The Crossing of the Danube
Since the early 1860s Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov had been the most influential military thinker on the tactics that should be adopted by the Russian army. He was born in 1830, the son of a distinguished soldier of the Napoleonic wars. After graduating from the Nicholas Military Academy he travelled to Western Europe, studying training methods in France and Britain. From the outset he believed that attack with the bayonet was the decisive act in battle. It was a conviction from which he never retreated, in spite of the evidence from the Wars of German Unification that the advent of the breechloading rifle had entirely changed the battlefield environment.1
Dragomirov became Adjunct Professor of Tactics at the Military Academy in 1860, and from 1862 served as a member of a committee on structure and training. As a protegé of the War Minister, he was able to influence the emerging Russian tactical doctrine. He did not accept the conclusion of Astafeev that the new firepower required the adoption of dispersed formations and skirmish lines, and that if a bayonet attack was necessary the units concerned would concentrate only temporarily for the purpose. Cold steel, argued Dragomirov, required closed formations, and these would remain the primary mode of attack. His emphasis on this did not entirely blind him to the power of the breechloader; but he feared that to encourage the infantry to individual marksmanship rather than volley firing would increase their concern for self preservation and hence their enthusiasm for the bayonet assault.2
The infantry regulations introduced in 1866 reflected Dragomirov’s strongly held beliefs. The formation to be adopted was, as Bruce Menning has pointed out, to place the emphasis as to four fifths on cold steel and one fifth on firepower. There was a noteworthy regard to the importance of conserving ammunition, a requirement that was in striking contrast to their Turkish opponents in 1877-1878. Volley firing was still seen as the principal utilisation of the breechloading rifle. In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war there was a vigorous debate about the appropriateness of Dragomirov’s doctrine; Baron Zeddeler, a Russian observer, noted that ‘fire was always preferred to the bayonet,’ because ‘firearms had attained a power so unprecedented that it superseded the bayonet attack, at least in this last war.’3 Such heresy, however, cut little ice with those in authority, and Dragomirov’s beliefs continued to prevail.
In 1877 Dragomirov, now a Lieutenant-General, was in command of the 14th Division, forming part of Radetzky’s VIII Corps, and it was to him that was assigned the task of forcing the passage of the Danube. During the enforced delay the Russian engineers had been carefully reconnoitering the country on either bank of the river. It was clearly essential that the crossing point should be kept secret from the Turks until the last possible moment and elaborate steps were taken to ensure this. A suitable location for the assembly of the bridging material was found in the River Aluta, which joins the Danube just above Nicopolis; the point selected for the crossing must therefore be reasonably adjacent to that river. The point chosen was originally at Simnitza; but it soon appeared that the level of the Danube there was so high that it would be impossible.4 Instead, therefore, it was determined to cross near Nicopolis, and the date provisionally chosen for the operation was June 24. However, in personally reconnoitering this stretch of the river on June 20, Nicholas and Nepokoitschitski became convinced that the strong Turkish works there would be difficult to force; at the same time the river level at Simnitza had fallen, and it was decided to revert to the original location.
Lieutenant-General Dragomirov, commander of the Russian 14th Division, part of Radetzky’s VIII Corps. (Russes et Turcs)
Meanwhile in order to focus Turkish attention on the left flank of the Russians, and to confirm the impression that the main line of advance would be through the Dobrudja, it was decided that before Dragomirov attempted his crossing Lieutenant-General Zimmerman’s XIV Corps should cross the Danube between Galatz and Braila. In addition to his own corps Zimmerman also had one division of the IV Corps under his command. On June 12 construction began of a pontoon bridge half a mile north of Braila opposite Getchet; however, the Danube was still fifteen feet above its normal level and at this point the waters were 2,500 yards wide. Zimmerman reported that a crossing was for the moment impossible. This was certainly not good enough, and he was sharply directed that he must be over the river by June 22.5
Since the bridge could not be completed in time, he resolved to cross in rowing boats, rafts and steam tugs from Galatz, his first objective being the Budschak Hills, which overlooked the marshes where it was intended to land. On June 22 at 3.00 am two groups each of five companies of infantry began the crossing; at first the landing was hotly disputed by the Turkish troops on the Budschak Hills, but as more Russian troops came across the Turks fell back first to Matchin and then further to the south.
