‘Ali b. Abi Talib (ca. 599–661)
Cousin and son-in-law to the Prophet by marriage to his eldest daughter, Fatima, ‘Ali is revered by Shi‘is as the first imam and, therefore, the true successor and inheritor (waṣī) to the Prophet’s legacy (waṣiyya) to whom absolute devotion (walāya) serves as the precondition of true knowledge of Islam. Sunnis regard him as the last of the so-called Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-khulafā’ al-rāshidūn). Although universally revered, the biography and station of ‘Ali within the Muslim community remain the locus classicus of the profoundest sectarian disputes between Sunni and Shi‘i believers. ‘Ali’s bid for the caliphate came in the midst of the Great Schism (al-fitna al-kubrā) following the assassination of ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan in 656. His brief and beleaguered efforts to reunite the umma under his leadership ended tragically with his assassination by the blade of one of his renegade followers on January 27, 661.
‘Ali’s political influence and, for some, his political right (ḥaqq) to leadership derives from his early and intimate ties with Muhammad, which originate from his early youth. ‘Ali ranks among the earliest converts to the new religion (a dispute exists over whether Abu Bakr’s conversion preceded ‘Ali’s or whether ‘Ali’s status as a minor rendered Abu Bakr’s conversion more meritorious). The prominence of place in the political arena publicly accorded to ‘Ali by the Prophet, particularly in Medina, is often striking. When instituting the brotherhood pact between prominent Meccan emigrants (muhājirūn) and Medinan helpers (anṣār), the Prophet chose ‘Ali as his brother designate. Muhammad also charged ‘Ali, who was renowned as a fierce warrior, with leading numerous raids and key diplomatic missions—for example, the Yemeni tribe Banu Hamdan allegedly converted at his hands—and twice Muhammad delegated him to destroy idols (first those of the Aws and Khazraj, then those of the Ka‘ba). Most important for Shi‘is, however, was the event transpiring in 632 at Ghadir Khumm, a marsh located between Mecca and Medina. After his return from his final pilgrimage, Muhammad declared to a congregation of Muslims, “Whosoever regards me as his master [mawlā], ‘Ali is his master.” This declaration is vague—the word mawlā by no means unambiguously conveys the sense of political or religious leadership. Shi‘is, however, interpreted the event as the Prophet’s investiture (naṣṣ) of ‘Ali with the leadership of the umma upon the death of the Prophet, whereas Sunni traditionalists usually regarded the event as evidence of ‘Ali’s high station in the community, though little more.
After the Prophet’s death, Abu Bakr’s initiation of the Qurashi caliphate with the help of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab and Abu ‘Ubayda b. al-Jarrah transpired without ‘Ali’s consultation, as he reportedly remained in the Prophet’s home preparing his corpse for burial. ‘Ali was not immediately forthcoming in granting Abu Bakr the oath of allegiance (bay‘a). The relations between the two worsened when Abu Bakr rejected Fatima’s claim to the Prophet’s orchard in Fadak. Fatima refused to meet with Abu Bakr ever again and died six months later, at which time ‘Ali swore his oath of allegiance. The ownership of Fadak remained a contested issue for centuries; caliphs periodically returned the property to Fatima’s descendents or seized it in varying contexts.
Even after the bay‘a, ‘Ali remained disconsolate and at a considerable distance from public life. In marked contrast to his exploits during Muhammad’s lifetime, ‘Ali participated in neither the wars of apostasy (ridda) under Abu Bakr nor the conquests undertaken by ‘Umar and ‘Uthman. ‘Umar, who reportedly disdained ‘Ali’s “foolishness” (du‘āba), may have played a direct role in marginalizing his influence from an early date. ‘Ali’s self-imposed distance and disenfranchisement apparently manifested a silent censure of the first three caliphs. Potentially revealing as well are the reports of his allegedly noncommittal (and consequentially negative) reply to ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Awf’s inquiry during the consultation (shūrā) that elected ‘Uthman caliph as to whether or not he would follow the policies of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.
‘Ali’s gradual reemergence onto the stage of public life coincides with the coalescing of opposition forces against the policies of ‘Uthman. When garrison rebels marched on Medina in 656, ‘Ali attempted but failed to mitigate their grievances. After the caliph’s assassination, many of the rebels, not all of whom had wished ‘Uthman dead, rallied to ‘Ali as their natural leader per the entreaties of the rebels. ‘Ali swiftly stepped into the power vacuum left by ‘Uthman’s death, quelling the chaos that had upended Medina’s peace. ‘Ali’s hastily convened shūrā, unlike ‘Uthman’s, incorporated not merely the emigrants, but also the helpers. Numerous prominent Meccan Quraysh fled the city—especially ‘Uthman’s Umayyad clansmen—to avoid yielding to ‘Ali’s authority, whereas others, such as the prominent Companions Zubayr b. ‘Awwam and Talha b. ‘Ubaydallah, offered their allegiance only under duress.
