The Third Battle of Plevna: The Assault
By the beginning of September, although the operations on the Lom were not going particularly well, the Russians were in an altogether stronger position than had been the case during August, and there were signs at headquarters of a mounting confidence that the worst was over, in Bulgaria at any rate. The Shipka Pass had been successfully defended; Osman’s sortie from Plevna had been repulsed; and, on September 3, Lovtcha had been taken. Above all, there had been a steady stream of reinforcements, to such an extent that consideration must now be given to how to use them. One option, of course, was to wait until the arrival of the Guards and Grenadiers completed the reinforcement that had been arranged. This, however, would involve remaining on the defensive at least until mid-October, which would not look good in public relations terms. It would also give the Turks more time to concentrate their forces and, most significantly of all, would mean that a winter campaign was inevitable.
The offensive choices open to the Grand Duke were three. None of them were straightforward. To reinforce the Tsarevich, with a view to defeating Mehemet Ali and driving him back, might give the opportunity to cross into Eastern Roumelia and turn against Suleiman. It might also, though, result in Mehemet Ali retreating on Rustchuk, Shumla or Rasgrad and from a secure position menace the left and rear of the Russian advance just as Osman was doing on the right.
War artists and correspondents as sketched by a Russian Cossack officer. (Rogers)
The next option was to reinforce the troops holding the line of the Balkans, and to advance against Suleiman. Once he had been defeated in the field, the road to Adrianople would be clear. Or would it? The Turks were known to have substantial reserves of unused troops which could be sent up to reinforce Suleiman; and the Turks could also move troops rapidly by sea to Burgas, to threaten the left flank. It would also leave Mehemet Ali the option of moving part of his army southwards through Slivno against the Russian rear. This option was the boldest; but to Nicholas it also seemed the riskiest.
The third option was to launch a major assault on Osman in Plevna, driving him back so far that he no longer offered a threat to a Russian move south. It was a possibility which would enable Nicholas to employ the whole Roumanian army; the deal with Prince Charles had placed restrictions on where they might operate.1 Furthermore, success here might inspire Serbia to enter the war. This, therefore, was the option chosen.
MacGahan, for one, considered that fighting in fortifications was a mistake. It would be better, he thought, writing on September 1, to take advantage of the Russian ability to manoeuvre more effectively, and to draw the Turks into open country:
Their want of military science, good officers, and the impossibility of executing manoeuvres on the field of battle could have put them at a great disadvantage with the well-drilled Russian troops. The Russians have always been wanting the Turks to come out and fight in the open field, yet they entrench themselves in such a manner that the Turks have no temptation to come out, and find it impossible to do so when they try.2
The arrival of Prince Charles of Roumania to take command of the army before Plevna. (Ollier)
The reason for the choice of Plevna was, however, probably political rather than strategic. The Russian defeats there had caused considerable damage to the military reputation of the Russian army, as Maurice observed:
Plevna had seriously affected Russian prestige, and the Grand Duke Nicholas held it to be his immediate duty to remove the blot from the Russian arms by driving Osman from that place at the earliest possible moment… Still, however expedient it may have appeared to order another attack on Plevna, this decision is not one which would have been approved by a great commander.3
History does not record whether there was a great deal of consideration given to alternatives to an assault on Plevna, but it seems likely that there was not. One voice at any rate was raised in opposition; Nepokoitschitsky apparently argued against it at the Council of War when it was discussed. The army was not sufficiently prepared to be sure of success, he thought, the concentration of all the available troops was incomplete, and there was not yet a sufficient store of ammunition for a lengthy battle.4 This at least was a rational military argument. The reason for the selection of September 11 as the date for the assault was not; it was the Tsar’s name-day.
The headquarters of the Grand Duke, and of the Tsar, had throughout August been located at Gorni Studen; the Grand Duke moved to Poradim on September 3, where Prince Charles and Zotov were also based. Next day orders went out for the concentration of all the units that were to take part in the planned assault. On the night of September 6/7 they moved forward to the positions assigned to them in front of the Turkish redoubts.
