Given that Heidegger is initially concerned with the inexplicitness of being-with-one-another, it should come as no surprise that he begins his analysis with the question of how others are “also encountered” in Dasein’s everyday association with useful things.
The “description” of the surrounding world nearest to us, for example, the workworld of the handworker, showed that together with the useful things found in work, others are “also encountered” for whom the “work” is to be done. In the kind of being of these things at hand, that is, in their relevance, there lies an essential reference to possible wearers for whom they should be “cut to the figure.” Similarly, the producer or “supplier” is encountered in the material used as one who “serves” well or badly. The field, for example, along which we walk “outside” shows itself as belonging to such and such a person who keeps it in good order, the book which we use is bought at such and such a place, given by such and such a person, and so on.1
Here it first seems as though others are simply “appresented” through useful things, which are what is primarily discovered, and thus as though the fundamental difference between beings that do not have Dasein’s way of being and being-with is becoming blurred.2 Heidegger himself anticipates this and states the following objection:
But our characterization of encountering the others is, then, after all, oriented towards one’s own Da-sein. Does not it, too, start with the distinction and isolation of the “I,” so that a transition from the isolated subject to the others must then be sought? (SZ 118, BT 111, translation modified)
But for Heidegger this supposition is a misunderstanding, and as he continues,
In order to avoid this misunderstanding, we must observe in what sense we are talking about “the others.” “The others” does not mean everybody else but me—those from whom the “I” distinguishes itself. They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too. This being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of being objectively present “with” them within a world. The “with” is of the character of Da-sein, the “also” means the sameness of being as circumspect, heedful being-in-the-world. (SZ 118, BT 111)
We can easily understand what Heidegger means here if we avoid the term “relevance” and, in keeping with the examples he cites, simply say that every production of something takes place with a view toward its possible use. As a norm, such use is use by others. It is true that all behavior is “for the sake of” one’s own Dasein in the sense that one wants to be one’s receptivity for the openness of beings in a definite way; but a series of activities can still only be performed because there are others for whom those activities are meaningful. Others are in turn defined by their activities, so that Dasein as being-with is “essentially for the sake of others” (SZ 123, BT 116). One is oneself an other, insofar as one makes possible through one’s own actions the actions of others. Talk of “others” makes sense only from the first-person perspective, and this perspective characterizes everyone with whom one is.
Accordingly, “being-with” means, for one, that each of us in our everyday taking care is referred by others and their taking care to the totality of useful things in which we operate—and when we use the term “reference” here, this implies that others remain “initially and for the most part” inexplicit. For instance, the supplier of materials does not generally call attention to himself per se. Now of course this does not mean that others are altogether disregarded; instead, they remain inexplicit from the standpoint of taking care as long as taking care remains unproblematic. Yet “being-with” does not just mean being referred to one’s own work by those who deliver the material for it or who assign the job to get done. It also means that those things that do not belong to one’s “workworld” can be grasped as useful things. Heidegger indicates this with another example of how others are “also encountered” with useful things: “The boat anchored at the shore refers in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes his voyages with it; but even as a ‘boat strange to us,’ it points to others” (SZ 118, BT 111, translation modified). The reference here does not consist in how, say, we explicitly occupy ourselves with the owner or user of the boat, but in how others’ possible association with it makes the boat intelligible in its handiness; we do not have to deal with something ourselves to know it is a useful thing, for there are always already others who are able to deal with it in this manner.
Although we can say that others are initially and for the most part inexplicit, we must also say that they have been freed:
The world of Da-sein thus frees beings which are not only completely different from tools and things, but which themselves in accordance with their kind of being as Da-sein are themselves “in” the world as being-in-the-world in which they are at the same time encountered. These beings are neither objectively present nor at hand, but they are like the very Da-sein which frees them—they are there, too, and there with it. So, if one wanted to identify the world in general with innerworldly beings, one would have to say the “world” is also Da-sein. (SZ 118, BT 111)
The freeing of others can initially be understood by analogy to the freeing of useful things, and like this type of freeing, the freeing of others can be interpreted both “ontically” and “ontologically.” If we reserve the term “relevance” for beings such as useful things, we cannot say of others that they are “relevant” and leave it at that, if only because freeing is to be thought of here as reciprocal. Yet the matter does admit comparison. For it is only on the basis of the inexplicitness of others that we are capable of concentrating on an activity, and since such inexplicitness does not come about by way of an interpretation that discovers a disposition, it is perhaps best to say that others essentially “hold themselves in reserve” and that we leave them in this reserve. In their holding themselves in reserve, others are “Dasein-with.” Contrary to Heidegger’s formulation, Dasein-with is never, strictly speaking, “innerworldly” but only “in the world”; being-with-one-another in the world then means primarily to reciprocally let one another behave.
