Gourko
The long wait to cross the Danube occasioned considerable frustration among the war correspondents eager to report spectacular action, but it was caused not only by the need to allow the waters to fall, but also to the most careful and deliberate preparations to ensure the operation’s success. In the next phase of the campaign, however, the Russians stuck to their original plan and went from one extreme to the other, showing themselves willing to throw caution to the winds. Certainly the sluggish and ineffectual Turkish response so far encountered might be thought enough to justify the bold stroke southward which had always been the intention.
But before that bold stroke could be undertaken there was some further delay which brought forth serious criticism of the Russian army by at least one observer. Archibald Forbes was sceptical that the reason was solely due to the need to bring up supplies, writing on July 9:
My own belief is that a great part of the reason is to be assigned to the pottering rearrangements of the commands in order that young gentlemen of the blood imperial may gain military fame and St George’s Crosses. But this is not all. There is a lack of go, of energy, of system, of purpose, about the direction of the army. The machine is a very fine one, the material is admirable, the workmanship is good, the finishing is fair – but there is not motive power sufficient to bring out its excellences and to do it justice.1
Nonetheless, there was a lot to be done before embarking on the next phase. First it would be necessary to complete the pontoon bridge over the Danube. Construction of this had begun during June 28 and was finished on July 2. While this was going on, orders were drawn up for the formation of a special detachment to lead the strike to the south, and for the operations of the main army once its move across the Danube had been completed. Basically, the plan to be adopted was that drawn up before the outbreak of war. The advance guard was to be led by Lieutenant-General Joseph Vladimirovich Gourko, the commander of a division of Guard cavalry at St Petersburg. Gourko was born in 1828, fought in the Crimea and in the Polish insurrection, became a regimental commander in 1866 and was promoted to Major-General in the following year. Since then he had held various commands in the Guard cavalry and hence was close to the imperial court. Since his division had not been mobilised at the start of the war, he came to the front as a volunteer, and was personally selected by Grand Duke Nicholas to lead the advance guard.2
Gourko’s detachment consisted of 10½ battalions (8,000 men), 31½ squadrons (4,000 men), with 18 horse artillery and 14 mountain guns. It comprised the 4th Rifle Brigade, (Drietsinsky), two companies of Cossack infantry, the six battalions of the Bulgarian Legion (Stoletov), a Dragoon Brigade (Prince Eugene Maximilianovich) a composite brigade of Hussars and Cossacks (Prince Nicolai Maximilianovich), a Don Cossack Brigade (Chernozubov) and a Caucasus Cossack Brigade (Tutolmin). The force crossed the Danube over the newly completed bridge on July 3 and at once moved south in the direction of Tirnova. Behind the advance guard in support came the VIII Corps (Radetzky). On the left the XII Corps (Vannovsky) and XIII Corps (Hahn) made up the Army of Rustchuk, which was placed under the command of the Tsarevich. Its mission was to advance on Biela, to occupy the line of the River Jantra, to contain the Turkish forces in the Quadrilateral and if possible to take Rustchuk. To the right, Krüdener’s IX Corps, with a brigade of Caucasus Cossacks was designated as the Western Army, with orders to seize Nicopolis and occupy the line of the Vid, thus covering the right flank. The reserve consisted of the XI Corps (Shakofskoi) and IV Corps (Zotov) and was concentrated around Simnitza. Finally, Zimmerman’s XIV Corps was to watch the northern part of the Quadrilateral.3
Lieutenant-General Joseph Vladimirovich Gourko. (Hozier)
Gourko’s objective was to be the crossing of the Balkan Mountains – in other words the penetration of what Moltke regarded as the true line of defence upon which the Turks should concentrate to resist an invasion from the north. In his history of the war of 1828-29, he reviewed the effectiveness of the Balkans as a barrier. The suggestion that it was insurmountable was not, he thought, warranted by the height or formation of the mountains, but
partly upon tradition, partly upon the number of small difficulties which are accumulated within five or six marches, and which have to be encountered by all the troops in succession, and lastly upon the paucity and badness of the roads across the mountains.4
General Stoletov. (Rogers)
He went on to list the routes across the Balkans that were, he considered, practicable for troops; there were, he thought, six of these, and much the best was that from Tirnova via the Shipka Pass to Kazanlik. Eastward of this he next identified the Iron Gate, through which passed the road from Tirnova to Slivno. In Moltke’s view, these passes would best be defended not so much by the erection of forts but by assigning bodies of troops to occupy them and, with barricades and abattis, to ‘oppose a very formidable resistance to any force attempting to cross the mountains.’ There were, of course, other passes to the west of those described, but these did not lead towards Adrianople and Constantinople.
