Karahassankoi
Abdul Kerim was undeniably physically torpid, and it had gradually became apparent to the government in Constantinople that this characteristic extended to his intellectual approach to the campaign in Bulgaria. Certainly it is true that, to his credit, he had authorised Osman’s movement eastwards from Widdin; but that, in terms of his strategic contribution, was about all. Whether the Russian staff prepared the same kind of penetrating analysis of their prospective individual opponents as was the practice of the Prussian General Staff is not recorded. If they did, they should perhaps have paid more attention to the possibility of interference by Osman’s large army at Widdin; on the other hand, they might have been more relaxed about the threat from the forces in the Quadrilateral under the direct command of Abdul Kerim.
As it was, the size of the Turkish forces based on Rustchuk and Shumla was such that two corps were considered necessary to deal with them. Designated as the Army of Rustchuk, and under the command of the Tsarevich, their initial objective was to occupy Biela and the line of the Jantra, to contain the Turkish forces in the Quadrilateral and, all being well, to take the fortress of Rustchuk itself. Energetically handled, the army under Abdul Kerim might have proved a formidable opponent. At the beginning of July he had a total of 136 battalions, 46 squadrons and 25 batteries under his command. Of these, 48 battalions constituted the garrisons of the four fortresses of the Quadrilateral; there were twelve battalions in each of Rustchuk, Shumla, Silistria and Varna. 20 battalions, with four squadrons and six batteries were with Ali Pasha in the Dobrudja. This still left a field army of 68 battalions, 42 squadrons and 19 batteries with which to oppose the Russian crossing of the Danube.1
At the time that the Russians crossed at Simnitza, the Turkish corps at Shumla was under the command of Ahmed Eyoub Pasha. It consisted of the 1st Division (Nedjib Pasha) of 8 battalions and 3 batteries; the 2nd Division (Assaf Pasha), of 16 battalions and 3 batteries; and a cavalry division under Fuad Pasha composed of 18 squadrons of regular cavalry, 6 squadrons of irregular cavalry and 3 horse artillery batteries. The corps at Eski Djuma was commanded by Salih Pasha, and was still in the process of being organised. It consisted of 22 battalions, 9 squadrons and 6 batteries; 5 batteries and 3 squadrons had been detached to Tirnova, while 9 battalions, 4 squadrons and 2 batteries held Osman Bazar. In addition a mobile brigade consisting of 8 battalions, 5 squadrons and 2 batteries had been assembled from the original garrison of Rustchuk, and was under Mustafa Zefi Pasha there.2
In addition to these a division made up from the contingent arriving from Egypt was at Varna, but was not yet ready for action. The total of mobile troops at the disposal of Abdul Kerim amounted to about 30,000 men, with another 45,000 garrisoning the fortresses of the Quadrilateral.
It had been expected that the Danube would prove a serious obstacle to the Russian invasion of Bulgaria, and the news that the Russians had succeeded in crossing with very little difficulty came as a nasty shock to the government in Constantinople. Abdul Kerim was called upon to explain what he was doing; his response was that permitting the Russians to get across the Danube was all part of his plan. Not surprisingly, he was then invited to explain what his plan consisted of; he refused, saying that if the government did not have confidence in him he should be relieved, but that the contents of his plan must remain a military secret.3
This was plainly not good enough, and he was peremptorily ordered on July 3 to advance and halt the progress of the invasion. In response to this, Abdul Kerim moved Fuad and Assaf to Rustchuk via Rasgrad. These were to be joined at Rustchuk by Mustafa Zefi’s brigade, and the whole force was then to advance on the Jantra. Meanwhile Nedjib remained at Shumla and the Egyptian troops at Varna, while Salik was also not required to move for the time being.