We can again clarify what it means to let one another behave by way of an example. Contexts of action are frequently compared to games or are illustrated in reference to them.3 For instance, chess players do not act together in the sense that they explicitly occupy themselves with each other by, say, making their moves a topic of conversation and critically or approvingly commenting on them. Naturally, they may do so, but whenever they do they are not actually playing. In the playing of the game itself, in the concentration on their individual moves, they nevertheless behave toward each other, primarily by letting each other have their turn. I do not mean simply that chess players do not normally hinder each other from moving their pieces on the board, but that above all they let each other have their turn by giving each other the chance to develop their own strategy, in that each player’s own move itself opens up further moves. Chess players reciprocally refer to the constellation of pieces by drawing the attention of their partner through their own moves toward an ever new constellation, and by holding their own personality in reserve, each invites the other to deal with this new constellation. Seen in this way, what makes the game possible is the opening up and keeping open of possibilities for action. Part of such keeping open is that one restricts oneself in the game to being a player: one acts only within the framework of the current game, and it is only on the basis of this holding in reserve that one can act at all. Of course, a game can be compared to everyday contexts of action only to a certain extent, because a game, unlike such everyday contexts, has standardized rules of play; in other words, it is clearly fixed which type of actions belong to the game and which do not. But even everyday contexts of action are unproblematic only when they have similar restrictions. To be sure, these restrictions are such that they cannot in every case—perhaps only in a few cases—be given as rules that can be formulated unambiguously. But it is true of all everyday contexts of action that we can behave in them only in a particular way, and insofar as we do this we always also hold ourselves in reserve. From this point of view, everyday action can never be grasped only as the explicit coordination of various actions in the service of a common goal, but instead always includes an openness for each other—an openness that consists in the fact that in many ways we do not relate to each other.
Now if the above interpretation is accurate, when Heidegger grasps our behaving toward each other as “concern” (Fürsorge), this cannot simply mean “acting on each other’s behalf.” Like “taking care” (Besorgen), the term “concern” includes “deficient modes”4 such as “being without-one-another, passing-one-another-by, not-mattering-to-one another” (SZ 121, BT 114). It is important to note, however, that the deficient modes of concern have a different status than those of taking care. The former play an essential part in the everydayness of Dasein, for “these modes of being show the characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness” (SZ 121, BT 114). Even though “Dasein initially, and for the most part, lives in the deficient modes of concern” (SZ 121, BT 144), it would be a mistake to interpret these modes as complete indifference and then to oppose them to explicit forms of associating with each other in which we are “affected” by or “interested” in each other. Heidegger’s point is precisely that he interprets even what might appear superficially to be indifference as a kind of concern; “caring” for each other for the most part does not mean explicitly occupying ourselves with each other.
That this is the case may be seen precisely in the two “extreme possibilities” of concern (SZ 122, BT 115). The first of these possibilities consists in putting oneself in the place of someone else in taking care and so “leaping in” for him; the one who is thereby cast “out of his place” “steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can take it over as something finished and available or disburden himself of it completely” (SZ 122, BT 114). However, this “concern that leaps in” is not an explicit relation to others, even when the one who is displaced is thereby made “dependent and dominated” (SZ 122, BT 114), for this kind of concern is carried out precisely in dealing with the things that are to be taken care of. Put differently, we can only do something for someone else by letting his holding himself in reserve refer us to the activity in question. Naturally, the one who is displaced can react to the one who does this with distrust and resistance. But such a reaction is always only the articulation of one’s own lack of explicitness for him who has taken one’s own place. Whoever brings himself explicitly into play lets it be understood that he was not explicitly in play before.