The very substantial forces set aside to cover the flanks of the advance and of the lines of communication meant that the thrust southward was being undertaken by only a small part of the Russian forces that had crossed the Danube. Thus far the Turkish response to the invasion had been notably passive, but it by no means followed that this would continue to be the case. Gourko’s advance carried with it the responsibility for the success of the whole of the Russian operations in Bulgaria. As Maurice pointed out, four fifths of the Russian army had thus been dissipated in what could reasonably be termed minor operations.
By the night of July 4 Gourko’s cavalry had reached a point some twenty miles south of their start line, and had so far encountered no opposition. His first objective was Tirnova, and the information which he gathered as he moved south was that this was held by the Turks with five battalions of infantry together with cavalry and artillery. July 5 was a rest day, made necessary by the slow process of getting the Russian army over to the south bank of the Danube at Sistova. Gourko’s cavalry maintained contact with the leading cavalry units of both the Western Army and the Army of Rustchuk.
Tirnova. (Fauré)
Approaching Tirnova from the north, the traveller entered a countryside still more fertile, the meadows greener and the scenery more striking. Moltke, in his Letters sur l’Orient, remarked on the beauty of the region:
What a marvellous country this Bulgaria is! Everything is green. The sides of the deep valleys are planted with lime and wild pear trees, wide meadows form framework for the rivers, rich cornfields cover the plains, and even the vast uncultivated tracts are covered with luxuriant herbage. The numerous trees, planted singly, cast their black shadows upon the plains of brilliant green.6
Tirnova was the ancient capital of the former rulers of Bulgaria before it was occupied in 1393 by the Ottomans. Many of the finest buildings were then destroyed during and after a three months siege. In 1877 the town had between 40,000 and 50,000 inhabitants. It stands on a hill about 1,000 feet high on the banks of the River Jantra. It was and still is dominated by a citadel and is surrounded by higher hills on which strong redoubts and earthworks could have been constructed, and was accordingly extremely well suited for a strong defence. It was a crucially important road junction, giving access to the best passes through the Balkans as well as being the junction of roads east and west to Osman Bazar and Selvi respectively. The roads entered the town from four directions through narrow defiles between high limestone cliffs.7
It was, therefore, not only the first principal objective of Gourko’s force but also one which must be approached carefully. In fact, however, the Turks had not taken the opportunity to create a strong defensive position in and around the town. Its defenders consisted of five battalions of infantry (about 3,000 Nizams), a body of Redifs and one battery. On July 7 Gourko reconnoitred the place, advancing with the brigade of dragoons from the west. It soon became apparent that the Turks were not in great force, and on getting a message from the Christian inhabitants that their lives might be in danger he resolved to move forward at once with the whole brigade, supported by a horse artillery battery of six guns. Four sotnias of Don Cossacks had arrived, and these he sent forward on his left, to turn the Turkish flank and rear, while he advanced directly on the town. The Turks put up little resistance, retreating hastily down the slope of the hill on which they stood, and taking the road to Osman Bazar:
Round the point of the spur they ran, flinging away their cartridge boxes and their arms, leaving huge heaps of ammunition boxes. Everything that could be was thrown away, and the place was literally strewed with the débris of their flight. Once, indeed, they formed line to the left as they passed across the field; but a shell or two falling amongst them put them to flight again.8
The precipitate flight of the town’s defenders was later explained by the delay in the arrival of reinforcements for which Said Pasha had asked. These were to come from Shumla under the command of Safvet Pasha; they had advanced as far as Osman Bazar and halted there. Meanwhile, because there existed no telegraph between that point and Tirnova, Said Pasha’s messages had to go through Adrianople, Constantinople and Shumla before they were received, and in the event Safvet could not reach Tirnova in time to take part in the town’s defence. It is a moot point as to whether it had made much difference, and when Said’s retreating forces met those of Safvet, nothing was done by way of any attempt to retake Tirnova.9 Said’s orders from Abdul Kerim had been to hold out to the last pending the arrival at the town of Safvet’s force.