‘Ali’s relationship with the rebels on an ideological level is difficult to discern. His criticism of ‘Uthman was markedly more public than his criticism toward Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. However, it remains clear that the rebels, along with the anṣār whom ‘Uthman severely alienated, quickly filled the ranks of his political and military base and ‘Ali, perhaps out of necessity, readily acquiesced to a number of their demands: most famously the distribution of the funds of the treasury and the dismissal of ‘Uthman’s governors from the provinces.
The factions that took up arms against ‘Ali universally decried his leniency with the rebels and even accused him as equally guilty of ‘Uthman’s murder. In Iraq, Zubayr and Talha, along with the Prophet’s wife ‘A’isha, formed a coalition that was swiftly crushed by ‘Ali’s forces at the Battle of the Camel in 656. ‘Uthman’s governor, Mu‘awiya b. Abi Sufyan, led the Umayyad opposition to ‘Ali in Syria. Mu‘awiya demanded that ‘Ali surrender ‘Uthman’s murderers to him so that he could determine the murderers’ fate, a right he regarded as his by Qur’anic decree due to his status as ‘Uthman’s next of kin (walī; cf. Q. 17:33). After failing to successfully negotiate these demands at Siffin, the armies met in pitched battle. To prevent defeat, the Syrians signaled their desire for arbitration on the basis of the Qur’an by raising sheets (maṣāḥif) of the text on the tip of their lances in the midst of the battle. The Syrian and Iraqi factions each put forward a representative arbiter (ḥakam) to render a judgment on the dispute.
‘Ali’s consent to this agreement proved to be his ultimate undoing; the arbiters’ decision proved untenable for ‘Ali. Rejecting the rebels’ claims of ‘Uthman’s guilt, it buttressed Mu‘awiya’s claims to pursue vengeance for ‘Uthman’s death and, therefore, also spurred the Syrians to pledge allegiance to Mu‘awiya as caliph in 659. ‘Ali’s coalition, rather than being galvanized like the Syrians’, disintegrated, with large numbers of his followers, later known as Kharijis, censuring the decision as abandoning Qur’anic authority in favor of the decisions of men. They regarded ‘Ali’s agreement as tantamount to disbelief (kufr), crying, “There is no judgment but God’s [lā ḥukma illā li-llāh]!” After attempts at reconciliation, ‘Ali eventually met, defeated, and massacred this group at Nahrawan in 658, though at a considerable cost to his coalition’s morale. Mu‘awiya could subsequently act aggressively as a rival caliph rather than a rebel governor, seizing swaths of territory in Egypt, Arabia, and even Iraq. A Khariji assassin, Ibn Muljam al-Muradi, murdered ‘Ali as he plotted to remobilize his forces against Mu‘awiya to avenge the deaths of his companions at Nahrawan.
Sharif al-Radi (d. 1015) collected the political orations, discourses, and letters of ‘Ali in the Nahj al-Balagha (Peak of eloquence) that today serves as an authoritative text among Shi‘is. It putatively contains many of ‘Ali’s views on sundry political and religious topics and has been published in numerous English translations.
See also Companions of the Prophet; imamate; Shi‘ism; succession
Further Reading
Asma Afsaruddin, Excellence and Precedence: Medieval Islamic Discourse on Legitimate Leadership, 2002; Sean W. Anthony, The Caliph and the Heretic: Ibn Saba’ and the Origins of Shī‘ism, 2011; Martin Hinds, “The Siffin Arbitration Agreement,” JSS 17, no. 1 (1972); I.K.A. Howard, trans., Kitāb al-Irshād, or The Book of Guidance into the Lives of the Twelve Imams by al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 1981; Wilferd Madelung, The Succession to Muḥammad, 1996; Erling L. Petersen, ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiya in Early Arabic Tradition, 1974; Abu Ja‘far Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, The Community Divided (The History of al-Ṭabarī, vol. 16), translated by Adrian Brockett, 1997; Idem, The First Civil War (The History of al-Ṭabarī, vol. 17), translated by G. R. Hawting, 1996; Maya Yazigi, “‘Alī, Muḥammad, and the Anṣār: The Issue of Succession,” JSS 53, no. 2 (2008).
SEAN W. ANTHONY