Osman
In strengthening the position which he held at Plevna, Osman could count on the traditional ability of the Turkish infantry to construct effective field fortifications. One historian of the siege of Plevna described it thus:
Simple Anatolian peasants as many of them were, the Turkish linesmen were as at home with their few, rough tools as they had made themselves familiar with their excellent Martini-Peabody rifles. It was, indeed, the Osmanli’s ability to ‘dig himself in and, from his entrenched position, direct a steady stream of rapid fire against opponents advancing in outmoded column formation, that gave him an advantage over the Russian soldier which only factors beyond the power of the man in the Osmanli ranks to control eventually served to redress.1
The defensive works along the Janik Bair formed at this stage the key to the Turkish position. Four redoubts were constructed, two north-west of Grivitza and two more further along the ridge to the west. Herbert’s battalion was engaged in the construction of Redoubt No 2, of which it formed part of the garrison. All four of these redoubts were square shaped. Herbert described No 2:
The northern slope of the redoubt, facing the enemy, bordered upon the ravine which played such a conspicuous part in the first battle. It had one ditch or trench for the protection of skirmishers on the southern side of the ravine, and two, one above the other, on the crest of the opposite bank. There were on each flank trenches running at obtuse angles to the redoubt, whence an attacking enemy could be taken by flank fire.2
A covered way led southwards to Redoubt No 1. Each of these redoubts was occupied by two battalions, with half a battery, while the two smaller redoubts each contained one battalion and one or two guns. With these hastily constructed fortifications the Turks had created a formidable stronghold shaped by the Janik Bair; from east to west it was three and a half miles long.
The design of these works was fairly basic, and reflected the defensive problem that Osman and his staff must solve. It was necessary to hold a very long line of defence, so the decision was taken to create a series of closed redoubts at key points, with light trenches on the front and flanks. Since the principal weapon to be employed was the rifle, the design must allow for clear fields of fire; it was evident that the Russians would always enjoy a heavy superiority in artillery. The redoubts provided good cover for their garrisons and were mainly located where the ground fell away to their rear, so that the reserves could take up a sheltered position there. As Sir George Clarke pointed out, and as the Russians were to discover to their cost, well sited redoubts that were fully garrisoned could wreak terrible havoc upon attacking infantry; ‘with an excellent breechloader and plenty of ammunition, the distance required to repulse an assault is comparatively short.’3
The troops worked in relays, by day and night. In the relatively short time available before the coming Russian assault they had created formidable field works. Redoubt No 1 was the largest of the four redoubts, covering Grivitza itself and the Bulgareni road. The parapet was nearly fourteen feet thick, and nine feet high; it was surrounded by deep and broad ditches. In addition to the shelter trenches described by Herbert, a series of rifle pits was dug in front of them, effectively providing three tiers of rifle fire.4
In taking up his position at Plevna, Osman was very much aware of the importance of Lovtcha, some twenty miles to the south. It had been occupied by a Cossack unit on July 16, but had not been reinforced. On July 25 Osman dispatched a force of six battalions, under Rifaat Pasha, with one battery and some Circassian cavalry to retake the place. Lovtcha had a population of about 14,000; according to Herbert it ‘was considered one of the richest, prettiest, best built, and most advanced towns of Bulgaria.’5 Rifaat had no difficulty in reoccupying Lovtcha, driving back the Cossacks who had been vigorously supported by many of the Bulgarian inhabitants. Osman may have hoped that reinforcements might have been sent from south of the Balkans to garrison Lovtcha; as it was, Rifaat was left to put it in a state of defence.
Osman, having been given command over the forces in western Bulgaria at Sofia and Novi Bazar, had brought up reinforcements to Plevna in the shape of a brigade from Widdin and eight battalions from Sofia. This gave him a total of thirty-nine battalions, six of which were at Lovtcha with Rifaat. The remainder he reorganised into two divisions each of twelve battalions, two squadrons and twelve guns, with a general reserve of nine battalions, one squadron and thirty-four guns. The 1st Division, commanded by Adil Pasha, was responsible for the northern section, while the 2nd Division (Hassan Pasha) held the eastern and southern sections of the defence works. These included four small redoubts that were more or less completed, but apart from those consisted principally of shelter trenches. The stiff clay soil around Plevna lent itself well to the construction of earthworks and trenches; the latter were deep and narrow, with perpendicular sides. As in the northern sectors, rifle pits had been dug for sharpshooters in advance of the main line of trenches.6
It was decided at Russian headquarters that, in order to ensure the success of the next assault on Plevna, additional forces should be made available. Krüdener had in hand Schilder-Schuldner’s force, plus three regiments of the 31st Division, the 9th Regiment of Lancers and eight batteries. The 19th Regiment was moved to Nicopolis, to recover from its mauling on July 20. The 124th Regiment was still covering the bridgeheads at Sistova, and two cavalry regiments were with Gourko. He was reinforced on July 29 by the arrival of the 30th Division from the IV Corps, the 1st Brigade of the 32nd Division (from the XI Corps) and the 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division. This force was under the command of Lieutenant-General Prince Shakofskoi.