The Tsar and his staff at Gorni Studen. (Ollier)
Osman had almost 60,000 men in Plevna, although the Russians credited him with having between 70,000 and 80,000. They were now organised in three divisions. On the left the 1st Division (Adil Pasha) was responsible for the defence of the northern and eastern sectors; in the centre the 2nd Division (Hassan Sabri Pasha) covered the southern front. The reserve of ten battalions, under Rifaat Pasha, occupied the town of Plevna, the Vid river bridge, and the headquarters hill. Osman’s total force consisted of 46 battalions, 19 squadrons and 80 guns, with about 500 Circassian cavalry.5
Given the strength of the position as it had been at the time of the two previous assaults, and the considerable and very visible improvements to it that had since been made, the Russians were embarking on a very dangerous venture. The total size of the attacking force was, in the view of many commentators, inadequate for the task. This was not merely hindsight; Sir Henry Havelock, who was at Plevna, estimated that at least 120,000 men would be required to have a good prospect of success. The increased range of modern weapons had materially shifted the balance:
A defending force, well entrenched and strengthened by formidable redoubts, can now pour such a perfect stream of fire upon assaulting columns as to nearly annihilate them, without being seriously inconvenienced itself. The Germans, in their war with France in 1870, practically admitted the madness of such point blank assaults by the numerous important sieges they undertook; but after two unsuccessful assaults upon Plevna already, it would seem to have needed the sacrifice of an additional 20,000 lives to make this truth equally clear to Russian military leaders.6
The half-circle of Turkish redoubts began in the northern sector with two at Opanetz and one at Bukova. Along the Janik Bair were three more. At the eastern end of the ridge there were the two Grivitza redoubts above that village. These perhaps enjoyed a more fearsome reputation than was justified due to the Russian failures to capture them in July. They were not really the key to Osman’s position, being lower than other redoubts and unlike them, not dominating a steep incline and not covered by efficient cross fires. Next, on the southern bank of the Grivitza brook, there was a cluster of six redoubts, connected with lines of trenches, covering the east of Plevna town, and running round to the Tultchenitza brook, and facing Radischevo. Finally, south-west of the town, there were six more redoubts to the west of the Green Hills; the southernmost of these, above the village of Krishin, was known as the Yunous Redoubt, after the name of Yunous Bey, who commanded here. These redoubts had been thrown up after the second battle, in which Skobelev’s success in this sector had shown up a weakness in the defence.
The Russian forces facing this formidable position were located from the banks of the Vid in the north to the Tultchenitza brook in the south. In the north were the 3rd and 4th Roumanian Divisions, with the 2nd Division in close reserve, facing the line of redoubts from Opanetz to Grivitza No 2. Krüdener’s IX Corps was to take up a position running from a point a mile and a half east of Grivitza on the main Rustchuk road to the Plevna-Pelisat road. Krylov’s IV Corps, consisting of the 16th Division (less the 64th Regiment with Skobelev), the 30th Division (less one battalion of the 118th Regiment with Skobelev) and their two artillery brigades (less one battery with Skobelev), was to move to the high ground just south-east of Radischevo. Imeretinsky’s detachment, which consisted of sixteen battalions with ten batteries of 76 guns, was ordered to take post at the village of Tultchenitza. Lockarev’s 9th Cavalry Division was assigned to cover the right flank of the IX Corps, keeping in touch with the left of the 4th Roumanian Division. Covering the left of the IV Corps was Leontiev’s 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, which maintained a connection with Imeretinsky’s detachment. The extreme left of the Russian forces was protected by the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and the Don Cossack Brigade, together having 18 sotnias and 6 guns. The general reserve consisted of three infantry regiments (20th, 119th and 120th), two cavalry regiments (4th and 9th Hussars) and five batteries. It amounted in all to nine battalions, three squadrons and 38 guns, and was located at Pelisat.7
Troops from the Russian IV Corps take up their positions prior to the assault. (Russes et Turcs)
The proper employment of the Russian artillery during the attack was the subject of dispute among the principal artillery officers. Zotov, who assembled a meeting on September 2 to discuss the matter, was of the view that no assault should be launched until, following a continuous bombardment of the Turkish works, there were signs that the fortifications had been seriously damaged and heavy loss inflicted on the garrison. This view encountered serious opposition:
It was objected that field guns could do but little injury to earthworks, and that neither the supply of ammunition nor the pieces themselves were equal to so heavy a call upon them. A counter proposition was then made that the redoubts should be swept by so heavy a fire as would destroy their armament, render them no longer a secure retreat for the reserves, and that by pouring a heavy fire on the approaches to them the advance of reinforcements should be rendered difficult. It was held by other members of this council that the destruction of the works should not be attempted, nor their continuous bombardment persevered in, but that the approaches alone should be cannonaded.8
In the end no consensus was arrived at, and no consistent policy was adopted, with the unsurprising result that the Russian field artillery performed ineffectively during the battle.
