Aftermath
No further assault had been planned for September 12, so that on both the northern and central sectors there was little activity. The day dawned bright and clear, after nearly two days of continuous rain and mist, but a cold wind swept the battlefield. It was with the southern sector that Osman was particularly concerned, since Skobelev still held the two redoubts, and he was in no doubt that this gravely threatened the entire defence of Plevna. It was a view which Skobelev shared, and he anxiously awaited Zotov’s response to his appeal for reinforcements. It finally reached him at 7.00 am in the form of a copy of a laconic order from Zotov to Imeretinsky:
By direction of the Commander-in-Chief, I order you and General Skobelev to entrench and maintain yourselves in the positions captured today. We cannot send reinforcements, because we have none. (signed) Zotov, Lieutenant-General.1
During the night of September 11/12 both sides had been extremely busy in the southern sectors, since it was obvious that fighting would be resumed next day. Yunous Bey had five battalions in and around the three southernmost of the redoubts. What remained of Emin’s force, consisting of eight battalions, was now commanded by Riza Bey; Rifaat, who had taken over when Emin was hit, had now himself been wounded. It was sited at the Baghlarbashi Redoubt, to the west of the two redoubts occupied by Skobelev. It included the company led by Herbert, whose battalion had been one of those sent south from the Janik Bair during the afternoon of September 11. In the early morning an order from Osman was read out to the effect that an attack was to be made on the lost redoubts: ‘With God’s help we shall recover our positions and win the battle. At every point save this the Russians have been defeated, and have suffered heavily.’2
Burial of the dead near the Grivitza Redoubt on the evening of September 11. (Russes et Turcs)
On the Russian side feverish efforts were made to repair the captured redoubts and to entrench the ridges facing the Turkish redoubts. On the third knoll Skobelev collected about 1,000 stragglers, from every battalion, and posted them to meet any assault from Baghlarbashi. Imeretinsky had sent up three battalions to Krishin and the ridge above the village – the second knoll – together with four batteries to cover Skobelev’s rear.
While the northern and central sectors remained quiet, Skobelev had already been in action on September 12 by the time he received Zotov’s response. At 6.00 am the Turkish artillery opened fire from all the western redoubts, while the infantry in the entrenched camp on the north delivered a heavy rifle fire. On the left of Skobelev’s position an assaulting column from the Yunous Redoubt at 7.00 am got to within 300 yards of the Russian line before being driven back. During this attack the Turkish artillery had been able to give little support, having run short of ammunition, but at about 9.00 am fresh supplies reached the guns in the redoubts, which opened fire with renewed force.
Grivitza Redoubt (No 2) as seen from the Roumanian positions at Grivitza Redoubt (No 1). (Strantz)
At about 10.30 a fresh Turkish assault came forward, reaching the trenches in front of the middle redoubt. The exhausted Russian infantry, worn out after 30 hours of continuous fighting, were beginning to drop out and make their way to the rear. Skobelev, who was on the third knoll, rode over ‘and expostulated, threatened, ordered and encouraged the men, and got them back into the redoubt again.’3 In spite of all he could do, however, the defence was on the point of collapse when Tahir Pasha, unexpectedly and for no apparent reason, ordered a withdrawal. It bewildered his men, among whom there was much discussion later of the possibility that he might be court martialled. Herbert learned later that Tahir’s decision had been motivated by a fear that the Russian cavalry operating to the west of Plevna might fall upon his rear. Osman was understandably furious, relieving Tahir of command in this sector, and he ordered that a fresh attempt be made to retake the two redoubts, under the command of Tewfik Bey.
It was at about this time that Skobelev received a further order from Zotov, brought by Colonel Orlov:
By order of the Commander in Chief, if you cannot hold the captured positions, you are to fall back – if possible not before evening – in the direction of Tultchenitza, covered by the cavalry of General Leontiev. Communicate this order, which is to be kept secret otherwise, to General Prince Imeretinsky. The Grivitza redoubt is in our hands, but the attack is not to be continued. 8.30 am (signed) Zotov, Lieutenant-General.4
Skobelev, always an optimist, did not give up hope even after receiving this order; he thought that the IV Corps would perhaps move forward against the central redoubts and in particular the Omar Redoubt, which would take some of the pressure off him. The Turkish artillery in the Omar Redoubt was causing him particular problems. In the middle redoubt two of the four guns were no longer operational and there were scarcely enough gunners to man the other two, so Skobelev ordered up three guns from the third knoll to replace them. Unfortunately the only ammunition wagon brought up to the middle redoubt was hit by a Turkish shell, and blew up, wounding Major-General Tebjanik, who commanded there, and Captain Kuropatkin.