Krüdener had, on July 28, telegraphed Russian headquarters for instructions after having carried out a thorough personal reconnaissance of the Turkish positions. He did not at all like what he saw. He received a peremptory reply from the Grand Duke, who could not understand Krüdener’s hesitation in carrying out the orders previously given to him. In the face of this, Krüdener had no option but to order an assault, to take place on July 30. Although, being slightly senior, he was in command, he shared responsibility for the attack with Prince Shakofskoi. It was a partnership that might well not work well, as Maurice observed:
The two men were of very different character. Krüdener had the reputation of being a good soldier, but a man who was inclined to take life easily. Shakofskoi was a man who believed that nobody but an aristocrat could be a good general; he was very quick tempered and impetuous, and was in no sense a scientific soldier.7
Progress Map No.2 – Second period of the Campaign. From the crossing of the Danube to the fall of Plevna, June 27 to December 10 1877
Russian infantry assault the Turkish entrenchments at Plevna. (Ollier)
One particularly valuable part of the reinforcement was however Michael Skobelev, newly returned from the Shipka Pass, who joined Shakofskoi on the latter’s march from Tirnova. On July 28 Shakofskoi ordered Skobelev to take the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and advance on Lovtcha, and occupy the place. When he reached his objective Skobelev found that Rifaat had forestalled him, and reported back that the Turks were engaged in strengthening the good defensive position which they had taken up, and that it would require at least an infantry division to support the cavalry if an attempt was to be made to take it. This was much more than could be spared, so Skobelev was directed for the moment merely to watch Lovtcha while the rest of the army concentrated for the assault on Plevna.
When he arrived Shakofskoi reconnoitred the Turkish positions before conferring with Krüdener as to the plan to be adopted. Shakofskoi, who had a great contempt for the Turks, had no doubt that the defeat on July 20 was the fault of Schilder-Schuldner and his lack of determination. He was equally certain that he could do much better, and pressured Krüdener into agreeing to dispositions which would give him as free a hand as possible. The intention was to attack in two columns, one advancing from the north-east under Lieutenant-General Veliaminov with the 31st Division, with Schilder-Schuldner’s 5th Division in support, and one from the south-east under Shakofskoi with the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division and the 1st Brigade of the 32nd Division. In the rear, near Poradim and between the two columns, stood the general reserve under Krüdener’s direct orders, consisting of the 2nd Brigade of the 30th Division and four squadrons of cavalry. Four more squadrons were to act as a link between the two columns. On the extreme right, a cavalry brigade under Major-General Lockarev was to be ready to cross the Vid in order to cut off a Turkish retreat to Sofia, while on the left Skobelev, reinforced with a battalion and four guns, was in addition to watching Lovtcha, to cover Shakofskoi’s left and rear. It was Shakofskoi’s conviction that the heights above Radischevo would prove to be the critical point of attack.8 Krüdener’s headquarters were on the left of the line of Veliaminov’s advance, on the heights about a mile and a half to the east of Grivitza.
Russian infantry contest the outskirts of Plevna. (Budev)
The advance began at 7.00 am in thick fog. By 8.00 am the leading troops of the right wing came within range of the Turks who opened fire. The Russian artillery, which had deployed about two miles east of the Grivitza Redoubt (No 1), opened fire at about 8.30 am. For the next four hours there was a vigorous artillery duel, in which the Russians, with eighty guns in action, had the advantage in numbers. It was not until 2.30 pm that Krüdener gave the order for the advance of the infantry This was to be in two columns, one from the north and one from the east. The first column consisted of the 121st Regiment and two battalions of the 123rd Regiment, followed by the 17th and 18th Regiments in reserve. The other column comprised the 1st Battalion of the 123rd Regiment and the 122nd Regiment, with the 20th Regiment in reserve. The leading battalion of the 121st Regiment carried the first line of trenches, but was held up by the second. Soon, however, the following battalion came up and they drove the Turks across the ravine and dashed for the redoubt, where many of them were cut down by the fierce rifle fire. The 121st Regiment fell back across the ravine having lost more than a third of its men and half its officers.9 The arrival of the 17th and 18th Regiments failed to restore the position; their assaults on the redoubt were also thrown back. The column advancing from the east was equally unsuccessful; the 122nd Regiment was held up on a little mound four hundred yards short of the redoubt and the 20th Regiment’s advance was also stalled.