Zotov’s intention for the assault was to concentrate on the south-eastern and southern sectors. In accordance with the opinions he had expressed, it would be preceded by a lengthy bombardment of the Turkish position. The infantry would advance under cover of darkness in order to seize the positions required for the Russian batteries. Once installed, the artillery would commence the bombardment, to last several days. The field artillery was supplemented by two batteries of very large siege guns, originally intended for the siege of Rustchuk. They had been waiting in Roumania for a call to the front. It took no less than 1,500 oxen to drag these monsters and their platforms to the Sistova bridge, and from there to the Radischevo ridge, where they arrived at 10.00 pm on September 6. Working parties from the IX Corps and from the Roumanian divisions toiled through the night to prepare the batteries both for the siege guns and the field artillery for the bombardment that was intended to begin at 5.00 am next day.
In the morning, however, a thick mist shrouded the valley of the Grivitza and the Turkish positions, and it was not until 6.30 am that the bombardment commenced. Although the assault was known to be imminent – on September 6 Osman had published an order of the day warning that an attack was expected on the following day – the Turks were amazed to see, when the mist had cleared, the extent to which the Russians had been able to prepare their artillery positions during the night. It was not until 8.00 am that the Turkish guns began to respond. The Russian infantry, meanwhile, had moved up under cover into positions generally sheltered from the fire of the enemy. The bombardment continued all day. The Russians had 88 field guns and the 20 siege guns in action at ranges from 2,700 to 5,200 yards. Much of their fire was concentrated on the Grivitza No 1 redoubt, in which the Turks had 8 guns. Since the latter returned fire all day, it seemed that the Russian guns had not inflicted much damage. Nor had they sustained much, their losses being minimal.9 Osman appears to have thought that the concentration on the south and south-east sectors of the defence was merely a feint, for about noon he transferred two battalions from Tahir to reinforce Adil.10
As night fell on September 7 it was clear to Prince Charles and Zotov that the bombardment must continue on the following day. During the night the Russian artillery continued to fire at intervals, the object being to prevent the Turks making good the damage sustained. The effort was in vain; at daylight next day it was apparent that not only had the damage been repaired, but in a number of places the works had been considerably improved. Meanwhile it had been decided that on September 8 Imeretinsky should advance on the Lovtcha-Plevna road and seize the ridge due east of Krishin, while Lockarev was to move to the extreme right of the Russian position, passing behind the Roumanian divisions to cross the Vid and operate in the rear of Osman’s army, cutting the road to Sofia by making contact with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division on the extreme left of the army.
