Catastrophe on God’s Mountain
As a result of the Russian retreats following the Battle of Zevin and the relief of Bayazid, they found themselves at the beginning of August back where they had started, with the exception of Ardahan, which remained in their hands. The news of Zevin, when it reached the Imperial headquarters in Bulgaria, prompted the immediate mobilisation of the 1st Grenadier Division (Roop) and 40th Infantry Division (Lazarev) and their dispatch to Armenia. At the same time the 20th and 21st Infantry Divisions, based in Dagestan and along the River Terek, were also mobilised, but the fear of insurrections in this region led to their being retained there for the time being.
The new reinforcements had a long way to go; the 1st Grenadier Division had 1,400 miles of rail travel to Vladikavkaz and a 200 mile march to Alexandropol, while the 40th Division had a journey of 1,000 miles by boat and train from Saratov to Vladikavkaz. Units of the latter division began to arrive at Alexandropol in mid-August; the last of the Grenadier units did not reach there until on September 25.
Following the retreat from Zevin Loris-Melikov had taken up a strong position in front of the River Kars, facing south-west. His right was at Kuruk Dara, his centre at Kizil Tepe (the ‘Red Hill’) and his left at the ruined city of Ani on the River Arpa. It was about 15 miles in length. Holding the position were the Caucasus Grenadier Division, the 1st Brigade of the 39th Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 38th Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 19th Division. The total strength of the force was about 35,000 men and 5.000 Cossacks. Facing Loris-Melikov, Mukhtar had a field army of 20,000 infantry, 54 guns and 6,000 cavalry, as well as with the garrison of Kars, which amounted to 15.000 infantry, 30 field guns and 1,000 cavalry, together with the 300 siege guns of the fortress.1
Mukhtar’s position, which if anything was even stronger than that of Loris-Melikov, was on the southern side of the lengthy ravine above which the Russians were entrenched, and ran parallel to the Russian position. His left was some ten miles in front of Kars, on two mountains, the Little Yagni and the Great Yagni. His centre was on the Aladja Dagh (‘God’s Mountain’), opposite Kizil Tepe, and his right ran to the River Arpa near Ani. The environment of this area was not pleasant:
This corner of Armenia is of remarkable aridity; water is rare, and vegetation is scarcely anywhere to be seen; the mountains, washed by the rains of thousands of years, present to the view only monotonous lines of a geometrical regularity, nowhere broken by the rounded shapes of trees; the plains on which these heights rise, like an island out of the sea, frequently look as level as a sheet of water.2
Mukhtar’s position was some eighteen miles long, which meant that it was only thinly held. A weakness of the position was on the left, which was separated both from Kars and from the centre; Mukhtar concentrated some of his best troops there. He also erected strong defensive works close to the village of Vizinkoi to baulk any Russian attempt to turn his left, and cut him off from Kars. One other drawback facing the Turks was the fact that, perched on the barren ridges of the Aladja Dagh, all their supplies, even including water, had to be brought up from Erzerum via Kars over very bad roads. The Russians, on the other hand, were close to their base at Alexandropol, with good communications; they were well supplied, with ample access to water.
General Lazarev, commander of the Russian 40th Division. (Russes et Turcs)
In addition to the relative comfort enjoyed by the Russian troops, they had the encouraging signs of a steady flow of reinforcements. For the Turks, on the other hand, there was no prospect of additional support. On short rations, unpaid, and totally neglected, it is unsurprising that the rate of desertion began inexorably to rise. The Circassians in particular, never a particularly reliable part of the Turkish army, began to melt away, with the result that Mukhtar progressively lost nearly all of his cavalry. As things stood, he was perfectly aware that he would have little chance of beating the Russians in the open field, and in spite of having achieved a considerable run of success the most he could hope to do was for the most part to stand on the defensive.