But the concern that “leaps ahead” and is the contrasting possibility to “leaping in” also does not explicitly occupy itself with an other. To be sure, such concern touches on “the existence of the other” (SZ 122, BT 115), but in a way that when one “leaps ahead,” the other can “become . . . free” for his existence (SZ 122, BT 115). How in particular this is to be understood can be clarified only through an interpretation of “authentic existence.” Without anticipating this interpretation, we can illustrate what Heidegger has in mind with a sentence from the 1925—1926 course Logic: The Question of Truth. For instance, the hearers of a lecture are never something one “takes care of”: “Communication and directing towards the seeing of a matter is never a taking-care, insofar as the seeing of the matter cannot actually be produced by the lecture, but can instead only be awakened, released.”5 Basically Heidegger is only making a pithy comment here about the art of Socratic dialogue. Even if at first glance this dialogical art consists in adapting oneself to another and taking into account his possibilities for understanding, it is still not explicitly occupied with him. We cannot lead someone else to an insight if we do not always also look away from him, and by concentrating on the matter, open up for him the possibility of achieving his own relationship to it. This type of “concern” is essentially “considerateness” and “tolerance” (SZ 123, BT 115), that is, it consists in letting others behave.
Nonetheless, the foregoing interpretation of the freeing of Dasein-with still remains “ontic.” Although this freeing can be understood by analogy to the freeing of useful things, it does not depend on someone’s factically being left to his reservedness. Instead, others must also be freed precisely when we explicitly occupy ourselves with them; that such occupation is at all possible implies that we must have already been involved with them as possible partners in action, or more accurately, that we must have always already been involved. We are “with them” insofar as we are opened up for them, and they are “there with” us insofar as they themselves are at all possible partners in action for us. Openness for each other is the presupposition for being able to act with each other or letting oneself be referred to one’s own action by others, and thus first of all for explicitly relating oneself to them.
What it means to relate to others explicitly is admittedly not yet clear. Because our dealings that take care are always characterized by the inexplicitness of others and because every action with each other is impossible without this inexplicitness, we might easily presume that we become explicit for each other only when we speak with or about one another. For only in discourse do we possess the possibility of determining how others behave and of comparing that to our own behavior, so that the question of how the context of “I”-statements is to be thought can also be adequately addressed only by taking into consideration discourse about each other, whether such discourse is outwardly articulated or remains unspoken. If we interpret “I”-statements as articulations of attentiveness toward something, then these statements, on the one hand, stand in connection with dealings that are initially not articulated linguistically, and insofar as such dealing is made possible in part by others, these statements also stand in connection with others. On the other hand, because others are also able to form “I”-statements, these statements always also stand in the context of other “I”-statements, and only when we take this context into account can we understand why Heidegger claims that the “who” of everyday Dasein is not “I myself.” “Self” is a term that does not express self-reference, but rather the context of “I”-statements. It belongs to the self-evident intelligibility of the self to be in this context.
This thesis, which may right away strike us as surprising, can be clarified initially by a brief observation about the everyday use of the word “self.” “Self,” in grammatical terms, is a “demonstrative pronoun.” However, this is misleading, because the term is in fact used not in a deictic sense but contrastively. In the sentence “Peter himself broke the vase,” we are made to understand that it was no one other than Peter—like, for example, the dog, as Peter had claimed. Along with “I,” the word “self” also has this function, so that the statement “I myself am of the conviction that p” means something different than “I am of the conviction that p.” Whoever says “I myself” not only expresses his attentiveness toward something, he sets himself off against others and their way of behaving. Moreover, he sometimes also makes it clear that he is explicitly laying claim to certain attributes or ways of behaving as his own; from this perspective we can explain why the capacity to develop such attributes and ways of behaving, as well as how they then constitute a person, is designated as “the self.”6 In any case, the point I want to emphasize is that it is only in the context of saying “I myself” that talk of “the others” receives its full sense. However, to claim that saying “I myself” always sets me off against others is certainly not to imply that an unmistakable difference exists between “me myself” and others. If such a difference existed, saying “I myself” would not at all be necessary. The utterance of the sentence, “I myself broke the vase,” is meaningful only if it is not clear who it was. The same is true when someone says “he himself” is of the conviction that p; he is not merely contrasting his position with someone who asserted that q, instead he means that he is not simply repeating the assertion that p.
