Cerkovna
Having pushed back the left wing of the XIII Corps, it was Mehemet Ali’s intention to do the same to the right wing of the XII Corps, and thus separate them. The 33rd Division with the 1st Brigade of the 12th Cavalry Division constituted Vannovsky’s right wing, which was at Kacalyevo and Ablava, the former a village on the right bank of the Kara Lom and the latter on the left bank. Lieutenant-General Baron Driesen was in command of this force, which consisted of 12 infantry battalions, 8 squadrons and 46 guns, amounting in all to about 10,000 men. Of these, Major-General Arnoldi commanded 5 battalions and 8 guns at Kacalyevo, while the remainder of the 33rd Division was posted along the plateau behind Ablava.
In order to conduct this operation with the maximum strength possible, Mehemet Ali restored Nedjib’s division to the 1st Corps, and reinforced the corps with Reschid Pasha’s brigade of Egyptian troops. In addition, in order to keep the left wing of the XII Corps occupied, which consisted of the 12th Division, he ordered Ahmed Kayserli, the commandant of the fortress of Rustchuk, to make a sortie in the direction of Kadikoi. Ahmed Eyoub was to direct Fuad’s division on Kacalyevo and Sabit’s brigade on Ablava. All being well, Reschid’s brigade was to make a wide turning movement around Arnoldi’s left with a view to seizing the bridge at Stroko and thus threatening the Russian line of retreat to Biela. Assaf’s division remained in reserve at Rasgrad. The intention was that the 2nd Corps should advance against Popkoi to prevent the XIII Corps from assisting Driesen’s force.
It would have been better had the Turkish army been ready to embark on these offensive movements immediately after the Battle of Karahassankoi; but it was four days before Ahmed Eyoub’s corps moved forward. Fuad set out from Rasgrad on the morning of September 2, reaching Esserdji that night. Next day he marched to Solenik, having to go out of his way to get round an impassable wood, arriving that night. He was soon rejoined there by the rest of the corps. On September 4 the advance continued, and by the afternoon the Turkish divisions began to deploy in a half circle around the Kacalyevo-Ablava position. Seeing that an attack was imminent, Driesen sent for reinforcements; two infantry regiments were sent to him, although not all these troops arrived in time to take part in the fighting on the following day.
Fuad was ready to attack on the morning of September 5. Arnoldi’s men were strongly entrenched, and the artillery was well sited. The ground over which the Turkish infantry must advance was broken up with ravines and watercourses, and the artillery could not at once be got forward. As a result, Fuad’s first attacks, unsupported, broke down. By 7.00 am however, the Turkish artillery was in position and opened fire with great effect. The next infantry attack went in at 10.00 am and it was immediately apparent to Arnoldi that he was heavily outnumbered, and he began to withdraw in as good order as possible across the Kara Lom. To effect this he held the second line of his entrenchments for as long as he could. The Turkish cavalry at this point tried to work their way around Arnoldi’s left, but this manoeuvre was prevented when the Cossacks and dragoons forming part of his force launched a successful charge which culminated in a bitter hand-to-hand fight.
Some of the reinforcements for which Driesen had applied having reached him, he sent forward at about noon the 130th Regiment and one battery from Ablava, which forded the Kara Lom and moved on Kacalyevo. By the time it neared the position the last of Arnoldi’s troops had retreated across the river; but the regiment’s arrival at least served the purpose of stopping any Turkish pursuit.
By 3.00 pm the Turks, in their turn, forded the Kara Lom and advanced on Ablava. This attack was led by Ibrahim Pasha, commanding part of Sabit’s brigade, and was undertaken without orders. Ibrahim’s battalions had not so far been engaged, but had been suffering all day from artillery fire from Driesen’s batteries, and Ibrahim had had enough. Pushing on through the village of Ablava, Ibrahim led his men up to the heights beyond, convinced that reinforcements would be sent up to support him. Mehemet Ali, however, always the cautious commander, believed that Driesen had two divisions there, and Ibrahim, on his own, could not resist the Russian counter-attack, and fell back across the river. The total Russian losses were 1,339 killed and wounded; the Turkish losses were about the same, including about 150 casualties sustained by Ibrahim’s force.1
Driesen’s position above Ablava was, following Arnoldi’s withdrawal, untenable, and next day he fell back through Orendzik and Sinankoi and across the Banicka Lom. The Turkish forces opposing him followed, albeit very slowly.