For his part Loris-Melikov had no intention of engaging in any substantial offensive operations either, while he waited for sufficient reinforcements to come in. He was, however, concerned about the possibility of a Turkish advance against Tergukassov in the direction of Igdir. This town was the centre of the numerous Armenian communities that had settled there since 1828-1829; it has been suggested that both Loris-Melikov and Tergukassov, both themselves Armenian, were anxious for the safety of their countrymen.3
Igdir was Tergukassov’s advance base, connected by poor roads to Erivan, forty miles to the north-east; partly surrounded by marshes, it was an unhealthy place for the troops. To the south and south-west of Igdir lay the forbidding tracks over the mountains, of which the best and most direct was the Cengel Pass, due south of Igdir; along this road Tergukassov located the bulk of his troops, in the belief that Ismail’s main force was at Bayazid.4 In this he was wrong; Ismail had selected Diyadin for his base and most of his troops were in the Balik valley.
On August 4, on the strength of local Kurdish advice that the Zov Pass, nine miles west of Cengel, was suitable, Ismail launched 4,000 Kurds, with six infantry battalions and six guns, in an attack on the Cossacks holding the position, and advanced to Alikocak four miles to the north. The infantry and artillery took up a position there; the Kurds pushed on to a point five miles from Igdir, before a counter-attack by the Pereyaslav Dragoons drove them back to Alikocak. It was not a very significant movement in military terms, but the Armenian population took fright and fled back over the River Aras. Tergukassov pulled back his troops at Cengel to Igdir, and sent for reinforcements. The great fear was that Ismail might push on and interpose between the forces of Loris-Melikov and Tergukassov. As the historians of the campaigns in the Caucasus have pointed out, however, Ismail had all the failings of a Kurdish chieftain, being lazy, incompetent and irresolute, and he made no further move.5
The threat he posed, however, was enough to prompt the sending of reinforcements to Tergukassov so that he might mount an operation against Ismail. In order to distract attention from this, a movement was undertaken against Mukhtar.
After two days of considerable activity behind their lines, the Russians on August 18 advanced against Mukhtar’s positions. Following a demonstration against his centre an assault was launched on the Turkish positions on Great Yagni and Little Yagni. This was preceded by an advance of the Russian cavalry under Komarov, who engaged in a short but bloody encounter with all the Circassian cavalry which Mukhtar could muster, which ended by both sides falling back on their infantry. The Russian infantry now came on, but could make no progress against heavy rifle fire; when Hussein Pasha, the Turkish commander in this sector, launched his infantry in a counter-attack, the Russians were obliged to retire.
Turks making coffee in camp. (The Graphic)
Mukhtar, who was possessed of an excellent intelligence system, had become aware of the planned attack on Ismail, and reckoned that the detachment of reinforcements to Tergukassov might give him an opportunity. He secretly brought up reinforcements from Kars, and prepared for an attack on the Kizil Tepe. Determined to surprise the Russians, he took steps to ensure that there was no general communication of the plan to the units concerned until the night of August 24/25, when he summoned a meeting of his senior commanders to tell them what was to occur.
Kizil Tepe, about 800 feet high, was one of the hills rising steeply from the plain to four irregular summits surrounding a crater. It was a key point in the Russian position, and was regularly held by a battalion and four guns. Mukhtar’s plan was for a night attack by an overwhelming force; three battalions were to advance on each flank, while the columns to storm Kizil Tepe, consisting of two brigades led by his best commander, the German Mehmet Bey, were to move down the slopes of the Turkish positions and across the valley. These moved out about midnight, pausing for a rest in the valley before silently climbing towards the Russian positions. They got to within half a mile before being challenged by a sentry. The artillery, kept back previously because of the sound of the wheels, was now rushed forward and opened fire on the Russian positions. The Russian gunners were ineffective in their reply, being unable to depress their guns sufficiently to sweep the slopes. The Turkish infantry then ran out of ammunition and fell back, which prompted a counter-attack by the Russian infantry. They were met by a hail of artillery, however, and retreated again, whereupon the Turks charged with the bayonet and drove them off the hill.
