The Storming of Kars
The forts that surrounded Kars were a very different kettle of fish from the modest earthworks that protected Plevna. They had almost all been built since the Crimean War, during which Kars had held out for five months until starved into surrender, and they had enormously strengthened the defensive potential of the fortress. Kars lies on the western side of the plain and on the river of that name. To the south-west, west and north of the city rise volcanic spurs jutting out from the Saghanly Dagh range. The river runs around the base of these spurs; to the north of the city it runs through a deep ravine in the mountains several hundred feet deep. On the north-east lies the Kara Dagh, or Black Mountain. The only weakness in a fortress so well protected by nature was on the south and south-east, where it was open to the rocky plain.
The citadel was built in masonry on a perpendicular rock overhanging the gorge just north of the city. Around the city were twelve detached forts. Two of these were on the north-east and east of the city (Fort Arab and Fort Karadagh). These were built on the bare rock; the earthworks were composed of earth brought to the site and there were no ditches or traverses. They commanded all the ground around, including the works on the Tchanak Dagh to the west and north-west. The forts were of a very considerable size. Fort Arab had an interior crest of 600 yards, with a curtain 300 yards long. Fort Karadagh, on the Black Mountain, consisted of a bastion with a curtain on either side enclosing a battery some 21 feet above the crest. The two forts were linked by a line of trenches.
On the Tchanak Dagh there were three smaller forts – Moukliss, Inglis and Veli Pasha, facing north and north-west. Next, to the west, the works on Shorak Dagh were as high as those on the Black Mountain. Here there were three forts, of which the most commanding one was Laze Tepessi, consisting of three batteries each with a front of 80 yards. Tik Tepessi was a square bastioned redoubt about 100 yards a side, with a ditch 9 feet by 7; a battery with a width of 60 yards was situated in front of it. Tekmass had two small square redoubts with an earthen parapet across the gorge.
The most powerful forts, understandably, were those covering the south-eastern sector. Fort Hafiz Pasha was a square redoubt, 400 yards a side, with bastions at the angles, traverses on the parapet and covered way, a ditch 12 feet by 6, and a three storied casemated barrack closing the gorge. Fort Kanly consisted of two small redoubts 150 yards square, behind which was a lunette with a two storied casemated barrack closing the gorge. Finally there were two small forts on the banks of the river, Forts Souvari and Tchim, (also called Vassif Pasha) which were simple lunettes without ditches or traverses.1
These fortifications had suffered little during the operations around Kars in May and June. Since then work had gone on to strengthen them, increasing the size of the ditches, and digging trenches to connect the forts on the south-eastern side. In resisting a siege Kars had a number of advantages; the forts were on commanding heights, were close enough to lend each other support, and the fact that they were built on rocky ground meant that they could not be mined. On the other hand, the forts were not far enough from the city to prevent its bombardment; they lacked sufficient storehouses and access to water; and in a number of instances the forts lacked sufficient defensive features such as caponnières and traverses. Above all, the River Kars split the defence in two, preventing the swift movement of reserves.
A field hospital near Kars following the storming of the city. (Russes et Turcs)
Greene made a careful calculation of the garrison that would have been required properly to defend these works:
The total armament of the place is about 200 guns (303 were captured at the assault, including a large proportion of field guns). The total development of the line of fire for infantry is about 6,000 yards, 4,000 in the works on the right bank and 2,000 in those on the left. Allowing 2 men to a yard, and 50 per cent in reserve, the proper garrison would be 18,000 infantry, and with 25 men to a gun, 5,000 artillery, or in all 23,000. This was almost exactly the strength of the garrison at the time of the assault.2
A different view of the adequacy of the garrison effectively to man the fortifications was taken by Hozier, who estimated that the city required at least 40,000 men:
In order to have defended it properly there should have been sufficient reserves in each of the three lines of defence to man the entire length of the entrenchments; for owing to the nature of the ground, the rugged slopes and absence of roads, a rapid movement of reinforcements from one quarter to another was quite precluded.3
Nor, in Hozier’s view, were the troops actually available sensibly distributed; the five strong forts on the west and north, which unlike those in the south covered each other, contained the bulk of the garrison, while the more vulnerable forts in the south and east were manned by Arab and Kurdish troops of doubtful quality, and were without reserves. Hozier judged that Hussein Hami, although a courageous divisional leader, had already shown that he was not up to the command of the fortress.
