6

Recourse to Arms

The Balkan roads left much to be desired, and were for practical purposes impassable by an army during the winter. Even after the failure of the Constantinople conference, therefore, there still remained a window of opportunity for peace, although with each week that went by it was closing rapidly. The suggestion put forward by Count Shuvalov, accordingly, that Lord Derby should urge the Sublime Porte to adopt some of the reform proposals, was one which the Foreign Secretary had no difficulty in taking up. He got a temporising reply. Shuvalov’s approach had been prompted by a conversation between Lady Derby and her stepson, on his return from Constantinople, as to the possibility that even now, with the Porte’s willingness to consent to reform, the Russians might draw back from a conflict that otherwise seemed inevitable. Shuvalov was also anxious that Gorchakov’s circular should receive a prompt reply.1

Bismarck was also anxious to know what the British response to the circular would be, and was concerned to hear of the close working relationship that had developed at Constantinople between Salisbury and Ignatiev. Always anxious about potentially hostile alliances, and in an effort to keep Britain apart from France and Russia, he put out feelers for an understanding between Britain and Germany, not just in relation to the present crisis, about which he was not much concerned, but on a more permanent basis. Lord Odo Russell reported on February 3 the Chancellor’s remarks at a meeting:

Bismarck became grave and silent after a while and said that one of his foremost political dreams had been an active and intimate alliance with England… [for peace] but that dream could not be realized by good offices and moral support only which appeared to be all England had to offer him in return for the intimate alliance of Germany. It was a good deal and he was grateful for it, but it was not enough when other Powers were actively preparing for war.²

When the British Cabinet discussed the German approach, there was the usual knee jerk reaction of suspicion of what Bismarck was up to, a suspicion shared by Queen Victoria, who wrote in her diary:

That monstrous Bismarck is again at his tricks, wanting us to go with him and is getting up the same cry as before against France, accusing her of the intention of attacking Germany. It is just what he did 2 years ago.³

Meanwhile to the alarm of Disraeli and his colleagues, Ignatiev was sent ostensibly to visit an oculist but in reality on a tour of the Western capitals with the draft of a protocol, which Bismarck approved. That alone aroused suspicion about Russian motives; but Salisbury was enthusiastic about its moderation, and Derby thought its terms studiously inoffensive: ‘nothing is said of the conference proposals; the Turkish Reforms are accepted instead; no date is fixed for their execution.’4 Ignatiev’s arrival in England on March 16 where, his reputation so bad that his presence was unlikely to assist the negotiations, there was nonetheless an opportunity for a series of meetings which offered some hope that the ‘golden bridge’ which would enable Russia to retreat might be constructed.

Queen Victoria.

Discussions continued between the Great Powers during the second half of March. One cause of delay was the continuing negotiation between Turkey and Montenegro, in the course of which Prince Nicholas of Montenegro was making territorial demands which the Turks were not disposed to accept. Derby suggested that the Protocol should not be signed until these negotiations were completed, but they continued to drag on and the Russian pressure for acceptance of the Protocol continued to increase. A more serious problem, however, was the insistence by the British Cabinet that the Protocol could not be finalised until the question of the demobilisation of the Russian army had been resolved. The Russian position as to this was that before they could demobilise, the Montenegrin peace talks must be completed, the Turkish reforms must be put in place and the Turks must themselves begin to disarm.

Just how sincere the Russians were in all this must be a matter of some doubt. Quite early in the approach to war the Russians had effectively painted themselves into a corner. Bismarck correctly understood that beneath the bellicose exterior of Russian policy there was a genuine reluctance on the part of Alexander and Gorchakov to go to war; however, they were, he observed, in the position of the diner who no longer wants the steak he ordered but feels compelled to eat it because he has to pay for it.⁵ If there was to be a war Alexander certainly did not want to find repeated the situation his father had faced before the Crimean War, when he was opposed directly or indirectly by the rest of Europe. Getting the Great Powers to agree to a protocol that was extremely vague, while being reasonably confident that the Turks would either reject it, or fail in practice to comply with its requirements, he could proceed without fear of interference.

In London, while the members of the Cabinet anguished over the wisdom or otherwise of signing the Protocol, the House of Commons continued to debate various aspects of the question. One of these was the issue of whether Elliot, notionally on leave, should return as ambassador to Constantinople. Rightly perceived as an extreme Turcophil who had been allowed to bend British policy in favour of Turkey over a long period, there was a strong expression of opinion in the House in debates during March that he should not go back. Inside the Cabinet, Disraeli, who had privately determined that he should not, had had a long struggle with Derby, who obstinately resisted what he saw as interference with the Foreign Office’s right to decide who should serve as ambassadors. But Elliot’s extreme pronouncements, and the Cabinet’s progressive retreat from a strongly pro-Turkish position, meant that in the end there could be no question of his return. Indeed, his maintenance in his position in the latter part of 1876 probably owed as much as anything to the requests of Shuvalov that he be removed; such a demand from a foreign ambassador could never be complied with.