During the night the Russian batteries were advanced to within 1,600 yards of the Turkish works, and were reinforced by bringing forward five Russian and five Roumanian batteries. Next day their fire was concentrated largely on the Grivitza No 1 redoubt and the Ibrahim redoubt, the most easterly of the redoubts above Radischevo. The artillery duel continued until the Turkish response began to slacken at about 2.00 pm; by nightfall it had ceased altogether.11
The Russian grand battery before Plevna. (Ollier)
Skobelev, with the advance guard of Imeretinsky’s detachment, had the 5th and 8th Regiments, the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions, four batteries, four siege guns and the 21st and 26th Don Cossacks. During the night of September 7/8 he had moved up to Brestovetz and to the Red Hill immediately to the east, and from here opened fire on the Yunous Redoubt at a range of 4,000 yards, and on the Turkish troops seen to be in occupation of the ridge to the east. Imeretinsky, with the rest of the detachment, was above a mile and a half behind in the direction of Bogot.
On the afternoon of September 8 Skobelev began a forward movement, advancing with the 5th Regiment, supported by two battalions of the 8th Regiment to take the ‘first knoll,’ as it was known, immediately north-east of Brestovetz. From here he pushed on to the second knoll, which was the ridge east of Krishin, which was held by several Turkish battalions. After a vigorous struggle the Turks retreated, and Skobelev moved forward to take the third knoll, which put him at 5.00 pm only about a mile south of the edge of Plevna. The Turkish artillery in the two redoubts close to the town and in the Krishin redoubt brought him under heavy fire; Osman brought up reserves from Plevna and Skobelev was driven back to the second knoll. During the night news came that the general assault which had been planned for September 9 had been postponed; believing that in his present position he was too exposed, Skobelev retreated to the first knoll, and there entrenched himself. It had been a bold stroke, but in the end had accomplished little; it had cost the Russians over 900 men killed and wounded.12
MacGahan, who had been watching the bombardment in the Radischevo area, was told by a Cossack that something more interesting was happening on the left. Making his way back over the ridge, he saw Skobelev’s force moving forward. He watched as it took first one knoll, and the others, before falling back. As the battle raged, visibility deteriorated:
At the time the Russians were advancing down the hill, the whole valley was filled with smoke. The town of Plevna, as well as the Turkish redoubts and even part of the wood where the Russians were, had become invisible. The sun was now just setting behind a mass of clouds, but it was seen for a few minutes like a fiery bloodshot eye, which tinged the smoke hanging over everything with the colour of blood. Then it suddenly disappeared behind the mountain, and darkness settled down over the scene. The fire continued for some minutes longer, and from the redoubt, as from the foot of the slope and the foot of the mountains, sprang forth thousands upon thousands of jets of flame like fireflies. Then the fire suddenly ceased. The fight for the night was over.13
Elsewhere Lockarev had succeeded with his large force of cavalry in occupying Dolni-Dubnik, brushing aside a force of Turkish cavalry. This, for the moment, did cut the road from Plevna to Sofia. The bombardment of September 8 was, however judged not to have been sufficiently effective, which was the reason for the postponement of the general assault. During the night the Russians again maintained a random fire, but were no more successful in preventing the Turkish infantry repairing the damage. On their side the Russians constructed new batteries, so that at dawn on September 9 they had 220 guns ready to resume the bombardment.
Camp followers watching the bombardment of Plevna. (Illustrated London News)
It continued as before throughout the day, except that the siege guns were running low on ammunition. The Turkish response was in some cases more muted; in particular the Grivitza redoubts were silent. Sensing a possible opportunity here, the Roumanians pushed forward a reconnaissance to Grivitza No 2, but the Turkish infantry drove them off with murderous rifle fire. The barrage was now having a cumulative effect on the Turkish earthworks, and in spite of all the defenders could do the parapets were steadily falling in. Zotov reckoned that the field artillery could keep up the pressure on their own, and had eight of the siege guns moved to a new battery above Radischevo during the night of September 9/10. Meanwhile there had been considerable activity on Skobelev’s front. At 5.00 am the Turks launched an infantry assault on his trenches on the first knoll, which was beaten back. A second assault three hours later got within 60 yards of his position before it too failed. Thereafter Skobelev was left undisturbed for the rest of the day; although Osman had sent three battalions under Emin Pasha to reinforce this sector, a planned assault was postponed. At the end of the day two more battalions joined Emin and during the night three more arrived. Emin kept his force concentrated in front of the redoubts, ready for an assault on the following day.