Even had the garrison not had twenty per cent of its number sick or wounded in the desperately overcrowded hospitals within the city, and the remainder been traumatized by the disaster on the Aladja Dagh, Kars would not have been impregnable. However, the size and strength of its redoubts undoubtedly made it a very tough nut to crack, and with the Russian experiences before Plevna very much in their minds, the Grand Duke and Loris-Melikov pondered hard on their options. A direct assault was plainly a very risky venture, but with the grim prospect of a lengthy winter siege as the alternative it seemed worth making the attempt. Besides, the Russian troops had their tails up after the victories of the Aladja Dagh and Deve Boyun, while the morale of the Turks was obviously correspondingly low. On the other hand, a siege would be a long affair; the garrison appeared well provisioned, and it was a type of warfare in which the Turks excelled. Supplying the besiegers would itself be a difficult undertaking, and the troops would be subjected to considerable and prolonged suffering.
All these considerations prompted the decision to launch an assault as soon as possible. Command of the Army of Kars was given to Lazarev, operating under the orders of the Grand Duke and Loris-Melikov. It consisted of the 1st Grenadier Division, the 40th Division, and parts of the 19th, 38th and 39th Divisions, comprising 41 battalions of 30,000 infantry, with 53 squadrons and 144 guns. Siege guns were sent up as quickly as possible, 48 of which arrived on November 4. They were established in twelve batteries around the east and south-east of the city, at a range of some 3,000 yards from the fortifications. The focus of the assault was to be Forts Hafiz, Kanly and Souvari, against which the siege batteries opened fire on November 11, keeping up the bombardment by day and night.4
Hussein Hami was not a robustly confident commander. The obvious intention of the Russians to press their advantage, whether by an energetically conducted siege or by a direct assault was all too evident, and he sent a gloomy report to Mukhtar soon after the bombardment commenced saying that his men were so demoralized that he was afraid that the fortress would fall at the first assault. Meanwhile the weather continued bitterly cold, although so far not a lot of snow had fallen.
The Turks made a spirited response to the Russian bombardment, on November 5 pushing forward to a position east of Fort Hafiz where they constructed a battery which caused a good deal of damage to Russian working parties. To deal with this a force under Alkhazov moved forward and compelled the battery to withdraw. At the same time two battalions of the Kutaisi Grenadiers, under Fadeyev, advanced from the direction of Vizinkoi, intending to cut off the battery’s retreat. Fadeyev, realising that the guns had already been withdrawn, remained within a mile of Fort Hafiz in a depression, out of sight of the garrison. After nightfall, he moved forward to the fort, which had only a shallow ditch, and decided to launch a surprise attack. Shouting ‘Come on, boys, here is glory for the Kutaisi Grenadiers,’ Fadeyev led his men over the wall before the startled garrison could respond, and drove them out. He realised that he could not hope to hold the fort, and spiked the guns before withdrawing with eighty prisoners. His total casualties in this adventure were 42 killed and wounded; it raised great enthusiasm among the Russian troops.5
This success made a major contribution to the Russian decision-making process. It suggested that the garrison of Kars might not be as resolute as had been supposed, and that an immediate attack might be even more desirable. This view was reinforced by the large number of Russian soldiers reporting sick as they endured the bitter weather in their advanced positions around the city.6
The weather, indeed, was a major consideration. It had been planned to launch an assault on the night of November 13/14, in order to take advantage of a full moon; but the weather deteriorated to the point that the attack was called off until it improved. This was a matter of real concern to the Russians, who had taken extreme precautions to prevent the Turks becoming aware of the imminence of the assault. They went to the lengths of assuring even those newspaper correspondents with whom they had a good and trusting relationship that such a thing as an assault was not even being contemplated. This secrecy appears to have been effective, for there is no sign that the Turks anticipated the attack when it came, or the direction from which it would come.