Russian casualties in the seizure of the Budschak Hills amounted to a total of 142 officers and men. When MacGahan was able to cross, he found that the operation was well under way. Looking towards Matchin, he could see the advance into the hills:
Long lines of white smoke rose up from the mountain side, and were borne away on the air in thin fleecy clouds. The dull, booming heavy sound of cannon, a distant roar of artillery, and the continued and rattling crash of small arms were borne to us in a softened kind of roll on the still sunny air … Slowly the two lines of smoke advanced along the range of hills towards Matchin, one pursuing the other, and marking the progress of the battle. Slowly the Russians drove back the Turks, following them from rock to rock, from point to point, from summit to summit, from hill to valley, and from valley to hill, over the irregular and uneven ground.6
The hills once taken, Zimmerman completed his crossing without further interruption, and slowly followed the retreating Turks, occupying Iskatchi, Toltcha and Hirsova unopposed. By the end of June the Turks, under Ali Pasha, who were about 15,000 strong, had retreated down the Dobrudja to Trajan’s Wall. Zimmerman arrived at this position by July 19, where he settled down to observe the enemy but took no action to disturb them.7
By now Tsar Alexander had arrived to join his army. As part of the efforts to deceive the enemy as to the chosen crossing point, it was announced that he planned to witness his troops enter Bulgaria, and he established his headquarters at Turnu Magurelle, close to Flamunda. The latter was one of the alternative sites near Nicopolis considered when Simnitza appeared impossible.
Russian troops crossing the Danube at Braila. (Russes et Turcs)
By June 24, the date originally selected for the attempt, the Russian forces had not yet reached their jumping off point, and it was delayed until the night of June 26-27. Even the Tsar was not told of the chosen site for the crossing until 8.00 pm on June 26, so stringent were the security precautions.8
Dragomirov had his own 14th Division, which comprised four regiments (53rd, 54th, 55th, and 56th), the 4th Rifle Brigade, and supporting troops, a force that in all comprised 17 battalions, 6 Cossack squadrons and 64 guns. The XIII Corps was ordered to advance from Alexandria to Piatra, and the IX Corps to make a feint of crossing at Flamunda, as part of the deception plan. Siege batteries were established opposite to the fortresses of Nicopolis and Rustchuk. Dragomirov split the forces available to him into six groups each of about 2,500 men, comprising twelve companies of infantry, with 60 Cossacks. To the two detachments intended to form the first wave of the attackers he attached eight mountain guns, with four field guns to support each of the other four. Strict orders were issued that not a shot was to be fired until the opposite bank was reached.
Supporting Dragomirov’s division was Prince Mirsky’s 13th Division; stationed at Lissa, it was under orders to move up to Simnitza at 7.00 am on the morning of June 27. For Archibald Forbes, who had attached himself to Dragomirov’s division, the move of the 13th Division was evidence that the Russians intended to succeed in the crossing whatever the cost; in the event that Dragomirov was checked, Mirsky’s division was then to be committed:
In the event of failure it was to take up the fighting, and force a passage at all sacrifices; for the Archduke Nicholas had announced that he would take no denial. The river had to be crossed at Simnitza, cost what it might. Other divisions stood within call if need were. The waters might be reddened, but they must be crossed.9
On June 24 the Russian artillery concentrated opposite Rustchuk began a heavy bombardment of the city; and on the evening of the following day the artillery began a bombardment of Nicopolis and the Turkish batteries on either side of that fortress, and covering the mouth of the Aluta river. The shelling continued throughout June 26 and 27, the Turkish artillery being entirely silenced, and two of the batteries destroyed. This, with the other steps taken to ensure complete security, fixed firmly in the minds of the Turkish commanders that Nicopolis would be the crossing site.
Although Moltke was reputed to have said that the line of the Danube could not be defended, a contested river crossing was bound to be a difficult operation, particularly given the breadth of the Danube. Simnitza lay almost opposite the town of Sistova on the southern bank. Below Sistova, the Turkish bank was steep, at some points precipitous. About two miles down river the Tekir brook formed a small cove, to the right of which there was a small camp occupied by a company of Mustafiz, while on the hills behind there was a battery of heavy guns. The total Turkish force in and around Sistova amounted to about 4,000 men, consisting of the brigade of Ismid Pasha and supporting artillery. The overall commander at this point was Ahmed Namdy Pasha.