The fortresses of the Quadrilateral, like their famous namesakes in Northern Italy, enjoyed a considerable reputation for defensive strength. They invariably figured largely in wars between Russia and Turkey, and in 1828-1829 held up the invasion for nearly a year. Notionally, the most powerful was Rustchuk, located where the River Lom joins the Danube. The city is on a plateau, which rises above the river to a height of about one hundred feet. In 1877 its population was about 30,000. Hozier described the city and its fortifications:
The houses are mostly low wooden buildings scarcely better than huts, and the streets are dirty and ill paved. The defences included the old fortified girdle, and a series of independent outworks. The enceinte consisted of eleven bastioned fronts with proportionally short curtains. The ditch was about forty-feet wide and ten deep. The scarp and counterscarp were of masonry. The bastions were each armed with from four to six guns, some of them being of heavy Krupp calibre.4
Outworks, mostly of a very modern date, surrounded the town and citadel by a kind of double girdle beginning and ending with the Danube. Plans to turn the area around the city into an entrenched camp had not been carried out, due to a lack of money; but one entrenchment had been completed, on the Sari Bair, known as the Levant Tabia.
Shumla, where Abdul Kerim’s headquarters were located, was an entrenched camp protected by a double line of forts erected on the highest points of its easily defensible position. It was a much more imposing city than Rustchuk, with a population of 40,000. In the reign of Mahmud II Moltke had drawn up plans for the first line of defence, and these had been the basis for the construction of the forts and the earthworks that linked them. Outside this line a second line of forts had been constructed, to take account of the greatly increased range of modern artillery. The two latest forts, constructed in accordance with the most modern designs, were built by two former Prussian officers, Reschid Pasha and Blum Pasha. The main works were armed with 200 guns, 50 of which were heavy Krupp guns. The entrenched camp provided shelter for an army of up to 150,000 men. Moltke noted the strength of the place in the war of 1828-1829:
Shumla, with regard to its supply of provisions, was like a fortress on the seaboard, which, although besieged on one side, can only be blockaded from a distance on the other. The circumference of the high plateau, at the foot of which lies Shumla, amounts to 18 or 20 miles. But unless troops can be placed close under the heights, they must extend their observation of the principal thoroughfares to a much greater distance round the town. To make the investment complete, it would be necessary to detach to distant points numerous divisions, which ought not to be weak, as in the woody and broken ground the enemy could steal upon them unawares, in considerable force, without running any risk of uncovering their own front.5
Country between the Lom and Yantra rivers
Silistria, always seen as crucially important from a strategical point of view, was unfavourably placed for the purposes of fortification. The town was smaller than either Widdin or Rustchuk. Its importance lay in the fact that it commanded one of the most practicable passages of the Danube, and posed a serious threat to the line of communication of an army advancing on either Shumla or Varna. The town was surrounded by a bastioned enceinte strong enough to protect it from being captured by storm. Since 1828-1829 it had been strengthened by the construction of two lines of outworks, 1,600 yards and 2,000 yards from the old walls, which were supported by modern bombproof redoubts.
Finally there was Varna, located on the Black Sea at the mouth of the River Devna. The town and fortress stood between two ranges of hills which run out to the sea and form the harbour. The inner fortifications had been modernised and rearmed with guns of a heavy calibre. Fourteen forts and redoubts had been constructed on the heights. In total the defences mounted some 300 guns. The resources lavished on this fortress were eminently justified by its crucial importance to the Turkish army in Bulgaria. Through it passed all the supplies and men destined for the defence of the country against invasion. If a Russian force got as far as Varna, it would be well placed to attack any Turkish field army operating north of the Balkans in its rear.