On the afternoon of November 16 the weather began to moderate, and the assault was fixed for the night of the following day. In all, 35 battalions were assigned to carry out the attack and the supporting demonstrations and by nightfall on November 17 those attacking the south-eastern sector had been concentrated in and around two villages about two and a half miles from the forts. The attacking force was organised in seven columns. The first column, under Komarov, of 6 battalions and 16 guns, operating north of the river, was to launch a demonstration against Fort Tekmass but then, following the ravine, move against Fort Tchim. Parallel with this advance on the other side of the river, the second column, under Lieutenant Colonel Prince Melikov, of 3 battalions, was to attack Fort Souvari. Next came the third and fourth columns, commanded by Major-General Grabbe. He had 10 battalions and sixteen guns in all, and was to attack Fort Kanly. He personally led the left column while Colonel Vodjakin led the right. The fifth column, under Major-General Alkhazov, of 5 battalions and 8 guns, was to attack Fort Hafiz. A demonstration against Forts Laze Tepessi and Mouklis was to be made by the sixth column, commanded by Colonel Tchereminissov with 5 battalions and 24 guns; a similar demonstration against Forts Arab and Karadagh was to be made by Major-General Rydzevsky, with 6 battalions and 24 guns. These last were to convert their demonstrations into substantive attacks if the opportunity offered.7
Lazarev had given careful thought to the tactics to be adopted, applying lessons learned from previous assaults. He firmly believed in a night attack, but that it should be when sufficient moonlight enabled the assaulting columns to find their way. They should avoid a long march, but be concentrated gradually about three-quarters of a mile from the point of attack. Night patrols were sent out in the preceding days to accustom the Turks to skirmishing near the forts. Above all, the bombardment was to be stepped up in the three or four days before the assault, but not particularly so on the last day.8
Loris-Melikov joined the columns to assault Fort Kanly at about 6 pm November 17, and about two hours later they moved off:
There was a touch of frost in the air, and the full moon shone brightly. The plain and the lower hills and valleys seemed to slumber peacefully in the dark, but above them loomed the snow-wrapped mountain ridges glimmering in the beams of the moon. The greatest care had been taken to preserve silence and secrecy as long as possible, and the men were forbidden to smoke or speak. The skirmishers, in open order, marched in advance, followed by the assaulting troops, who at first marched in compact columns, deploying into columns of companies as they approached the line of attack9.
At about 9 pm the Turks seem to have become aware that something was up, and there was some firing from their outposts. To concentrate their attention on the northern sector, the Russians opened fire with their artillery on the forts there. In the south no reply was made to the Turkish fire, which ceased for a while, before bursting out again at about 9.30 pm, when the Russian columns were about to reach their objectives.
The first to do so was Melikov’s column, which stormed into Fort Souvari before its defenders realised that the Russians were so close. Attacking with the bayonet, they overwhelmed the defenders in a few minutes, spiked the guns, and then charged forward through a party of Turkish cavalry to reach, and ford, the icy water of the River Kars in order to attack Fort Tchim on its left and rear. To the right of Melikov’s advance, however, the attack on Fort Kanly was encountering stiffer opposition.
Count Grabbe, leading his column on horseback, passed around the western redoubt in order to attack the rear of the main work. A few yards from the parapet he fell dead, shot twice in the chest. The command passed to Colonel Belinsky; as he cheered his men on, he too was shot dead. As the assaulting troops struggled to reach the parapet, it was found that the scaling ladders were too short, and the Russian troops had to scramble up the rugged sides of the wall. Entering the redoubt, there was a desperate hand-to-hand struggle before the outworks and batteries were taken. Next day some 500 Turkish bodies were found in this part of the fortification. The battle for Fort Kanly was not yet over, however. The two-storey barrack held out, and its defenders poured such a hail of fire on the Russians that they were forced for the moment to quit the fortifications they had taken and retreat to the edge of the parapet and the ditches. Hearing of the casualties among the senior officers, Loris-Melikov sent Colonel Bulmering of the engineers to take command of the troops at Fort Kanly. Two battalions and two companies from the reserve were sent forward and Loris-Melikov directed Prince Tchavtchavadze, who with 17 sotnias of Cossacks was at the bridge which carried the high road to Erzerum over the river, to advance into the area between Kanly and the city, and to support the troops in and around the fort. Meanwhile the Turks, encouraged by the lull in the fighting, had sortied from the barrack in an abortive attempt to force the Russians from the top of the parapet; at about midnight 250 dismounted Cossacks arrived in time to drive the Turks back into the barrack.
The storming of Kars on the night of November 18 1877. (Strantz)
Bulmering now split his forces; he led one column which cleared the trenches leading to Fort Souvari, and advanced to the edge of the city, while the other, under Colonel Karassev, occupied the eastern part of the fort. Bulmering, returning to the fort, demanded the surrender of the barrack, threatening to knock it to bits with his artillery. The demand was refused, and firing continued until shortly before 4.00 am. Bulmering had had enough of this, and shouted that unless the barrack surrendered at once he would blow it, and its occupants, to pieces with dynamite. On being assured that the lives of his men would be spared Daoud Pasha, who was in command, surrendered with 300 men, who were all that remained of the garrison.
