Gorni Dubnik
The Council of War held at Russian headquarters on September 13 after the crushing defeat at the third battle of Plevna had been an emotional affair. During the course of the discussion the Grand Duke Nicholas offered as his advice that the correct course of action would be to retreat to the Danube, establishing a fortified bridgehead there, and await reinforcements. Alexander then asked Miliutin for his view. He disagreed with the Grand Duke, reckoning that Osman was neither strong enough nor mobile enough to launch an attack, and that while reinforcements should be sent for they should be awaited in the army’s present position. Nicholas was greatly offended: ‘If that is your opinion, General Miliutin, you had better assume the command of the army yourself.’ Alexander intervened to say that Nicholas should remain in command but that Miliutin’s advice should be followed. Three months later, as Wellesley recorded, the Tsar had not forgotten the exchange; when the news of the surrender of Plevna reached him, he took Miliutin’s hand and, with tears coursing down his cheeks, said that he should have the Grand Cross of the Order of St George. The Minister of War said that he had done nothing to deserve it, having been merely in attendance on the Tsar:
Whereupon the Emperor, pointing across the valley to the hillock on which the Council of War was held on that fateful September day, said, ‘I owe Plevna to you. Do you think I shall ever forget the advice you gave us on yonder hillock? And if he,’ pointing to his brother in the valley, ‘were here now, he should thank you in my presence for the counsel you then gave.’1
In truth, Nicholas had to some extent been a busted flush since the disastrous failure at Plevna. No clearer demonstration of this could be found than in the summoning of Todleben to headquarters. There had been considerable surprise at the outbreak of war that Russia’s greatest military hero should have no command. These feelings were intensified when, after the first two battles of Plevna, Nicholas continued to resist pressure that Todleben should be sent for. His belated arrival was greeted with delight on all sides, coupled with an increasing public feeling against Nicholas:
The resentment was the greater because the reason of the Grand Duke’s antipathy to the great engineer was pretty well known. It appears that as chief of the engineer corps, of which the Grand Duke Nicholas was the Inspector-General, Todleben had put a stop to certain malpractices in the department, or, at any rate, had done all in his power to check them, and this action on his part had given umbrage to those who had derived profit from the old state of things.2
Although there was naturally a feeling of discouragement at the Russian headquarters, there was also a clear determination to carry the war through to the bitter end, although this view might not have been shared in the Ministry of Finance, where concern about the cost of the war was mounting. MacGahan wrote from headquarters on September 19:
I find the feeling here not so gloomy as I had expected. Military men acknowledge that they have been beaten, but as much by their own errors as by the bravery of the Turks, and there is not the slightest sign of hesitation, or weakening of the determination to fight it out. The idea of peace is not entertained. Everybody feels that it is a death struggle in which Turkey or Russia must go to the ground irretrievably, and the final issue is not doubted for a moment. Although the struggle must be hard, and may be long, Russia must ultimately crush her adversary, it is held, if only by mere brute force, in default of science, skill and generalship.3
The Russian Imperial Guard marching to Plevna. (Ollier)
The steps necessary to achieve a complete investment of Plevna were not taken immediately. During the third battle Lockarev’s cavalry had operated very freely to the west of the city, and by September 11 had established contact with Leontiev’s cavalry at Dolni-Dubnik, theoretically completing the ring. Patrols were sent to the west over the Isker and to the south-west towards Radomirtza, but no substantial contact was made. On September 18, however, Lockarev was ordered to the east of the Vid to a position on the left of the force in front of Plevna, on the Lovtcha road. All the rest of the cavalry, operating to the west of the Vid, was now placed under Krylov, following Zotov’s resumption of command of the IV Corps. Krylov, with about 4,000 cavalry, was given a number of tasks; he was to clear the country as far as the Isker of Bashi-Bazouks, seize all the food and forage, break up Osman’s lines of communication, reconnoitre towards Sofia and Widdin and prevent supplies or reinforcements reaching Osman.4
It was a formidable list, and Krylov soon encountered difficulties. On September 21 a reconnaissance found about 10,000 Turkish infantry dug in around Telis; next day Krylov’s patrols reported a strong force moving out from there towards Dolni-Dubnik, and he ordered Lockarev to cross the Vid to take it in the rear. However, when he learned that another force (under Atouf) was advancing from Plevna to meet the column from Telis, he gave up the attempt to interfere, and retreated no less than fifteen miles to the north, fearful of being taken between two fires.
