Eski Zagra
Having seized the Shipka Pass, Gourko at once set about strengthening its defences. The existing works were occupied by a newly arrived brigade of the 9th Division, and were armed by a battery consisting of the three mountain guns and five Krupp guns captured during the fighting. Once the reinforcements had arrived Gourko was able to move his whole force, save for the 30th Don Cossack Regiment which was still north of the Balkans, to Kazanlik. There it was able to rest for a while.
But not for long. Gourko was quite convinced that only by pressing on could the moral effect of his success be maintained. He set out his intentions clearly:
If we stay where we are we shall accomplish nothing, nay, we shall risk losing everything. The Turks will recover from their panic, collect their scattered forces, receive reinforcements by train, realise how weak we are, and, reassuming the offensive with greatly increased numbers, drive us from the valley of the Tundja.1
On the other hand, if the offensive was continued, further hard blows might be struck at the enemy; at worst, the force could retreat into the Shipka Pass.
Accordingly, Gourko wrote on July 20 a personal letter to Nicholas to seek approval to advance towards Adrianople, for which he asked for an additional infantry brigade and the return of the 30th Don Cossacks, together with an additional nine pounder battery. If he lost a day in his present position, he wrote, he might lose all the advantages he had gained. The letter crossed with one from Nicholas, which Gourko received on July 21, congratulating him on his successes but asking him not to move his infantry beyond the Tundja, while sending his cavalry forward on a wide front. It was followed by an order from Nepokoitshitsky on the following day, which reported on the setback at Plevna, and also required him to hold his infantry at Kazanlik. Information was also given on the movement of Suleiman Pasha’s army from Montenegro, news of which had already begun to reach Gourko from local sources.2
Gourko was disappointed; standing still in this way was to court disaster, but he had no choice but to obey. In the meantime he sent his cavalry forward as requested. On July 22 the 9th Dragoons and a section of horse artillery went to Eski Zagra at the request of the Christian inhabitants. Next day came news of Turkish reinforcement arriving at Adrianople, and Gourko resolved to break up the railways from there to Philippopolis and Yeni Zagra. Two cavalry regiments and a section of horse artillery were sent to wreck the railway station at Karabunar and a similar force went to Kajadzik on the same errand. Gourko himself accompanied the 9th Hussars and two Bulgarian regiments which were moved to Eski Zagra.3
The cavalry reconnaissances each succeeded in breaking the railway, but in each case found the stations strongly defended. They returned with the news that the Turks were concentrating at the railway junction at Semenli.
On July 28 a further reconnaissance showed that the Turkish strength there was about two brigades in strength; another brigade was at Yeni Zagra, and the force opposed to him was growing daily in strength. That this was possible was due solely to the Turkish command of the sea, as Maurice pointed out:
This movement of Suleiman’s army from Montenegro to Rumelia is one of the most striking examples in military history of the value of sea power to operations on land. The distance in a straight line from Antivari to Hermanli is 300 miles, the actual distance by sea and rail is 1,200. Thirty thousand men had been conveyed between these points without fatigue and without risk of interruption by the enemy … This operation was made possible by the preponderance of the Turkish fleet; a single Russian cruiser unaccounted for in the Mediterranean would have confined Suleiman to Montenegro.4
Gourko’s intelligence as to the enemy strength was incomplete; unknown to him the Turks had some 48,000 men between Slivno and Semenli. Always in favour of the aggressive approach, Gourko decided to bring forward not only his 4th Rifle Brigade from Kazanlik but also the 1st Brigade of the 9th Division which was holding the Hainkioi Pass. His aim was to smash the Turkish force at Yeni Zagra before the main body at Semenli could intervene. His information was that it was extremely demoralised. Gourko was not, however, indifferent to the risk he was running, already reporting to headquarters on July 25 that Suleiman’s army would be dangerously close to him within five or six days.