It had been intended that in support of the attack on Kacalyevo the 2nd Corps should operate against Popkoi, to force the XIII Corps away from the XII Corps. Salih, upon whom Mehemet Ali particularly relied to conduct the actual operations of Prince Hassan’s corps, proposed on September 6 to attack Popkoi. His batteries dominated the village; when that morning after a heavy preparatory bombardment the Turkish infantry went forward they soon compelled the Russians to begin a retreat. At this point, believing that enough had been achieved, Prince Hassan halted the attack. Next morning it was clear that the Russians were pulling out of their positions altogether, and Baker and Salih went to Prince Hassan to urge an immediate pursuit, while they were in a state of confusion and encumbered by a mass of transport. Hassan at first was inclined to agree, but was then talked out of doing anything by his staff in the absence of instructions from Mehemet Ali. ‘Utterly depressed,’ as Baker wrote in his account of the war, he and Salih rode forward behind the cavalry they had sent on to follow the Russians. It was abundantly clear to them, as they watched their prey retreating out of their reach toward Biela, that if they had been allowed to press forward with two brigades, as they had advocated, ‘nothing could have saved a large portion of the Russian XIII Corps.’2
Salih, outraged at the loss of this opportunity, reported what had happened to Mehemet Ali when he arrived next day. When the latter carried out operations himself he was successful, ‘but his own lieutenants took it upon themselves to render his success useless.’ He seemed powerless to procure obedience:
When he arrived at Shumla in July he had reason to believe himself invested with the most extensive powers, an illusion which was now dispelled. Suleiman Pasha had his party at Constantinople, and he profited by it to disobey the orders of the Generalissimo, play his own game, and betray the interests of his country. As to Prince Hassan, the Sultan had a particular friendship for him; and courageous indeed must have been the man who should have interfered with him. What could the foreigner, Mehemet Ali, do in the midst of these intrigues, with nothing but his talents to recommend him?3
When Baker and Salih returned to Hassan’s headquarters to report what they had seen, they found the Prince in a remorseful frame of mind, ‘aware, on reflection, that he had made a mistake, and had lost an opportunity.’ This was certainly true, and it allowed the Russians to retreat to the safety of their position in front of the Jantra. There, their left flank rested on the Danube at Batin and their right at Koprivca on the Banicka Lom. The front of the Tsarevich’s army had been shortened to about 25 miles. The Russian high command also hastened to cover the gap between the Tsarevich’s right and the XI Corps on the Tirnova-Osman Bazar road, posting the newly arrived 26th Division (Dellingshausen) at Cerkovna and the 1st Brigade of the 32nd Division at Cairkoi.4
In spite of the ineptitude of both his corps commanders, Mehemet Ali’s operations had been successful in driving back the Tsarevich from the line of the Solenik Lom to that of the Banicka Lom. He had fought and won two battles and had inflicted not inconsiderable losses on his opponent. Including the force from Rustchuk, he had about 60.000 men along the right bank of the Banicka Lom, covering a front of about 35 miles. 10.000 men were at Kadikoi; 30,000 at Kacalyevo; and 20,000 at Popkoi. Mehemet Ali located his headquarters for the moment at Sarnasuflar, and paused to consider his options.
Meanwhile his army moved forward, following the retreat of the Russian army. On September 14, pressed uncomfortably closely by Assaf’s division, the Russians turned to attack the advancing Turks in order to disentangle themselves. They ascended the heights on the left bank of the Banicka Lom, and began to move down towards Sinankoi, about two miles beyond the opposite bank. A successful Russian advance here, if followed up, would have compelled the Turks to retreat from the centre of their line, and would leave the 2nd Corps very exposed. Assaf, however, who had twelve battalions and five batteries, occupied a strong position on a plateau south of Sinankoi, and all the Russian assaults broke down. When Sabit arrived after an hour’s fighting, bringing with him the twelve battalions of his division, it was the Russians whose situation became dangerous, as their retreat was menaced by a force of six battalions which moved on their flank at Goluburaar. They quickly fell back; although this amounted to another minor Turkish victory, the immediate Russian objective of getting back to their defensive position without further interference had been achieved.
