayda, which added to the general confusion and lack of cohesion in the governance of the country. During Ben Uthman’s administration, Crown Prince Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, a nephew of King Idris, paid an official visit to the United States. A memorandum from Robert W. Komer, a National Security Council staff member, to President Kennedy captured the U.S. strategy at the time.
Crown Prince Hasan of Libya is here as part of our effort to build him up as an effective successor to 72-year-old King Idris. The UAR is very active in Libya; there are also a number of contending domestic factions. We fear that Idris’ death may lead either to chaos or a coup endangering our hold on Wheelus Base and our growing oil interests.59
Muhiaddin Fekini, successor to Bin Uthman in March 1963, favored reaching an accommodation with both Algeria and the United Arab Republic. He also questioned a 1955 Franco-Libyan Agreement that covered airfields, radio stations, and other military facilities in southwest Libya, on the grounds that the recent independence of Chad and Niger rendered obsolete the need for such facilities. However, he was unable to negotiate a complete French withdrawal as long as British forces remained in the coastal area. Many of Fekini’s policies were a source of grave concern for the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. As the prime minister prepared to visit Washington, U.S. Ambassador Lightner cabled the following observations to the Department of State:
I do not wish to disguise my concern regarding the course that Fikini is following: his undue catering to extremist voices that call for the cancelation of the Wheelus agreement (and the British treaty), his invoking the Addis Ababa disarmament resolution and the alleged pressure from neighboring Arab countries to explain the failure of the GOL [government of Libya] to stand up in public support of its foreign base agreements. He is walking a tight rope to stay in office and needs popular support, since he has no tribal or other partisan backing. Maybe that explains his wishy-washy handling of all matters connected with the U.S. and British military presence in Libya. The result, regardless of cause, is an attitude of uncertainty which articulate opponents have exploited and will continue to exploit. Playing on nationalistic, pan-Arab emotions and the namby-pamby attitude of the Government, these forces may be expected to succeed in drumming up stronger and stronger anti-Wheelus sentiments among the population. . . .
Bearing in mind that Fikini is vain and ambitious as well as pro-Arab, pro-Egyptian, pro-African, anti-Israel, anti-foreign base, anti-colonial, and a neutralist in the East-West struggle, the USG [United States government] should make an effort during his forthcoming trip to the United States to influence his thinking and if possible to get from him an expression of his policy toward Wheelus base.60
The talking paper circulated to prepare President Kennedy for Fekini’s visit differed in tone but not in content from the cable dispatched by Ambassador Lightner: “In foreign policy Fekini has tended toward Arab nationalist positions. For example, he has emphasized the Palestine issue, has been less friendly toward Wheelus Air Base and has concluded Libya’s first trade agreement (a small one) with the U.S.S.R.”61
Prime Minister Fekini met with President Kennedy at the White House on 30 September 1963. Kennedy noted recent press attacks in Libya on Wheelus Field and emphasized to Fekini that the “base was important to [the] stability of [the] area and [a] kind of guarantee of Libya’s continued independence and stability.” Asking Fekini’s support in reducing the press attacks, President Kennedy suggested it was not wise to “make Wheelus [a] great dominant political issue.” Less than four months later, demonstrations in support of the Palestinian cause broke out in several Libyan cities, leaving some students injured and eventually leading to Fekini’s resignation. The demonstrations in January 1964 were largely a reaction to the decision of King Idris, under strong pressure from the United States and other Western governments, not to attend a summit of Arab heads of state in Cairo. American opposition to his participation in the Arab summit, together with ongoing American pressure to support controversial policies like the Eisenhower Doctrine and diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, only contributed to the growing isolation of the monarchy.62