Bashi-Bazouks as sketched by an artist with The Graphic illustrated newspaper. Note his legend – “The best abused men in Europe on the road to Glory”. (The Graphic)

On March 28 Loftus, from St Petersburg, telegraphed Derby that the chances of peace were seriously put at risk by British insistence on Russian demobilisation:

It is my duty to inform your Lordship that the present crisis here is one of serious gravity. I am privately informed that if the condition for demobilisation is maintained… war is certain. Emperor of Russia regards it as one of humiliation, and will prefer war to its acceptance. Unless difficulty as regards the demobilisation can be solved and the protocol signed it is my conviction that the Russian army will cross the Pruth in about three weeks.6

Later that day the Cabinet met again and in the face of such a threat had no option but to authorize the signature of the Protocol without further delay. The Foreign Secretary feared a trap, and told Shuvalov that if armament and war were not avoided, the Protocol would be regarded as invalid.

In last minute negotiations to ensure the signature of the Protocol, Shuvalov obtained his government’s agreement to a Turkish envoy going to St Petersburg to discuss disarmament; and following this, on March 31 the London Protocol was duly signed by Derby, Shuvalov, the Marquis d’Harcourt for France, Münster for Germany, von Beust for Austria and Menabrea for Italy. The terms of the document were as follows:

The protocol reaffirmed the interest of the powers in the amelioration of the condition of the Christian populations and in the reforms to be introduced in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. It took cognisance of the peace concluded by the Porte with Serbia on March 1. The Turkish government was invited to consolidate the peace by putting its armies on a peace footing and by taking in hand the reforms which had been promised. The powers proposed to watch carefully, by means of their representatives, the manner in which the promises of the Porte were carried into effect. If their hopes should again be disappointed, they declared, such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe generally. In that case they reserved to themselves further consideration as to the means best fitted to secure the welfare of the Christian populations and the interests of general peace.

Derby added a declaration that if there was no reciprocal demobilisation the Protocol should be treated as null and void. He recorded in his diary his suspicion and dislike of the whole business of the Protocol:

We are signing a paper which is a sham, on the assurance that Russia wants it as an excuse for disarming. The best that can be said is that guarded as we propose, it can do no harm: and that if we had refused, as possibly it is wished that we should – the whole blame of war breaking out would be thrown on us.⁷

Although, as the Foreign Secretary had observed, the Protocol was ‘studiously inoffensive,’ it was entirely possible that it would be rejected by the Turks. This in fact occurred on April 9, when the Turkish government protested against the imposition of the surveillance of its conduct which the Protocol contained, and appealed to the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Musurus Pasha, the Turkish ambassador, saw Derby two days later, prior to the formal publication of the Turkish circular. He suggested that ‘it would be better for the Sultan to lose one or two provinces than his prestige and independence;’ in reply the Foreign Secretary said that it was no longer just a matter of one or two provinces but of the future of the Ottoman Empire.

Henry Layard, British Ambassador to Turkey following the transfer of Sir Henry Elliot. (Ollier)

A number of factors contributed to the decision of the Turks to reject the London Protocol. First, there had of course been a recent change of government in Constantinople. The fall from power of Midhat after only a brief spell as Grand Vizier spelt the effective end of his constitution; its first function was to undermine the proceedings of the Constantinople Conference and its last was to secure ‘parliamentary’ rejection of the Protocol.8 Secondly, there were strong objections to the suggestion in the Protocol of a rectification of the frontier in favour of Montenegro. Next, the announcement on March 31 of Henry Layard as British Ambassador (to start with, only as a temporary appointee) seemed to mark a return to the pro-Turkish policy espoused by his predecessor; there existed a feeling that, once the chips were down, the British government would perceive it to be in its interests to stand by Turkey. Finally, and perhaps crucially, the Turks believed that they would be calling Russia’s bluff, and that St Petersburg would draw back from war. Russia’s financial problems were well known, while the reorganisation of the Russian army pursuant to Miliutin’s reforms still had some way to go.

