Batum
Apart from the fortresses of Kars and Erzerum, the acquisition of Batum was for Russia much the most attractive territorial war aim in Asia. It was an excellent harbour, and its possession would greatly strengthen Russia’s grip on its turbulent provinces in the region. Hobart thought Batum to be ‘the key to Asia Minor.’1 It will be recalled that the Rion detachment based on Kutais had Batum as its objective, together with the protection of the Black Sea coast. Its proceedings were largely unaffected by, and did not affect, the operations of the other three columns invading Turkish territory.
It was recognised from the outset that Oklobju, in command of the Rion detachment, had a peculiarly difficult task. The terrain it must cross to get at Batum was especially forbidding, while the Turks could derive considerable assistance from their command of the sea. They were able to bring in reinforcements unhindered, while the guns of their ironclads could help with the defence of some of the approaches to the town. Added to this, the Turkish garrison was commanded by the able and energetic Hassein Tashmi Pasha, who had available between 10,000 and 12,000 regular troops, plus between 7,000 and 8,000 irregulars recruited locally, who were particularly well versed in mountain warfare. His nominal strength was thirty-four battalions with thirty guns.
The particular geographic problems faced by Oklobju were considerable:
The distance in a direct line between the Russian frontier and Batum is only about fifteen miles; but it presents the greatest difficulties to the advance of an army. It consists of a strip of land enclosed between a range of nearly inaccessible mountains and the sea, and crossed by seven mountain torrents, together with numerous tributaries of the Tcholouk. The ravines at the bottom of which they flow are separated by steep wooded heights, affording great facilities for defence. Nor had the Russian general much choice as to his mode of approach. From his starting point it was possible to enter the Turkish territory by three roads, which after a short distance reunite near Muchaster, from whence there is only one available road, passing down to the sea at Tsikhe Dsiri and proceeding along the coast to Batum.2
As usual, the Turks had been assiduous in fortifying the heights around the town, and it was evident that Oklobju’s force would be obliged to attack these positions directly. The surrounding terrain would render any ambitious turning movements impossible. Oklobju had been provided with only a small force of cavalry, consisting of two Cossack regiments with twelve guns, since the nature of the country was unsuitable for cavalry operations on any large scale, and it was not to be expected that he would be making long marches. Oklobju had about 12,000 men and 48 guns available together with 7,000 more in reserve at Kutais and Ozurgeti. Bearing in mind the advantage afforded the defence by the nature of the country, it was scarcely enough.3
Oklobju began his advance on April 24, immediately following the declaration of war, moving in three columns. Those on the right and the centre were to reunite under the command of General Shelemetiev; that on the left was a commanded by General Denibekov. To their surprise the Russians almost immediately encountered Turkish skirmishers on the heights in their immediate front, and it was necessary for these to be driven off before the advance could continue. When Shelemetiev was able to push forward he found that the Turks had established a strong defensive position around Muchaster, held by five battalions of irregular infantry and three squadrons of cavalry under the command of Ali Pasha. These resisted Shelemetiev’s advance throughout April 25, inflicting heavy casualties. On the following day, however, the Russian troops succeeded in taking Muchaster, while on the left Denibekov occupied the village of Alamberi. The advance had got no more than five miles beyond the frontier; but for the next two weeks Oklobju contented himself with strengthening his position at Muchaster before making his next forward move.4
During this period Hassein was fortifying the line of the River Kintrish, and occupying the Khontsoubani heights. Oklobju was aware of considerable and increasing restlessness among the local population and it was as much to push back the Turks and thus discourage any rising, as to move on Batum, that he prepared to advance against Hassein’s positions on May 11. Denibekov, with the 164th (Zakatala) Regiment, two battalions of Caucasian Rifles, a Kuban plastun battalion (Cossack infantry unit), the Gurian militia and two batteries, was to advance against the village of Khontsoubani, while Shelemetiev, with the 163rd (Lenkoran) Regiment, the Imeretian militia and four batteries, was to move out of the Muchaster position towards the mouth of the Kintrish. The road to be taken by Denibekov led to the River Acho, but to get there he had to cross a range of natural terraces, which had been heavily fortified, while the road itself had been barricaded at several points. Denibekov marched in two columns, the larger on the right of the road consisting of fifteen companies of infantry and four guns, while that on the left took the road with six companies and two guns. The advance was supported by a battery of 24 nine pounders in front of Muchaster.
Hassein had posted some 5,000 men on the line of the Acho, and Denibekov was made to fight every yard of the way. For five hours he was pinned down in front of the Turkish entrenchments, and Oklobju was obliged to bring up reinforcements. The heavy artillery fire from Muchaster was effective in smashing the buildings dotted among the trees, but it was only when Denibekov personally led a bayonet charge on the position that the Turks finally gave way and retreated.
