Political and Social Reform in Russia
The accession to the throne of Russia of Alexander II had been melancholy and dramatic. Heartbroken by the events in the Crimea, and the fearful damage inflicted on the army that was so dear to him, Tsar Nicholas I seemed almost to be deliberately courting death in the freezing temperatures of St Petersburg in February 1855. Catching a cold, he ignored his doctors’ advice and continued with his duties. His cold became worse; influenza was diagnosed. At first his doctors felt no real concern; but early in the morning of February 18 the true situation became clear. Nicholas faced his end with dignity, giving orders and dictating despatches, including a message to King William of Prussia begging him never to alter the alliance with Russia. He spoke his last words to his son:
I wanted to take everything difficult, everything serious, upon my shoulders and to leave you a peaceful, well-ordered and happy realm. Providence decreed otherwise. Now I go to pray for Russia and for you all. After Russia I loved you [his family] more than anything else in the world. Serve Russia.1
With his death, the system created by Nicholas, which has been described as ‘the epitome of an 18th Century Western European police state,’ effectively collapsed. For Alexander and his advisers a wide programme of change in practically all aspects of the Russian state was absolutely necessary.
The Crimean War, and its disastrous outcome, demonstrated with pitiless clarity a number of aspects of Russian government and society that demanded reform. One was of course the extent to which the army needed root and branch overhaul. It was dependent on the loyalty of the peasant soldiers, who had shown their willingness to tolerate appalling privations during the war. But it was increasingly clear to intelligent observers that this loyalty could not be depended on indefinitely, and that the emancipation of the serfs must be high on the reform agenda.
Alexander II was thirty-seven when he became Tsar. He had had the benefit of a much more sympathetic upbringing than his father, the tutors assigned to him being humane and sensitive. His education was well fitted for a future ruler, addressing all aspects of the civil and military duties he would undertake, and gave him a humane and understanding view of the world.2 In 1842 he married Princess Marie of Hesse-Darmstadt, (over his parents’ objections) who became the Grand Duchess Maria Alexandrovna, and who bore him six sons and two daughters. One historian has described him, in somewhat highly coloured terms, as ‘an unpredictable mixture of stubbornness and feebleness, boldness and timidity, enlightenment and obscurantism.’3
Nicholas I had been careful to give his son steadily increasing responsibilities: he stood in for his father when the Tsar left the capital for any lengthy period. In 1849 Alexander was given command of the Corps of Guards, and of all military colleges and schools. He was less of a soldier than his father but, on the other hand, had had much more experience of the problems of government by the time he came to the throne. He has been characterized as ‘milder, less imperious than his father.’ But at the same time he did not relinquish the decision-making process to anyone else.4 He would usually back the advisers he appointed against all criticism.
Alexander wasted little time in tackling the question of the emancipation of the serfs. In a speech in Moscow on March 30 1856 he said: ‘It is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait until the serfs begin to liberate themselves from below.’5 At the beginning of 1857 a secret committee began to address the key questions involved in carrying through a reform that was far reaching in its social and economic implications. During 1858 committees were set up in most provinces to study the issues; many could not reach unanimous agreement and sent in both a majority and minority view. Alexander was himself moving to a more generous view of what it was necessary to give the serfs in terms of the right to buy not only their own homes but also the surrounding land. One of his key advisers, General Rostovtsev, previously supposed to be a reactionary, was also moving to a more liberal position; his appointment to head the ‘Editorial Commissions’ that were set up to sort out the issues was a key factor in enabling the emancipation programme to move forward.
Rostovtsev died in February 1860, and Count Panin was appointed in his place. Although more reactionary than his predecessor, he accepted the liberal thrust of the proposals. To get the process completed it was necessary to overcome the bitter hostility that existed between the bureaucrats of the Ministry of the Interior and the landowners. The final proposals were discussed by the Council of State in January 1861 and the legislation was introduced in the following month. The serfs were emancipated from the possession of the landowners and were to receive land of their own. There were complex arrangements for the process which would gradually release them and enable them to acquire their land.
While noting that the settlement did not solve the peasant question, Hugh Seton Watson remarked on the fact that serfdom had been ‘peacefully abolished in the same year in which failure to abolish slavery in another great country was a principal cause of one of the most bloody wars of the 19th century.’ In seeking an explanation for the difference, he pointed out that Government authority was much stronger in Russia than in the United States, while the sanctity of private property was less.6
The Crimean War had demonstrated the complete inadequacy of the system of communications in Russia. In the year after the war ended there were just over a thousand kilometres of railway in the whole country; in the next twenty years this increased by a factor of nearly twenty. Largely developed by private companies, the encouragement given to them by the government was prompted by strategic considerations, but in such a huge country the economic benefits were enormous and immediate. Industries which had hitherto depended on serf labour naturally faced a downturn for a number of years after the emancipation, while those employing wage labour prospered. Gradually the industries that had fallen back recovered; in the 1860s there was an annual average of 798,000 workers employed in manufacturing, mining and metallurgy, a figure which rose in the next decade to 946,000. Output of pig iron more than doubled between 1862 and 1886, although the total still remained relatively small compared to other industrial nations.7
The progressive expansion of Russia from the principality of Moscow which Ivan III inherited in 1462 to the vast territorial empire to which Alexander II acceded nearly four hundred years later involved the absorption of many different peoples and ethnic and religious groups, and by no means all of these completely lost their cultural identity or their desire for autonomy and, in some cases, for independence. This meant that the Russian government, to preserve the integrity of the empire, must impose a rigid and autocratic rule over the provinces in which unrest might occur; and, of course, the imposition of such a system itself stimulated protest.
