Lovtcha
Osman’s failure to follow up his defeats of the Russians in the first two battles of Plevna left his opponents the opportunity of putting into practice at least one lesson which they had learnt, and that was to embark on the construction of strong defensive positions around Plevna. The month of August passed with no significant move on the part of the Turks, and the Russian works were every day strengthened. For the moment it was the Grand Duke’s policy to stand on the defensive while waiting for the reinforcements that had been sent for. The Turkish failure to carry into effect the coordinated offensive called for by the War Council at Constantinople at a time of the greatest Russian vulnerability let slip the best opportunity which the Turks were ever to have.
Osman, however, had not been idle. He too had energetically been constructing defensive works at both Plevna and Lovtcha, and had been bringing up reinforcements and stores of all kinds. By August 22 he had at Plevna forty-nine battalions, twelve squadrons and fifty-four guns, while Lovtcha was held by ten battalions with two squadrons and six guns.1 He also organised a mobile column with which to conduct operations in the field, consisting of nineteen battalions, eighteen squadrons and three batteries, together with some irregular Circassian cavalry. This force, organised in two brigades under Tahir Pasha and Emin Pasha, was led by Hassan Sabri; Adil Pasha was in command of the troops left to garrison Plevna. Rifaat Pasha was in command of the garrison of Lovtcha.
The quarters of the Tsar at Gorni Studen. (Ollier)
Once the negotiations for the participation of the Roumanian army had been completed, its four divisions were available for the immediate reinforcement of the Western Army. The 1st Roumanian Division remained posted on the north bank of the Danube opposite Widdin. The 2nd Division had crossed at Nicopolis at the end of July. The 3rd and 4th Divisions crossed the Danube some twenty-two miles up river from Nicopolis, apparently with the intention that they should operate against Plevna on the left bank of the Vid. However, after a few days they were brought over to the right bank. MacGahan believed that this was due to the cooperation between Russians and Roumanians being ‘not very good’, reporting that one Roumanian regimental commander had declined to receive an order from Zotov.2
Effective command of the Russian forces around Plevna had passed to Zotov immediately after the second battle. In addition to the Roumanian units and his own corps he had the IX Corps. He had detached one regiment and part of another from the IV Corps and sent them to Selvi to join Skobelev and his Caucasian Cossack Brigade. This brought Skobelev’s force up to a total of five battalions, ten squadrons and two horse artillery batteries. His orders were to occupy Kakrina, just north of the Lovtcha-Selvi road, and to watch the Turks in Lovtcha.
With the troops he already had, the newly arrived reinforcements from Russia, and the Roumanians, the Grand Duke would have a total of almost 105,000 men with which to conduct operations against Plevna and on his right flank. There would be no more substantial reinforcements until at least the latter part of September. The question for the Russian high command was what to do about Plevna in the immediate future. On August 21, to the great surprise of the Russian command, Osman embarked on a sortie. Quite why he chose to do so then is unclear; it has been variously suggested that it was to mark the start of Ramadan or alternatively to celebrate the anniversary of Abdul Hamid’s accession to the throne. During the night of August 30/31 Hassan Sabri’s column was assembled close to the Ibrahim Redoubt, and at daybreak on August 31 moved out on the Pelisat road. At 6.30 am the Russian outposts reported the movement; Zotov took it to be merely a demonstration intended to occupy his attention while the real attack was made on the Roumanian army. About a mile west of Pelisat the Turkish batteries unlimbered and opened fire, while the infantry rapidly advanced. Their objective was a lunette built by the Russians on a long undulation formed by some hills in front of Pelisat and Sgalievitza. Shouting ‘Allah il Allah!’ the Turkish troops rushed up the plateau and drove the Russian defenders out of the lunette; the latter fell back but upon being reinforced the 62nd Regiment counter-attacked and retook the position, driving back the Turks for half a mile.