The Battle of Kizil Tepe. (Ollier)
Recovering from their surprise, the Russians regrouped. A grenadier brigade advanced against the Yagni hills. The flanks were protected by cavalry, while in the centre an infantry brigade from Devel’s division and Komarov’s five battalions prepared to retake Kizil Tepe. By 7.00 am the whole line was in action, and the infantry assault went in, supported by the fire of 72 guns which pounded the crater, raising clouds of red dust. The Turkish infantry sheltered under the rocks, but the gunners held their ground on the edges of the crater, replying vigorously to the Russian artillery. Finally the Russians abandoned their assault, and fell back to a fresh position.
Meanwhile Devel, who had been on the march to join Tergukassov, had heard the sound of firing from the Kizil Tepe, and at 6.00 am learned that it had fallen to the Turks. Irresolute, he was uncertain what to do, but was persuaded by his senior officers that he must march to the sound of the guns. Recrossing the Arpa at 11.00 am with six infantry battalions, some Cossacks and four mountain guns, he approached the scene of the fighting and sent a runner to Loris-Melikov’s headquarters at Karayal to seek instructions. In reply, Dukhovsky, the chief of staff, told him that reinforcements were on the way, but that if the Russian position at Poldervan was abandoned he should retreat on Alexandropol. Seeing that the infantry on his right was retiring, he withdrew to the crossing over the Arpa at Kuyucuk; urged by his senior officers to launch an attack on the Turks on the Kizil Tepe, he refused, and ordered his troops back across the river, remarking bitterly that next day they would say he was to blame for all that had happened.6 In fact much of the blame was attached to Dukhovsky for communicating by runner rather than by field telegraph.
Removing Turkish wounded during the Battle of Kizil Tepe. (Ollier)
Kemball reported that the Turkish losses amounted to 430 killed and 1,401 wounded; he reckoned that the Russian casualties would have been much greater. Reflecting on the outcome of the battle, he wrote to Layard:
It is probable that the Turks might have improved their victory or at least have completed the discomforture (sic.) of the Russians by advancing upon the villages of Kadikler, distant, the first about a mile and a half, the third as much further, from Kizil Tepe; but these villages appeared to be defended by earthworks and trenches, and are situated on ground rendered difficult of access by the precipitous banks of the Magrak, and the organisation of the Turks not being favourable to rapid or extended movements, Mukhtar Pasha did well, I think, to rest satisfied with the important success he had gained.7
Williams, who had accompanied Kemball throughout the battle, and found the latter’s coolness under fire ‘appalling,’ reckoned that the Russian losses were about 3,000. He had been particularly struck by the behaviour of the Turkish irregular cavalry, as to which ‘nothing could have been worse:’
Wherever one looked within our front line there were to be found these fellows spending valuable hours in pretending to water their horses, or more flagrantly skulking and going to sleep in the shadow of corn ricks or even sponging upon the villagers in the rear, when they might at least have been picking up stragglers of the enemy.8
He thought that ‘perhaps shooting a few of them for cowardice might have its effect.’