The Battle of Sinankoi, September 14 1877 (Strantz)
In the discussions at Turkish headquarters as to what should next be done, it soon became apparent that before Mehemet Ali had left Ahmed Eyoub the latter had very strongly urged upon him the desirability of an advance from the direction of Rustchuk against the left of the Russian position. Baker, Salih and Hassan were strongly opposed to this. The Biela position was particularly strongly fortified on that side, and the more open country would give the Russian artillery and cavalry much greater opportunities to manoeuvre. And if the Turks were beaten, it would give the Russians the chance to move forward and threaten the line of retreat to Rasgrad. The alternative view was that there should be an offensive movement on the Turkish left. The fact that the headquarters of the 1st and 2nd Corps respectively each advocated an operation based on their own sector cannot have come as much of a surprise to Mehemet Ali. His own confidence had begun to evaporate. In his heart he did not believe that he could beat the Tsarevich, and would much have preferred to fall back to his former strong positions. But he was in no doubt that if he retreated, he would be severely reprimanded, and there was little chance that at this distance he could convince Constantinople of the unwisdom of attacking. His perplexities were, however, soon resolved; an imperative order arrived that an attack should be launched on Biela, prompted perhaps by the news of the capture of Lovtcha.
Mehemet Ali’s diffidence about following up his victories at Karahassankoi and Kacalyevo has puzzled commentators. Greene put it down to his lack of confidence in his subordinates:
The only reason which has ever been assigned for the inaction which Mehemet Ali displayed was that his army, though composed of good fighting men, was so badly officered as to greatly diminish its efficiency for offensive purposes; and especially was this incompetence noticeable among the chiefs of regiments and brigades, who desired to conduct their men on their own responsibility, and without subordinating themselves to the general plan of campaign, or even to the orders of the Commander in Chief, who on account of his foreign birth never had the confidence of his generals.5
Russian cavalry at Biela. (The Graphic)
This was certainly an analysis which Baker would have endorsed. In the short time that he had been with the army he had seen plenty of examples of disobedience and ineptitude among senior officers, and the advice which he tendered to Mehemet Ali took this into account.
Arguing for an advance on the southern side of Biela, Baker pointed out that the Russian fortifications there were known to be far weaker than on the northern side:
Then, even if on our arrival the position appeared to have been too strongly fortified for us to incur the risk of a direct attack, we might either pass the Jantra at Kosna Kosowa, or a portion of our force might strongly entrench the positions east of the Banicka Lom, whilst a part might be detached to act with the force of Mehemet Salim to sever the Russian communications between Tirnova and Biela. In fact, we urged a concentration instead of a dispersion of force.6
Baker and Salih were both men who commanded Mehemet Ali’s respect, unlike his two corps commanders, and their arguments carried the day. It was resolved to make an attack on the point of junction between the XIII Corps and the XI Corps, and to concentrate the attack on the latter’s 32nd Division. Ahmed Eyoub, meanwhile, was to make a demonstration to occupy the attention of the Russian left and centre. As to this, Mehemet Ali gloomily observed that it was extremely doubtful if Ahmed Eyoub would thoroughly do his part.