The Telis column, which was commanded by the able Ahmed Hifzi Pasha, who had recovered from the wound he sustained at Plevna in July, was escorting an immense convoy of some 1,500 wagons laden with supplies and ammunition. With Krylov out of the way it was able successfully to complete its journey to Plevna unscathed. It consisted of three brigades under Hakki Pasha, Edhem Pasha and Veli Bey, and had set out from Orkhanie on September 18. It was here that the Turks were assembling supplies for Plevna, under the direction of Chefket Pasha. He had become notorious as the officer principally responsible for the atrocities in Bulgaria in 1876 and had, indeed, been sentenced to death in response to insistent demands from the Western Powers. The Sultan commuted the sentence to banishment; all that this had amounted to, however, was a posting to a command at Batum.5
While Chefket was putting together the next convoy for Plevna, Krylov spent five days in reconnaissance along the Widdin road and towards Rahova. He encountered little except a few parties of Bashi-Bazouks, and by October had returned to his base at Trestenik, where he concentrated his force, sending patrols down the Sofia road. While he was thus engaged, Osman had sent Ahmed Hifzi’s column on a successful foraging expedition around the villages to the south-west of Plevna. Aware that Chefket’s next convoy was en route, he sent Ahmed Hifzi out to Dolni Dubnik to meet him. Chefket left Orkhanie on October 6 with an escort of 15 battalions, 4 cavalry regiments and two batteries, reached Telis next day and on October 8 entered Plevna with a convoy of 500 wagons. Apart from a brush with some of Krylov’s cavalry at Radomirtza, the principal obstacles to this successful mission had been the appalling weather, which had swollen the streams to torrents, and the bridges destroyed by the Russians which had to be repaired. Krylov had, it is true, no infantry with which to bar the progress of these convoys; but he had a strong force of cavalry, and the long line of wagons presented a target which any vigorous cavalry commander would have longed for.
It had been apparent to Osman after the third battle of Plevna that the correct course would now be to withdraw from the city, falling back through Orkhanie to the line of the Balkans. There could be no doubt that to remain in Plevna was ultimately for his army to be lost. It was inevitable that, with overwhelming forces at their disposal the Russians would invest the city, and that now was the last opportunity for extricating the army. When Osman sought permission to do so, however, what Spenser Wilkinson described as the ‘secret debating society’ at Constantinople refused to entertain the proposal; Plevna, he was told, was too important to be abandoned, and must be held at whatever cost. Maurice pointed out the military absurdity of the decision:
It is difficult to conceive a more unjustifiable answer to the request of a gallant commander. The importance which Plevna had acquired was due to the menacing position of Osman’s army, which from that place was a constant danger to the Russian right flank and to their communications. Once the Russians were able to accumulate sufficient force to make an offensive movement by Osman Pasha impossible the importance of Plevna was gone. To order Plevna to be held because it had proved to be a strategically important point under quite different conditions was to sacrifice uselessly a brave leader and a gallant army. The only possible defence of the policy of holding on to Plevna at any cost is that it was intended to take advantage of the fact that the Russians were concentrating the greater part of their strength against that place, and to throw every available Turkish soldier against one of the other Russian armies, and by overwhelming it compel the Russians to give up their operations against Plevna. But any such resolute action as this was far from the thoughts of the Sultan’s advisers.6
Cossacks foraging. (Russes et Turcs)
The true reason for this foolish decision was political; the defence of Plevna had radically altered the international perception of Turkey. No longer appearing as a corrupt and brutal empire on the verge of a well-deserved final collapse, the Ottoman Empire was now displaying sufficient vitality for it to survive. As such its preservation might again be a reasonable policy objective for those Great Powers such as Britain and Austria that had previously regarded this as essential.
There is also one other aspect of the matter which the authorities at Constantinople might reasonably have taken into account. For Osman’s army to get away from Plevna reasonably intact it would require speed and manoeuvrability, which were qualities it almost certainly did not possess. Although the troops had shown great courage during their defence of Plevna, they were not well trained. There was an inadequate force of cavalry to protect the marching columns; and the officers were of a decidedly variable quality. All this suggests that Osman’s army was unlikely to prove a match for the Russian army in the open field. The Russians had a large force of cavalry, and their infantry heavily outnumbered the Turks. The route that Osman must take to extricate himself was towards Sofia. No doubt his troops would have put up a good fight when, as they would certainly have had to do, they turned to face their pursuers. But casualties would almost certainly have been high; it would have been difficult to prevent parts of the army being cut off in the course of the retreat. Of course, if the Turks had put together a strong enough force to move north to meet Osman, all these problems would have been materially reduced; but, as Maurice observed, this would have required a clear-sighted determination which was totally lacking.