The vast areas covered by the Russian Empire would in any case make its government an especially difficult task. This problem was, however, exacerbated by the backwardness of its communications system, particularly when compared to that of other Great Powers. In spite of the accelerated building programme, Russia still possessed in 1870 only 10,700 kilometers of railroads compared with 17,900 in France and 18,700 in Germany. The network of paved roads was equally unsatisfactory. Troops could, therefore, not be moved quickly to prevent or put down insurrections or to meet external threats.8
By the time Alexander came to the throne, continuing Russian expansion was directed to the south, in the Caucasus; to the east and south-east in Turkestan and Turkmenistan; and to the Far East as far as the Pacific. Expansion into the Caucasus had encountered bitter opposition, particularly in Circassia in the west and Dagestan in the east. In Dagestan resistance was led by religious leaders, and in particular by Shamil, a brilliant guerilla fighter and a man of passionate conviction who inspired absolute loyalty in his followers. A campaign by the viceroy of the Caucasus, Count Michael Vorontsov, ultimately took Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, after an eighteen-month campaign which cost many thousands of Russian casualties. In spite of huge efforts, Chechnya, Dagestan and the mountainous regions of Circassia remained out of Russian control up to the Crimean War.9
In Kazakhstan, Russian influence had been steadily consolidated, in spite of a series of revolts in the 1830s and 1840s. Further east, beyond the Aral Sea, Turkestan was divided into three khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Khokand. Between the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea lay Turkmenistan. In 1858 Count Ignatiev led a Russian mission to Khiva and Bokhara which opened the way for the development of trade. Russian interest in the region grew in the 1860s, and in 1864 a series of military operations began, which steadily expanded the area of Russian control. The most successful of the Russian leaders was Cherniaev, who took the city of Tashkent in June 1865. In the following year some territory in Bokhara was occupied.
In 1867 a governor general of Turkestan was appointed, which was a confirmation of the forward policy being adopted by St Petersburg. By 1873, first Khiva and then Bokhara had each become a Russian protectorate. In 1875 a rebellion in Khokand spread to Russian territory; Kauffman, the governor general, pursued the rebels into Khokand and by January 1876 Major-General Michael Skobelev had taken Andizhan, following which the Russian government annexed the whole of Khokand.10
In the Far East the governor general of Siberia, N N Muraviev, pursued a vigorous policy, including the exploration of the Amur river, at the mouth of which a Russian settlement was established in 1850. This was not recognised by the Chinese government until 1858. In the following year, the site for a port further down the coast was selected. Then, in 1860, the Russians successfully negotiated the cession of all the territory claimed between the Ussari River and the Pacific, and the building of the port of Vladivostok began.
Meanwhile in the Caucasus the Russians, once the Crimean War had ended, embarked on a methodical military strategy to impose their control on the rebellious regions. Between 1857 and 1859 strong Russian forces penetrated further and further into the areas hitherto dominated by Shamil, and one by one the Chechens and the tribes of Dagestan surrendered. Shamil himself finally surrendered in August 1859. In 1862 a similar campaign began against the Circassians; by May 1864 the Russians were in complete control, although more than half the Circassian population chose to emigrate to Turkey rather than remain under Russian rule.11 The two Christian nations of Transcaucasia, Georgia and Armenia, were perfectly content to remain under Russian rule, although as time went by there was some social discontent which made the region a fertile ground for revolutionary ideas.
Within Russia itself by far the most serious security problem faced by the government was the Polish rebellion of 1863. The population of Poland was somewhat less than five million, of whom three-quarters were Poles; there were 600,000 Jews and a quarter of a million each of Germans and Lithuanians. The Poles and Lithuanians, and some of the Germans, were Catholic. The question of the future of the peasants in Poland could not be avoided at a time when in Russia itself progress was being made towards the emancipation of the serfs; and the introduction of reforms in Russia made it expedient for the government to extend reform to Poland.
Unfortunately, the reform programme introduced by Alexander in 1861 had the effect of stimulating demand in Poland for still greater concessions. There was a difference of view in Poland between those leaders who believed that it was useless to struggle for independence and that what should be done was to make Russian rule more tolerable, and those who refused to compromise in this way. Street demonstrations in April 1861 led to Russian troops firing on the crowds; unofficially, the death toll was estimated at 200. Later that year there were further demonstrations, culminating in the declaration of a state of siege.