It was the strength of these fortresses which had persuaded Abdul Kerim that he was better off operating within the Quadrilateral. Whether he had any more of a plan than to sit and wait for the Russians to come and attack him is unclear, and the movements which he ordered following the directions from Constantinople do not disclose his intention. Certainly the defence of the line of the Jantra was his best bet for the moment, and for this he must hold Biela. To do that he must bring strong forces forward as quickly as possible. Fuad’s cavalry was obviously the fastest moving unit, and could have quickly reached Biela from Shumla, a distance of fifty miles.6
It cannot be said, however, that on the other side the Russian movements displayed much sense of urgency. Of the two corps comprising the Army of Rustchuk, it was the XII Corps (Vannovsky) that was to invest that city and besiege it with the assistance of the heavy artillery installed on the north bank of the Danube at Giurgevo. The XIII Corps (Hahn) was to cover this operation and watch the Turkish forces around Shumla. The Russian cavalry entered Biela on July 4, but it was not until July 11 that the first infantry reached the town in the shape of the 33rd Division (from the XII Corps) (Timoslav). The other division of this corps (the 12th Division) (Firks) was at Pavlo, about six miles to the west of Biela. The two divisions of the XIII Corps, the 1st Division (Prosharov) & 35th Division (Baranov) were also by now closing up to the Jantra, and were within a few hours’ march of Biela. The cavalry division of the XII Corps (Driesen) had advanced up the road toward Rustchuk, and was now some eight miles from Biela.
Ahmed Eyoub had, in accordance with his orders, effected his junction with Mustafa Zefki, south of Rustchuk, on July 9; his cavalry moved south on the Rustchuk-Biela road. They soon bumped into Driesen’s cavalry coming up in the opposite direction, and there was a brief engagement before Abdul Kerim ordered Ahmed Eyoub to retreat. Mustafa Zefi went back to Rustchuk, while Ahmed Eyoub also went back the way he had come, taking up a position behind the Kara Lom. Four rivers bore the name Lom; the most westerly was the Banicka Lom which joined the Kara Lom; together they flowed into the Solenik Lom some fifteen miles south of Rustchuk. Finally the Beli Lom joined the Solenik Lom about eight miles south-east of that point. Abdul Kerim’s abrupt reversal of his orders to move out of the comfort zone of the Quadrilateral was prompted in particular by the news of Gourko’s occupation of Tirnova.
This latest demonstration of Abdul Kerim’s ineptitude made up the Sultan’s mind. Redif Pasha, the War Minister, and an elderly retired general, Namyk Pasha, were sent to Abdul Kerim’s headquarters to find out just what was going on. Unknown to Redif, Namyk had orders to report not only on Abdul Kerim but upon Redif as well. When he got there, Namyk speedily made up his mind what must be done; producing his secret instructions, he ordered both Redif and Abdul Kerim to leave Shumla at once. Mehemet Ali arrived to take over command at Shumla on July 19.7
His arrival immediately energised the Turkish headquarters. On the day following, after the firman appointing him had been read to the troops, he made a personal address, saying that he was empowered to promote a deserving soldier to the rank of general, or to degrade the undeserving, or shoot a traitor. Following this, Mehemet Ali became a whirlwind of activity:
Marchings and counter-marchings, reviews and inspections, were now the order of the day, till the so lately languid, dispirited legions of Shumla were stirred with all the fire of martial life, and heard of the deeds of their brothers-in-arms at Plevna with mixed feelings of admiration and envy. As the spirits of the soldiers revived, their health improved; and complete confidence being established in their new chief, the men were soon burning for an opportunity to distinguish themselves under his orders.8
Mehemet Ali’s immediate concern was to ensure that his movements would be concealed from the Russian cavalry, and he sent out patrols in all directions. In the irregular Circassian cavalry he had a body of troops that could be as much of a nuisance to his own army as they were to the enemy; but they were well suited to match the Cossack cavalry, who were very effective in covering the movement of the main body of the Russians. By the time he took over there was not much contact between the opposing forces, although a body of Turkish cavalry under Eshreff Pasha was well forward in a position at Torlak, only four or five miles from a Russian advance guard operating north of Kostanzi on the Solenik Lom. Mehemet Ali sent forward a force to cover Eshreff’s retirement, consisting of 4,000 infantry with two squadrons and six guns under Aziz Pasha. The force ran into the Russian advance guard, to the surprise of both parties, and there was a sharp skirmish at close quarters at the village of Essirdji, in which both sides lost heavily. Among the dead was Aziz, regarded as one of the most promising leaders of the Turkish army.