Bashi Bazouks on vedette. (Russes et Turcs)
The need to pull out of Plevna while there was still time was also obvious to the foreign military attachés. On September 5, before the third battle began, Liegnitz was noting that the time had come for the Turks to withdraw, but believed that this would not happen because ‘the Turkish soldier has no understanding of the strategic retreat.’7
Osman, therefore, must necessarily make plans to prolong the defence of Plevna for as long as he could. When Chefket arrived there with his second convoy the two men sat down to plan for the regular revictualling of the fortress. It was agreed that there should be a fortnightly supply convoy which would follow the excellent road from Sofia to Plevna. On either side of the road there would be a cordon of cavalry, and at regular intervals of five or six miles works would be constructed as halting places for the convoys, which would have up to 1,000 wagons. These places included Dolni Dubnik, with a garrison of 5 battalions and 2 guns; Gorni Dubnik, with 6 battalions, 4 squadrons and 4 guns; and Telis, with 7 battalions and 4 guns. These were all under Osman’s command; the sector from Telis to Orkhanie was the responsibility of Chefket, who commanded a total of 23 battalions, 12 squadrons and 12 guns. The works constructed at the halting places might also serve another purpose; if Osman was ultimately to retreat from Plevna, they would provide him with positions at which to hold up any Russian pursuit.8
The weather, meanwhile, had steadily deteriorated, rendering bad roads almost impassable. By the beginning of October snow had fallen in the Balkans, and elsewhere prolonged heavy rain turned Bulgaria into a quagmire. These conditions particularly affected the bringing up of Russian reinforcements and supplies, since there were no metalled roads running from the bridges over the Danube. Broken wagons and wrecked carriages littered such roads as there were:
It was a scene of hopeless wreck: fragments of shattered vehicles emerged from the black, semi-fluid mixture, and dead horses, which no one even tried to drag out, were lying half buried in the mud nearly everywhere. Everything that passed along the roads cut them up more and more, and all tended to create a scene of dirt and confusion beyond conception.9
Krylov’s inept attempts to interdict the Turkish supply system came to an end with the formal announcement on October 4 of the new command structures in an order of the day. Todleben’s position, officially, was to be ‘Adjunct to the Commander of the West Army’, with Imeretinsky as Chief of Staff; Krylov was to proceed to Russia as Inspector of Cavalry Remounts, leaving Gourko with the responsibility for operations against Osman’s supply line. Meanwhile the Russian works around the east of Plevna had been strengthened, and new batteries established from which the siege guns could reach every point in the Turkish defences on the Janik Bair. On the Turkish side also the fortifications were repaired and strengthened, and a chain of redoubts and shelter trenches was constructed to cover the hitherto unfortified heights to the west of the city.
Todleben, now the effective commander of all the Russian troops around Plevna, was perfectly clear that no further assaults should be attempted, but that the investment should be completed as soon as possible. This he deferred until the further reinforcements arrived, since the intelligence available to him suggested that Osman had as many as 80,000 troops in the city; the true figure was actually about 50,000. It was not until the arrival of the Guards that Todleben felt he could take active measures to complete the circle of investment. On October 21 Gourko was given command of a strong force to capture the Turkish posts on the Sofia road. For this task he was given the 2nd Guard Cavalry Division, Krylov’s cavalry division, the 1st and 2nd Guard Infantry Divisions, the Guard Rifle Brigade, another regiment from the 3rd Guard Infantry Division, and an engineer battalion. The force comprised 40 battalions, 60 squadrons and 146 guns, and its first objective was to be Gorni Dubnik.10
Battle of Gorni Dubnik October 24 1877
At the same time Todleben intended to close the Plevna-Lovtcha road and complete the investment on the south of the city, an operation that would also cover Gourko’s movement. This task was assigned to Zotov, with the 16th Division, now commanded by Skobelev, one brigade of the 30th Division, 3 regiments of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division, 3 battalions of the 3rd Rifle Brigade, an engineer battalion and 184 guns. These operations were to be carried out on October 24, and were to be accompanied by a bombardment of the Turkish positions by all the batteries around Plevna.
Gorni Dubnik had been selected as the point at which the Sofia road should be cut because of its proximity to the besieging forces and because it was considered that the ground in front of the village offered tactical advantages to the attacker. It was also, however, the strongest of the positions fortified by Chefket on the Sofia road. There was a large redoubt on the northern side of the road, surrounded by extensive advanced entrenchments and a lunette on the other side of the road. The position was commanded by Ahmed Hifzi, who had a total of between 7,000 and 8,000 men, with 4 guns, and who was, accordingly, heavily outnumbered. Of course, the position was not far from the whole of Osman’s army, and Chefket’s force, at Radomirtza, was not far away either.