At 2.00 pm the last available reserves sent up by Imeretinsky arrived, consisting of two battalions and about 200 riflemen. Four companies went to the redoubts, while the rest covered the left and right flanks of the position on the third knoll, and the riflemen were held behind the second knoll as a reserve. Their arrival was timely, for Tewfik was preparing the assault ordered by Osman. For this he had three battalions drawn from the central sector, three battalions under Mehmet Nasi which had previously been withdrawn into reserve, and the troops in the Baghlarbashi Redoubt who had carried out the abortive attack under Tahir. Tewfik split his force into two parts; one would advance against the two redoubts from the direction of the town, making as much noise and show of force as possible, while the other would be concealed among the vineyards on the Namasguiah hills to the west of Plevna.
All the time the Turkish artillery maintained a heavy fire. An abortive attack was made from the Yunous Redoubt soon after 2.00 pm. At about 2.30 pm the Turkish troops in the Baghlarbashi Redoubt began to form up for the assault. At 3.00 the column advancing from Plevna made its move; twenty minutes later the Baghlarbashi column left its trenches and marched on the middle redoubt, while the column hidden in the vineyards emerged and rushed forward. By 5.00 the leading troops had reached the redoubt. The Russian defenders, by now utterly exhausted, began to give way. Some 200 men under Major Gortalov remained to the end but were cut down to the last man in a vicious hand-to-hand fight. By the time the Baghlarbashi column arrived the Turks had taken the redoubt.
Mehmet Nasi’s column from Plevna pressed on to the smaller redoubt, to which a number of companies that had entered the middle redoubt also advanced without orders. By now it was obvious to Skobelev that there was no hope of retaining it, and he gave orders for a withdrawal. Meanwhile elements of the 118th Regiment, sent by Krylov on his own initiative in response to the heavy firing in Skobelev’s sector, had begun to arrive. It was too late for them to play any part in the struggle to hang on to the redoubts; all they could do was to cover the retreat of the defenders as they struggled back first to the third knoll and then to the second knoll. As night fell, Skobelev brought his whole force back to the first knoll, above Brestovetz, where he remained all night.
MacGahan saw Skobelev after he had been forced to retreat from the redoubts, and sent his readers his famous description of the young general:
He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uniform was covered with mud and filth; his sword broken; his cross of St George twisted round on his shoulder; his face black with powder and smoke; his eyes haggard and blood-shot, and his voice quite gone. I never before saw such a picture of battle as he presented.5
Later that night MacGahan saw him again, and was struck by his composure as he discussed the events of the day. MacGahan asked him why he had been refused reinforcements; who was to blame? ‘I blame nobody. It is the will of God,’ was Skobelev’s reply.
Skobelev remained in his position throughout September 13. Evidently the Turks had sustained quite enough casualties in restoring the position in this sector to think of following up their success by a further assault. And it had certainly been a success, due in Herbert’s opinion not only to Tewfik but also to Yunous, who both deserved the praise heaped on them by Osman. He did not fail, however, to note the distinction between Skobelev and many of his colleagues, regarding the young general as possessing ‘impetuosity, science, personal bravery, and astounding, almost uncanny, influence’ over his men.6 Skobelev’s total losses in the battle were 160 officers and over 8,000 men, out of 18,100 engaged.7 It was a fearful price for which the Russians had in the end nothing to show.
On September 13 and 14 the Russians gradually withdrew, although maintaining their occupation of the Grivitza No 1 Redoubt. During this time their batteries bombarded the town, to no great effect; and on the evening of September 14 the Turks launched an infantry assault on Grivitza No 1 which was, however, driven off.
The Third Battle of Plevna had therefore the same result as its predecessors. The Russians had 75,000 infantry present, of which some 60,000 came into action. Their total loss was computed at 18,581. The Turkish losses are unclear. Osman later observed that his losses in the southern sector exceeded those of Skobelev. The best estimate that was made of the total Turkish loss was that it was between 12,000 and 15,000 men.8
The decision not to send reinforcements to Skobelev has been ascribed to Levitsky, possibly on the basis that a decision to pull back had already been effectively made after the defeat of the IV Corps. The other explanation, that there were no reinforcements available, seems less plausible. By nightfall on September 11 the Russian had eleven regiments disposed in a half-circle from the village of Grivitza to the Tultchenitza river, and of these, as Greene pointed out, five had not been engaged at all. Since there was no plan to conduct offensive operations anywhere else on September 12, it is extremely surprising that no greater effort was made to take advantage of Skobelev’s success. Osman could see its potential; his opponents could not.