In a number of respects the chosen crossing place presented difficulties. Although around Simnitza the Roumanian bank was high, it was separated from the Danube proper by a low lying stretch of land partly of meadow, partly of sand and partly of mud, which at this time was just emerging from inundation. These flats were cut off from Simnitza by a narrow arm of the Danube, so that it was effectively an island. It was not the most advantageous jumping off point. The recent floods had wrecked the bridge, so the Russians erected a short pontoon bridge to reach the flats. They were intersected by many streams; marshy land was punctuated by standing water left by the floods. The flats were bare, apart from a wood of willows and alders facing, across the Danube, the cove formed by the Tekir brook, and this did offer some cover.10
In the late afternoon of June 26 Dragomirov’s troops had been discreetly concentrated on the shore near Simnitza, with their pontoons. As night fell they began to move out to cross the bridges to the flats. The bridges creaked so loudly and the wheels of the guns and vehicles rattled so much that it was feared that the Turks would discover the movement. Hay was taken from the horses and laid over the bridges, which to some extent muted the passage of the troops who next took up a position in the willow wood. The troops carried food for three days; they had discarded their white uniforms, and were wearing their heavy duty blue uniforms, the reasons for this being given as the greater warmth that would be afforded to wounded lying exposed to the cool of the night, and that the white uniforms rendered them too conspicuous. Forbes was derisive:
The latter reason is rubbish. Blue on the light ground of the Danube sand is more conspicuous than white. Everywhere British Scarlet is more conspicuous than any other. The true fighting colour is the dingy kharki (sic) of our Indian irregulars.11
Russian infantry on the march. (The Graphic)
The troops began embarking around midnight, but it was not until between 1.00 and 2.00 that the first wave began the crossing. This was Yolchine’s brigade, comprising the 53rd and 54th Infantry Regiments. The boats set out in a line, but soon the current, and the different speeds attained by the rowers, resulted in their separation. They were soon spotted by the Turkish lookouts, and before they were half way across first the Turkish infantry and then the artillery opened fire. One boat, with forty officers and men, was hit and sank; two others, lashed together either side of a stage carrying two of the mountain guns, were hit repeatedly and sank abruptly, with all their passengers. Apart from these, the losses during the crossing itself were not great. As dawn came up some 208 boats had made the crossing.
The first wave landed, and the troops were led ashore by Yolchine, who ordered them to lie down in the mud of the cove to await the following reinforcements. They then ran forward with fixed bayonets to seize the cliffs, driving back the Turkish skirmishers.12 By 2.00 am the leading Russian troops were already advancing some three-quarters of a mile from the shore to the east of the Tekir brook. As dawn broke Ahmed Namdy had sent forward two battalions; these were, however, quite unable to hold their position as more and more Russian troops came ashore. Before the crossing began, one of Ahmed Namdy’s battalions had been stationed in Sistova itself, while the other three were in camp some two miles to the east of the town, about a mile and a half back from the river, and hence well placed to move forward to confront the first wave of the attackers. But the Russian obsession with security had paid off, and the surprise of their enemy was complete. However, even after Ahmed Namdy had become aware of the strength of the landing, he missed his chance of inflicting a serious check on the Russian advance:
The moment that it became clear that the Russians were making a serious attempt to force the passage of the river, it was Ahmed Namdy Pasha’s duty to throw in every man he had available, to oppose the Russians on the river bank, and to delay them by every means in his power, pending the arrival of reinforcements from Rustchuk, distant only thirty-five miles. By sending up his reinforcements piecemeal, he allowed the Russians to obtain a foothold on the right bank, and the success of the crossing was thereby assured.13
Russian troops are welcomed on their entry into Sistova. (Ollier)
At about 5.00 am Dragomirov arrived on the southern bank and assumed command. He was accompanied by Michael Skobelev as a volunteer, who evidently found acting as his father’s Chief of Staff to be insufficiently stimulating. Dragomirov sent fifteen companies to attack the Turkish troops in camp to the left of the Tekir brook, and proceeded to push the rest of his force as it arrived down the valley and on the heights on either side to form a defensive perimeter. Reinforcements began to arrive more rapidly, a steamer having run past the Turkish batteries at Nicopolis to help get more troops across. The troops crossing did not escape unscathed; in all some five boats were sunk, with the loss of about 100 men killed and wounded.14