The bombardment continued unabated on September 10. The Grivitza redoubts were silent, the Turks having pulled most of their artillery out of these works, which had been severely damaged. The Russian artillery was also running low in ammunition in places, while a number of guns had suffered substantial wear and tear as a result of being fired at high elevation. During the afternoon the weather took a hand; heavy rain fell during a succession of violent thunderstorms. Everywhere the ground rapidly turned to a pasty black mud, which seriously hampered movement and in particular the bringing up of ammunition.14
Skobelev, who was no longer under the command of Imeretinsky, had been authorised to launch a preliminary assault on September 10. At the same time Emin had prepared to advance to drive back Skobelev and to seize the first knoll, but after a personal reconnaissance he reported back to Osman that it would be impracticable to hold it, even if it was possible to take it. He therefore moved forward to occupy only the second knoll with a skirmish line, with six battalions in support. When he launched his attack Skobelev was able without difficulty to drive back Emin’s skirmish line and occupy the second knoll; but it was clear that any further advance would be vulnerable, and he contented himself with entrenching the position, which he held with two regiments and 16 guns, with two more regiments and two rifle battalions in reserve.
Zotov and Prince Charles had during the day decided that the artillery preparation had gone on long enough, and that the assault should be launched on September 11. The plan was for a heavy bombardment to begin at daybreak, which was to end abruptly at 9.00 am. It would be resumed again at 11.00 am but be halted at 1.00 pm, resuming at 2.30 pm. The infantry assault would go in at 3.00 pm.
The appalling weather afflicted both sides equally. In his redoubt on the Janik Bair, Herbert had suffered little from the bombardment, but was much affected by the heavy rain as he and his men awaited the assault:
The first day of the actual battle opened with a drizzling rain and in a white mist. The latter cleared towards noon; the rain continued all day, occasionally with a heavy downpour, mostly in a demoralising spray. The ground was a swamp; the wet penetrated our clothing; it invaded our sleeping-apartments and store-chambers and precautions had to be taken to keep the ammunition dry.15
A platform had been erected from which the Tsar and his staff could watch the assault. Descriptions of this by various correspondents as a ‘grandstand’ attracted a good deal of unfavourable comment in the Western press, as did the provision of lunch there. Wellesley described the arrangements that had been made:
There was no grand stand in the usual acceptation of the term, but a small wooden platform with a railing round it, and capable of holding about fifty persons, had certainly been erected for the Emperor’s use. Many disagreeable remarks were also made with regard to the preparation of a great luncheon near the stand for the Emperor and his staff after witnessing the assault from this place of safety. It cannot be denied that the luncheon table was there, with its display of white tablecloths, knives, forks, champagne etc, close to the little stand, and I could not but think that the whole scene would have been more in keeping with a small provincial race meeting than with a field of military operations of so momentous a character.16
The general assault had been timed for 3.00 pm, but in the southern sector Skobelev had concluded that if his objective at that time was to be the two redoubts closest to Plevna, he must first advance and retake the third knoll. In front of him was Emin’s force, which had been further reinforced to a total of 19 battalions and 11 guns. Skobelev had the 61st and 62nd Regiments of the 16th Division, the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Rifle Battalions and the 7th Regiment from the 2nd Division, a total of 13 battalions and 60 guns. Skobelev’s artillery opened fire at daybreak against the Yunous redoubt and the two redoubts on the south-western edge of Plevna, while the infantry concentrated behind the second knoll. The countryside south of the town was covered with vineyards, which greatly reduced visibility; on the morning of September 11 the thick mist additionally made it hard to see more than a few yards.