The necessary movements of the Turkish army began on September 12. The weather had broken, and the troops advanced in heavy rain, delaying the progress of the operation considerably. There was little contact between the Russian and Turkish forces except that at Sinankoi on September 14; this did, however, add to Mehemet Ali’s pessimism, and his movements thereafter were characterised by extreme caution. Instead of the concentration so strongly advocated by Baker and Salih, his forces remained strung out over a wide area. On his right Mustapha Zefi’s brigade covered his flank at Kadikoi, while behind the northernmost end of his line Nedjib stood at Kacalyevo. Fuad held a position from Stroko through Cernica to Ostrica. Next came Assaf, from Sinankoi to Osikova, and behind him was Sabit, at Jenidzesi. Salih’s division prolonged the line south from Osikova to Vodica, with Ismail’s division from Vodica to Karatas. The left flank was protected by Salim’s brigade, which was covering Osman Bazar. For Maurice, these dispositions told their own story as to Mehemet Ali’s intentions:
Had he had any fixed idea of making a resolute advance he would most certainly have concentrated the greater part of his army and screened his concentration by a lightly held line of outposts. Circumstances had given him the advantage of the initiative, and he was in a position to throw superior force against some one part of the Tsarevich’s necessarily extended line; but to do this successfully it was essential for him to be able to manoeuvre rapidly, and this was impossible with his troops scattered over such a wide front.7
The Battle of Cerkovna. (Ollier)
Baker records that in order that the projected advance should be given as much support as possible, a message went to Suleiman urging him to bring at least part of his force over the Balkans in the direction of Elena. This produced no response at all, which is what Mehemet Ali no doubt expected; and this was in spite of the fact that the War Council in Constantinople had sent urgent orders to Suleiman as well as Mehemet Ali to move forward in an effort to relieve the pressure on Osman in Plevna.
The rain stopped on September 21 and next day the sun began to dry the rain-sodden roads, enabling the Turkish troops to move forward early to their positions from which the attack was to be launched, on the right bank of the Banicka Lom. Five batteries were concentrated at Cerkovna, and at 11.00 am these opened fire on the Russian positions. The Russians were by no means taken unawares by the attack; they had been alerted for several days by the Turkish activity behind Cerkovna. The Russians at this point were commanded by Lieutenant-General Tatischev, of the 11th Cavalry Division. He had posted his troops on either side of the road which, after crossing the Banicka Lom, ran through Cairkoi to Kesarova and on to Tirnova. To defend the position he had two regiments of the 32nd Division (the 125th and 126 th), one regiment from the 1st Division (the 1st) and one of the 26th Division (the 101st). This gave him 12 battalions, about 10,000 men; the 102nd Regiment had also been sent to him, and was marching down from Biela. Tatischev also had the 11th Dragoons and 11th Lancers, five batteries of field artillery and one of horse artillery.
The Turkish plans for the ensuing battle had been the subject of further spirited debate while the army was slowly moving forward during the previous few days. Although Baker, with Salih’s support, had persuaded Mehemet Ali to attack at the southern rather than the northern end of his line, he lost the argument as to how the attack should be launched. Regarding Fuad’s division as being with that of Salih the best in the Turkish army, Baker wished to bring that down to Cerkovna to join with Salih’s division on the attack over the Banicka Lom. It was to be expected, however that Ahmed Eyoub would let out howls of protest, and Mehemet Ali’s own staff persuaded him to agree to a turning movement around the Russian right. Baker was unable to get Fuad’s division involved at all, but he did, however, get his own way as to the location of the Turkish gun line in the position described above.8
The principal opponent of Baker’s plan had been Rifaat Pasha, and it was his brigade, of four battalions, that was given the task of attacking the Russian centre. On his right three more battalions, under Ali-Reza, were to attack the Russian left, which Baker in particular regarded as the weak point of the line. The Russian right wing was to be attacked by three battalions under Salim Pasha. In reserve there were ten battalions of Egyptian infantry under Hassan.
The Turkish attack began on the right at 1.00 pm when Salim’s brigade began to debouch from the woods near Yurukler. Driving back the Russian cavalry in his front, Salim pressed on either side of the village. One company of infantry held him up; Tatischev realised that this movement of Salim’s was an attempt to turn his right flank, and was the real attack, nothing more than a demonstration having so far been made against his centre, and he sent forward a battalion with several guns by way of reinforcement. Salim continued to feed fresh troops into the struggle and almost surrounded the Russian troops opposed to him. Had any part of the reserve been sent to him, he would have swamped Tatischev’s left flank.