Prince Hassan, son of the Khedive of Egypt, and commander of the detachment his father provided. (Ollier)
The setbacks at Plevna had effectively paralysed Russian operations on the Lom as elsewhere, and the Tsarevich’s army remained virtually static throughout the early part of August. It occupied an extended line, in which there were large gaps, from Rustchuk almost as far south as Osman Bazar. The XII Corps covered Rustchuk by posting the 12th Division at Pirgos, on the Danube about ten miles from the fortress; the 33rd Division stood on the Lom, from Kadikoi south to Nisava. The XIII Corps had the 35th Division on the line of the Kara Lom from Kacalyevo to Opaka. The 1st Division was in a slightly more forward position, with its left resting on the Solenik Lom at Sadana, and its right at Yaslar on the Kara Lom. Units of the 1st Division maintained contact with the main body of the Russian army at Kozarevica, five miles east of Tirnova. Cossack patrols were thrown forward in advance of these positions, covering to a limited extent some of the gaps in the Russian line. The most serious of these was between the XII and XIII Corps, more or less opposite Rasgrad, where the largest body of Turkish troops was stationed.
Mehemet Ali had soon set about redeploying his army, bringing forward the units that had been concentrated around Shumla to a strong position from Rasgrad to Eski Dzuma. He at once set his infantry to the construction of earthworks along this line, devoting particular attention to those in front of Rasgrad. He had no confidence in Ahmed Eyoub, who commanded there, but the latter was an influential man among the more conservative pashas, and Mehemet Ali did not feel strong enough to bring about his removal. Ahmed Eyoub remained, therefore, in command of one of the two corps in which the army was organized. It was to consist of three divisions, each of sixteen battalions, six squadrons and four batteries, commanded respectively by Fuad, Assuf and Nedjib Pashas. In addition there was an independent brigade led by Hassan Pasha, of six battalions and one battery; a flying column commanded by Mehemet Bey, consisting of three battalions, six squadrons and half a battery; and a cavalry brigade under Emin Pasha of eighteen squadrons, a section of horse artillery and 2,000 Circassian cavalry.
Baker Pasha, a former British officer who rendered good service to the Turks during the War. (Ollier)
Mehemet Ali had to put up with a lot of attention from the international press. Wentworth Huyshe, the correspondent of the New York Herald, who accompanied the Turkish army, described the effect on the Commander in Chief of the journalists who besieged his headquarters:
Poor Mehemet Ali, who had been frightened by the deluge of English officers, was now appalled by the avalanche of pressmen, but he made the best of it, and, instead of bullying and insulting us as his predecessor had done, he assumed an attitude of friendly reserve. ‘Wait, messieurs, till I am ready, and then you shall see’ – that was his stock phrase for his interviewers.9
Mehemet Ali was also not given the opportunity of making his own choice as commander of his 2nd Corps. Aged twenty three, and with little military experience, though a favourite of the Sultan, Prince Hassan was the eldest son of the Khedive of Egypt and had arrived in command of the Egyptian contingent that had arrived at Varna and which was now considered almost ready to take the field. A French journalist offered an ironic opinion of its military capacity:
A few months ago some fine men-of-war brought to Varna several thousands of nice little soldiers with chocolate faces and uniforms of dark blue cloth; they were so pretty, so prim, so well dressed, that one began to hope it would not rain for fear they should melt away. One could have sworn that they had all come out of boxes of toys from the Black Forest. It was natural to suppose that these elegant troops were not intended to take part in the hardships of warfare, for which they seemed no more fitted than a lady of fashion for work in the fields.10
A Russian supply column. (Russes et Turcs)
On joining the army, the Egyptian soldiers, well equipped and well paid, were inclined to look down on their rougher Turkish comrades. They were more energetic and efficient in the matter of digging entrenchments, but were not, however, to prove as effective when it came to fighting. Political necessity compelled Mehemet Ali to accept Prince Hassan as commander of the 2nd Corps, which stood in front of Eski Dzuma. It was composed of three divisions. The 1st Division (Ismail Pasha) was of fourteen battalions (nine of which were Egyptian) and four batteries; the 2nd Division (Salih Pasha) had eighteen battalions, a cavalry regiment and four batteries; and the Reserve Division (Salim Pasha) had fifteen battalions and three batteries. There were three flying columns; the first of these, which would be assigned to Baker Pasha, consisted of three battalions, 1,000 Circassian cavalry and three guns, while Ibrahim Pasha and Mustapha Bey each had two battalions and eight squadrons of Circassians.