Mahmud al-Muntasir took office in late January 1964, a move the government-controlled media in Egypt interpreted as signifying an intent to perpetuate the Anglo-Libyan treaty due for revision in 1964. In a Unity Day speech in February, Egyptian President Nasser depicted the foreign bases in Libya as a threat to the United Arab Republic and to the Arab cause in general and called for their liquidation. “No country can claim independence unless the military bases on its territories are liquidated. What guarantees are there for us that American and British bases in Libya will not be used against the Arabs in the event of a clash with Israel?” Expanding on this theme, Cairo Radio falsely alleged that the foreign bases in Libya had been used against the Egyptians during the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956. The Libyan government hurriedly responded to Nasser’s request with a statement indicating it had no intention of renewing or extending its military agreements with either the United Kingdom or the United States. Libya was in full agreement with the views expressed by President Nasser, added the statement of the Libyan government, and would never allow its foreign bases to be used as a source of aggression against its Arab brothers. The contradiction between this statement and the terms of Libya’s treaties with the United Kingdom and United States was obvious and could not be ignored.63
In March 1964, a small group of pro-Nasser deputies in the Libyan parliament introduced a resolution calling for abrogation of the treaties and liquidation of the bases, a move the Muntasir government, accurately reading public opinion, was not strong enough to oppose. Instead, the prime minister issued a statement promising that the government would demand termination of the treaties and set a time for the withdrawal of Anglo-American forces. The timing of the statement, issued so soon after Nasser’s speech, was unfortunate, as it gave the impression the Egyptian president was dictating policy in Libya. The parliamentary resolution and the prime minister’s statement deeply upset King Idris, who viewed them as an abject surrender to Egyptian intimidation. The King soon submitted a letter of resignation, which was quickly rejected, but he did nothing to repudiate the parliamentary resolution, leaving it for the Muntasir government to negotiate with the United Kingdom and the United States. The British government, welcoming an opportunity to reduce overseas military expenditures, agreed to withdraw from Tripolitania by 31 March 1966 and from Benghazi one year later. The future of the small garrison at Tobruk and the Al-Adem airfield were left for future consideration.64
Nasser’s Unity Day speech and the response of the Libyan government to it raised serious concerns in Washington. On 8 March 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a personal message to King Idris in which he expressed concern that recent events appeared to threaten their mutually beneficial cooperation centered on Wheelus Field. A memorandum signed jointly by Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council staff on 17 March 1964 expressed the concerns of the White House in more explicit terms:
There seems little alternative but to agree now to renegotiate our Libyan base agreement, in hopes this will defuse the issue. Our best friends in the Libyan Government (the King and PM) plead that we do so. They’ve panicked in the face of an outburst of Libyan nationalism, and face an aroused Parliament demanding prompt abrogation of the US/UK treaties. Nasser started off the parade by criticizing the bases, but clearly both his action and Libyan popular hysteria were stimulated by the Arab-Israeli issue.
Our ability to resist is undermined by UK agreement to renegotiate its base rights. . . . We want to save this regime (the best we could have), and also protect our oil investment, now $670 million. So State, our Embassy, and our Libyan friends recommend we be forthcoming now to sidetrack demands for abrogation. We would then hope to spin negotiations, and finally agree to a reduced tenure which will buy us three-five more years.65
Under pressure from the Libyan government, Washington at first agreed to accept the principle of withdrawal from Wheelus Field with no dates mentioned. Later the Libyans agreed to allow the Americans to remain until the 1954 base-rights agreement expired in December 1971.66
After Muntasir resigned due to ill health, Hussein Maziq took charge of the government in March 1965, completing the base rights negotiations with the United Kingdom and United States initiated by his predecessor. Increasingly fearful of the political threat from Nasser’s brand of Arab nationalism, King Idris requested assurances that the United States would help defend Libya in the event of external aggression. Responding to his concerns in a 1 September 1965 letter that National Security Council staff member Komer described as “very carefully drafted,” President Johnson assured King Idris “that the United States could not remain indifferent to an unprovoked and aggressive attack on Libya.” In such an event, Johnson promised that the U.S. government would consult with the Libyan government “and other interested governments on the necessary and appropriate steps to meet the situation within the framework of the international obligations and constitutional procedures of all concerned.”67
When the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel broke out in June 1967, Libya suffered a fate similar to its experience during the 1956 Suez crisis. The swift, overwhelming defeat of Egyptian forces, blamed by Cairo Radio on the United Kingdom and United States, made Libya with the presence of foreign bases an easy target. Huge demonstrations took place in Benghazi and Tripoli, U.S. offices were attacked, and Jewish property was destroyed.68 With the situation tense for weeks on end, it was readily apparent that pan-Arabism, as preached by Cairo Radio, had undermined much of the political support for the Idris regime. Walter W. Rostow, a senior administration official, captured the seriousness of the situation in a short note to President Johnson:
Herewith a fear that will mount: a Nasser takeover of Libya after U.S.-U.K bases are withdrawn. The takeover could be either from within or without, probably the former. It would put Nasser on easy street with oil and bring great pressure to bear on Tunisia. But, as the second attached report indicates, we shall try to buy time on the bases. A good deal depends on whether the King can sweat it out.69
Following the resignation of Maziq and a short interim administration by Abdel Qadir Badri, the King turned to Abdel Hamid Bakkush to serve as prime minister. A young, energetic reformer, Bakkush assumed a more assertive stance, aligning Libya more closely with Arab nationalist policies. Many observers at the time felt Libya had finally bestirred itself and might now embark on a mainstream course to modernization. Unfortunately, Bakkush’s innovative policies were cut short by King Idris upon the recommendation of his conservative advisers, many of whom saw in the prime minister’s initiatives a challenge to royal hegemony. Reportedly, the King himself was especially troubled by Bakkush’s insistence that he be allowed to select new cabinet ministers more attuned to his policies and goals. The aging monarch simply could not bring himself to delegate authority even for such modest changes to governmental policy and practice.70
As a series of governments failed in their attempts to reform and modernize Libya, the Libyan economy took off fueled by the rapid expansion in oil production. Per capita gross national product rose more than twenty-five-fold, from around $40 in the early 1950s to over $1,000 in 1967. In the latter year alone, per capita GNP increased by 42 percent over 1966. Libya eventually became the most dramatic example of economic growth in the decade, and one of the most dramatic examples in the century. Concomitant with unprecedented economic growth came dramatic change in the nation’s social fabric. Swept up in the oil boom, farmers sought the fruits of new jobs in the petroleum industry with the result that a country once self-sufficient in food production became a net importer of foodstuffs. Rapid urbanization put revolutionary demands on housing, health services, and educational facilities. The demand for skilled labor far outstripped supply, while a general condition of unemployment and underemployment prevailed in the ranks of unskilled labor. In the process, social discontinuities everywhere served as frequent reminders that social change could be both idiosyncratic and destabilizing. As the decade ended, xenophobia against the West combined with a crisis in values to produce a growing identity crisis in Libya and a resulting crise de l’ancien régime.71
On 12 June 1969, the aging King Idris left Libya for rest and medical treatment in Greece and Turkey. Capitalizing on his absence, a group of approximately seventy army officers executed a successful coup d’état on 1 September 1969, one year after the resignation of Prime Minister Bakkush. Public response to the overthrow of the monarchy was surprisingly mute. The public at large reacted with a combination of bewilderment and jubilation. The available evidence suggests that the army officers who led the September 1969 coup were only one of several groups at the time plotting the overthrow of the Idris regime.
Three decades later, with the release of official papers first made public on 1 January 2000, it was learned that the British government had rejected an appeal from its old ally, King Idris, to intervene on his behalf in 1969 when Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi led the military revolt against him. According to official documents released by the Public Record Office in London, the king secretly asked then Prime Minister Harold Wilson to help restore him to power, but Britain’s Labour government decided to remain neutral. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart warned it would be “dangerous and wrong” to intervene in the coup d’état. Within days of the overthrow of the monarchy, Stewart reportedly noted that the sooner the United Kingdom got on reasonable terms with the revolutionary government, the greater would be its chances of protecting its essential interests in Libya.72
Monarchical Libya, especially in the period before the discovery of oil, was a thoroughly penetrated economic and political system in that external actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, played significant roles in the formation of the monarchy’s domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, those policies largely consisted of adjusting to the interests, pressures, and actions of others. Conversely, the monarchy had little or no impact on the policies of other states, although the revenues from oil exports later increased its influence to a very limited degree.