In their turn the Turks brought up further troops and drove forward again to retake the lunette. Maintaining a heavy artillery bombardment, from batteries posted along the crest of the ridge, they prepared to assault the main Russian positions around Pelisat, and in trenches to the south and west of Sgalievitza. The attack began at 1.00 pm; the Turkish column moving on Pelisat was held up by the Russian artillery, and after an hour broke off the fight and retreated. To the south of Sgalievitza the Turks had greater success, occupying a battery and some trenches. After about three hours, however, they were driven back by the 120th Regiment, arriving from the reserve which Zotov had directed to Poradim. He had by now realised that he had to take this attack very seriously.
Lieutenant-General Imeretinsky. (Illustrirte Geschichte des Orientalischen Krieges von 1876-1878)
Momentarily successful in occupying some trenches north of Sgalievitza, the Turks appeared to be gaining the upper hand; but again fresh Russian troops appeared and drove them out. Undaunted, at about 3.00 pm the Turks mounted further attacks, but were beaten off with heavy loss, and they began steadily to withdraw to the ridge where their artillery was posted. Zotov, who was by now on the scene, personally directed the pursuit of the retreating Turks, following them for three miles. At this point, however, Hassan Sabri launched a counter-attack with his reserve, which threatened to take the pursuing Russians in the flank, who thereupon withdrew to Pelisat. When the sortie began, the general opinion at Russian headquarters that it was only a demonstration induced MacGahan not to go and see for himself. After a while, however, he became impatient and rode towards Pelisat, encountering large numbers of Bulgarian refugees escaping the Turkish advance. He soon realized that this was a serious assault, and stayed to record the battle as it swayed to and fro. He was impressed by the courage of the Turkish infantry as they sought to push forward:
Encouraged by their success in taking the redoubt, and believing they could also take this line, they had no sooner withdrawn from the Russian fire than they formed and went at it again. They dived down into the Valley of Death to struggle there amid smoke and fire, a death struggle of giants; for there is nothing to choose between Russian and Turk on the score of bravery. Many bodies of Turks were found within ten feet of the Russian trenches. The little slope, on the crest of which the trenches were situated, was literally covered with dead. I counted seven on a space of not more than ten feet square. The battle here was terrible, but the Turks were again repulsed, and again they retreated up the hill. It will hardly be believed that they went at it again; and yet they did so.3
A view of the terrain over which Major-General Dobrovolski attacked at Lovtcha, with Hills 3 and 4 in the background. (Springer)
Russian troops in action at Lovtcha. (Album della Guerra Russo-Turca del 1877-78)
The sortie had been expensive; the Turks lost about 2,000 men in killed and wounded, while the total Russian losses were 975.4 The Turks had fought bravely, and had been well led in an assault which took the defenders entirely by surprise. It was, though, unwise:
The whole enterprise, however, can only be regarded as a most useless and wasteful expenditure of blood. It was too extensive to be regarded as a mere reconnaissance, and far too feeble to break through the massive girdle now rapidly being drawn around Plevna.5
In his conduct of the operation Osman had made the same mistake as had the Russians in their first two assaults on Plevna; he had attacked in insufficient strength and had failed to support his assaulting columns.
With the defeat of this sortie the initiative now passed to the Russians. Their immediate objective was Lovtcha, which was in a key strategic position so far as any assault on Plevna was concerned. Indeed, it has been suggested that if this town had been held in force instead of Plevna it might have proved an even greater nuisance to the Russian invasion of Bulgaria. It had speedily been taken by Osman in the course of his advance to Plevna, and remained in his hands as a valuable part of his defences. It prevented the total investment of Plevna, and threatened the rear of any Russian assault on the place. From the outset Skobelev in particular had been a fervent advocate of an assault on Lovtcha.