At Fort Hafiz Pasha, Alkhazov’s troops had also been split into two columns. As they approached they were fired on not only by the fort but also from the trenches connecting it to the Black Mountain and the batteries constructed on its southern slope. To clear this threat, Colonel Fadeyev with 2,500 men succeeded in taking part of the trench system, driving the defenders towards the town and Fort Karadagh. Having cleared these trenches, Alkhazov turned his attention to the fort itself, which had been badly damaged by the Russian artillery, the casemated barrack building having been completely destroyed. Alkhazov led two battalions to the assault in the front and left of the fort, his troops pouring over the parapet. The Turks fell back behind the ruins of the barrack; but as they did so another battalion, sent around by the left, took them in rear, and after a bayonet charge the defenders were virtually wiped out.
Meanwhile Fadeyev’s force had made considerable progress. Following up the Turks retreating towards Fort Karadagh, he pressed them closely, his troops chasing the enemy up the slopes of the mountain until reaching the fort itself. Climbing on each other’s shoulders, some of them entered the fort from the rear. The defenders took refuge in the inner work, but before they could gather their wits the Russians were upon them. Soon, half the garrison had been bayoneted or knocked senseless, and the survivors fled along the trench system to Fort Arab. A party of Russians pursued them, but by now the Turks were beginning to recover, and practically annihilated their attackers before forming up for a counter-attack on Fort Karadagh. Fadeyev had, however, received reinforcements from Alkhazov in the form of the 158th Regiment, and resisted all the Turkish attacks.
By 2.00 am the Russians had taken all the works on the right bank of the river from Souvari to Karadagh, apart from the isolated barrack at Fort Kanly which was still holding out. Lazarev, riding along the lines, could see the extent of his success, and sent forward parties of troops taken from Alkhazov and Bulmering to take possession of the city. However, on the other side of the river things had not been going so well for the Russians.
Komarov had, in accordance with his orders, made a feint attack against Fort Tekmass with 2 battalions of the 3rd Grenadier Regiment, occupying Mount Moukha, some 3,500 yards from the fort. The remaining battalion and the artillery he held in reserve, sending Colonel Boutchkiev with the three battalions of the 151st Regiment along the ravine to attack Fort Tchim. At about 9.00 pm, as soon as firing was heard from the direction of Souvari, the regiment advanced from its position near the Kutchukkoi bridge. However, as it neared the ravine it ran into Turkish outposts in trenches at its entrance. The exchanges of fire that followed alerted the Turks in camp behind Fort Tekmass, who advanced to the edge of the ravine and poured a destructive fire on the Russians. Changing direction, Boutchkiev led his men up the slope and drove the Turks back towards Tekmass. Following them up closely, he went forward to the attack of the fort; as he charged forward he was killed instantly, and his disheartened troops fell back to the ravine, having suffered heavy casualties.10
Meanwhile Melikov’s column, having crossed the river partly by a bridge of boats and partly by fording the icy waters, had launched an attack on the rear of Fort Tchim. In fierce fighting Melikov was mortally wounded, and many of his officers went down. The column retreated in some disorder to a cemetery on the south-west edge of the city. Komarov now sent forward the whole of his reserve along the road through the ravine in an attack on Fort Tchim, under heavy fire from that fort and from Fort Tekmass. The artillery unlimbered close to Fort Tchim and opened a heavy fire on it, while the infantry reached the cemetery and kept up a furious fusillade. This made little impression, though, and the Russians were by now taking heavy casualties from crossfire. Komarov had no choice but to pull back his troops and they, and the survivors of Melikov’s column, fell back along the river bank to the Kutchukkoi bridge. The attack on this sector of the fortifications had thus failed with heavy loss. It had however, succeeded in keeping the attention of Hussein Hami, and limited the opportunity of reinforcements being sent to the south-eastern sector of the defences.
The remaining operations, along the northern flanks of the fortifications, were under the command of Roop. The column under Tchereminissov launched an attack on Fort Laze Tepessi at about 9.00 am. Initially successful, Tchereminissov’s men stormed the trenches in front of the batteries and reached the ice-covered parapet. Here, however, they were held up, but hung on for several hours until the arrival of Turkish reinforcements drove them back into the trenches. Ryzdevsky’s column, further east, maintained a heavy artillery fire on Forts Arab and Karadagh, which softened up the garrison of the latter before Fadeyev launched his assault. When Ryzdevsky heard of the capture of Karadagh fort he switched all his forces and launched an impromptu but vigorous assault on Fort Arab led by the 160th Regiment. This was entirely successful; the survivors of the garrison fled back towards the city. There, the citadel had fallen, offering little resistance to the 152nd Regiment advancing from Fort Hafiz.