A Cossack reconnaissance party near Yeni Zagra. (Budev)
On July 27 he wrote from Kazanlik to Nicholas to break the news of his intention to disobey orders by concentrating at Eski Zagra. Explaining the disadvantages of the position at Kazanlik, he pointed out the danger in which he would be placed by a Turkish offensive. He went on to explain in extravagant language why the move was essential:
To shift my headquarters to Eski Zagra is to me a matter of life and death. Here my base is the narrow strip of the valley of the Tundja, and I cannot use my cavalry to reconnoitre in front, while at my back is the precipitous chain of the Balkans, which, in case the enemy should advance in overwhelming numbers, leaves my force no alternative but to seek a glorious death.5
At Eski Zagra, on the other hand, reconnaissance would be straightforward, and if he concentrated his force he would have ‘every chance of getting the better of the enemy.’ There was another compelling reason to hold on to Eski Zagra; if he left, the Bulgarians would kill and plunder the unarmed Turkish civilians there and the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians would massacre both.
On the same day as Gourko was trying to persuade Nicholas of the wisdom of his scheme, Suleiman had a meeting with Raouf Pasha, now commanding the forces at Yeni Zagra. Until July 22 the latter had been Minister of Marine; but the simultaneous dismissal of Abdul Kerim and his replacement by Mehemet Ali, and the dismissal of Redif Pasha, the War Minister, had led to a complete cabinet reshuffle. Raouf found it necessary to turn up for the meeting with an escort of no less than six battalions. At their meeting the two generals agreed on an advance on Eski Zagra in three columns, Raouf from Yeni Zagra, Suleiman from Semenli and Khulussi from Philippopolis. The movement was to begin on July 29, the same day on which Gourko planned to launch his advance to Yeni Zagra.
Suleiman, who was to play a pivotal role for the remainder of the war, was highly regarded in Constantinople. His distinguishing characteristics were said to be energy and obstinacy; he was certainly to demonstrate the latter quality in the months ahead.
Gourko was also planning a move in three columns. The left, from Hainkioi, consisted of five battalions of the 9th Division, with a battery and four sotnias, under Major-General Boreisha. The centre column, under Major-General Tsvietsinsky, which Gourko accompanied, marched from Kazanlik through Magilish, Kisla and Balabanli, where it was to cross the Lesser Balkans; it comprised the 4th Rifle Brigade, with six sotnias and sixteen guns. The right column consisted of the troops already at Eski Zagra, under the command of Prince Nicholas Maximilianovich; these were four Bulgarian battalions, three cavalry regiments and two batteries, which were to take the main road to Yeni Zagra.
The right and centre columns united at Kavlikioi early on the morning of July 30, at which time nothing had been heard of the left column. Gourko decided not to wait, and advanced to the attack of Yeni Zagra.
The Turkish troops in Yeni Zagra amounted to five battalions with six guns. Gourko’s attack soon drove them back, and by midday he had captured the station. At this point, however, Gourko received a message outlining the situation of the left column, which had been stopped in its movement east from Eski Zagra by superior forces. In fact the troops which he had driven out of Yeni Zagra were part of Raouf’s force, the bulk of which was in motion towards Eski Zagra to link with Suleiman.
The capture of Yeni Zagra. (Ollier)
The Times correspondent at Yeni Zagra. (Ollier)
As night fell on July 30 Prince Nicholas, with the Eski Zagra detachments, held the high road eastwards from that place for about six miles. The Bulgarian battalions and some Cossacks made up his right flank in the town itself while his cavalry was at Aidinli and Hirsta, about half way between Eski Zagra and Dzuranli. Gourko, now joined by Boreisha, had collected his troops ready to come to their aid on the following morning and he had ten battalions just to the west of Yeni Zagra. At Karubunar, Suleiman, with some 40,000 men in hand, was disposed on an arc about five miles from Eski Zagra from the Chirpan road on his left to the village of Dzuranli on his right; the troops here were the remainder of Raouf’s contingent.6
Prince Nicholas had fought all day against these extremely heavy odds; it was obvious to him that it would be crucial to hold Eski Zagra if he could, since it covered the Russian retreat to Kazanlik. During the day the Russian cavalry, about 1,800 strong, had withstood the attacks of 4,000 infantry and several hundred irregular cavalry, fighting with great courage and skill. By now, however, as they prepared to face another day, they were close to the end of their tether.