Accordingly, the presupposition operative in “I myself ”-statements is that there is fundamentally no way of behaving that can be accomplished by only one alone. Furthermore, ways of behaving do not become explicit as long as they are accomplished undisturbed, and with any such disturbance, what first draws attention is not how we are behaving, but what is making the disturbance—thus what is lacking or faulty about the useful thing. Ways of behaving are first encountered as the ways of behaving of others, for the others “are what they do” (SZ 126, BT 118); that is, with their definite ways of behaving, others also come into view as “these definite ones.” They are always “these definite ones” insofar as what they do admits comparison with our own doing, and this comparability also allows us to distinguish ourselves from each other. The common pursuit of the same or similar things is, as Heidegger says, characterized by “distantiality”:
In taking care of the things which one has taken hold of, for, and against others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether this difference is to be equalized, whether one’s own Da-sein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in relation to them, whether Da-sein in its priority over others is intent on suppressing them. Being-with-one-another is, unknown to itself, disquieted by the care about this distance. Existentially expressed, being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality. The more inconspicuous this kind of being is to everyday Da-sein itself, all the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out. (SZ 126, BT 118)
The relations to others Heidegger has in mind here are what we ordinarily know as “competitiveness,” “ambition,” “oppression” and the like. So it seems strange when he claims that disquiet about the distance from others is “concealed” in Dasein. He cannot mean that we know nothing in an everyday way about competition, ambition, and oppression. In addition, Heidegger mentions in a different context that we can do or want to do something “purely out of ambition.”7 What he must mean, then, is that being-with-one-another is characterized by “distantiality” even when one is supposedly concerned about unity or agreement with others. For then one is trying to eliminate one’s differences from the others, so that even here in being-with-one-another a “being-against-one-another” is at play (SZ 175, BT 163). Insofar as all behavior that is explicitly accomplished by “oneself” is marked by others, Heidegger can speak of the “domination of others” (SZ 126, BT 119). This domination does not consist in the fact that we are always subjected to the influence or enforcing of a decision by others; it can be manifest even in our own dominion over others. Instead the critical point here is that all behavior explicitly accomplished by “oneself” is a behavior in otherness. Otherness in this sense does not mean becoming other, or “alter-ation.”8 For the concept of becoming other implies that one does not primarily experience oneself in being-with-one-another—and that it is not primarily in being-with-one-another that one experiences oneself—but that instead one can also be the “pure Ego of my pure cogitations,”9 and one becomes an empirical “I” only when one comes into community with others. Aside from the fact that it is difficult to think such a “becoming” at all, otherness and the way it comes to expression in saying “I myself” is possible only under the presupposition of being-with and Dasein-with. “Otherness” designates solely the way in which one’s own behavior is explicitly determined as one’s own.
As the colloquial use of the phrase “I myself” attests, this explicitness is not tied to definite others. Whoever says “he himself” has done such and such does not necessarily set himself apart from definite others; possibly he does not even know who might otherwise be responsible for the deed in question. The same holds true when someone wants to be better than others; he does not have to think about definite persons, and if he should ever happen to do so, what takes priority for him is what they do and how they do it. The others retain a certain inexplicitness in coming into view only in accordance with what they do. Because saying “I myself” is never determined only by definite others but is determined by an otherness that is ultimately uncontrollable in its singular possibilities, the openness of Dasein-with comes to appear in explicit being-with-one-another. Now being-with-one-another, as the medium in which one achieves one’s own explicit definiteness, is what Heidegger calls the “they.” The “they” is characterized by “inconspicuousness” and “unascertainability” (SZ 126, BT 119), and in this it unfolds “its genuine dictatorship” (SZ 126, BT 119). This dictatorship consists in how “they” give the answer beforehand—or ‘dictate’—which activities are deemed worthwhile and how the performance of these activities is to be evaluated. Seen in this way, “they” articulate meaningfulness, which, as Heidegger expressly makes clear, is tied to discourse (GA 20, 275). Once again, the “they” as obvious or self-evident has somehow always already been pronounced and as such is the “obvious intelligibility of me myself.”