It was an almost bloodless victory; Gourko lost two men and eight horses wounded. The possession of Tirnova meant that he was now well placed for his advance on the Balkan passes. The remainder of Gourko’s force now came up to Tirnova, not without difficulty, as Colonel Epauchin, in his history of the advance guard’s operations, described:
The heat was terrible. The men got dreadfully tired, and so faint from thirst that they could not be kept from drinking from every pond they passed. They dipped it up in their caps, poured it over their necks, wetted their heads, and sluiced each other with it.10
Gourko spent the next four days in the town, gathering intelligence about the Turkish forces and the state of the passes over the mountains, organising a pack train and preparing for his advance. His information was that the Turkish authorities and most of the population had left Tirnova for Shumla. So far none of the passes appeared to be defended except the Shipka Pass where there were apparently some 3,000 infantry, some mountain guns and some Bashi-Bazouks. Pondering the best way to cross the Balkans, Gourko concluded that he should not attack the Shipka Pass directly. Instead he proposed to cross by one of the most difficult and least known passes, that at Hainkioi, ignoring the local proverb that ‘ill luck awaits him who crosses the Hainkioi Pass,’ on the basis that he would meet with the least resistance there. It was by no means certain, however, that this pass would be viable for any substantial force. Moltke, indeed, in his history of the war of 1828-29, did not consider it one of those practicable for an army.11 Gourko’s intention was that, having crossed the mountains and descended into the Tundja valley, he should turn westward, and having occupied Kazanlik take the Turks holding the Shipka Pass in their rear. He planned to take his whole force through the Hainkioi pass, leaving behind only the 30th Don Cossack Regiment with two guns. For the moment four squadrons of this regiment would remain at Tirnova, while two squadrons and the guns would watch the Shipka Pass. A small detachment would reconnoitre the Elena passes, to check that there were no Turkish forces there.12 Gourko’s plan was approved by the Grand Duke, who himself reached Tirnova on July 12, the day in which the advance guard set off on its hazardous mission. In conveying the approval of headquarters, Levitsky wrote in somewhat restrictive terms:
The Grand Duke … desires you to understand that you must without fail confine yourself to merely seizing the passes and their outlets, and move no further without orders. In support of your movement against the Shipka Pass HIH will send from Tirnova to Gabrova on the 14 July a regiment of infantry and a battery from the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Division, which is to arrive at Tirnova tomorrow, the 12 July.13
Some of Gourko’s men burning a railway station. (Illustrated London News)
Levitsky went on to refer to the retention at Tirnova of two of the Bulgarian battalions and a Hussar regiment, a suggestion that caused Gourko some anxiety; however, following two letters to the Grand Duke pointing out that his force was weak enough already, headquarters relented, and Gourko was allowed to proceed with the whole of his force.
When the Grand Duke himself arrived at Tirnova on July 12, he was accompanied by the leading units of the VIII Corps. A detachment of these was moved to Gabrova, under the command of Major-General Darozhinsky, consisting of the 36th (Orel) Regiment, the remainder of the 30th Don Cossacks (two sotnias were already at Gabrova) and 10 guns. The intention was that this force should advance to attack the Shipka Pass from the north on July 17. Subsequently on July 16 Prince Nicholas Sviatopolk-Mirsky, the younger brother of Grand Duke Michael’s deputy in the Caucasus, who was the commander of the 9th Division, arrived and took over the conduct of the operation.