It must also be emphasized that the potential impact of oil revenues on the monarchy’s foreign policy was far greater than the actual impact. Although the monarchy indicated in 1964 that it would not extend or renew the base agreements with the United Kingdom and the United States when they expired in the early 1970s, it continued to maintain a close relationship with the Western powers. The approach of the Libyan government was based, not on any widespread commitment to Western ideals and traditions, but on the monarchy’s belief that the Western powers remained in the best position to guarantee Libyan security. On the contrary, the monarchy throughout the 1960s sought to minimize the impact of Western social structures and mores on Libyan society. The Libyan government also remained detached from Nasser’s radical Arab nationalism, as evidenced by the firm steps it took to quell the serious domestic disturbances precipitated by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Even when the monarchy employed its economic largess as a political tool, the strategy it pursued remained a reactive, defensive one that used its growing financial resources to reduce political agitation from surrounding countries.
Although the revenues from petroleum exports had a minimal impact on the monarchy’s foreign policy, those same revenues created the domestic preconditions for the September 1969 revolution, a development that is often misunderstood or ignored. By 1969 oil production exceeded three million barrels a day, and per capita income had increased almost six-fold since 1962. The socioeconomic change that accompanied this oil revolution precipitated a demand for political change that the monarchy was unable or unwilling to accommodate. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that by the mid-1960s King Idris was increasingly out of touch with the political demands and realities of Libya and the region. Unfortunately, American diplomats mostly reinforced the viewpoints of the king instead of encouraging him to promote the social, economic, and political changes demanded by his subjects.
Ironically, a primary source of growing Arab nationalism in Libya was the government’s policy of supplementing its underdeveloped educational resources with Egyptian teachers and textbooks. Libyan students demonstrated in defiance of the police in 1964, for example, and the first conference of the Libyan Students’ Union was held in 1966. At the conference, the students opted for a leftist tendency within the Arab nationalist movement, pledged support for the Vietnam revolution, demanded a more radical approach to the Palestinian problem, criticized the government’s oil policy, and demanded liquidation of the foreign military bases. By the end of the decade, increasing numbers of Libyans, especially the younger, more articulate sectors, had concluded the Libyan government was corrupt and parochial and should be replaced.
The end of World War II brought the United States into North Africa and the Middle East to a degree theretofore unknown. Concomitantly, it reshaped U.S. priorities in the region. That said, it is important to realize that the United States had no clear-cut, well-defined policy for the Middle East at the end of the war. Possessed of enormous power, both absolutely and in relative terms, the United States could travel down any one of several roads in the Arab world. With the advent of the Cold War, America’s strategic options, in perception if not reality, narrowed sharply. North Africa and the Middle East became a central arena in a zero sum game in which any advance by the Soviet Union was viewed by Washington policy makers as a defeat for U.S. interests.
In this context, the policies of the Western governments, in particular the United States, before and after independence in 1951 contributed mightily to the state of political bankruptcy reached by the monarchy in 1969. In so doing, these governments must bear a major burden of responsibility for the revolutionary government headed by Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi that took power on 1 September 1969. The United States government and its allies pressured the monarchy to accept long-term base agreements that became an increasingly grating symbol of Western imperialism, especially after the discovery of oil propelled Libya virtually overnight from rags to riches. Not content with the occupation of Wheelus Field and other military facilities, American policy makers also pressured Libya repeatedly to support regional and international policies, like the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the intervention in Beirut, that clearly were not in the best interests of an Arab state. Libyan support for such policies played well in Washington but were deeply resented throughout the Arab world.