Colonel Wellesley’s quarters. (The Graphic)
Before commencing his assault Skobelev, with two officers and six Cossacks, rode forward to reconnoitre the Turkish positions. In his trademark white uniform, on a white horse, he was an obvious target. He and his party got so close in the fog to the Turkish infantry that, when they were spotted, they drew the fire of an entire company. Within moments, the two officers and four of the Cossacks were shot dead, and the other two Cossacks wounded; only Skobelev escaped unscathed.17
At 10.00 am the 61st Regiment and the 10th Rifle Battalions began their advance. Passing Emin’s left in the fog, they fell upon his right wing and drove it back, quickly securing the third knoll. By 11.00 am the fog had begun to lift, and Emin launched a counter-attack. Skobelev reinforced his troops on the northern and western slopes of the third knoll; although according to the general order the bombardment should cease at 11.00 am, it was clearly impossible to break off the action. He brought up another battery to the second knoll, and ordered the 62nd Regiment to meet the counter-attack. The Turks were driven back into their works, and Skobelev took advantage of this to reform his troops which had become disordered during the fighting. Meanwhile, on his left, Leontiev’s cavalry brigade had taken the village of Krishin and kept the Yunous Redoubt under fire. By 1.00 Skobelev had begun his preparations for his main assault on the two redoubts that were his principal objective.
It was remarkable that the vigour of the Turkish activity in this sector did not alert Zotov or the rest of the Russian high command to the importance that Osman evidently attached to its defence:
It was the vital point; if the south-western heights had been taken, Osman Pasha would have been obliged to evacuate Plevna; while to close round them, and bar the Sofia road, would cut off all supplies. In spite of the excessive inquietude the Turks manifested each time they were threatened at this point, the fact was entirely overlooked by everyone on the Russian staff.18
Skobelev seems to have applied to Zotov for permission to bring forward the time for his assault, but only to have received this at 2.30 pm. It was not, therefore, until 3.00 pm that his troops advanced down the slope of the third knoll in two lines of company columns, with bands playing. They drove the Turkish skirmishers out of a line of rifle pits at the foot of the slope and began the climb up towards the two redoubts, reaching a point two hundred yards from the Turkish positions before being pinned down by heavy rifle fire. Seeing this, Skobelev sent the 7th Regiment forward, while the artillery kept up a heavy fire on the redoubts. The attack remained stalled, however, until Skobelev rode forward with two rifle battalions. His horse was killed in the charge, but he led forward his men on foot and stormed into the ‘middle redoubt’, this being the more westerly of the two.
MacGahan watched Skobelev’s charge into the redoubt with the two rifle battalions:
Skobelev had now only two battalions of sharpshooters left, the best in his detachments. Putting himself at the head of these, he dashed forward on horseback. He picked up the stragglers; he reached the wavering, fluctuating mass, and gave it the inspiration of his own courage and instruction. He picked the whole mass up and carried it forward with a rush and a cheer. The whole redoubt was a mass of flame and smoke, from which screams, shouts and cries of agony and defiance arose, with the deep-mouthed bellowing of the cannon, and above all the steady awful crash of that deadly rifle fire. Skobelev’s sword was cut in two in the middle. Then a moment later, when just on the point of leaping the ditch, horse and man rolled to the ground, the horse dead or wounded, the rider untouched. Skobelev sprang to his feet with a shout, then with a formidable, savage yell the whole mass of men streamed over the ditch, over the scarp and counter-scarp, over the parapet, and swept into the redoubt like a hurricane. Their bayonets made short work of the Turks still remaining.19
The Turks fell back about six hundred yards to a fortified camp, from which they kept up an incessant fire. Soon a counter-attack, in the course of which Emin was wounded, was launched from the next redoubt to the west, which seriously threatened the Russians in the middle redoubt; seeing this, Captain Kuropatkin, who was serving as Skobelev’s Chief of Staff, collected about 300 men to meet the Turks head on in the open. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued in which, in spite of heavy casualties, the Russians succeeded in driving back the attackers.