As the sun came up, Hussein Hami took stock of his position. For a long time the successful repulse of the attacks on Souvari, Tchim and Laze Tepessi, and the prolonged defence of Fort Kanly, had led him to believe that overall the Russian assault had failed. By 2.00 am, however, the true situation had become apparent.11 All the forts on the right bank of the river were now in Russian hands, as was the citadel and the rest of the city. Although between 12,000 and 15,000 men still held out in the forts on the heights on the left bank of the river, it was entirely clear to him that there was no prospect of recapturing the lost positions. To remain where they were meant their inevitable surrender to the Russians, and he collected all the troops available to him, assembling them between Fort Tekmass and Fort Laze Tepessi. In thick columns these moved out in the direction of Olti, in an effort to break through the Russian cordon and then make their way through the mountains to Erzerum.
Roop alerted his cavalry, ordering an attack on the flank of the Turkish columns while his infantry, at the villages of Bozgala, Samovat and Aravartun, held them in front. At Bozgala, the largest Turkish column was surrounded, and quickly laid down its arms. At the other two villages the Turks broke through, and continued their march into the mountains. It was an opportunity for cavalry commanders to dream of. Pursued by Cossack cavalry, with horse artillery batteries, the columns were picked off one by one, surrendering by battalions after they had been ravaged by shrapnel fire. Gradually the whole Turkish force was overwhelmed in this way, until only about 150, on horseback, remained. During the pursuit of these, the Cossacks cut down about 100; the remainder, thanks apparently to the quality of their horses, got away, reaching Erzerum, after a desperate ride, on November 27. Among this group was Hussein Hami, together with two or three of his senior officers.
The burial of Russian soldiers fallen during the storming of Kars. (Strantz)
Turkish officers captured at Kars. (Album della Guerra Russo-Turca del 1877-78)
The storming of Kars was a remarkable achievement. It was an extremely powerful fortress, well equipped and provisioned. Its garrison was equipped with modern breechloading rifles. There had been no preliminary siege operations, no painstaking approach by parallels, and Hozier called it ‘an incident almost unequalled in modern warfare.’12 17,000 prisoners were taken, with 303 guns, 25,000 small arms and a huge quality of stores and ammunition. 2,500 Turkish bodies were found in all, while nearly 5,000 wounded were found, in the hospitals and on the field. The Russian losses were not inconsiderable, amounting to 488 killed and 1,785 wounded. The proportion of officers among the casualties was noticeably high, a tribute to the way in which they had led their men forward.13
Hozier described the grim aftermath of the battle:
The scene in the town after the assault was terrible. The Turkish dead lay in heaps in and behind the trenches, all frozen stiff in the attitude in which they had expired. The wounded Russians were removed and treated by their surgeons, who were thus fully occupied, while the unfortunate Turks, utterly neglected by their own surgeons, were left for days tortured by their wounds and exposed to the bitter cold without assistance … For more than a day the town was given up to anarchy and disorder … The Turkish rule was broken, and that of the Russians was not established. The camp followers of the Russian army, and the rabble inside the city, made full use of the interval to gratify their love of plunder.14
Following the seizure of Kars, and the Russian check before Erzerum, the winter closed in, and brought virtually to an end all active military operations. Ultimately, the campaign in the Caucasus had ended in a decisive Russian victory. Initially, the Russian strategy had been markedly confused, and it then had to face a remarkable recovery led by the outstanding Ahmed Mukhtar. This was only overcome by the arrival of strong reinforcements and with the development of a clearer set of objectives. The higher leadership had not on the whole distinguished itself, although some notable victories had been won. Perhaps the outstanding Russian leader was Lazarev, who displayed a more consistent talent than the mercurial Heimann; like the competent Tergukassov, as well as Loris-Melikov, he was of Armenian origin. What they could all depend on was the patient, loyal and brave Russian soldiers, who endured great hardship without complaint.
On the Turkish side, the infantry also displayed great endurance and, especially in defence, fought well throughout the campaign. As on the Bulgarian front, they were mostly poorly served by their junior and middle ranking officers. Mukhtar did have a number of excellent subordinates, such as the Hungarian Faizi and the German Mehmet; but he also had some dreadful senior officers with which to deal, such as Faik and Ismail.