But the attempt to call Russia’s bluff was a fearful miscalculation; it was in any case unwise to do so when the hand of cards which the Turks held was itself so weak. Nationalist opinion in Russia in support of the Slavs might somewhat have abated; but those around the Tsar exerted sufficient influence to ensure that his courage remained screwed to the sticking-place. Turkish rejection of the Protocol, even if not a surprise, inevitably resulted in a hardening of the Russian position. No step was taken to reopen discussions with the other Great Powers, although this had been contemplated in the event that the Turks did indeed reject the Protocol. Instead, the process of full mobilisation of the army was at once ordered. The Russians had, by their diplomacy, obtained the conditions which would enable them to make war on the Ottoman Empire without the fear of foreign interference. And, above all, the coming of spring would make the Balkan roads passable; the campaigning season had begun.

Edhem Pasha, Grand Vizier. (Hozier)

Layard arrived in Constantinople on April 20 and at once went to see Edhem Pasha, the Grand Vizier, who told him that it was too late to prevent the war. Layard made clear that if war broke out, Britain would not help; this kind of protestation had of course been made before, even by Elliot, and the Turks were inclined still not to believe it. Next day, with Safvet Pasha, the Foreign Minister, Layard discussed the possibility of mediation, and found him inclined to pursue the idea. Finally, on April 24, Layard had an audience with Abdul Hamid, who emphasised, with tears in his eyes, that he desired peace. Layard was impressed with the Sultan, and thought him sincere and ‘a man out of whom much might be made.’ However, in the course of their meeting the Sultan received a telegram from his ambassador in St Petersburg to the effect that he had received a note from Gorchakov containing the Russian declaration of war.

The Tsar’s manifesto announcing this was issued from Kishinev, and was a lengthy one. It did not however, set out with any precision the Russian war aims. After referring to his strong interest in the oppressed Christian peoples of Turkey, Alexander referred to his constant solicitude for peace, and to the incessant efforts of the Great Powers to induce the Porte to effect the necessary reforms. He went on to explain the London Protocol, which contained the most essential conditions of the Constantinople Conference, and the failure of the Turks to adhere to it:

Having exhausted our pacific efforts, we are compelled by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more decisive acts. A feeling of equity and of our own dignity enjoins it. By her refusal Turkey places us under the necessity of having recourse to arms… We expressed the intention to act independently when we deemed it necessary, and when Russia’s honour should demand it. In now invoking the blessing of God upon our valiant armies, we give the order to cross the Turkish frontier.9

The departure of the Tsar from Kishinev. (Illustrirte Geschichte des Orientalischen Krieges von 1876-1878)

On the same day Gorchakov issued a Circular Note to the other Great Powers informing them of Russia’s declaration of war, a step which, he wrote, was fulfilling a duty which was imposed on him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceable development was impeded by the constant troubles in the East. In doing so, he expressed the belief of the Tsar that he was at the same time responding to the views of Europe.

Thus ended in futility two years of the most intricate diplomacy intended to avert the outbreak of hostilities, conducted by the participants in a manner that was at various times sincere, cynical, constructive, selfish and half-hearted. The prospect of the ceaseless negotiations ending in success was impaired by the fact that in St Petersburg and Constantinople there were differing opinions as to the policy to be pursued. Still more was this the case in London, where the British Cabinet was deeply divided; while popular opinion remained profoundly affected by the Bulgarian atrocities, Disraeli was just about able to hold together his Cabinet. He and Derby were however beginning to drift further apart; he was discontented with the Foreign Secretary’s negative approach, while the latter constantly reiterated his belief that the middle class was ‘strong against war.’10

Derby’s attitude particularly annoyed the Queen, who told Disraeli that ‘Lord Derby must be made to move; the Queen feels horribly anxious about this.’ Her Russophobia was becoming more pronounced; in March she had complained to her Prime Minister of ‘this mawkish sentimentality for people who hardly deserve the name of Christian … and forgetting the great interests of this great country.’ Under no circumstance, she said, could Russia ever be permitted to occupy Constantinople.¹¹

British suspicion of Russian motives may well have been unjustified. Of course there were many points of view within Russia as to the real war aims which might be achievable, and certainly the military men had some extremely ambitious ideas on the subject; but a memorandum written by Gorchakov at the beginning of June for the benefit of Shuvalov and the latter’s anxiety to reassure Britain shows that in the Chancellor’s mind at any rate British fears were without foundation. Addressing the key areas of concern, he wrote:

As to Suez and Egypt, we shall not touch these two points: we have neither the interest, the desire, nor the means, to do so … Once the British Ministers are fully assured that we shall in no case remain at Constantinople, it depends on them to save us from the need of going near to it.