Central to the success of Gourko’s enterprise would be the work of the pioneers in ensuring that the route to be taken would be passable by the whole of the advance guard, including the artillery. The trail to be followed was essentially not much more than a footpath. The mounted pioneers, taking with them carts carrying dynamite and tools, under Major-General Rauch of the Engineers, in two days made a road over which it was possible by one means or another to transport the guns.14 The ascent began at Parovtchi, at an elevation of 1,800 feet, and in the following eight miles rose a further 1,900 feet at which point the summit was reached. On the far side the pass descended 2,300 feet to Hainkioi. For part of the journey it was necessary for the guns to be dragged by the infantry. Hozier described the ordeal of the gunners:
At one place two of the mountain guns rolled down from the path to the bottom of the valley, but without injuring horse or man. The guns which passed first cut up the road a great deal, and for the last battery the day’s work was terrible; nearly all the drivers pressing their horses and laying on their whips – the gunners assisting by pushing or pulling. Never did horses work harder, yet the guns hung behind; but it is doubtful whether artillery was ever taken along such roads before even at such a pace.15
MacGahan, who was intent on accompanying Gourko in his march over the mountains, left Tirnova on the day after the advance guard, confident at first that he should easily catch it up. Taking first the Elena road, he soon learned that Gourko had not followed this route; he concluded that, instead, he must have gone through Gabrova in order to cross the Shipka Pass and rode off in that direction. Here again he was disappointed, and reasoned that the advance guard must have taken a route between those he had tried; eventually, he learned from the inhabitants that this was indeed the case, and that a pass began near the village of Parovtchi which was, however, not marked on the Russian staff map. He duly followed this road, which led him to a sight which he described lyrically in a dispatch of July 15:
We emerged from the forest upon a high narrow ridge that seemed to be a watershed, where we had the most splendid view of the Balkans I have ever seen. There was first a low uneven hilly country, full of green little valleys and hollows, rich and luxuriant with orchards, trees and growing grain that almost hid the villages of fifteen or twenty houses which they surrounded. Then, beyond, the range of the great Balkans, their huge round forms rising up against the sky, in glorious robes of misty purple, and extending far away to the west until they mingled imperceptibly high up in the sky with the golden-edged, many-tinted clouds.16
Ahead of him Gourko’s detachment was led by a force of 200 Cossacks. Serving with them as a volunteer was the young diplomat Prince Tsertelev, who had been on Ignatiev’s staff at Constantinople. They were also accompanied by McGahan, despite his suffering from a broken ankle. It was Tsertelev who had, on reaching Tirnova, heard of the Hainkioi Pass and recommended Gourko to take that route. Now, on July 13, as the Cossacks neared the exit of the pass, he had gone ahead in the dress of a peasant and found that Turkish troops had been posted there, although no entrenchments had been formed. When this report reached Gourko, he pushed on with the advance, not stopping until midnight. At 6.00 am on the following day the advance was resumed. At 10.00 am the Cossacks reached the mouth of the defile which opened to the width of half a mile, and there before them lay the beautiful valley of the Tundja, known as the ‘Valley of the Roses.’ The Turkish troops posted to watch the exit to the pass were taken entirely by surprise, and retreated rapidly toward Slivno. On reaching Tvarditsa, about five miles south of Hainkioi, they were joined by the garrison of that place, making a total force of about 2,000 men in four battalions.17
The retreating Turks were followed up by two battalions of the 4th Rifle Brigade. During the late afternoon the Turks launched a brief counter-attack, advancing to Tvarditsa. After only a brief engagement, in the course of which the riflemen were reinforced by a third battalion, the Turks broke off the action and fell back to Slivno. The Russians occupied the abandoned Turkish camps. With the passage of the Balkans completed successfully, Gourko ordered a rest day for July 15, assembling his complete force for the next stage of his operations.
He did, however, send out a number of reconnaissances. Two squadrons of Cossacks moved out towards Slivno under Baron Korf. Near Orezary they ran into a large group of Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians, supported by three battalions of infantry with two guns. The Cossacks fell back on Zapanli, where they were reinforced by two further squadrons. At 6.00 pm further reinforcements reached them in the shape of the Kazan Dragoons, a Bulgarian brigade and four guns, and the Turks soon retreated in disorder. An attempt was made to stand at Tvarditsa, but the Turks soon broke again and were pursued by the Cossacks for seven miles. Total Russian losses were one killed and three wounded.
Two squadrons under Captain Martinov probed towards Yeni Zagra, where they destroyed an eighty wagon transport train. However, they then encountered strong Turkish forces, and were threatened in flank by two Circassian squadrons; they fell back to Kavlikoi and thence to their camp at Esekeye, having ascertained the total strength of the Turkish forces as three battalions, with a battery and the Circassians. Their losses amounted to three horses. These actions led the Turks to suppose that Gourko’s next move would be on Yeni Zagra, which they decided to await, leaving Gourko free to make his move on Kazanlik. A third reconnaissance had a minor encounter on the Kazanlik road.