Mehemet Ali had therefore 109 battalions, 56 squadrons and 153 guns at his disposal. Based on an average battalion strength of 500 men, and a squadron strength of 120 men, it has been calculated that the total of the army amounted to about 70,000 men. It was something to go to war with, and was certainly strong enough to justify Russian fears for the threat it posed to their entire operation.11 Maurice observed that the Russian position ‘was as remarkable as any to be found in the whole course of military history,’ strung out as it was on a huge arc with a circumference of about 180 miles, which covered nothing except the bridges over the Danube:
There were no general reserves: everywhere the Russian armies were reduced to acting on the defensive, and there was no immediate prospect of dealing the enemy a decisive blow. It was impossible to withdraw from the extended position taken up, for this would have meant abandoning the Christian populations of those districts which had enthusiastically welcomed the Russian flag, to the savage revenge of the Muslim soldiery. It would also have meant a loss of prestige and morale, which the Russian leaders dared not face in view of the careless confidence with which they had entered on the war.12
One of the steps taken by Mehemet Ali to strengthen the leadership of his army had been to send for Baker Pasha, at that time organising the new Turkish gendarmerie. Valentine Baker, who held the rank of Mirliva in the Ottoman Army, had been a highly promising cavalry colonel until he was cashiered from the British Army after an incident in a railway carriage that led to his conviction for indecent assault. His appointment to head the gendarmerie came as a result of an intervention by his friend the Prince of Wales who, like very many of those who knew Valentine Baker, was convinced of his innocence. Baker had kept in touch with the Prince of Wales, and in November 1876 had written to him to report on the positions that he had indentified which Britain could, if necessary, occupy to prevent a Russian occupation of Constantinople.13 Baker, who arrived at Shumla on August 16, was appointed as a military adviser to Mehemet Ali, taking part in the discussions at headquarters as to the strategy immediately to be followed.
The Battle of Karahassankoi. (Illustrated London News)
He had arrived to find Mehemet Ali pondering the rejection by the War Council of his plan to bring a large part of Suleiman’s army over the Balkans. Discussing the alternatives of remaining on the defensive, or of launching an offensive towards Biela, Baker found neither option attractive. To stand fast meant inevitable defeat when the large scale Russian reinforcements, known to have been called up, actually arrived, while operating against the fortifications which were believed to have been thrown up to cover Biela with an army unused to manoeuvring in the open field was particularly hazardous. Baker strongly urged Mehemet Ali to strengthen Prince Hassan’s corps, and then to move forward cautiously in such a way as to oblige the Russians to attack. If such operations were successful the army might then, he thought, go over to the offensive.14
Mehemet Ali agreed that Prince Hassan’s corps should be strengthened, and was cautiously in favour of a limited forward movement. He then went off to Rasgrad, leaving Baker with Salih, who was in temporary command of the corps pending the arrival of Prince Hassan.
Baker had previously accompanied Mehemet Ali on a personal reconnaissance of the Russian positions near Popkoi, and had been impressed by the defensive potential of the position at Yenikoi, on the wooded heights in front of Eski Dzuma. It had been briefly occupied by the Russians in July, but in the general alarm after the second battle of Plevna had been abandoned, even though it commanded Eski Dzuma, and would have made it impossible for the Turks to hold that place. Hahn, whose headquarters were at Popkoi, realised when he observed the Turks busily fortifying Yenikoi what a serious mistake it had been to give it up, and decided to attempt to retake it. On August 21 he sent forward a force in two columns from Yaslar, which pushed back the Turkish outposts to Sarnasuflar and Rassimpachakoi.