One immediate result of the battle was that a proposal to send troops from Alexandropol to join Tergukassov was abandoned. Another was the entrenchment of the new position between Bach-Kadikler and Poldervan; only outposts were left in the previous positions at Utch Tepe and Ani. The Grand Duke Michael now arrived at headquarters to take personal command, overtly at any rate. Quite how much this Imperial reinforcement added to the strength of the Russian high command must be doubtful; Williams, on another occasion, was dismissive of the Grand Duke as being ‘ever ready to push himself into prominence elsewhere than in the field.’9
Following the battle Mukhtar advanced his lines down into the plain, and these were at once entrenched. The previous position was, however, retained, to provide a line to fall back on if necessary. In Constantinople the news of the victory at Kizil Tepe was received with delight. It seemed that Mukhtar’s run of success was continuing, and the Sultan sent him a sword set in brilliants, two handsome Arab horses, and the Cross of the First Class of the Osmanli, and conferred on him the title of Ghazi, or Conqueror.10
During September there was little action, although in fact events behind the front lines were occurring that would decisively influence the future course of the war in Asia. On the Russian side, reinforcements continued to stream in, a fact that was well known to Mukhtar, as Kemball reported to Dickson, the military attaché at the embassy. He also conveyed news of the disastrous supply situation facing the Turkish army, which Dickson passed on to Layard:
Sir A Kemball also reports in a letter of the 10th instant from the Turkish headquarters at Kerkhaned, that the army under Mukhtar Pasha has been mainly rationed and supported from the supplies of food, etc, at Kars, and this important fortress is spoken of as almost denuded of provisions. Every exertion ought to be made to revictual Kars, else it may be placed in great jeopardy for want of means, and it ought to be provisioned for at least twelve months.11
By the end of September the total Russian strength was over 60,000 men, with 200 guns; Mukhtar, on the other hand, was still growing steadily weaker as a result of both sickness and desertion, and in spite of calling up all the troops covering his line of communications and part of the garrison of Erzerum, his field army was no more than 35,000 strong, with 84 guns. His front was now some thirteen miles. His position was suitable as a jumping off point for an offensive, but he did not have nearly enough troops to contemplate this; on the other hand, his force was insufficient for the defence of such a long line. He had tried, and failed, to get reinforcements from Dervish at Batum and from Ismail.12 He now set about the task of strengthening the field works that he occupied. Since Ismail had declined to provide him with additional troops, Mukhtar pressed him to take the offensive against Tergukassov. Rather reluctantly, this was what Ismail now did, advancing towards Igdir. An attack on Halfali on September 19-20 failed to shift the Russian defenders there, and another attack a week later on Corukca also failed, whereupon Ismail retreated into the mountains. Tergukassov left him alone there, feeling that any offensive operations were beyond his exhausted troops. No further assistance for Mukhtar was to be expected from this quarter, although Ismail did grudgingly agree to release six battalions and two batteries to reinforce the position on the Aladja Dagh. There, the best that Mukhtar could hope for was to hang on to his present positions until winter came to put a stop to campaigning. The Russians, however, were determined to make use of their reinforcements to put paid to Mukhtar’s army while it was still practicable to do so.
Bashi-Bazouks marching to headquarters. (Illustrated London News)
The Russian plan, drafted by Obruchev, was to seize the Yagni hills, to cut off Mukhtar from Kars, and to overwhelm him on the Aladja Dagh. For this purpose Loris-Melikov was assigned 20,000 men, in three columns; on his right, Roop was to attack Little Yagni, in the centre Sheremetiev was to attack Great Yagni, and on the left Schack was to prevent the Turks reinforcing the position. Heimann, with the 4th Caucasian Grenadier Division, was to launch a feint attack on Kizil Tepe while Shelkovnikov was to make a diversionary movement towards the Aladja Dagh. Mukhtar’s spies picked up the news of an intended offensive, but also the disinformation which the Russians circulated to the effect that the principal target was to be Kizil Tepe, and he concentrated his troops in that direction. Mukhtar’s decision to await an attack was criticised by a number of his officers; and on October 1, following a conference with Omer Pasha and Hussein Pasha, newly arrived from Constantinople, he sent a telegram seeking permission to withdraw to his spring positions in the Saghanly Dagh. He got no reply, but it was too late anyway; next morning the Russians attacked.
The Great Yagni, an immense truncated cone rising 650 feet above the plain, was regarded by the Russians as being almost impregnable, and Sheremetiev’s main task was to distract attention from Roop’s assault on Little Yagni. Great Yagni had three tiers of entrenchments, but on October 2 was held only by one battalion of about 500 men. Little Yagni, on the other hand, was occupied by about 4,000 men with twelve heavy guns, under the command of Mehmet Bey When Sheremetiev began his demonstration against Great Yagni, at about 6.00 am, it soon became evident that the Turkish entrenchments were weakly manned. As soon as he realised this, Loris-Melikov converted the demonstration into a general assault. Soon the slopes of the hill were covered with Russian grenadiers as they climbed towards the lines of entrenchments, undaunted by the rifle fire of the defenders. When they got into the trenches, the grenadiers easily overwhelmed the Turks and by 8.00 am the whole position had been taken. Only 140 of its defenders survived to be taken prisoner.