Gourko, having reconnoitred the Turkish position on October 22, crossed the Vid in the early hours of October 24. He planned to attack on the north, east and south sides of the Turkish position, and to send a Cossack brigade and two regiments of Roumanian cavalry to the west to cut off the Turkish retreat. On the right of the attacking columns was Major-General Ellis, with the 4 battalions of the Rifle Brigade, 3 sotnias of Cossacks and 16 guns. In the centre Major-General Zeddeler had the 8 battalions of the Moscow and Grenadier Regiments, the sapper battalion, one sotnia and 16 guns. On the left, Major-General Rosenbach had the Paul and Finland Regiments (8 battalions) with 16 guns. The three columns reached their jumping off points at 8.30 am, about 1,800 yards from the Turkish positions, and all the artillery opened fire. The bombardment was supported by the Cossack horse artillery of 6 guns which had arrived on the north-west of Gorni Dubnik, so that by 9.00 am 56 guns were shelling the Turkish redoubt.
At about 10.00 am Colonel Lioubovitsky led the Grenadier Regiment forward, capturing the lunette and following the Turks up to the redoubt. There the advance halted; driven back by a murderous fire, the grenadiers took refuge behind the lunette and in the ditches beside the high road. Zeddeler now sent the Moscow Regiment forward with two batteries. The infantry joined the grenadiers in the ditches on the high road while the artillery pressed to within 900 yards of the Turkish position, only to be obliged to retreat owing to the accuracy with which the Turkish infantry picked off the gunners. By now Lioubovitsky was down, and so were Zeddeler and Colonel Scalon, his chief of staff; the infantry remained pinned down in the ditches, about 60 to 80 yards from the redoubt.11
Both Ellis and Rosenbach, seeing the whole of the centre column engaged, took it to mean a general attack, and each sent forward their columns to attack the redoubt. Ellis, with the Rifle Brigade, was held up by heavy fire from the trenches north-east of the redoubt, while Rosenbach’s assault failed in the face of a terrible fusillade of rifle fire, the Paul Regiment falling back to a position behind the Grenadier Regiment and the Finland Regiment to a dead angle at the bottom of the ravine south-west of the redoubt. In this attack Rosenbach was wounded and Colonel Rounov, commanding the Paul Regiment, was killed.
The attack of the Russian Imperial Guard at Telis, October 24. (Russes et Turcs)
By noon, therefore, Gourko was staring defeat in the face, and an intervention by either Osman or Chefket at this point would have been conclusive. However, Osman had his hands full, with the heavy bombardment of his positions and the movement by Zotov’s force. Chefket, on the other hand, was disinclined to get too close to the Russians; it was widely believed that if caught, he would be hanged by the Russians for his part in the Bulgarian atrocities, and he refrained from advancing out of Radomirtza. Ahmed Hifzi, therefore, was obliged to fight his battle unaided. At 2.00 pm Gourko, reviewing the position of his forces, received very bad news. He had, in order to cover his attack on Gorni Dubnik, sent a column of 4 rifle battalions, with 17 squadrons and 20 guns, under Colonel Tchelistchev, towards Telis, with orders to capture the Turkish works there if possible, and to protect the left flank of the attack on Gorni Dubnik.