Baker was soon heavily involved in the defence of the centre of the Turkish position near Yenikoi. In the course of fierce fighting the Russian assault was repulsed. The heat was brutal; on both sides the troops were exhausted. On August 22 the commander of the key sector of the Turkish defences, the Eshek Tepe, suddenly retreated, and the Russians, taking advantage of this, threatened the whole position. Fortunately for the Turks, two companies pushed forward by Baker surprised the attacking column, and the Tepe was reoccupied.15
It was clear to Salih that although this Russian assault had failed, the Yenikoi position would continue to be at risk while the Russians held Yaslar, and on August 22 he crossed the Lom with a strong column and drove out the two battalions which held the village. This, in turn, threatened the Russian position at Popkoi, and Hahn ordered an immediate counter-attack by Prokhorov’s 1st Division. It was as late as 10.00 pm that the attack went in, and fighting continued all night before the Russians retook Yaslar. Salih was not done with, however, and concentrated the whole of his division, which put in three assaults during August 23, all of which were driven back. A fourth attack, however, succeeded, and Prokhorov fell back two miles to Sultankoi. Coming after Mehemet Ali’s reinvigoration of the army, this victory, albeit a modest one, resulted in a disproportionate improvement in general morale.
Reinforcements continued to arrive. On August 26 the Egyptians came up to the front, and impressed Baker rather more than they had the French journalist previously quoted:
They were fine, lithe, active-looking men, uncommonly well dressed and drilled; in fact, very far superior to the Turks in both respects, and they formed a strong contrast to the ragged battalions that had fought so well a few days before.16
On August 28 Prince Hassan arrived and took command of the corps. Mehemet Ali came to Eski Dzuma, and met with Prince Hassan, Salih and Baker to consider the situation. It was agreed that the time had now come to take the offensive. Popkoi was an obvious target; but the Russians had been heavily entrenching their position there since the engagement at Yaslar. The XIII Corps appeared to be concentrated in and around Popkoi, and on the left bank of the Kara Lom, but Karahassankoi, on the right bank, was not strongly held. After a lengthy debate, it was agreed that this should be the objective.17 Prior to this, Mehemet Ali had carried out reconnaissances in force, both to determine the extent of the defences of Karahassankoi and, further north, towards Kairkoi to concentrate the attention of the XII Corps in that direction.
Apart from the fact that Karahassankoi was only lightly defended, another reason for selecting it as the point of attack was that it marked the junction between the two Russian corps. Hahn’s position extended from Sultankoi, held by the 1st Division, to Gagova, held by Baranov’s 35th Division. His line extended over the Kara Lom, through Karahassankoi and on to Sadina and Kisil-Moura. Major-General Leonov had held Karahassankoi for several weeks with a small force of cavalry; following the Turkish reconnaissances, he was reinforced with an infantry regiment and some field guns, bringing the total number of these to ten.
The Battle of Karahassankoi. Key – 1) Sadina, 2) Karahassankoi, 3) Gagovo, destroyed by bombardment, 4) Popkoi, 5) Haidarkoi, (there is no 6), 7) River Lom, 8) Cossack squadron, 9) Bashi Bazouks, 10) Turkish troops coming from Rasgrad, 11, 12, 14, 15) Russian batteries, 13) Turkish battery near Rasgrad firing on 11 and 12, 16, 17, 18, 19) Turkish batteries, 20) Turkish infantry crossing the Lom. (Ollier)
Russian trenches at Karahassankoi. (Illustrated London News)
Mehemet Ali advanced on August 29. Nedjib’s division of the 1st Corps was on the right. Preceded by a large number of Circassians his troops moved unnoticed under cover through the cornfields, before being launched in an assault on Sadina, which was immediately successful in driving the Russians from the village. On the left, the men of Sabit’s brigade of Salih’s division also advanced unobserved, moving forward behind a ridge before advancing in two columns, one on Haidarkoi and one on Karahassankoi. By noon they had deployed under cover of heavy artillery fire and were ready to attack; the overmatched Russian guns responded gamely, but by 2.00 pm had been reduced to silence. The Turkish columns advanced through the high standing maize stalks, being still scarcely visible to the attackers.