Gourko and his staff near the Shipka Pass. (Album della Guerra Russo-Turca del 1877-78)
On July 16 Gourko began his advance toward Kazanlik. He had twenty miles to cover to reach that town, and hoped after taking the place to be in position to attack the Shipka Pass on the following morning. He took with him a force of six and a half battalions (5,000 men), nineteen and a half squadrons (3,000 men) and 16 guns. He left behind four battalions (3,000 men), six squadrons of 500 men and 14 guns at Hainkioi under Major-General Stoletev.19
The advancing Russian troops encountered at about 10.00 am a Turkish force about 3,000 strong in position behind a stream at the village of Uflani. MacGahan described the outcome:
This force retreating before us proved to be a most unfortunate circumstance for four or five Turkish villages on the way to Kazanlik. They took refuge in these villages, and either they or the inhabitants fired on us from the houses. The result was that we set fire to every house from which we had been fired at, and, the fire spreading, these villages were for the most part destroyed. The Turks seem to have the faculty of always doing the wrong thing and never the right one. Had they fired at us from behind the rocks and trees in the defiles of the Balkans it would have annoyed us very considerably, delayed our progress, and have done the Turkish population no harm. Instead of that, they fire at us from villages in the plain in the most senseless and useless manner, where this kind of resistance could not delay our march an hour, with the natural result of getting these villages burned. They leave no mistake uncommitted that perversity, ignorance, and stupidity can commit.20
The engagement at Uflani did however seriously delay Gourko’s march, with the result that by the time the Turks were finally driven back to a position near Kazanlik, Gourko’s timetable had been disrupted, and he bivouacked for the night with his force at Magilish. Russian losses in the engagement were relatively light, amounting to sixty-two killed and wounded. Turkish casualties were far greater, over four hundred being killed, in addition to a large number of wounded and a considerable number of prisoners.21 Seeing how heavily the Turks had suffered, when he rode across the battlefield that evening, Gourko reckoned the moral effect of the defeat meant that they were unlikely to venture on an advance against his rear from the direction of Yeni Zagra. Accordingly he gave orders for the four Bulgarian battalions left with Stoletev at Hainkioi to march to rejoin his main body at Magilish.22
Next morning Gourko resumed his advance, moving on Kazanlik in three columns; on his right one and a half battalions moved into the mountains to come down on the town from the north-east, while in the centre five battalions with ten guns advanced directly from the east. On the left the cavalry, with six guns, was to follow the Tundja valley and turn the Turkish right. The Turks were found to have taken up a position along the Kara Dere, about five miles in front of Kazanlik, with three battalions and three guns, with another column on the left coming down from Shipka. The engagement began at 7.00 am and lasted about three hours before the Russian cavalry, having turned the Turkish right, drove the whole force back in disorder; it retreated to Kazanlik, where it briefly made a stand before falling back to Shipka, having lost heavily, including four hundred prisoners and the three guns. The Russian loss was fourteen men.23 Gourko was in Kazanlik by noon, where he was enthusiastically welcomed by the population. However, his hope of mounting an attack on the Shipka Pass that day was over optimistic; in the intense heat his men were exhausted. He rode on with the cavalry to reconnoitre the enemy position, and was joined by the infantry in front of Shipka as the sun was setting. The Turks had abandoned the village of Shipka, and their camp, falling back to the pass, where it was said some 5,000 men were in position. Gourko’s inability to assault the pass that day meant that he was going to be one day late for the joint attack from north and south which had been planned for July 17. At Shipka, firing could be heard from the other side of the pass, indicating that the attack there was under way.
On the south side of the Balkans there are scarcely any foothills, the mountains falling abruptly to the plain, as MacGahan described:
As you ride along the valley of the Tundja you see these monster masses of earth and rock and forest rising abruptly out of the plain without any intermediate hills or irregularities, like a row of sugar loaves placed along a floor and rounded off at the top. The pass is therefore only a couple of miles from the foot of the mountain on this side and the road up to it is very steep and difficult.24
A Russian Cossack encampment. (Rogers)
Gourko’s intention was now to launch an attack early on the morning of July 18, and he sent off a message over the mountains to Prince Mirsky asking him to support the attack from the north. The message did not get through, however, until noon, too late for anything to be done. Mirsky had, as arranged, at 7.00 am on July 17 launched his attack from the north from Gabrova, moving in four columns on what was clearly a strong Turkish position in several lines of trenches across the road leading to the Shipka Pass. East and west of this position there rose a number of commanding heights, of which the highest was Bald Mountain, some 4,875 feet high, which dominated the whole area. The Turks were commanded by Khulussi Pasha, whose force was about six and a half battalions strong, between 4,000 and 5,000 men, with a number of Bashi-Bazouks and twelve guns. Mirsky had only the 35th (Briansk) Infantry Regiment, about 2,400 strong, with six guns. To drive the Turks out of a very strong position with such a small force was a tall order.