On the morning of July 31 Gourko began his move along the high road towards Eski Zagra. When the Cossacks leading his force reached the vicinity of Dzuranli at about 7.00 am, they came under heavy fire from the Turks posted there. Seeing this, Prince Nicholas sent the 9th Hussars with four guns against the left flank of the Turks at Dzuranli to relieve the pressure on Gourko’s leading troops. He then dispatched the 8th Dragoons against the right flank of the rest of Suleiman’s army. The actions of these two cavalry regiments effectively kept the two parts of the Turkish army apart for several hours.
Further west Suleiman had begun a rather ponderous assault on the Bulgarian battalions holding Eski Zagra, moving forward at about 8.00 am along the roads reaching the town from the south and south-west. By 11.00 am the Bulgarians had been pushed back into the town; the 9th Dragoons were sent to their aid at the same time Gourko’s main body came into action against Dzuranli, driving back the Turks, but at the same time losing touch with the Eski Zagra detachment when he pulled back all the rest of the cavalry to his right wing.7
The fighting in front of Dzuranli was prolonged and bitter; from the shelter of the dense woods in front of the village the Turks poured a fire so heavy on the attackers that Major Liegnitz, the German military attaché, described it as ‘the most terrible musketry fire he had ever seen or heard.’8 However, with the support of a well-timed cavalry charge, Boreisha’s infantry pressed forward and drove the Turks back through the wood.
In Eski Zagra the fighting continued throughout the afternoon. By now Major-General Rauch, having reached the town after a circuitous ride around the Lesser Balkan Mountains, had taken command. It was evident that there was a serious risk of the town’s defenders being cut off, and he ordered a retreat to a position on the heights some five miles north of the town.
Hozier, describing the Bulgarian resistance to the very strong forces sent against them, observed that they had defended themselves with great bravery; it was not surprising that, when the risk of being surrounded became apparent, they preferred to fall back rather than be taken and face massacre by the Turks. He added:
In this struggle the Russians seemed to hold the lives of their Bulgarian allies somewhat cheap; at all events, the regiment of dragoons which remained occupied itself much more in extricating itself than in protecting the retreat of the Bulgarians.9
Gourko, in spite of his success at Dzuranli, could see that any attempt to reach the troops in and above Eski Zagra was doomed to failure, and with a heavy heart he ordered his contingent to fall back along a sheep track which ran through the mountains to Dalboka, and then rose up from that place through the pass to the Tundja valley. That night his troops bivouacked briefly at Dalboka. Early on the morning of August 1 they resumed their retreat through the pass, covered by the cavalry. Hozier, commenting on Gourko’s operations, remarked on the courage displayed and the difficulties overcome during the advance, and added that ‘the retreat was perhaps even more noticeable, both for its daring, being undertaken in the face of an enormously superior force, and for having to overcome the greatest natural obstacles.’10 Trudging onwards, the force attained the relative safety of Hainkioi on August 3, and from there sent back patrols to see what Suleiman was doing.
These reported that the Turks were moving in considerable force from Eski Zagra to Yeni Zagra. One patrol rode through the burnt and ruined town of Eski Zagra, finding that only some Bashi Bazouks remained. The unfortunate inhabitants had suffered terribly at the hands of the Turks, although no reliable estimate of the civilian casualties could be made. It seems clear that Suleiman had authorised the destruction of the town as a reprisal for what was regarded by the Turks as the ‘treason’ of the inhabitants.11 Quite what was the reason for Suleiman’s move to Yeni Zagra is unclear, but it meant that the Russian retreat on Kazanlik and Hainkioi was largely undisturbed.
No separate account of the casualties suffered by Gourko’s force during the fighting between July 22 and July 31 appears to have been published. Greene recorded the total casualties from the departure from Tirnova until August 6 as having been 981, of which he estimates that about 500 were lost during the Eski Zagra battles. These figures manifestly understate the true figures. Forbes reported on August 8 that ‘of the severity of the fighting a judgment may be formed from the fact that of the Bulgarian Legion, which began sixteen hundred strong, only between four and five hundred reached Shipka.’
He went on to give a figure of three thousand casualties for Gourko’s force during the fighting on July 30 and 31.12 These figures, which were estimates made at the time with no official figures against which to check them, probably exaggerated the true position.