Britain could achieve this, he wrote, by exerting due pressure on Turkey. He went on to deal with fears of Russian action on the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf or at Erzerum, and its effects on the route to India:

Our position is simple and clear. We have no interest to injure England in this direction, but we may be forced to seek measures of defence against her hostility. Our attitude depends entirely upon hers … We are quite disposed to come to terms frankly and loyally on all these questions with the London Cabinet: we believe such an entente to be possible and more advantageous than mutual distrust and suspicion. In general, we have no interest in troubling England in her Indian possessions or in her communications. The present war does not demand this, for its aim is clearly defined and it would only be complicated by so vast an extension of the struggle.

He offered an explanation of British misunderstanding of Russian motives:

The English find it hard to understand a war of religious and national sentiment, and being incapable of one themselves, they constantly look for arrières pensées. But they should at least be accessible to the material side of the question.

This was that Russia could no longer tolerate a situation which might affect her peaceful development and precipitate her into disastrous crises and wars. It was necessary to put an end to this by asserting Russia’s military superiority in such a way that the Turks should not in future defy her lightly, while guaranteeing the situation of the Christians, especially of Bulgaria. Britain on the other hand desired the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and the inviolability of Constantinople and the Straits. These views, he wrote, were ‘not irreconcilable.’12 Since this memorandum was intended for Shuvalov alone, it may reasonably be taken as a sincere account of Russian intentions.

In this memorandum Gorchakov also set out the specific terms on which Russia would make peace if Turkey put out feelers for negotiation before the Russian army crossed the Balkans. These comprised the following: Bulgaria as a vassal state under European guarantee, administrative guarantees for Bulgaria south of the Balkans and the other Christian provinces, additional territory for Serbia and Montenegro, autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and regulation by Europe of the relations between the Balkan states and Turkey. In addition Russia would require the cession of Bessarabia, for which Roumania would receive compensation in the Dobrudja; and Russia should also receive Batum. These might be seen as the minimum practical war aims of Russia at the commencement of hostilities.¹³ Shuvalov communicated these terms to Derby on June 8. When these were reported to the Cabinet, a lengthy debate ensued. The lack of any assurance that the Russians would not, in the course of military operations, occupy Constantinople or the Straits, caused concern. Although Derby thought them reasonable and the best that Turkey could hope for, Disraeli was not so happy, and nor was the Queen, who wrote to the Foreign Secretary to call on him to be firm and energetic. When asked, Layard replied that the Porte would in any case refuse to consider such terms.14

Russian aristocratic women help prepare medical supplies for the front. (Budev)

Meanwhile, as soon as it was clear that war was inevitable, Disraeli had been pondering British options. He was keen on a plan whereby British troops should be sent to occupy Gallipoli as a means of securing the Dardanelles. He talked to the two most prominent of his Cabinet colleagues who might, from very different points of view, be expected to dissent, as he reported to the Queen on April 17:

This morning, a torturing hour with Ld. Derby, who was for doing nothing, and this afternoon, with Lord Salisbury, who evidently is thinking more of raising the Cross on the cupola of St Sophia, than the power of England.¹⁵

The Cabinet, when they discussed it, were reluctant to accept the plan, although a report from the Secretary of State for War, Gathorne Hardy, that the Russians intended to occupy the Dardanelles before advancing on Constantinople, shocked them into agreeing that something must be done, even if that was for the moment unresolved.

The British Cabinet continued to meet frequently; on May 1, its fifth meeting in eleven days, it agreed on the text of the formal reply to Gorchakov’s Circular Note, rejecting the arguments put forward for the Russian decision to go to war. In particular, the reply complained that by its action the Russian government had departed from the position it had correctly adopted in 1871 ‘that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty’ without the consent of the other parties, in relation to the Treaty of Paris.

Stocking public buildings at Nish with biscuits. (The Graphic)

Britain would, however, remain neutral. However, having failed to get the Cabinet to approve his Gallipoli scheme, Disraeli insisted that the British position be made clear to Russia. On May 6 Lord Derby’s Note set out the conditions upon which that neutrality would be maintained. There were a number of key British interests which Her Majesty’s Government would be determined to defend, and he wished to make clear what these were. First was the necessity of keeping open the Suez Canal; any attempt to blockade or otherwise interfere with it would be regarded as a menace to India. Next, Britain could not ‘witness with indifference the fate of Constantinople or the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors, of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position.’ Third, there might be other interests, such as those on the Persian Gulf, which Britain might have a duty to protect.16

As the war went on, the diplomats of the Great Powers continued ceaselessly to negotiate possible ways in which the conflict might be ended. Thus far, the chief ministers had not achieved a great deal; Andrassy had been defensive, and had fallen back on seeking territorial compensation; Disraeli had been inconsistent, beset by cabinet dissensions; only Bismarck had a clear grasp of the situation. He saw no German interest in the future of the Ottoman Empire, save only to avoid a European war in which his nation might become involved.¹⁷