Meanwhile Shelemetiev’s advance had run into similar difficulties after crossing the Acho; an attempt to storm the heights in front broke down, and the attackers were forced to retire. Shelemetiev contented himself with an artillery bombardment of the Turkish positions. While this was going on Hassein advanced with about 2,000 infantry and attacked the column’s right flank, and almost overwhelmed it, before being driven back by reinforcements hurriedly brought up. At this point an ironclad gunboat came up river, and began shelling the Russian troops on the north bank of the Acho. The artillery duel continued for about four hours before Shelemetiev judged it right to resume his advance, pushing forward a company of sharpshooters which turned the enemy left, whereupon the Turks fell back rapidly.
The fighting had been severe, but no official return of casualties was published on the Turkish side. Some 200 were found dead on the field of battle; other losses are unknown. The Russians admitted only eighteen killed and 150 wounded, but Hozier reckoned that their casualties must have been greater than the Turks. The latter made the preposterous claim to have killed 4,000.5
Russian steam engines at work helping to load and unload war matériel. (Budev)
After a further pause of two weeks Oklobju again moved forward with a view to occupying the line of the Kintrish, which had been more strongly fortified than the Acho position. However, an advance in two columns quickly succeeded in crossing the river, whereupon the Turks fell back quickly towards their principal position at Batum. If the outlying works had been strong, those surrounding the town were even more formidable.
Oklobju, who had now only got halfway from the frontier towards Batum and was not yet even in sight of the town, resolved to wait for the time being in the positions he had taken. The Turks continued to resupply Batum by sea, while their ironclads effectively interdicted the coast road to the town, which would otherwise have provided the most straightforward route for an advance.
While this deadlock continued, the Turks determined to take advantage of their command of the sea by launching an attack on the coast of the Russian Trans Caucasian provinces. They had already, soon after the outbreak of war, bombarded Poti, where they employed courageous divers to cut the cables of the torpedoes, or mines as we should call them, which had been laid extensively around the port in an attempt to keep any assailant out of range. Once floated, the mines were towed away to be destroyed. These mine clearing operations were extremely successful, and the Turkish ironclads were able to steam close inshore and do considerable damage to the buildings of Poti.
Hobart had taken personal command of the Turkish fleet off Batum, which consisted of eight ironclads together with a large number of transports bringing in supplies. Warned by spies in Sebastopol that torpedoes would be used against the fleet, he put a barrier of booms ahead of the ships, in the port, with guard boats to cover the harbour entrance. His precautions were wise; attempts were made on a number of occasions by two fast Russian steamers, carrying torpedo boats, to launch attacks against the Turkish ironclads.6
The operations against the Russian forces threatening Batum, and against Poti and other places on the coast, were suspended for a more ambitious operation. The Turkish plan was to stimulate a rising against the Russians in Abkhazia, where the population had been unremittingly hostile to the Russian occupation; most recently there had been an insurrection in 1866, put down by Russian troops. The Abkhazians, however, did not make the most dependable of allies; a British traveller compared them to some of the tribes on the North-west frontier of India:
Of all the rascally robber tribes of the Caucasus, whose regular occupation up to the period of Russian ascendancy was vendetta, kidnapping, and horse stealing, the Abkhazians are by many degrees the worst, worse even than the Tcherkess, which is saying a great deal. Their character very much resembles that of the Afridis, Bajouris and Bonairs of our North-west frontier in India, being a compound of avarice, treachery, caprice, and ferocity, joined to considerable courage, and great aptitude for guerrilla warfare.7
A Turkish officer with his orderly. (The Graphic)
Turkish agents had been secretly sent to stir up the population in advance of a landing on the Russian coast. This was to take place at Soukhoum Kaleh, some twenty miles north of Poti. The town was largely populated by Greeks and Armenians, and by the Russian officials; the native Abkhazians came into town to trade on market days. Hozier described Soukhoum Kaleh as ‘a place of very great beauty, enclosed by an amphitheatre of hills, with a gorge and snow–clad mountains behind.’ The Russians had not done much to fortify it; there was a bastioned square, a work called the New Battery and a large fortified barracks.
Hobart detached four ironclads for the expedition, commanded by one of his best officers. Admiral Hassan Pasha had served in the British navy, and was extremely competent. On May 12, after a series of feigned attacks on the village of Gudati, east of Pitsunda Point and about ten miles north-west of Soukhoum Kaleh, the commander of the garrison, General Kravchenko, panicked and sent part of his force in that direction. The Turkish squadron accordingly steamed off to Soukhoum Kaleh, and began a heavy bombardment of the town. Kravchenko retreated with the rest of his force into the hills behind the town on May 15; the main force intended for the landing was not yet at sea, but he fell back further into the interior. Large numbers of Abkhazians assembled to take up the arms distributed by the Turks. Kravchenko took with him a large part of the population who suffered severely on the journey through the mountains; many of those who fell behind were massacred by the Abkhazians.9
On May 23 a force of 3,000 Circassian troops was landed at Adler, thirty miles further north, causing a further Russian retreat; about 100 miles of coast had been abandoned to the Turks. 10,000 further Turkish troops were sent to Soukhoum Kaleh to follow up the initial successes, but to no purpose; hemmed in by the mountains, and by the Russian forces assembled to resist them, they were completely ineffective. It was soon realised that there was no choice but to evacuate them, a task which fell to Hobart.
