Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Bajja joins Ibn Rushd (1126–98) in the West and Farabi (ca. 878–950) and Ibn Sina (980–1037) in the East as one of the most renowned philosophers within the classical Islamic tradition. Although he left his mark on Islamic civilization as a philosopher, Ibn Bajja was also well known throughout Spain and North Africa for his accomplishments in medicine, poetry, music, and astronomy. Owing to his talents and acclaim, he was quick to impress those in power and rose to a high office in their courts. At the same time, however, Ibn Bajja was just as quick to acquire enemies and provoke rivals, which twice resulted in his imprisonment (first for treason, then for heresy) and possibly in his being poisoned at the beckoning of a rival courtier.
His political philosophy comes primarily from his Governance of the Solitary. In this work, Ibn Bajja makes explicit references to Plato, Aristotle, and Farabi, and the influence of these thinkers comes through clearly in his argumentation. Like Plato, Ibn Bajja contends that the city is properly called “virtuous and perfect” when it is ruled by the philosopher. Ibn Bajja’s conception of the faculties through which the philosopher rules follows Farabi’s treatment of the active intellect, which, in turn, has its origin in Aristotle’s remarks on the soul. The active intellect is an intermediary between God and humanity often associated within the Islamic tradition with the angel Gabriel or the “faithful spirit” of the Qur’an. At times, it is described along the lines of the Platonic realm of forms as a kind of unified constellation of paradigmatic spiritual realities from which all things in the material world receive their being. At other times, it is depicted as supplying rational agents with principles of reason. It is also the means by which the philosopher receives prophetic and revelatory visions from God. Through earnest philosophical investigation and training, the accomplished philosopher is united with the active intellect. At this stage, the philosopher realizes his “universal spiritual form,” which entails unsurpassed understanding of the cosmos and the workings of the terrestrial realm. When the philosopher takes his rightful place as ruler, he puts his theoretical knowledge into practice and governs in such a way that the character of each citizen is maximized according to its capacity. There is no false opinion in his city. All citizens are united in friendship so there are no disputes, making the office of judge irrelevant. Nor is there a need for physicians, since each citizen maintains a good state of health by eating proper foods and exercising regularly.
The philosopher’s perfect city stands in contrast to four types of corrupt governance that Ibn Bajja characterizes in accordance with divisions established by Plato in the Republic: the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and despotic. The unique and defining feature of Ibn Bajja’s political philosophy is inspired by the idea that the perfect city has not been realized and that the philosopher is forced to live in one of the four types of corrupt cities or a mixture thereof. Ibn Bajja’s prescription for a healthy philosophic life, therefore, is withdrawal from sociopolitical affairs. In order to maintain his own spiritual health and union with the active intellect, the philosopher must isolate himself, shunning the affairs of the imperfect city and thereby protecting himself from its corrupting influences. This is not ideal, for Ibn Bajja recognizes with Aristotle that the human being is a political animal and concedes that there is something rather unnatural about withdrawing from political life. Nevertheless, the prescription of withdrawal is a necessary evil in the context of the corrupt state. Ibn Bajja likens it to opium, which is harmful to the healthy body yet beneficial to the diseased. In this regard, Ibn Bajja writes of the philosopher’s sociopolitical isolation as “medicine for the soul.”
Questions have been raised regarding the consistency of Ibn Bajja’s prescription of withdrawal with his self-professed fidelity to Plato, Aristotle, and Farabi. Such withdrawal is out of the question for Aristotle, and although there is a seminal notion of withdrawal from the corrupt city in the work of Plato and Farabi, it is not clear that their political philosophies accommodate the radical isolation that Ibn Bajja recommends. Concern has also been voiced about Ibn Bajja’s attitude toward the shari‘a, which seems to be made obsolete in the life of the socially isolated philosopher and in the context of the perfect state, where the right action of its citizens is interpreted as an outgrowth of their well-formed character and true opinion rather than as obedience to religious law.
See also Almoravids (1056–1147); al-Farabi, Abu Nasr (ca. 878–950); government; Ibn Rushd (1126–98); individualism; North Africa; philosopher-king; philosophy; Spain and Portugal (Andalus)
Further Reading
Lenn E. Goodman, “Ibn Bajjah,” in History of Islamic Philosophy, edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman, 1996; Ibn Bajja, “Governance of the Solitary,”in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, edited by Ralph Lerner and Mushin Mahdi, translated by Lawrence Berman, 1963; Oliver Leaman, “Ibn Bajja on Society and Philosophy,” Der Islam Zeitchrit für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients 57, no. 1 (1980); E.I.J. Rosenthal, “Ibn Bajja: The Individualist Deviation,” in Political Thought in Medieval Islam, 1962.
W. CRAIG STREETMAN