The column on the right, of four companies, led by Lieutenant Colonel Khomenko, was directed on Bald Mountain, which it did not reach until 7.00 pm, without having encountered any resistance. The centre column, also composed of four companies, was pinned down in front of the most advanced Turkish trenches, a position too strong to assault. On the left, two companies advanced through the woods towards the St Nicholas hill which was in fact the strongest part of the defences; this column soon ran into trouble, but held its ground until about 4.00 pm, when it fell back, pursued by the enemy, suffering losses of 115 out of the total of 320 men. Finally, the column on the extreme left, also of two companies, advanced through the woods on Mount Berdek, three miles from St Nicholas. This column, commanded by Major Rodzevich, which moved off much earlier than the others, enjoyed the only success of the day, storming the Turkish position and driving the enemy back to St Nicholas. But it was not sufficient to redeem the failure of the other columns, and during the night all the Russian troops fell back to Gabrova, with total casualties of 205.25
Gourko’s attack on the southern end of the pass on July 18 was similarly unsuccessful. Pushing through the woods on either side of the main road they arrived at the strong position on St Nicholas. Soon after the Russians opened fire, the Turks displayed white flags and the Russians ceased fire and sent forward a flag of truce. MacGahan recorded what followed on the part of the Turks:
They seized the bearer of the flag, murdered him, and opened fire upon the Russians without warning. The whole business is so barbarous and so savage that the story would probably not be believed if it rested on Russian authority alone. Fortunately it does not. There was a Prussian officer present, Major Liegnitz, on whose authority, as well as on that of many Russian officers, the truth of the story rests.
When the Turks displayed the white flags they ceased firing, as did the Russians, who imprudently emerged from cover. When the Russian flag of truce went forward, there was a general relaxation and Liegnitz went close enough to the Turkish position to speak to a Turkish soldier. Once the flag bearer entered the fort, fire was opened without warning, not accidentally but, as MacGahan reported, in response to a trumpet call. Next day when the Russians entered the fort the mutilated and decapitated body of the flag bearer was found.26
With the ending of the apparent truce Gourko’s men launched a charge against the Turkish position, capturing some of the first line of trenches, but were not strong enough to make any further progress into the main works on St Nicholas. They fell back on Shipka, having suffered casualties of over 150.
These uncoordinated attacks on the Turkish position in the Shipka Pass having failed, it was resolved to launch further attacks from both north and south on July 19. Khulussi, however, despaired of being able to hold the position, and during the night of July 18/19 and the following morning, the Turks evacuated St Nicholas in small parties which made their way through the mountains. To buy time for this manoeuvre a letter was brought to Gourko’s headquarters at 7.00 am with an offer to surrender; the Turkish officer took back a proposal that the capitulation take place at noon, promising to return within two hours. Gourko sent forward some hospital attendants to care for the wounded. The Turkish officer did not return; when noon passed without further contact, Gourko sent forward a reconnoitring party and was preparing to advance with two battalions when some of the hospital attendants returned to say that Skobelev was on St Nicholas. This was soon confirmed by a note from the latter to say that the Turks had abandoned the position, leaving behind eight guns and a large quantity of ammunition and supplies. What had happened was that Skobelev, always thirsting for action, had taken nine companies of the 36th Regiment with four guns to attack St Nicholas; but as he advanced through the defences found that the enemy had gone, leaving behind the mutilated bodies of many dead Russian soldiers.27
With this, Gourko’s objective had been accomplished. It had been a remarkable success. At the cost of less than 500 casualties he had occupied Tirnova, seized three passes through the Balkans, opened the road into Rumelia, dispersed Turkish detachments totaling over 10,000 men, and disarmed the Turkish population in a large part of the Tundja valley. He had taken two flags, thirteen guns and 800 prisoners, and had vindicated the boldness of the Russian plan.