Leonov had in all some 3,000 infantry with 500 cavalry, and was heavily outnumbered as he struggled to hold his position. In the intense heat the Turkish infantry forced their way forward, the Russians retreating yard by yard in front of them. An eyewitness accompanying Leonov described the battle:
All around and in front of us bullets were falling in showers. The dark foliage of the hillsides opposite, the whole crest of the flat ridge in fact, was dotted with puffs of blue smoke, and all about us sprung sudden clouds of dust and earth, showing how well the Turks knew their mark. We anxiously looked towards Gagova for the expected help; for from the moment the ridge was taken our only hope of holding the village lay in the arrival of reinforcements.18
In fact the only reinforcement which Leonov received, at about 2.00 pm, was about 300 men. This was just enough to repel an attack by Nedjib, whose division had moved forward from Sadina on the right. For about two hours there was a lull in the fighting, which caused Baker, watching from the Sakar Tepe, the most intense frustration:
It was perfectly maddening to remain a spectator on our point of observation, and to see a battle so completely thrown away. I could stand it no longer, and begged Mehemet Ali to let me go down and order a general advance on the village. It had originally been intended that the assault on Haidarkoi should be made directly Karahassanoi had fallen, but it was evidently no time to wait, and the chief ordered an immediate attack. Collecting my English staff – Colonel Allix, Colonel Briscoe, and Major Jenner, and accompanied by Major Sartorius, we pushed rapidly down the steep declivity and galloped off in the direction of Bachiler.19
Reaching Sabit’s brigade, Baker found that its commander had gone off to look for Nedjib, to coordinate his assault. Baker sent Allix to find him, and tried unsuccessfully to get the Turkish skirmishers to move forward. At this moment the Russian artillery opened fire again, heralding a counter-attack; Baker’s horse was killed, and that of Briscoe wounded. It was a dangerous moment; the Russian infantry advanced and at about half a mile short of the Turkish line halted and opened fire. At this juncture a Turkish battery, which Baker had ordered up from Bachiler, arrived and began firing. It was the turning point; as the Russian infantry wavered and then fell back the Turkish troops rose up and dashed forward. These Russian troops had been moving up to support the garrison of Karahassankoi but, checked by Baker’s intervention, made no further progress. The village was now assailed by the troops of Nedjib’s division and by Sabit’s brigade, and by 7.00 pm it was in Turkish hands. At the same time two Egyptian battalions advanced and drove the Russians out of Haidarkoi.
As a result of this battle Hahn had been obliged to abandon the line of the Kara Lom. Had the success been immediately followed up, an even more comprehensive victory might have been won. Baker was extremely discontented with the performance of the Turkish staff in particular, which had confirmed the assessments he had received from foreign military attachés that the Turkish army was unable to manoeuvre effectively:
The inefficiency of the Turkish staff had been singularly apparent. In the Turkish army the staff occupies a position towards its general very different from that of any other army in Europe. Young officers are trained at the Staff College. They attain a certain amount of theoretical proficiency which is not, as a rule, prevalent among the generals whom they serve, but they lack experience in practical maneuvring in the field. At the same time they are eaten up with the knowledge which they think they have acquired.20
On August 30 Mehemet Ali held a council of war before leaving Prince Hassan’s Corps to go to Rasgrad, when it was agreed that Ahmed Eyoub’s Corps should move forward to occupy to occupy the whole of the line of the Kara Lom. The Turks were gaining in confidence after the Battle of Karahassankoi; no very accurate figures of the losses sustained by either side were published, but Greene records a Turkish estimate of about 1,800 Russian casualties as against 1,000 Turkish.21