With, as he hoped, Russian attention focused on Salim’s attack, Mehemet Ali at about 3.00 pm launched Ali-Reza’s battalions against the Russian left. A squadron of lancers in front of Verbovka opposed them as they crossed the valley and began to climb up the vine-covered terraces. The lancers fell back slowly, using the terraces to hold up the attackers. It was clear, however, to Mehemet Ali that Ali-Reza had struck at the weakest point of the Russian defence, and he sent for Hassan’s Egyptian battalions to come forward and support the attack. However, the roads were still very heavy, and these reserves simply could not get up to the front in time. The lancers continued to resist, although growing weaker, and did so long enough for Tatischev to bring up a battalion and a fresh battery to hold the position. The Turks fell back, before Ali-Reza committed his last battalion which he led up the hill in a desperate assault which reached the village of Verbovka. There, however, the 102nd Regiment arrived in the nick of time after its march from Biela. The exhausted Turkish infantry, with no support, could do no more, and fell back to their start line.
While all this was going on the contribution of Rifaat and his force was confined to a demonstration in front of the Russian centre. He went so far as to put his battalions in column to make a feint against the enemy, but made no attack. As night fell, the Turks remained in their positions all along the front. It was clearly a Turkish defeat, but Mehemet Ali’s army was unbroken, and certainly in a position to launch a further attack if he had been so minded. However, Turkish casualties had been extremely high, given the nature of the battle; Hozier puts the number killed at about 800, with from 1,500 to 2,000 wounded. The total Russian loss was recorded as 501. The disproportion was ascribed first to the fact that the Turks were attacking the Russians, who were in prepared positions; and secondly to the fact that the 26th Division was equipped with the Berdan rifle, which had a much greater range than the Krenk. Against the latter weapon the Turks had always enjoyed a pronounced advantage of range with their Peabody-Martinis, and the difference came as an unpleasant surprise to them.9
Turkish infantry near Biela, showing the type of field defences frequently used in the battles of 1877-78. (Illustrated London News)
On the night after the battle yet another Council of War was held at the Turkish headquarters. Baker and Salih bitterly opposed the suggestion of a retreat; if it was necessary to pull back from the heights of Verbovka, then an effort should be made to turn the Russian right, and move on Tirnova. A movement by about 2,000 cavalry in this direction had been made on September 19, but came to nothing.
Against Baker and Salih were Sabit and those who supported Ahmed Eyoub, and these in the end got their way. Mehemet Ali, thoroughly disenchanted with the performance of many of his commanders, was very ready to return to a strong defensive position. On September 24 Prince Hassan’s corps retreated briskly to Sarnasuflar, abandoning a good deal of materiel in its haste; and next day Ahmed Eyoub, whose corps had not fought at all, began a retreat to Rasgrad. By October 1 the whole of the army was behind the Kara Lom, and the Russian pickets were back in their former positions.10
On October 2, as he returned from an inspection of his positions, Mehemet Ali found a letter waiting for him. Its contents were perhaps not unexpected to some of those around him, but came as a complete surprise to him. He was relieved of his command with immediate effect, and ordered to return to Constantinople. He was to be succeeded by Suleiman. Baker went to say goodbye to him:
I found the Marshal, with a very small escort, sitting in the verandah of a house, and he welcomed me warmly. He was evidently much depressed and discouraged by the heavy blow which had fallen upon him, and he now began to see how thoroughly he had been playing into the hands of his enemies. The result which I had anticipated had been completely verified. The very men who had urged the Marshal to change his plan of operations at this critical period of the campaign were the first to urge against him the delay and want of decision which this change of plans had brought about.11
Baker said farewell to Mehemet Ali with the greatest regret, both on military and personal grounds: the Commander in Chief’s ‘kindness of heart and general good nature had much endeared him to all the officers by whom he was surrounded.’ The choice of Suleiman as his successor was more surprising than Mehemet Ali’s removal; it was widely understood that Suleiman’s refusal to cooperate had been largely responsible for the failure of the offensive. In commenting that the latter’s expensive failure at Shipka should have led to a court martial, Hozier observed: ‘In a country of intrigue rewards are not obtained by merit, but by favour, and Suleiman Pasha was named Generalissimo.’12