He was obliged first to take off the force at Adler, an operation which he described with considerable self satisfaction:
The corvettes and the paddle transports were moored in as close to the shore as possible, my intention being to cram them with men and stores first, leaving my flagship free to the last to manoeuvre off the Russian camp and shell it, should the slightest opposition be offered to the embarkation. The work commenced at daylight, and was actively carried on throughout the day and following night, the last batch of men coming off at dawn. The men were taken off under the very teeth, as it were, of the Russians. The ships in shore were well within rifle range, and the boats passing to and fro were exposed the whole time to a fire from hidden foes.10
Dervish Pasha. (Russes et Turcs)
The troops were taken in the first instance to Soukhoum Kaleh; but it was evident that this place must also be abandoned, and Hobart was ordered to evacuate not only the troops, but also all those of the indigenous population who preferred to leave rather than face Russian vengeance. In the end, within about a fortnight, Hobart was able to take off some 50,000 people, landing them at the nearby Turkish ports, completing the operation by 31 August. During the evacuation a bold torpedo attack was made on the Turkish ships by converted launches from the Russian sloop Constantine, on 23/24 August during an eclipse of the moon. Although it failed, the confidence of the Turks was badly shaken.11 In military terms the operation had been a failure; but it did illustrate what might have been done if a more ambitious use had been made of the Turkish command of the sea.
Meanwhile in the fourth week of June Oklobju had prepared for a further offensive. After ten days of preparation, not only in bringing up artillery and supplies, but also in constructing some eighty miles of roads and thirty bridges, the Russians were ready to advance. By now they faced a new opponent, command of the Turkish forces in the Batum area having passed to the extremely able Dervish Pasha. He was able to deploy additional troops, reinforcements having come in by sea from Trebizond; he had some 20,000 troops at his disposal, half of whom were regulars, with 35 guns, some of which were heavy calibre pieces with a considerable range.12
Oklobju organised his force in five groups. On the right, Shelemetiev, with the 2nd Caucasian Rifles, two battalions of the 163rd Regiment, and Imeretian militia, with three battalions of the 101st (Piatigorsk) Regiment, was to push forward in support of the attack on the Kvirike ridge. This was to be made by Colonel Gurchin, with the 1st and 4th Caucasian Rifles and Gurian and Imeretian militia, with two battalions of the 76th (Kuban) Regiment in reserve. A general reserve consisting of the 151st Regiment and two battalions of the 75th Regiment stood on the Khontsoubani heights; three battalions were held to the left rear of the assault, and the 164th Regiment watched the lower Kintrish. Oklobju was keeping his options open; he planned a reconnaissance in force, but if the attack was successful he would throw in his reserves to exploit it.13
Dervish was ready to meet the attack. He had ten battalions on the Kvirike ridge; his right flank in the dense forest of the Kintrish ravine was covered by 3,000 irregulars. The Kvirike ridge was his second line; behind it, the Deva heights had been prepared for defence and four batteries installed, while at sea the guns of a 9 inch monitor had the Khontsoubani heights within range.
On June 23 the Russian artillery opened fire on the Kvirike ridge, quickly silencing the Turkish guns. Gurchin’s infantry advance, however, made slow progress, while the Turkish artillery on the Deva heights came into action to prevent the Russian gunners from coming forward. By nightfall Oklobju had taken about 1,000 casualties, and had had enough, ordering a withdrawal to the Sameba Heights and Table Hill. Next day Dervish counter-attacked, his men advancing boldly to a point at which the Russian guns were in danger of capture; in the end, however, they were driven back by bayonet charges, and Dervish called off the attack. Oklobju, reckoning that his exposed position was extremely vulnerable, fell back on June 30 to the Muchaster position that he had occupied two months before. He had suffered some 2,000 casualties during the fighting, plus a similar number sick from the prevalent coastal fever.14 At Muchaster he constructed powerful fortifications, and there he remained to the end of the war. This front saw no further action until January 30 of the following year, when an unsuccessful attack was launched under the command of Komarov; it cost the Russians some 1,200 men in killed and wounded. Among the dead was Shelemetiev, killed under long-range fire from Turkish ironclads as he was establishing his batteries. The Russians fell back to their start line, and the Turks remained in possession of Batum until the Congress of Berlin, where the successful defence of their position which they had maintained in the face of constant attacks, certainly strengthened their hand in the peace negotiations.15