Roop’s attack on Little Yagni fared less well. At first, however, the heavy bombardment from 50 guns forced the Turkish infantry to abandon their trenches, and the Russians moved forward; but the Turks returned, and opened a heavy rifle fire on the attackers, who fell back with a loss of nearly 400 men. Reinforcements sent up by Mukhtar, to whom the Russian intentions had by now become apparent, ensured that Little Yagni was held.
In the centre, Mukhtar had concentrated the strongest part of his army at the base of the Olya Tepe, a flat-topped mountain separated from the Aladja Dagh by a ravine. The position was well fortified, although the summit itself was unoccupied, a fact discovered by the Russian cavalry, which had found no Turkish troops at all across the only line by which they could retreat. Loris-Melikov had plenty of troops available; he and Heimann conferred, discussing what would be needed for an assault, and the latter declared that his own division could take the position while the rest of the units in hand were deployed against Little Yagni.
Heimann’s optimism proved unwarranted; his assault on Olya Tepe failed, and the Turks were able to hold their position. On their right, however, Shelkovnikov had been unexpectedly successful. His move across the Arpa towards Ani and his recrossing of the river towards the spurs of the Aladja Dagh took the Turks by surprise, and he was able to take the line of entrenchments in his front. He did not, however, have sufficient troops to hold them, and when Mukhtar sent forward two brigades under Hussein Pasha and Chefket Pasha against him, Shelkovnikov’s six battalions and two cavalry regiments were bundled out of the trenches and forced back to the Arpa. En route they were surrounded and only got back to their start line by forcing their way through, with the help of some reserves sent forward to support them.13
Next day Mukhtar went over to the attack, moving out towards noon and advancing towards Karayal. However, the Russians were ready for the Turks and prepared what was effectively an ambush, rows of soldiers lying down concealed in the rocky terrain. The Turks moved forward confidently, since it appeared that they had only two battalions to deal with. As they approached the Russian lines they realised the size of the force awaiting them, and opened a heavy fire. The Russians, rising up, returned the fire. After a short while, as the Russians began to advance, the Turks fell back, contesting each area of higher ground until after night fell, when they reached their previous positions. The Russian troops spent the night on the battlefields before withdrawing next day to their original lines.
The Russians soon found that although they were now in possession of the Great Yagni, it would be scarcely possible to hold it. It was exposed to artillery on three sides; there was no water; and the Turks, being still in occupation of the village of Subatan, could at any time attack it in the rear. Either more ground must be gained by a further battle, or the Great Yagni must be abandoned. As one of the few tangible proofs of success, it was hard to give up; but common sense prevailed, and on October 4 the Russians pulled back, retiring in good order. The Turks retook possession to find that the defences had been improved by the erection of redoubts for artillery. Nothing had therefore changed, but the fighting had cost both sides heavy casualties. The Russian losses were reported to be 960 men killed and 2,400 wounded. The Turkish losses were of the order of 1,000 killed and 3,200 wounded.14
The Turkish loss was, expressed as a proportion of their army, very much greater than the Russian. In addition, it seemed to Loris-Melikov and his senior commanders that the fighting around the Yagni hills had demonstrated that Mukhtar’s forces were too stretched to hold a line that was thirteen miles long. They resolved, therefore, to launch a major offensive. Meanwhile, on the other side of the hill there were strong differences of opinion as to what should be done. Faizi and some others, facing the reality of their position, again urged a retreat to the Saghanly Dagh, reinforcing Kars by 20,000 men en route; the fortress, thus strengthened, should hold up a very large part of the Russian army for up to six months. The remainder of the Turkish army should, Faizi thought, take up a naturally strong position near Zevin, on the plateau of Horundozou, and there await reinforcements. Mukhtar took a different view. He believed that having failed in their attempt on the Yagni hills, the Russians would go into winter quarters and await the following spring, snow having already fallen. Mukhtar’s view of the situation displayed a lack of understanding of his opponents, as Colonel Brackenbury pointed out:
The Russians hold that the winter is of all seasons the most favourable for their military operations, because their army consists of men inured to all the rigours of frost and snow. Nothing was more unlikely than that they should give up the campaign at this point.15
Although minded to reject Faizi’s advice, and remain in a forward position facing the Russians, Mukhtar was growing increasingly anxious about the increasing disparity of force, as the Russian reinforcements continued to arrive. He decided to concentrate his army, since it was strung out over too great a front, and on the night of October 8/9 he pulled his troops back from Great Yagni, Kizil Tepe and the villages of Hadji Vali and Subatan, retreating to the Aladja Dagh. He left a small outpost in front of Little Yagni. The movement escaped the attention of the Russians – it was conducted during a particularly dark and stormy night – until dawn on October 9. At first they suspected that this might some kind of trick on Mukhtar’s part, but soon advanced to occupy the deserted position. So rapidly did they push forward that Mukhtar sent forward three battalions in skirmishing order to check the Russian advance. In the ensuing engagement, fought at long-range, the Turks lost about 500 men killed and wounded; the Russian loss is not recorded.16
If Grand Duke Michael’s coming added little, the intellectual capacity of the Russian headquarters had been markedly improved by Obruchev’s arrival, who had on the advice of Miliutin been posted to the Caucasus front by the Tsar in an effort to stem the tide of reverses. He had arrived in September in time to put forward the plans for the attack on the Yagni hills. Now, since Mukhtar had withdrawn from his position, Obruchev saw an opportunity to atone for the losses in that assault; but since the withdrawal might be a precursor to a retreat to the Saghanly Dagh, he believed that he must take action urgently.17
His new plan was aimed at the total destruction of Mukhtar’s army, calling for a demonstration by Loris-Melikov with 32 battalions and 112 guns against the front of the Turkish positions while Lieutenant-General Lazarev, with 23½ battalions, 29 squadrons and 73 guns was to execute a wide turning movement around Mukhtar’s right flank and thence into his rear. Coordination between the Russian forces was essential; Obruchev relied on the field telegraph to achieve this.
Lazarev set out on his long march during the night of 9/10 October, initially with 17 battalions of infantry, 22 squadrons and 70 guns. En route he was joined by two detachments from Tergukassov which brought his force up to its planned strength of about 20,000 infantry, and 3,000 cavalry. He crossed the Arpa into Russian territory and then some miles further south at Kizil-Kiliskly recrossed the river, reaching Digor on October 12. Lazarev ordered a rest day for the following day. Remarkably, he had so far encountered no hostile forces during his march. He had been paying out the telegraph line behind him, enabling him to keep in touch with headquarters throughout. Mukhtar’s lack of cavalry meant that apart from accidents Lazarev might reasonably expect not to have his communications interrupted.
While Lazarev was engaged in his march the remainder of the Russian army was moving into position for the combined assault. On the right, Major-General Grabbe had 3 battalions, 8 guns and 15 squadrons between the Kars River and the high road north of Little Yagni. In the centre Heimann had 24 battalions (about 20,000 men), 8 squadrons and 104 guns; his force was posted from Great Yagni to Hadji Vali. On the left, under Major-General Kouzminsky, 8 battalions (6,000 men) with 24 squadrons and 24 guns were located in front of Kizil Tepe. The reserve, under Major-General Dehn, consisted of 6½ battalions (5,000 men) 8 squadrons and 24 guns; it was posted behind Kulveran. The right and left wings and the reserve were under the command of Roop. The intention was that once Lazarev was securely in the Turkish rear Heimann should assault the Turkish centre on the heights of Avliar, while Roop and Lazarev attacked and surrounded the Turkish right.
