The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

Islamic Jihad

The organization known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Jihad al-Islami al-Misri, hereafter EIJ), also frequently referred to as the Jihad Organization (Tanzim al-Jihad), is a militant Islamist group. At least until 2007, its objective was to engage in offensive jihad (lit. struggle; here, military action) against the Egyptian state to weaken the regime and ultimately to initiate an Islamic revolution. The group draws its ideology from ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj’s work al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Neglected Duty), which further develops ideas set out by Sayyid Qutb’s Ma‘alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones). EIJ was involved in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981 and was a leading participant in the jihad in Afghanistan during the 1980s. It was also involved in several attempts on the life of high-ranking Egyptian politicians, among them an attempt against President Husni Mubarak in June 1995. EIJ carried out a series of bomb strikes on military and civilian installations in Egypt and abroad during the 1980s and 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, the group was affiliated with Ayman al-Zawahiri and subsequently constituted a subgroup of al-Qaeda.

The beginnings of the group go back to the late 1970s, when a number of loosely organized militant networks in Cairo came together under the leadership of Faraj. One of the networks feeding into the early EIJ was the circle of Zawahiri, which included his brother Muhammad al-Zawahiri, Ulwi Mustafa Ulaywah and his brother Muhammad Mustafa Ulaywah, ‘Isam al-Qamari, and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif. The ranks of the early EIJ extended to the military; Qamari and Muhammad Ulaywah were members of the armed forces, and Lieutenant Colonel ‘Abbud al-Zumur was a high-ranking officer who then organized the military wing of the group. In June 1980, Faraj managed to convince the Saidi (Upper Egyptian) network of Karam Zuhdi—which included smaller groups centered around Najih Ibrahim, ‘Abdallah Sayyid, Muhammad al-Islambuli, and Hamdi ‘Abd al-Rahman and which formed the nucleus of the later al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)—to coordinate their activities and join forces. The groups, which remained locally distinct, formed a shūrā (consultation) council of 12 and nominated ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman as their mufti (interpreter of Islamic law).

On October 6, 1981, an EIJ military action unit under the command of Khalid al-Islambuli assassinated Sadat during a military parade in commemoration of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Following the event, a military trial sentenced Faraj, Khalid al-Islambuli, and the latter’s three accomplices to death. The court cases against another 302 EIJ members resulted in 58 prison sentences and, except for a few senior members, most members of the organization were released within 3 years. The prison years revealed underlying tensions between the Saidi and the Cairene factions of the organization on questions of leadership, strategy, and the future of the organization. The differences led to the establishment of al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya under ‘Abd al-Rahman as a group distinct from EIJ, which chose Zumur as its leader.

In order to escape prosecution in Egypt and because of the prospect of engaging in combat, many EIJ members left to participate in the Afghan jihad against Russian troops. Since Zumur remained imprisoned in Egypt, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl) took charge of EIJ’s operations. Following ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam’s call to join the jihad in Afghanistan, EIJ adhered to the concept of the “near enemy,” which draws on traditional concepts of Muslim warfare to stress the obligation to directly confront a force occupying what is perceived to be Muslim land.

With the withdrawal of Russia from Afghanistan, EIJ members reviewed their strategy and ideology, particularly their definition of jihad. Zawahiri and the remaining EIJ combatants favored the concept of warfare against the “far enemy,” stressing their view that it was obligatory to fight against the United States and its allies, which they perceived as enabling the continuance of governments such as the Egyptian regime under Mubarak. Zawahiri thus gradually increased his influence on the Egyptian mujahidin (fighters engaging in jihad) and, with the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991, took charge of EIJ. EIJ then effectively merged with al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden. Evidence of the correlation between EIJ and al-Qaeda is the fact that six of nine seats of al-Qaeda’s leadership council belong to former EIJ members. Furthermore, a number of terrorist attacks, such as the 1995 bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad and the 1995 attempts on President Mubarak’s life, were financed, planned, and executed through al-Qaeda.

Zawahiri’s leadership and the strategy of international terrorism did not go unchallenged. In the late 1990s, ideological disputes emerged on the question of engaging in combat on a national or an international level; however, a clear rift took place in 2007, when Sayyid Imam al-Sharif published a statement that called for a review of the idea of militant jihad. This revision led EIJ members to distance themselves from international terrorism, al-Qaeda, and Zawahiri. It is still too early to say whether EIJ thus reinvented itself as an organization separate from al-Qaeda and opted to give up its militant opposition to the Egyptian state.