Skobelev was everywhere in the thick of things. He was encountered by Forbes on the morning of the crossing:
I shook hands with him on the edge of the bank of the Danube after the bayonet charge in which he had taken part. His face was black with powder, and he, general as he is, carried a soldier’s rifle, with the bayonet fixed.15
By 11.00 am Dragomirov had sufficient men on the ground to think of making a significant advance. He had most of the 14th Division in hand, with part of the 4th Rifle Brigade, and he now ordered an advance on the Sistova Heights. By 3.00 pm these were in his hands and his troops had entered Sistova itself. Turkish opposition now crumbled away; the bulk of Ahmed Namdy’s troops retreated in the direction of Tirnova, with those on the western side of their position retreating to Nicopolis. At 3.00 pm Radetzky, the VIII Corps commander, crossed to the southern bank; by 9.00 pm the whole of the corps had made the crossing. It had been a brilliantly successful operation. The total of Russian killed and wounded was 821.16 Turkish losses were said to be about 700. The Russian plan had been a bold one; it could have gone very wrong, but unfortunately the fact of its success confirmed the Russian disposition to underestimate the enemy.
Dragomirov, in his report, drew a number of conclusions, observing that the Russian troops, once over the river, did not fight in their regular formations:
The characteristic feature of the combat of June 27 was that the first troops engaged did not form whole battalions, nor companies, nor even platoons; on landing the troops formed themselves into improvised groups; … each group observed attentively what its neighbours were doing, each regulating its movements by those of the others, and lending each other a mutual support. It was not possible to think of forming a general reserve, until after the passage of the last detachments of the 14th Division, i.e. about 9.30 am, nearly eight hours after the beginning of the action.17
Greene thought that the Russian success and the relatively small number of casualties might be due to this individuality of the Russian soldiers.
Next day the Russian engineers now made strenuous efforts with the bridging material collected in the River Aluta to complete the first of two pontoon bridges over the Danube, not without difficulty; on June 29 a Turkish monitor appeared, but for reasons unexplained sailed away again without opening fire. Next day a storm delayed the work. On June 28 the Tsar had crossed the Danube to visit the troops that had forced the passage of the river; the bridge was completed on July 2, and large bodies of troops were now able to move into Bulgaria.
The Tsar’s arrival at the battle front had an immediate effect on the planning of the next stage of the war. Although not formally taking any part in the deliberations of the high command, the Tsar was soon exhibiting decided uneasiness about the best way forward, to the understandable annoyance of the Grand Duke Nicholas. The problems which the latter now faced were complex; the Ottoman commanders in the field whose resistance must be overcome possessed large numbers of troops, and further reinforcements, brought in from Montenegro and Albania, might add something of the order of 50,000 men. Apart from the garrisons of the principal Turkish fortresses at Widdin, Nicopolis, Rustchuk, Turtukai, Silistria and Varna, which probably amounted in all to about 50,000 men, there were three principal field armies with which the Russians would have to deal. Ali Pasha had about 15,000 men and 40 guns in the southern part of the Dobrudja, while Osman Pasha was said to have 40,000 men and 100 guns in the Widdin area. Finally, there was Abdul Kerim’s principal army, currently located around Shumla, of about 60,000 men and 230 guns.18
Although everything had so far gone according to plan for the Russians, the units composing the Army of the South were by now well below establishment. The long sojourn in Roumania during a lengthy period of wet weather, and the marshes of the Danube, had put large numbers of men on the sick list, and it had been necessary to make a number of detachments for the protection of the long line of communication, while the threat from the Turkish navy, although not having amounted to much so far, had still to be taken into account. It remained to be seen how far the original bold concept of a rapid strike south to the Balkans could still remain the basis of Russian strategy. So far, everything had gone well; the difficult part was about to begin.