Epauchin, in his account of the operations of Gourko’s advance guard, gives the total Russian casualties between the start of the advance from Tirnova to the return to the Balkan range as being 527 killed, 916 wounded and 85 missing, a total of 1,528, or more than ten percent of the whole force.13 This, too, may be inaccurate, and may understate the loss. Epauchin was, naturally, at pains to depict the operation as an overall success, noting that the Russian advance through the Balkans had caused total panic in the Turkish government, one despatch referring to the Ottoman Empire as being ‘placed between life and death.’ In particular the threat to Adrianople caused great concern, and prompted the recall of Suleiman’s army as well as the changes in the high command. Epauchin listed the trophies gained by the advance guard:
They were indeed great. Firstly, the Balkan chain for a considerable distance, (2) the two convenient passes of Hainkioi and Shipka, (3) the town of Tirnova, so important both in a military and political sense, (4) a wide belt of territory which passed into our hands, (5) numerous stores of all kinds, (6) some 1,500 prisoners, and three standards, fifteen guns, and lastly, twenty three battalions routed and dispersed.14
Turkish infantry advance to the attack. This image conveys an excellent impression of how infantry manoeuvred about the battlefields during the war, and how men were sent forward to feed a skirmish line. (Illustrirte Geschichte des Orientalischen Krieges von 1876-1878)
Whatever Gourko’s original ambitions for his operation may have been, he was soon convinced by the feebleness of the opposition that he encountered that he was in the presence of a beaten enemy, and that a bold push southwards would keep the Turks on the run. However, the objectives of the high command in planning the operation were more limited. Gourko was to seize one or more of the Balkan passes, stimulate a rising of the Christian population south of the Balkans, and disperse whatever Turkish forces he might encounter in the Tundja valley. In the period before the first two battles of Plevna he enjoyed a spectacular success, and but for Osman’s intervention might have received the reinforcements necessary to exploit it. But after Krüdener’s defeat on July 31 the Russian leaders lost their nerve. Colonel Brackenbury, who had accompanied the advance guard, wrote some months later:
Unfortunately for Russia, perhaps for Europe, timid counsels were allowed to prevail, and instead of detaining the Turkish armies while the reinforcements were coming up, instead of pushing forward the VII Corps over the Shipka Pass so as to overawe the already panic-stricken forces in Roumelia, and claim a success ending in an honourable peace, the Russian chiefs threw away the reputation of their arms and the precious lives of their best soldiers by hurling them against the breastworks and batteries of Plevna. A very well informed officer of the Turkish army in Roumelia has assured me that the dash forward of the VIII Corps must have been crowned with success, for there were but few troops to oppose it, and these were both raw and demoralised.15
While this assessment, looked at with the benefit of hindsight, is almost certainly true, it pays no regard to the enormity of the threat that Osman, in Plevna, posed to the fragile line of communications or, indeed, to the menace of the entirely fresh troops to the east of the Lom, which had not yet made their presence felt. It would have taken leadership far abler than was to be found at the Russian headquarters to press on in the manner suggested.
What was clear to Nicholas and his staff at the beginning of August was that for the moment no further operations south of the Balkans would be possible. On August 5 Gourko was ordered to post the 9th Division, 4th Rifle Brigade and the Bulgarian battalions to hold the passes, while he was to take the cavalry back to Tirnova. From there, he was himself to return to St Petersburg to resume his command of the 2nd Cavalry Division of the Guard, which had now been mobilised and was preparing to leave for the front. This was part of a major reinforcement of the Army of the South which was seen as urgently necessary after the second battle of Plevna. On August 3 the Tsar signed an order for the mobilisation of the Guard, the Grenadiers, and two further infantry divisions (the 24th and 26th). This was in addition to the mobilisation of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions, which had been ordered soon after the outbreak of war. The additional forces made available by these steps comprised 125 battalions, 42 squadrons, 436 field guns and 24 horse artillery. Three reserve divisions, in addition to one already en route, were to be mobilised. The Tsar had also ordered the calling out of the first ban of the militia to replace the losses already suffered or which might be thereafter sustained.16 There could hardly have been a clearer acknowledgment of the extent to which the Russians had underestimated their adversaries. The total effect of the measures taken was to provide 120,000 men for service at the front, with a further 220,000 to replace losses, and to provide garrisons and line of communications troops. Of course, it would be some time before these reinforcements arrived, which meant that the additional support of the Roumanian army was of crucial importance, while offensive operations must for the moment be avoided.