Krüdener had released one of his regiments (the 119 th) from his reserve to Shakofskoi; he now at 6.00 pm sent forward one battalion of the 120th Regiment with a squadron of dragoons and two horse guns to the help of the 17th and 18th Regiments who were hard pressed; with this reinforcement they managed to hold their position. As the sun went down, Krüdener ordered another general assault. It went in with desperate courage but broke down in the face of the heavy fire. Obliged to recognise the complete defeat of the right wing of the Russian assault, Krüdener ordered a retreat, covered by the two remaining battalions of the 120th Regiment, and by the 124th Regiment, which had just arrived from Sistova. Exchanges of fire continued all night, and it was daylight on July 31 before the last of the Russian infantry retired to an assembly position at Tristenik and Karagatch.
Russian infantry at Plevna. (Ollier)
Meanwhile Shakofskoi’s attack with the left wing had begun with the descent of the Radischevo ridge by the 125th (Kursk) and 126th (Rylsk) Regiments. However, as they began to climb the opposite slope, the troops were met by murderous rifle fire, and suffered fearful losses. Nonetheless, by 5.00 pm they had carried the two small redoubts in their immediate front, from which the Turks withdrew, saving all their guns bar two. On Shakofskoi’s left, parties of his troops had managed to advance through a ravine to the edge of Plevna itself. He had committed his 118th Regiment, so now had only one regiment in reserve; of his artillery, four guns were with Skobelev and three had been knocked out, so he had 21 in reserve. His position was precarious; although he had captured two redoubts, the Turks were clearly massing for a counter-attack. There was no hope of support from the right wing; even if it had not taken the fearful pounding which it had endured, it was over five miles march from Shakofskoi’s column. The 119th Regiment, which had been sent to reinforce him, had been diverted to face a Turkish column advancing into the gap. Shakofskoi now committed his final reserve, so that by 6.00 pm all his troops were engaged. It was soon clear that no further progress was possible, with the Turks threatening the Russian troops on three sides, and as soon as it was dark the order was given to fall back to the Radischevo ridge. Next morning the whole force retreated to Poradim.10
Although he had been heavily defeated, Shakofskoi had Skobelev to thank for not having faced an even more serious disaster. Under cover of the thick fog, Skobelev moved his force out of Bogot at 5.00 am, and succeeded in reaching the village of Krishin, having taken the Turks entirely by surprise. He occupied the heights above the village and then with two squadrons and four guns worked his way through the vineyards to within 300 yards of Plevna. From the heights he looked down on the whole Turkish position, seeing the large Turkish reserve, which he estimated at 20,000 men. When Shakofskoi opened fire at about 10.00 am, Skobelev’s four guns joined in, whereupon a force of some 4,000 of the enemy advanced against him. He fell back to Krishin; but he had spotted that if the Turks moved some two miles down the road from Plevna to Lovtcha they could take a hill from which they could enfilade the whole of Shakofskoi’s line. He scattered the bulk of his cavalry to cover the flank in accordance with his orders and then, with the remaining four sotnias, the infantry battalion and four guns moved to the attack of the Turkish infantry that had assailed him.
Keeping three companies and two sotnias in reserve until 4.00 pm he maintained the fight all day and until after dark, when he withdrew, taking with him his wounded, reassembling what was left of his scattered force at Krishin before retreating first to Bogot and then to Pelisat. Greene wrote of Skobelev’s force that ‘it was hotly engaged during the whole day, and, although small in numbers, was handled with such skill as to establish beyond doubt the military genius of this brilliant young general.’11
The Russian defeat was complete. Out of 30,000 men engaged, they had lost 169 officers and 7,136 men; 2,400 had been killed. The regiments which had suffered the most were the 121st and 126th Regiments; the latter lost 725 killed and 1,200 wounded, or 75% of its whole strength. Turkish casualties are unclear; they admitted to 1,200 killed and wounded, but the total was almost certainly much greater than this.12 News of the defeat was carried back to Sistova by evacuated wounded, and in a highly exaggerated form, causing a grand stampede among both inhabitants and camp followers on both sides of the bridge.