The principal reason for the Russian failure was seen by observers as the lack of effective control in the conduct of operations. Prince Charles was nominally in command of the forces attacking Plevna but in practice it was Zotov who took the key decisions. Maurice found it astonishing that not only should the reserve have been so small, at less than ten per cent of the whole force, but that it should have been located behind the weakest of the three attacks to be launched, an attack that was directed at the strongest part of the Turkish line. There was no unity of command in the northern sector; the Russian and Roumanian units attacked independently of each other.9
The headquarters of Grand Duke Nicholas at Gorni Studen. (Budev)
Tactically, the bombardment by the field artillery was misconceived in its purpose; to be fully effective it should gradually have increased in intensity up to the moment of assault. The pause in the bombardment of September 11 served no purpose, and the overall effectiveness of the Russian artillery preparation may be judged by the fact that as it proceeded the Turkish works were strengthened rather than weakened. Nor, with the exception of Skobelev’s operations, were the infantry well used; as so often before, attacks went in piecemeal, one after another as each in turn failed.
During the bombardment on September 7-10 the volume of the Russian artillery fire had steadily declined. Skobelev’s Chief of Staff, Kuropatkin, subsequently examined the expenditure of ammunition, calculating that during the four days a total of some 30,000 shells were fired; each gun averaged about 50 rounds on the first day, 40 on the second and only 30 on each of the third and fourth days.10 This certainly contributed to the resilience of the Turks in making good the damage suffered. Even more worrying, however, was the reluctance of the field artillery (except that under Skobelev’s direct control) to move forward to shorten the range in support of the attacking infantry. A conviction that the Turkish artillery was decidedly superior, and a pronounced fear of taking casualties from rifle fire, led many batteries to hang back and fire at a range where they were ineffective. Kuropatkin quoted Thilo von Trotha with approval:
A battery which fires at the decisive point with destructive effect for five minutes – and is then lost, has done better service to the whole command than ten batteries which from well chosen rearward positions have maintained a well aimed, but in the end rather useless, fire.11
Todleben. (Histoire de la Guerre d’Orient 1877-1878)
Zotov deserves, perhaps, some sympathy. He was obliged to conduct the operations under the gaze not only of Nepokoitschitsky and Levitsky, but also of the Grand Duke. Levitsky had come to Zotov several days before the battle to explain the Grand Duke’s wishes. Perhaps even more importantly, the Tsar was present throughout the battle, and so was Miliutin. Although the Tsar was there merely to encourage his troops, and hopefully to witness their victory, it was not possible, as Greene pointed out, for him to be solely a spectator. For every Russian soldier, his will was law at all times.12
On September 13 and 14 lengthy councils of war were held, presided over by Alexander, at which Nicholas, Miliutin, Prince Charles, Nepokoitschitsky, Levitsky, and Zotov were present. These discussions, conducted with the spectacle of the fearful casualties sustained fresh in the minds of the participants, led to a firm conclusion. The right way now to deal with Plevna, it was concluded, was investment. There would be no more assaults, no more expensive attacks on a well-entrenched enemy. To conduct the investment the veteran General Todleben was recalled from retirement. The hero of the siege of Sebastopol, Eduard Todleben was born in Latvia in 1818. During the Crimean War he had risen from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to Lieutenant-General, and he was the one Russian military leader who emerged from that war with credit. After the war he was appointed assistant to Grand Duke Nicholas, and became Chief of the Department of Engineers with the rank of General. Francis Greene described him thus:
He has grown with advancing years, but he is still full of activity, both physical and mental. In personal appearance he bears a strong resemblance to Bismarck, and is a man who at once impresses you by his agreeable manners, polished address, and dignified bearing.13
Todleben was appointed to take the place of Zotov, who returned to the command of the IV Corps. Prince Charles continued in nominal command of the forces around Plevna. Krylov became commander of the cavalry forces operating on the left bank of the Vid. Imeretinsky became Chief of Staff of the Western Army, while Skobelev was appointed to the command of the 16th Division. Both of them were promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. Gourko, having come back from St Petersburg, was placed in overall command of all the cavalry. Two other casualties of the reshuffle were Hahn, who was held to blame for the defeats on the Lom, and who was replaced as commander of the XIII Corps by Korsakov, and Shakofskoi, who was succeeded in command of the XI Corps by Dellingshausen. As reinforcements poured into Bulgaria over the Sistova bridge, Todleben arrived on September 24 to take up his duties. An entirely new phase of the war had begun.