Russian infantry taking a Turkish redoubt at Lovtcha. (Ollier)
On August 6 Skobelev had conducted a reconnaissance in force against the town so boldly and skilfully that he obliged the garrison to develop its whole strength. His topographers were able to make a detailed map of the position, which he was able to examine personally before retreating to Kakrina. Lovtcha is some twenty miles southeast of Plevna by the high road, although the extremities of each set of defence works were only about twelve miles apart. It is located in what amounts to an amphitheatre, surrounded by a ring of hills with a diameter of about ten miles. The hills are about 600 feet high. Through the valley flows the River Osma; on its right bank the ridges form four peaks, which the Russians designated as Hills 1, 2, 3 and 4. Hill No 1 was also known as Mont Rouge. Behind this chain of heights, two further heights (called Mounts A and B) stand either side of the road to Selvi. Finally, at the bottom of the valley behind Lovtcha, close to the road to Plevna, the Turks had constructed a powerful redoubt on an isolated hill. A network of trenches linked the various fortifications.6
Skobelev issued an inspirational order of the day to his troops, setting out his instructions for both the infantry and the artillery. He concluded with a reminder of the importance of order and silence:
You should not shout ‘Hurrah!’ except in cases when the enemy are near, and when you are preparing to charge with the bayonet. I direct the attention of all the soldiers to the fact that in a bold attack the losses are minimised, and that a retreat – especially a disordered retreat – results in considerable losses and disgrace.7
On August 31 Skobelev was ordered to advance up the road from Selvi and to seize Mounts A and B in order that batteries might be established there preparatory to an attack, an operation which he carried out with the minimum of fuss on September 1. During the night he worked hard at entrenching the position and preparing epaulments for the batteries; he installed the eight guns he had with him.
Overall command of the operation had been entrusted to Prince Imeretinsky. In addition to Skobelev’s detachment, he had the 2nd Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division, the 3rd Rifle Brigade and the 30th Don Cossacks. Skobelev’s detachment was on the left; the remaining units, on the right, were under the command of Major-General Dobrovolsky. Having sent Skobelev forward on September 1 to secure the heights, Imeretinsky ordered Dobrovolsky to move up that night to be ready for an assault on the following day.
At 6.00 am on September 2 fifty-six Russians guns opened fire from Mounts A and B; it was half an hour before the Turkish artillery responded, but when it did it was once again apparent that its Krupp guns had a much greater range than those of the Russians. Alfred Krupp had an agent with Osman Pasha reporting on the performance of his guns, and had been very pleased with the information which he had received. In August he showed the Belgian Director General of Artillery, Colonel Nicaire, a telegram from his agent, about which the British Chargé d’Affaires at Brussels reported to the Foreign Secretary:
The result of this great trial, the agent says was admirable, the guns not only carrying further than the Russian, but the precision of their fire was quite remarkable while the destructive power of the shells was double that of the ordinary shells. As to the Turkish artillerists, their mode of handling the guns was beyond all praise.8
A panoramic view of the action at Lovtcha, as seen from the Russian batteries. The widely-dispersed skirmish lines are particularly notable. (Budev)
However, although the Russian artillery was unable to master its immediate opponents, it inflicted heavy casualties on the Turkish infantry sheltering in their trenches on Mont Rouge and Hills 2, 3 and 4. The heavy artillery preparation for the assault entirely achieved its object; by the time the attack came in the Turkish soldiers were completely demoralised. In addition, considerable attention had been paid to the needs of the Russian troops who were to make the assault:
Probably for no other engagement during the war were troops more thoroughly prepared in every respect, than for this attack on what was regarded as the chief outwork of Plevna. The men were well rested and refreshed, extra rations were provided, and a special detachment was set apart for conveying supplies of water into the ranks – a more important duty than may at first appear, the day of assault being so insufferably hot that, in spite of every care, many of the men were rendered quite ill and had to leave the ranks9.
The intention had been to defer the infantry assault until 2.00 pm; but so effective was the Turkish artillery fire that Dobrovolsky, seeing the effect on the morale of his men, felt obliged to go forward at once. By 10.00 am his troops had taken Hill 4, and driven the Turks over the Osma. Imeretinsky now ordered Skobelev’s column forward, and in less than half an hour the other three hills were in Russian hands, thanks to the thoroughness of the artillery preparation. There remained only the powerful redoubt on the Plevna road, the capture of which was essential to the success of the operation, and which was a much tougher nut to crack. The redoubt was rectangular in layout, 160 yards long and 60 yards wide, with a heavy 24-foot parapet on which the Russian guns had made little impression. It stood on the Pordim hill, which was some 300 feet high.