As had been the case after his victory on July 20, Osman made no move to follow up his beaten enemy. Greene weighed the wisdom of this:
It would appear at first sight as if Osman made a great mistake in not pursuing the force which he had so signally defeated, especially as he probably had a considerable force of fresh troops which had not been engaged at all, and as the Russians had retreated in two columns on divergent country roads totally independent of each other, leaving the great high-road midway between them perfectly open. Yet it is a fact that every offensive movement of the Turks throughout the war came to naught, and it is more than probable that Osman did exactly the wisest thing; he felt sure that the Russians would come to him again as soon as they got a few more men together, and he therefore kept his troops on their own ground, and set them to work as hard as they could with their spades.13
Maurice was of much the same view, observing that ‘Osman had little cavalry, few trained staff officers, and neither the character nor organisation of his force were suited to sudden and unforeseen efforts.’14
In fact, there was a brief encounter on the following morning, which Herbert described, when a Russian regiment and some batteries came back within range and opened fire. Osman sent all his available cavalry, a light battery and an infantry battalion; but the Russian movement had no doubt been made only to cover the retreat, and they soon fell back. Herbert remarked that ‘no pursuit took place; for, truly, the Turks were not in a condition to pursue.’15
Not surprisingly, commentators have been extremely critical of the Russian leadership. Krüdener’s abandonment to Shakofskoi of all responsibility for the left wing has been particularly censured, as has the weakness of the general reserve. The reconnaissances made had failed to reveal much information about the Turkish positions. The infantry assaults had not been preceded by the action of skirmishers, a fact which Herbert noticed and which surprised him. And, in particular, there was little cooperation between the three arms in the course of the battle – with the striking exception of Skobelev’s little force, whose exploits were the one redeeming feature of Russian operations.16
Regrettably the Russian leaders were swift to blame each other. Shakofskoi complained that Krüdener had not supported him; on the other hand Krüdener asserted that Shakofskoi had not obeyed his orders, and that he should not have moved to the assault without further orders. Nor was Grand Duke Nicholas free from blame; he gave the orders for an assault against a position about which he knew little or nothing, and in the teeth of the reservations of the man on the spot.
Archibald Forbes, who had been present at Shakofskoi’s headquarters throughout the battle, took his report personally first to Bucharest and then, fearing that the Russians might censor his news of their defeat, decided to ride the eighty miles across the Carpathians and over the Hungarian border to Kronstadt. Reflecting on the outcome of the battle a day or two later from Bucharest, he contemplated the possibility that the Turks might advance to cut the Russian line of communications, sweeping aside the broken forces of Krüdener and Shakofskoi:
Beaten, disorganised, and weakened, there can be no certainty that this force is able to withstand the Turks advancing in force against it, and the result of another battle that should go against the Russians would be the clearance for the Turks of the road to Sistova, and the absolute severance of the whole Russian force in Bulgaria from its base in Roumania.17
Alternatively, he thought, Osman might march on Tirnova and join hands there with Mehemet Ali, in which case, he wondered, what would be the plight of Gourko and Radetzky’s VIII Corps, ‘jammed in the Balkans or dispersed in reckless raids on the further side’?
It was now evident not only to the Russian high command, but also to Gorchakov, that Roumanian assistance was essential. There had already been some cooperation, with Roumanian troops covering the Russian deployment and supporting with their artillery the Danube crossing and the attack on Nicopolis. Receiving a pressing demand for further support, Prince Charles and his ministers agreed to provide it, but only on the basis of settled terms. Agreeing these was not entirely straightforward, since the Russians attempted to impose unreasonable conditions, such as the incorporation of Roumanian troops in Russian units.18 For its part, the Roumanian government insisted on a separate line of operations along the River Isker. Finally, after protracted negotiations, it was agreed that, retaining their separate identity and leadership, the Roumanian divisions should form the right wing of the Russian army. From the Roumanian point of view it was necessary that the independence of the country proclaimed by its parliament should be underlined by military success, and that it should be seen that Roumania had come to Russia’s aid.
There was one ticklish question to be resolved. At a meeting on August 28 with Grand Duke Nicholas and the Tsar, Prince Charles made it clear that he intended to command his own troops in person. In his memoirs he recorded the reaction:
The Grand Duke objects then that this decision will cause difficulties, as naturally it is not possible that the Prince should be placed under the orders of a Russian general. The Prince answered rather vivaciously; certainly he can’t accept that, it is an impossibility; but on the contrary one could put ten Russian generals under his orders. The Emperor listened in silence to this exchange of words … But before the Prince had finished dressing Grand Duke Nicholas comes to him, and offers him, by order of the Emperor, the supreme command over all Russian troops around Plevna.19
Lieutenant-General Zotov, the commander of the IV Corps, was to serve as his Chief of Staff, and second in command, thus ensuring effective Russian control of the operations, and over the Roumanian troops taking part.
It would, however, take some time before the Roumanian divisions could be brought over the Danube and fully deployed. Now was the time for the Turks to take advantage of their situation and strike an effective blow. It would be for Mehemet Pasha to lead it; he had arrived at Shumla on July 22 to take over the supreme command from Abdul Kerim.