On the morning of October 13 Mukhtar, still sublimely unaware of the serious threat posed by Lazarev’s movement around his right rear, came to the conclusion that he had been unwise in giving up Great Yagni, and determined to try and recapture it. He sent out a strong force before dawn in the hope of surprising the Russian defenders. The Turks reached the base of the hill before their advance was discovered; unluckily for them it was a moment when the Russian trenches were crowded with troops that had come up to relieve the overnight garrison, and they received the Turks with such a murderous rifle fire that after an hour the attackers retreated, leaving 123 dead on the slopes of Great Yagni.18 Later in the day the Russian artillery, having located Mukhtar’s position, began shelling the area; one shell burst only twenty yards from where the Turkish commander was standing. This cannonade was part of the Russian endeavours to keep Turkish attention on their immediate front.
Turkish infantry assault the Great Yagni, October 13. (Russes et Turcs)
At some point during the day Mukhtar became aware of Lazarev’s turning movement, and he hurriedly cobbled together a force to resist it, sending a detachment about 6,000 strong under his brother in law Reshid Pasha, including three battalions that had arrived from Ismail to take up a position between Orlok and Bazardjik. Lazarev continued his march on October 14 after the rest day at Digor, and in the afternoon his advance guard ran into Reshid’s force in a strong position south-east of Bazardjik. Reshid had had some opportunity to start preparing entrenchments; but Lazarev wasted no time in launching an immediate assault, his troops climbing the slopes of the position under heavy fire before driving the Turks back at the point of the bayonet. Mukhtar was himself quickly on the scene, bringing up reinforcements. These were, however, charged by Lazarev’s cavalry, and fell back in the face of what could now be seen as a much superior force.
The Turks retreated to a second position, which commanded the whole country between Vizinkoi and Bazardjik; both sides could see that if that went, then there was nothing to stop the Russians falling upon the Turkish rear. Lazarev sent Shelkovnikov forward with a large force of infantry. Under cover of a heavy artillery bombardment the Russians swept forward, and by nightfall were firmly in occupation of the position. Mukhtar was now in serious trouble; there was only one road left to him, and to retreat by night towards Kars would involve a difficult and dangerous march. He was also reluctant to abandon the strong position on the Aladja Dagh. He ordered the baggage and supplies to start the journey back to Kars, while his troops remained in their earthworks, to await the morning. It was a fatally mistaken decision.
That night the field telegraph proved its value. Lazarev sent back at 2.30 am a full report of all that had occurred and the position he had occupied. The opportunity of a decisive victory was readily apparent, and orders were at once issued for an attack at dawn on October 15. Heimann, with the Caucasus Grenadier Division and 64 guns was to storm the Olya Tepe position. Lazarev was to advance against Vizinkoi, while Roop was to advance on Kerchane and, if Heimann’s attack succeeded, was to assault the Aladja Dagh.
As dawn broke on October 15 Heimann’s artillery moved forward to a line only 1,500 yards short of the Turkish works on the Olya Tepe. From here they opened a heavy fire on the Turkish position, using on this occasion shrapnel, which had not hitherto been employed to any great extent. The bombardment was, at this range, fearfully effective, causing heavy casualties. The position on the Olya Tepe was naturally very strong:
All round the conical height of the Olya Tepe, formed of entirely bare rocks, the Turks had established a continuous entrenchment composed of a ditch for sharpshooters, five feet wide and three feet deep, provided with salient and reentering angles.19
Heimann advanced with three regiments to the northern side of the Olya Tepe, remaining there until the artillery preparation had caused sufficient damage. Mukhtar observed that one of these regiments was too far advanced and reckoned that it might be vulnerable. At 10.00 am he sent seven battalions forward towards the right of the Russian column, but their assault failed in the face of heavy artillery fire from Great Yagni, and from the concentrated rifle fire of the infantry. By noon Heimann decided to launch his assault, and the Russian infantry began to climb the slopes of the Olya Tepe. The garrison maintained a heavy fire for as long as they could, but as the Russian masses came on they abandoned first their outpost line of trenches, and then their position on the crest. The Russian infantry pursued them in a fierce bayonet charge, and the Turks fled in confusion. Heimann rode forward to the summit and ordered an immediate pursuit, while the artillery advanced between the Olya Tepe and Great Yagni, from where they could cover the only line of retreat from the Aladja Dagh.