Whoever “himself” wants to be better than others because of that already oriented toward what “they” in a certain respect do and say. What “they” do and say is “average”: “The they maintains itself factically in the averageness of what is proper, what is allowed, and what is not. Of what is granted success and what is not” (SZ 127, BT 119). The “care of averageness” (SZ 127, BT 119) can be understood in terms of the fact that one’s own behavior becomes explicit in relation to others’ behavior; it is ultimately care for this explicitness, for no one can set himself apart from others, and by so doing explicitly be “he himself,” if others’ behavior does not thereby remain comparable with his own behavior. Whoever wants to be better than others—or at least as good as them—must in principle also see what they do as achievable. The presupposition that the everyday being of others only comes into view as doing enables Heidegger to also speak of the “leveling down of all possibilities of being” in relation to averageness (SZ 127, BT 119). The differing possibilities of behavior must be leveled out according to the measure of comparability.
In view of the misunderstandings that have repeatedly sprung up around Heidegger’s conception of “they,” I first want to emphasize that his analysis is not intended as “cultural criticism.” Heidegger does not enter into a critique of the anonymity of mass society. The references to public transportation and the news media are solely illustrations of the comparability of behavior that characterizes the “they”: “every one is like the next” (SZ 126, BT 127) as a user of trains, cars and planes, as a television viewer and newspaper reader. But this is not because of modern means of transportation or modern information technology. The comparability of behavior is also the precondition for public appearance or standing, and what Aristotle describes as the politikos bios can, at least in part, be reformulated in terms of Heidegger’s conception of the “they,” to the extent that the “political life” is concerned only with honor (timē). One could also see Hegel’s conception of a self-consciousness that is dependent on others as an attempt to bring into view the structure that is at issue for Heidegger. It should be noted that what is not being asserted by these references is that Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness and Aristotle’s analysis of honor are the same as Heidegger’s conception of the “they.” The working out of a structure in a philosophical theory is so bound to the fundamental concepts of that theory that an attempt to bring Heidegger and Hegel into dialogue would first require developing Hegel’s fundamental concepts. That is not my intention here. Suffice it to say that it makes a vast difference whether the talk is of self-consciousness, as in Hegel, or whether, as in Heidegger, it concerns how one’s own behavior becomes explicit in relation to others’ behavior. Like Hegel’s conception of self-consciousness, Heidegger’s conception of “everyday being a self” is certainly a philosophical conception, and as such it is to be distinguished from critical diagnoses of culture or society in that it lays claim to being plausible in itself and not only with respect to particular historical conditions.
But even when the philosophical import—or more accurately, the “daseins-analytical” import—of Heidegger’s elucidation of the “they” is taken seriously, this elucidation has often been misunderstood. One such misunderstanding consists in interpreting the “they” as a mode of determination by outside forces and opposing this mode to the mode of self-determination. That the “who” of everyday Dasein is the “they” then means: “I allow what I respectively do and intend and how I understand myself to be determined by what one (the they) regards as good, and I do not determine it myself.”10 To be sure, this interpretation takes up a distinction that is fundamental for further developments in Being and Time, namely the distinction between the “self of everyday Dasein,” the “they-self,” and the “authentic self, the self that has explicitly grasped itself” (SZ 129, BT 121). But what this interpretation leaves out of consideration is the point of this distinction. This consists in the fact that there is talk of a “self” of everyday Dasein at all. If this “self” is nothing other than what is expressed in saying “I myself,” as has been shown, then being in the “they” is precisely not a “letting oneself be determined,” but rather the everyday way of self-determination. From this it admittedly follows that even the “authentic self” can now no longer consist in acting deliberately, that is, from a reasoned choice.11 Indeed, for Heidegger the “they” renders in advance “every judgment and decision” and thereby takes “the responsibility of Dasein away from it” (SZ 127, BT 119); it is by letting oneself be “disburdened” in this way (SZ 127, BT 120) that one is characterized by “dependency” (SZ 128, BT 120). However, this means that all decisions and judgments are made everyday in the way of saying “I myself” and in this are determined by the structure designated as the “they”; to the extent that saying “I myself” is a comparing oneself to others and thus a setting oneself apart from them, it