At 5.30 pm Imeretinsky gave the order for the assault to commence. It was carried out by a force of eight battalions which moved on the right of the redoubt, while four more battalions crossed the river lower down and attacked the left of the position. There ensued a furious conflict. The redoubt was heavily shelled by the Russian artillery, while the Turkish infantry responded with a hail of rifle fire on the attacking columns, which took heavy losses as they climbed the hill, taking cover wherever they could. After twenty minutes the Russians collected together several hundred men in a patch of dead ground; then, as the defenders’ attention was distracted elsewhere, they stormed up the slope, led by the colonel of the 5th Regiment, with only a cane in his hand. As the Russian infantry poured over the parapet and into the redoubt, the Turkish infantry fell back, only to find that its only exit was blocked by an ammunition cart of which the horses had been killed. There followed a savage hand-to-hand fight, in which fearful casualties were suffered on both sides before the Turkish resistance was overcome; there were few survivors among the defenders of the redoubt.
Battle of Lovtcha, September 3 1877
The rest of the garrison of Lovtcha retreated into the hills to the west, pursued energetically by the Cossacks, who cut down many of the battered Turkish infantry, and took many more prisoners. In the rugged country, however, and as night fell, the Cossacks were unable to cut off Rifaat’s retreat, and he succeeded in bringing all of his guns and what remained of his infantry into Plevna two days later, by way of side roads through the hills. Russian losses during the battle were reported as being 319 killed, with 1,145 wounded and 52 missing. Estimates of the Turkish casualties varied. The Russians claimed to have buried 2,200 Turks within the entrenchments; in addition many casualties were sustained during the subsequent pursuit. Throughout the war the losses claimed or admitted were wildly inaccurate, and this battle was no exception, as Thilo von Trotha pointed out:
The statement of Prince Imeretinsky at the conclusion of his report, that 3,000 Turks (the number occurs more than once, and is therefore not a misprint) were cut down in their flight, bears too much the stamp of inordinate exaggeration to be of any value whatever, the more when it is considered that the pursuing Cossacks could barely have numbered more than 1,000 horses.10
Prince Imeretinsky’s corps following the Battle of Lovtcha. (Russes et Turcs)
Osman had first become aware of the threat to Lovtcha on September 1, when the guns of Skobelev’s advance guard could be heard at Plevna. Soon after this the telegraph was cut, but for some time Osman attached no great importance to the situation, in spite of the reports which he received from Rifaat. Next day, however, news reached him of the strength of the force attacking Lovtcha, and he realised the danger. He assembled a force of twenty battalions, two squadrons of regular cavalry and a regiment of irregular cavalry, about 100 Circassian cavalry and three batteries of artillery. This column was not, however, ready to move off towards Lovtcha until noon on September 3. Osman took personal command of the force. It was not long before Cossack patrols spotted the Turkish columns as they marched southwards towards Bogot. Osman detached a flank guard to cover his left, and moved by a mountain track through Laskav to Zilkova, bivouacking for the night of September 3 just short of that place, about ten miles from Lovtcha.
That night Imeretinsky ordered Skobelev to take the units comprising his original detachment, and to occupy a position covering Lovtcha on the north, and early next morning Skobelev’s men were dug in behind a brook flowing into the Osma near Pridunsec.
As dawn broke Osman resumed his march, his leading troops in touch with the screen of Cossacks that was monitoring his movement. At about midday his advanced patrols reported Skobelev’s position. The fact that no firing could be heard suggested that the relief column was too late. Osman halted his march near Lisec and rode off by a side track to a point where he could see the town. It was clear that it was now strongly held by the Russians, and he saw little prospect of retaking it in the face of Imeretinsky’s substantial force. He called a Council of War of his senior officers; it was reluctantly concluded that the relief column must return to Plevna. On September 5 he skilfully withdrew to the west through Miras and Peternica, going back all the way to Widdin, which he reached next day. This movement ensured that he was not cut off by the Russian forces around Plevna, and persuaded Imeretinsky that a movement to the south of Lovtcha was intended, as a result of which he dug in around the town rather than attempting any pursuit.11