Another group of Russian infantry made an assault on the eastern redoubt, but practically the whole force was shot down. Then Colonel Shestakov, from Imeretinsky’s staff, came up the slope to the redoubts with three companies, collecting stragglers on the way to create a force of 1,200 men. With these, and a further group of infantry from the middle redoubt, he launched an attack on the eastern redoubt which, at 5.30 pm, was successful.
During these assaults, however, the Russians had suffered fearfully, their total casualties of 3,000 representing about a quarter of the force engaged. And, as night fell, Skobelev’s position was now extremely precarious. Having occupied two redoubts he had created a wedge in the middle of the Turkish positions. In this vulnerable situation he sent off a message to Zotov by Colonel Orlov, an aide de camp to the Grand Duke, to explain that unless reinforced his position would become untenable, and that further forces should be sent against the Yunous Redoubt which threatened his rear. Meanwhile he would hold on as long as he could.20
While this success was being achieved on the Russian left, the other two assaults had been launched at the appointed time. In the centre the Russian batteries, located between the roads to Rustchuk and Bogot had opened fire at 7.00 am, and the infantry of Krylov’s IV Corps had begun to get into position for their assault. By 11.30 am the 63rd and 64th Regiments, due to attack the Omar Redoubt and the works between it and the Tultchenitza, with the 117th and 118th Regiments in support, had been collected on the spur above Radischevo. Just before noon, as the mist cleared, some Turkish troops were seen moving near to the Russian outpost trenches. This, and the sound of Skobelev’s battle, suggested that a Turkish attack was imminent. One battalion of the 63rd Regiment was ordered forward to cover the artillery; but due to confusion as to the object of the move the whole regiment, followed by the 117th Regiment, went on down the slope and launched an entirely premature assault against the Omar Redoubt. It failed completely, being stopped about 500 yards short of the Turkish trenches. Having lost more than 30 percent of their strength, the two regiments fell back to Radischevo. At 3.00 pm the 64th Regiment moved forward against the redoubt and the 118th Regiment against the trenches between it and the Tultchenitza. Neither made any greater impression than the previous assault, and by 4.00 pm they had been driven back with heavy loss. No reinforcements had been provided to replace the 63rd and 117th Regiments, and nor was the artillery moved forward.21
Two piecemeal attacks having failed, it might have been expected that some lessons had been learned. At 4.30 pm the 123rd and 124th Regiments, which had been covering the guns on the ridge south of Grivitza, were brought forward to attack the Omar Redoubt, a move which met the same fate as the preceding assaults. Finally, another abortive attack was made by the 20th Regiment, with the same result. The Turks had resisted these assaults with a force of six battalions and six guns, although reinforced later in the day with a further battalion, so the total strength of the defenders was much about the same as the attackers in each assault – a ratio which was certainly not one which should have given confidence to the Russian commanders. As it was, the assault on the Turkish centre had been a complete failure, and had cost the Russians 4,434 casualties.22 The Tsar, who had previously been watching the fighting in the northern sector, arrived in the late afternoon to witness the defeat of the IV Corps:
There were tears in his eyes when he saw his brave soldiers, decimated by the grapeshot, waver, stop, then fall back once again under the defenders’ fire, and finally fly in disorder in every direction. His officers were scarcely able to induce him to leave the mournful spot, but they did at last succeed in getting him, in a greatly dejected state, to set off for the headquarters at Poradim.23
The Tsar’s distress was apparent to all who saw him; Forbes later wrote of his profound anxiety as he watched the assaults on the Grivitza redoubts: ‘As he stood there in solitary anguish, he was a spectacle of majestic misery that I can never forget.’24
In the northern sector the morning mist had been particularly thick and took even longer to clear. Here, the rigid timetable for the bombardment to begin and end appears not to have been followed, and there was little or no coordination between the Russian and Roumanian artillery. There was, however, a worse problem. From the north, in the front of the 3rd Roumanian Division there could be seen only the Grivitza No 2 Redoubt. From the east, in the front of the 4th Roumanian Division and from the southeast, in the front of the 1st Brigade of the 5th Russian Division, there could be seen only the Grivitza No 1. The objective of all three assaulting units was to be the Grivitza No 2, which they were to attack simultaneously. It did not apparently occur to the Russian staff to explain to them that there were in fact two redoubts.