Turkish cavalry. (Album della Guerra Russo-Turca del 1877-78)
Meanwhile Lazarev had advanced against the heights between Vizinkoi and Magaradjik. Eight battalions in two columns moved forward to drive the Turks out of the position. As they retreated they encountered the demoralised survivors retreating from the Olya Tepe, and the whole body fled in confusion in the direction of Kars. Mukhtar, who had been posted on a hill behind the Olya Tepe with Kemball and the members of his staff, watched as the left wing of his army dissolved. The Daily News correspondent described the scene:
At this juncture the Marshal left the hill on which he had stood since morning … The line of retreat was all but impassable. Lingering convoys still struggled over the strong surface; and a couple of battalions, with a haste scarcely dignified, were making for Sari Tepe. I must here state that through all the confusion which followed, Mukhtar Pasha bore himself like a true soldier, retiring only when his soldiers left him no other choice.20
The successes of Heimann and Lazarev now opened the way for a decisive assault on the Turkish positions on the Aladja Dagh. At about 2.00 pm Heimann was ordered to cross the ravine and attack from the north-west, leaving sufficient troops to hold Vizinkoi and the Olya Tepe. Lazarev was to attack from the south-west, and at the same time to bar all the escape routes near Bazardjik which the Turks might attempt. Finally Roop was to assault the Aladja Dagh from the north. In fact, the latter had already made his move, seeing signs that Omer Pasha, commanding in this sector, was getting ready to withdraw his artillery. Ordering the charge to be sounded all along his line, Roop pushed forward his infantry. The Turks replied with a fierce rifle fire, but actually Omer’s position was already impossible. Although it was already becoming dark, Roop resolved to make a final attack on the Turkish trenches. Just as the advance was beginning, the sound of cheers could be heard from the southern slopes of the Aladja Dagh, and from the direction of Bazardjik, where Omer had sent envoys under a white flag, the news spreading like wildfire. Grand Duke Michael, on the Vizinkoi heights, sent orders to Loris-Melikov to ratify the surrender, on terms that officers could retain their arms, personal goods and horses, but that the surrender of the army, its equipment and stores should otherwise be unconditional.
The surrender began at 2.00 am on October 16, the Turkish soldiers leaving their weapons in their trenches and marching down unarmed. A Russian officer described the scene to the Moscow Gazette:
It was a fine picture and well calculated to rejoice our hearts. On both sides a living hedge – our soldiers – and in the middle a long motley line of disarmed Turks winding down the path; at the foot of the mountain, the silent masses of our troops waiting with sloped arms. The descent of the Turks lasted a long time – nearly two hours.21
It had been a crushing victory. Seven pashas, among whom were Reshid and Omer, had been taken, together with 36 guns and 2 battalions. During the two days following the battle the Russian cavalry picked up further prisoners, together with 9 guns. Altogether the Turks lost 5,600 men killed and wounded, and 12,000 prisoners. By comparison the Russian losses were modest, at 230 killed and 1,611 wounded. Of the 35,000 or so with which Mukhtar had started the battle almost half were lost, and his army, as an organised force, had been effectively destroyed.22 Mukhtar himself declared that he was ‘beaten by the Russian artillery,’ which on this occasion at least was remarkably effective. Mukhtar was really beaten by the fact that the reinforcements which the Russians received were sufficient to make possible the turning movement prescribed by Obruchev; and perhaps also by the field telegraph, which enabled the various Russian forces to be coordinated.
Major May, after reviewing the evidence of observers at the battle, offered another explanation, concluding that the Russian success was largely due to the effectiveness of the field artillery, which in contrast to that at Plevna had engaged the enemy at close range. He quoted the Russian official account describing the performance of the artillery:
It was worked on this day with a precision and activity which had not distinguished it on former occasions, and, as was remarked by an independent witness on the Russian side, instead of confining itself to a shell fire at impossible ranges – where neither accuracy nor effect could be expected, and where its fire was soon masked by the advance of its own troops – moved forward this time in support of the infantry, and materially cooperated towards the result of the day.23