Arriving in front of the Telis redoubt, the riflemen launched their attack at about 10.00 am, and soon cleared the Turks out of a line of rifle pits in its front. These were, however, very shallow and offered no protection from the fire of the redoubt, so the riflemen must either retreat or go forward to the redoubt. They chose to attack, courageously rushing forward under heavy fire, but could not reach the redoubt. They took cover for a while in some broken ground until Tchelistchev, hearing that Turkish reinforcements were approaching, ordered the regiment to fall back, retiring about a mile and a half. A dreadful scene ensued:
From 200 to 300 wounded Russians remained on the ground; and when the Turks came out immediately after the retreat of Tchelistchev’s column, they were all killed, after being subjected to the torture of most horrible and disgraceful mutilations.12
This atrocity appears to have been perpetrated by Bashi-Bazouks. There was no doubt that it occurred; two English surgeons, serving with the Turkish garrison and later made prisoner, confirmed the incident. The riflemen had suffered terribly, losing a total of 973 men killed and wounded. Although the Turks made no attempt to follow them, their retreat left the road to Gorni Dubnik open, exposing Gourko’s force to an attack from the rear, and it was clear to him that there was not a moment to lose. He ordered an attack from all sides at 3.00 pm, to be signalled by a succession of three volleys to be fired in turn by the batteries on the left, then in the centre and then on the right, after which all the infantry should assault the redoubt. Gourko went to the left column, giving the necessary orders to Lieutenant-General Count Shuvalov, the commander of the 1st Guard Division. However, at this point the artillery of the right column fired three volleys, and the infantry charged forward to the assault. Gourko, in his report of the battle, described what followed:
It was with a sinking heart that I followed what was about to take place; there were going to be isolated assaults one after another, of which the success was more than doubtful. To remedy matters as far as possible, and to sustain the column on the right, which had already begun the assault, I sent orderly officers in all directions to give the troops the order not to wait any longer for the signal, but to support the attack of the column on the right. As was to be expected, a series of attacks one after another took place. Received by an extremely murderous fire, no one body of troops could reach the great redoubt.13
The Battle of Gorni Dubnik. (Fauré)
Pinned down by the incessant fire, the attackers found what shelter they could, and held the ground that they had won, apart from the Finland Regiment, which was caught in open ground and forced to fall back to the dead space on the slope of the ravine, losing its commander Major-General Lavrov, killed at the head of the regiment. The assaults were over by 4.00 pm. The Russian artillery had ceased fire for fear of hitting their own men, while a withdrawal from the temporary shelter found by the troops would have caused enormous losses. Dusk began to fall, and with it a silence over the redoubt, until two battalions of the Ismailov Regiment, crawling forward, got within 50 yards of the redoubt. Simultaneously the rest of the infantry rushed forward, and stormed into the redoubt:
The artillery also advanced to within 100 yards of the Turkish redoubt; and at this short distance poured in an effective and deadly shell fire, the effect of which was to create a scene of indescribable horror. The blockhouses within the redoubt were speedily in flames; the wounded and the horses were being burnt alive; the trappings of the artillery were on fire, and the explosion of cartridges which lay about mingled with the cries of the sufferers, the rattle of the infantry fire, and the thunder of the guns. The atmosphere of the camp was a thick yellow mist of dust and smoke, made lurid by the scarlet tints of the setting sun.14
At about 6.00 pm Ahmed Hifzi hoisted the white flag. The Russians took 2,289 prisoners and 4 guns. The Turks had lost about 1,500 men killed and wounded. About 5.000 of the garrison did, however, manage to escape, making their way into Plevna or back down the road to Telis. The Russian losses were heavy; 829 men had been killed and 2,980 wounded. Two regimental commanders and a battalion commander were among the dead, while two brigade commanders, a regimental commander and three other colonels were wounded, together with the divisional chief of staff and three of his officers.15
Greene, reflecting on the heavy casualties which had been sustained during the battle, observed:
The blow was a heavy one, for the troops were all picked regiments of the Guards, and their officers nearly all belonged to the nobility; it brought the sufferings of war home to the higher classes in a way they had previously no idea of. The fault was not so much Gourko’s, but rather that of the men themselves and their subordinate officers; yet it was a generous fault, for they had rushed forward impetuously in advance of their orders, filled with the pride of their birth and position.16
The Tsar was broken-hearted when he read the casualty lists, so many of the individuals being personally known to him; the extent of the butcher’s bill almost led to Gourko being relieved of his command.
Gorni Dubnik had thus been cleared, but it was obviously necessary that Telis should be taken as well, since Gourko was for the moment uncomfortably situated between two enemy forces. Accordingly he assembled most of his force and on October 28 was in front of Telis. At 11.00 am he opened fire on the works with 70 guns, and by 2.00 pm the Turkish artillery had been silenced, preparing the way for an assault. At this point, however, showing a good deal less resolution than Ahmed Hifzi at Gorni Dubnik, the Turkish commander Ismail Hakki Pasha sent out a white flag. Upon being assured that his officers would be allowed to keep their personal property, he agreed to surrender. The Russians moved forward to occupy the Turkish positions. As they did so, however, they came upon the unmistakable evidence of the massacre of their wounded on October 24, and in spite of all their officers could do they violently attacked the Turkish troops, killing about 50 before order could be restored. Over 3,000 prisoners were taken, together with four guns and a large quantity of small arms ammunition intended for the garrison of Plevna.
Meanwhile Osman, still apprehensive that another general assault on the city was planned, recalled the garrison of Dolni Dubnik to Plevna. This made its way into the defences of the city during the night of October 31/November 1, just as Gourko was massing his forces to storm the place. When the Russians occupied the fortifications of Dolni Dubnik next day, the investment of Plevna was complete.