At 3.00 pm the 4th Roumanian Division advanced from the east against Grivitza No 1, led by the 1st Brigade to two lines with the 2nd Brigade in reserve. The Turkish shelter trenches were soon taken when, to their amazement, the attackers found that the redoubt was still 600 yards away, the other side of a steep ravine. When the two brigades advanced across the ravine against the redoubt itself, they reached the ditch, but could get no further. Support had been expected on both flanks, from the 3rd Roumanian Division and the 1st Brigade of the 5th Russian Division respectively, but this did not arrive, and the attackers fell back to the shelter trenches at 5.00 pm. Meanwhile the 3rd Roumanian Division had advanced to the assault at 3.00 pm as planned, one regiment advancing against the easternmost of the Janik Bair redoubts and the trenches running to Grivitza No 2, while the remaining regiment and a rifle battalion attacked the latter redoubt. The rest of the division, which constituted the reserve, got lost in the fog, and did not arrive in time to be of help, and the assault on Grivitza No 2 was beaten off with heavy loss.
A panoramic view of the Battle of September 11. Key – 1) Russian batteries, 2) Grand siege battery, 3) Roumanian batteries, 4) Redoubt captured by the Roumanians on September 8; 5) Russian infantry reserve, 6) Russian infantry regiment moving forward, 7) General Zotov and staff officer, 8) Caissons of the reserve, 9) Grivitza village, 10) ridge behind which part of Plevna lay, 11) Attack by the Russian1st Brigade of the 5th Division, 12) Roumanian assault, 13) Turkish Grivitza redoubt, taken in the evening of September 11, 14) Further Turkish redoubt, 15) Turkish entrenched camp, 16) Turkish lines, 17) Redoubts in the Turkish centre, 18) Turkish redoubt attacked by Russian 30th Division, 19) Turkish redoubts, 20) Road from Plevna to Biela, 21) Road from Plevna to Pelisat, 22) Red Cross ambulance, 23) Location of the Tsar, Grand Duke Nicholas and Prince Charles of Roumania during the battle. (Russes et Turcs)
Roumanian chasseurs assault the Grivitza Redoubt at Plevna. (Russes et Turcs)
The Russians assaulting Grivitza No 1 had advanced at 3.00 pm to take up a position just below the redoubt. Major-General Rodionov, commanding the 1st Brigade, believed that his orders required him to cover the left flank of the Roumanian 4th Division rather than to attack the redoubt. It was only after the Roumanian attack had failed that he decided to attack, sending the 17th Regiment forward against the southern face of the redoubt and two battalions of the 18th Regiment against the western face. On becoming aware of the Russian assault, the 4th Roumanian Division poured out of the shelter trenches on the eastern side of the redoubt. This attack coincided with the successful assault of the 17th Regiment, and the allies took possession of the redoubt. A Turkish counter-attack was briefly successful in driving them out again, but after a savage hand-to-hand fight the Turks were driven out in their turn. Throughout this time the allies had endured fierce fire from Grivitza No 2, which dominated the position. The total Roumanian losses, among which there were more killed than wounded, amounted to 2,566, while the Russians lost in all 1,327 men.25 For this high price the reward was five guns and a flag, and the possession of the redoubt. The value of that, however, was made painfully clear on the following morning when it was realised that it was completely commanded by Grivitza No 2, which was as large, as strong, and as powerfully armed as the redoubt that had been taken.
Roumanian Dorobantsi fighting within the Grivitza Redoubt. (Russes et Turcs)