The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

commanding right and forbidding wrong

“Commanding right and forbidding wrong” (al-amr bi-l-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar) is a pervasive Islamic doctrine with textual roots in the Qur’an and hadith, the recorded sayings and actions of Muhammad, that articulates a general moral duty incumbent upon all Muslims. Its interpretations and applications have varied significantly throughout the history of the Islamic tradition, depending on sectarian affiliation, scholastic tradition, and political context. For convenience, the doctrine is referred to here as “forbidding wrong.” The most thorough treatment of the principle can be seen in Michael Cook’s magisterial Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, which serves as the primary reference for the following summary.

While there are many Qur’anic sources for the obligation to forbid wrong, 3:104 resolutely describes the tenet as a principle constituting the Muslim community and Islamic identity writ large: “Let there be one community of you, calling to good, commanding right and forbidding wrong.” As is often true in Qur’anic style, the details of the tenet are obscure, leaving only a broad ethical injunction, and as is common in Islamic tradition more generally, such interpretive gaps are readily filled in by the hadith literature. The most common hadith report relevant to the doctrine appears in a number of both Sunni and Shi‘i collections, canonical and otherwise. It relates that Muhammad said, “Whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can’t, then with his tongue; if he can’t, then in his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith.” In Cook’s words, this hadith “provided later generations with a fundamental building-block for their scholastic doctrines of forbidding wrong,” because in its contradistinction to the opacity of the Qur’anic articulations, it “spells out a hierarchy of modes of response to wrong: deed, word, and thought.” It is within this broad spectrum that the political possibilities of the tenet can range from activism to quietism.

Exemplifying the quietist approach to the practice, Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855), the famed scholar of hadith, was modest in describing the parameters of the duty to forbid wrong. He did not advocate the use of violence in the performance of the duty, though the destruction of forbidden objects (e.g., smashing musical instruments, overturning chessboards) was permissible. Verbal extortion and scolding were also considered appropriate measures. If an offender’s repeated refusal to change his or her behavior might lead to an escalation or confrontation, it was deemed better to cease. Privacy of one’s home was also considered an insurmountable barrier to implementation of the duty. Also, according to Ibn Hanbal and other quietists, one should refrain from the duty when one’s safety is in question. Therefore, like other formative quietest Sunni thinkers, he discouraged its performance against the state and shunned political activism.

The activist manifestation of the doctrine, which does not necessarily imply political rebellion, would nonetheless find expression in the movement founded by Ibn Hanbal in later generations, most specifically in the activities of the infamous Baghdadi activist Hasan b. ‘Ali al-Barbahari (d. 941) and other tenth-century populists who engaged in acts of public disturbance in targeting various figures who strayed from “proper” Islamic behavior. The duty was also regularly articulated in doctrinal terms and thus supported public attacks against competing theological and sectarian visions of Islam.

Activist interpretations also came from Mu‘tazili theologians such as Sayyid Mankdim (d. 1034) and al-Hakim al-Jishumi (d. 1101), who, though grounded in the school of ‘Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025), may have varied on the place of arms in the performance of the duty but rejected the idea of restricting the duty to performance in the heart solely. The Zaydi Shi‘is likewise were activist oriented, though expectedly more so in terms of rebellion against unjust rulers. Hadi ila al-Haqq (d. 911), founder of the Zaydi imamate of Yemen, considered it foundational to his religious leadership and political mission, making it a formal component of his followers’ pledge of allegiance to him. Imami Shi‘i positions on the quietist-activist spectrum centered on the need for the imam’s permission to perform the duty. The majority of scholars endorsed a view restricting the responsibility of the duty to the imam or his deputy, while ‘Allama Hilli (d. 1325) argued that a qualified jurist could enact it—a juridical theme later expounded on by Ayatollah Khomeini in his adaptation of the guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat-i faqih), the religious doctrine that justifies clerical Islamic rule in Iran.

Given the ambiguity of the term “Sufi,” it may not be fruitful to search for the Sufi theory of forbidding wrong. Nonetheless, the influential mystical thinker Harith al-Muhasibi (d. 857) declared that the best method includes the sincere cultivation of the obligation to forbid wrong. A regular refrain in Sufi articulations of the duty is the need to sublimate the ego’s passions and to turn to God for help in correcting the wrongdoer’s actions.

Forbidding wrong has had an ambivalent place in the development of modern state institutions in Muslim majority countries. In the wake of colonialism, many nations adopted secular codes of civil law, thus rendering many of the provisions of the shari‘a irrelevant, much less subject to enforcement. It was not uncommon for reform intellectuals in the early 20th century to read into the Qur’an (3:104), the political injunction of representative assembly or other liberal modes of governance. However, in polities seeking a reconstitution of Islamic law, forbidding wrong became a cornerstone principle of public order. Shortly after the consolidation of Ibn Saud’s conquests across the Arabian Peninsula in the late 1920s, committees for commanding right and forbidding wrong were established in Mecca to regulate pilgrims during their visits to the holy sanctuaries. The function quickly spread to the regulation of moral behavior in society at large, and it has since been a prominent feature of the modern Saudi state. Ayatollah Khomeini and like-minded Shi‘i activists took up the doctrine of forbidding wrong as a central justification for their revivalist aspirations. In line with their general political views, they sharply criticized religious scholars who subscribed to the traditional quietest approach of Twelver Shi‘ism, which held that in the absence of the direct instructions of the imam, many such political obligations were suspended indefinitely. Instead, they argued that with the permission and guidance of a jurist, forbidding wrong could again be a duty incumbent upon Muslims. The tenet was adopted as the basis for an article of the constitution of the Islamic Republic, and as in Saudi Arabia, the doctrine has been entrusted to substate local committees and councils for implementation.

In conclusion, forbidding wrong in Islamic tradition is as all encompassing as it is ambivalent. Its manifestations can range from the attacks of the violent activist to the inner thoughts and passive resistance of the quietest; likewise, its interpretation can lead to either conservative or liberal political conclusions.