There was also a difference of view on the Russian side, between those who favoured further concessions and those who wished to take a hard line. In May 1862 Alexander approved a fresh reform programme and appointed his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, as viceroy. He also appointed Poles to the positions of provincial governors, and conceded the adoption of Polish as the official language. In spite of reforms such as the reopening of Warsaw University, Polish extremists made attempts on the lives of the viceroy and Marquis Alexander Wielopolski, who headed the commission on education and religious affairs. The banishment of the Polish moderate leader Count Andrew Zamoyski, and the announcement of conscription for young Poles, added fuel to the fire, and the radicals began to set up provincial committees for armed rebellion, which broke out on January 22 1863.
Public opinion throughout Europe was in sympathy with the Poles. France, Britain and Austria united in protesting against repressive Russian measures against the rebels, and called for Polish autonomy. It was not unexpected that Napoleon III, always supportive of the right to national self-determination, should take this line; but it marked an end to the cooperative relationship that had existed between France and Russia since the Tsar and Napoleon met at Stuttgart in 1857. But for Prussia, Russia would have been completely isolated. Bismarck, however, looked askance at the prospect of a successful Polish rebellion, which he considered would be a threat to Prussia; besides, for future purposes, he wanted Russia to be beholden to him. He sent General Konstantin von Alvensleben to conclude a convention whereby the rebels might be pursued across the border by either government. It was a step which caused the most bitter opposition within Prussia, where public opinion was entirely in support of the line taken by the other Great Powers.
Prince Bismarck. (Russes et Turcs)
Bismarck, however, was unmoved. By early 1864 the rebellion was crushed. The French attitude effectively prevented Napoleon from getting any support from Russia over the Schleswig Holstein question, and the ensuing action taken against Denmark by Prussia and Austria. Bismarck’s policy assured him of Russian friendship in the future, and he was no more concerned by the hostility of the other Great Powers than he was by political sentiment at home. He was playing a much larger game.
The suppression of the Polish rebellion was in the end brutally efficient, particularly in Lithuania. This was in spite of the efforts of Grand Duke Constantine to secure leniency for the Polish people; by now Alexander was no longer prepared to resist those of his advisers who called for the strictest measures to be taken within Poland to maintain internal security. He was, however, prepared to introduce agrarian reform; by the settlement of March 1864 about 700,000 Polish peasant families obtained freeholds, while keeping their rights to the use of common pastures and forests. The Russian objective was in this way to separate the interests of the peasants from the Polish ruling class. However, it has been pointed out that although the Polish peasants did better out of the deal than they would have done had there been no rebellion, their ownership of the land itself confirmed them in their conviction that Poland was their country.12
War preparations in Russia – impressing wagons and horses for army transport. (Illustrated London News)
This ineradicable belief was maintained in spite of the application to Poland of the russification policy, which included the confiscation of all properties of the Catholic Church, and the maintenance of government control over the administration of the Church. In 1864 the Russian judicial system was substantially introduced into Poland; and in 1872 the Russian system of secondary education. The Russian government was also now extremely sensitive to any signs of nationalism arising in the Ukraine, and in particular to the effect of Austrian policy in the neighbouring province of Galicia, the population of which was made up of Poles and Ukrainians.
Russia also faced the incipient problems of nationalism in the Baltic States, and in Finland. In Estonia and Latvia there developed literary movements that carried with them a growing sense of national identity. In Finland, the Swedish minority dominated the landowning and business classes. The Russian government was inclined to favour the Finnish majority, introducing legislation to promote the use of the Finnish language in public business, and bringing into effect laws on education which had the result of hugely expanding the number of schools taught in that language.
All of this meant that the internal government of Russia was an extremely complicated business. In the development of its foreign policy, it was obliged, notwithstanding the autocratic nature of its institutions, to have regard to the possible effect of that policy on the various interest groups that must be kept in mind. There was a strong body of public opinion which retained a belief in the common destiny of the Slav people.13 The foundation in Moscow in 1858 of the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee was the first of a number of organisations that came into being with the support of the government. Gradually the strident policies of the Pan-Slavs displaced the rather more diffident approach of the Slavophils. Russian Pan-Slavism was based on a belief that it was Russia’s destiny to lead the smaller Slav nations, and that only those nations with an Orthodox rather than a Protestant or Catholic population could be trusted. The strength of Pan-Slav opinion would in due course exert a considerable influence over Russian policy, and its response to international events.
As the nation on its borders that was itself adjacent to the Ottoman Empire, Roumania was, of course, still notionally subject to Ottoman sovereignty, but its future was very much a matter of concern to Russia. Napoleon’s idea that Austria might acquire it in exchange for Venetia was wholly unacceptable; Alexander said that the suggestion was ‘inadmissible jusqu’à la guerre,’ and Gorchakov was equally outspoken.14 The idea had arisen when Prince Nicholas Couza, the Prince of Roumania, was compelled to abdicate in February 1866. When the Roumanian leaders sought a foreign prince, and their choice fell on Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the Russians were far from pleased. Nor was Austria; but the other Great Powers supported his election (achieved with an overwhelmingly popular majority in the national plebiscite) and in October 1866 the Ottoman government accepted the position. Roumania’s new ruler would have an important part to play in the years ahead.
Prince Charles of Roumania. (Ollier)