expresses a reliance on others that we can call “not standing on one’s own” or “dependency” (Unselbständigkeit). This dependency is disburdening in that in everydayness, it always provides possibilities for comparison as one makes judgments and decisions. Besides, it is not enough to refer to the deliberateness of action, for deliberation alone is still not a criterion for “independence” over and against the “they.” Actions motivated by envy or ambition can also be highly deliberate. Furthermore, every process of deliberation that guides action is in one way or another related to others. Insofar as actions are justified by the grounds given for them, these grounds—in order to be accepted at all—must take into account what “they” say, that is, they must abide by the comparability of actions. If we determine the independence of those acting in terms of the process of deliberation that informed their actions, then we have at best succeeded in arriving at a pragmatically conceived concept of independence and must disregard the structural dependency through which one is bound to an other in saying “I myself.” “Independence” can then only mean that someone does not primarily do what he does from an orientation toward others, and in this sense someone, even if he acts out of ambition, would be called “independent,” just as long as he is not totally obsessed by his ambition. In such an obsession, the determination by outside forces consists in the fact that “something is happening in me,”12 and is, seen in this way, the same thing as the Platonic-Aristotelian kata to pathos zēn (living according to passion). Yet the pathē occupy a completely different place for Heidegger than they do for Aristotle, and besides, Heidegger’s concept of independence is not intended pragmatically.
Until this point it has admittedly remained unclear why Heidegger’s conception of the “they” is to be conceived as the basic concept of unfreedom. In order to answer this question, it may seem obvious to return to the interpretation of the “they” as determination by outside forces. But in the framework of this interpretation, one could not even define “unfreedom” in the Aristotelian sense, for Aristotle does not hesitate to call behavior “free” even if it is strongly determined by affect. If we designate the conception of the “they” as the basic concept of unfreedom, we are not in addition saying that the “they” is as such identical with “unfreedom.” If we suppose that “authentic being a self” is “being free,” then if we were to identify the “they” with “unfreedom,” “authentic being a self” and the “they” would be cast as rigid alternatives. That Heidegger is not asserting this is made clear when he says: “Authentic being one’s self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential” (SZ 130, BT 122). Accordingly, even in authentic being a self one is determined by the structure of the “they,” and if that were not the case, as “authentic self” one would have had to stop being this definite one among others. Moreover, if the “they” were identical with unfreedom, then as this definite one among others, one would always be unfree. However, we are unfree only if we are exclusively oriented by the structure of the “they” and want to be nothing but a definite one among others. What is foreclosed through this is how one “authentically” is, and “authentically” one is characterized by disclosedness. The closing off of disclosedness presupposes disclosedness; it is the dominance of the appearance of disclosedness rather than disclosedness itself. Yet the appearance of disclosedness is behavior, and if we want to grasp how the dominance of appearance can at all come about, we must first investigate the relation between disclosedness and behavior. This relation is the difference of freedom. The “they” is an appearance of this freedom insofar as ways of behaving are made familiar within it. Without the “they” there is no behavior.
—translated by Julia Davis and Richard Polt
Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1996), 111 (German page 117). Henceforth cited as “SZ” followed by the German pagination, and “BT” followed by the English pagination.
Thus Michael Theunissen writes, “Encounter in Being and Time hardly means: We encounter each other, but almost entirely: Inner-worldly beings encounter a Dasein that lets itself be encountered”: The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), 181.
As a classic text on this point, see Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
On this term cf. Klaus Hartmann, “The Logic of Deficient and Eminent Modes in Heidegger,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 5 (May 1974): 118—34.
Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 21 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 222.
On this use of the expression see esp. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 245.
On this concept cf. Theunissen, The Other, 89.
Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, Collected Works, vol. 1, trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), 100.
Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), 206.
Cf. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, 215-17, 265.
Cf. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, 250.