As it turned out, Wilberg became a valuable contact for Göring. The thirty-five-year-old Hauptmann²⁹ had commanded FFA 11 at the outbreak of the war³⁰ and, beginning on 27 July 1915, he became Stabsoffizier der Flieger [staff officer for aviation] for a succession of individual army staffs.³¹ After Göring’s second flight with Wilberg, from Stenay to Metz on 24 September, Wilberg introduced him to a pilot of rising prominence, Oberleutnant Hans Berr. A former observer with FFA 60 who had become a pilot,³² Berr went on to command a fighter unit that Göring later joined. The German flying corps was a ‘young’ branch of service in 1915 and Wilberg’s introduction put Göring into a network of personal connections that aided current and prospective commanders in selecting people for their units.

While serving as Wilberg’s aerial chauffeur, Göring was well away from the chaos at the frontlines when the French offensive began early on the morning of Saturday, 25 September. He did not miss much, according to Leonhardy, who described part of the confusion that prevailed:

‘Throughout the French surprise attack, an understandable nervousness had broken out in the trenches among our [German] brethren who blamed the activities of the enemy flyers for the bombardments and attacks. [And] our own flyers often caused a commotion among German troops. I recall that … five aeroplanes, one after another, had to be sent to [a point designated as] Kanonenberg to drive off the continually increasing and allegedly enemy aeroplanes that were circling overhead. When, after dispatching the fifth machine, yet another call for help rattled from the telephone, I flew there myself – and became the sixth “enemy” flyer [over the area].’³³

Aviation was then a new phenomenon that was incomprehensible to many senior German officers. Consequently, they were uncertain how to make use of it in modern warfare, noted Leonhardy, who wrote:

‘Incredibly, people [at 3rd Army headquarters] had not believed the assessment that the staff officer for aviation prepared based on aerial reconnaissance photographs … We flyers were very annoyed, but it should be explained that our general staff’s knowledge about the flying corps had to be built up. Having them employ this new … air weapon as a [planning] factor and placing trust in the flyers’ reports was something that, especially among the older general staff officers, occurred only gradually.’³⁴

In any event, there was still much to do when Göring reported back to FFA 25 on 1 October,³⁵ the day the unit relocated to Vouziers airfield. He noted: ‘During the Champagne Offensive, I flew with my observer[s] in the 3rd Army Sector and carried out long-range reconnaissance along the line from Epernay to Châlons to St. Ménéhould.’³⁶ FAA 25 records show that, from 2 October to 5 December, he flew with several observers on various operational assignments.³⁷

Loerzer returned to FFA 25 the following day³⁸ and found it to be more tightly run under Hauptmann Leonhardy, whose combination of military organisational talent and personal bravery led him to become one of five bomber group commanders to earn Prussia’s [de facto Germany’s] highest bravery award, the Ordern Pour le Mérite, in late 1918.³⁹ There was no questioning Leonhardy’s orders or, as had occurred earlier, of FFA 25 crews (e.g., Göring and Loerzer) arranging their own flights together. Moreover, with Göring now flying as a two-seater pilot, Loerzer moved on to other assignments as a fighter pilot.