Elena
While the story of Plevna proceeded towards its ultimately tragic conclusion, there had been action on the other fronts in Europe. At the Shipka Pass, Suleiman had, after the repulse of his expensive assaults of August, limited his activity to desultory artillery and rifle fire for the next two weeks. His passivity suggested that he had given up his attempts to force the Shipka Pass, and that instead he would try to cross the Balkans elsewhere. Radetzky therefore sent back more than half of his troops to the north, for the protection of his communications in the event of an attack from Elena or through the Trojan Pass. Suleiman did still hold some of the positions captured during the August fighting, although the bulk of his army had been withdrawn behind Shipka village and to Kazanlik.
Suleiman had not, however, given up on the Shipka Pass, and his next plan was to use mortars and siege guns, the Russian positions on St Nicholas being almost out of range of field artillery. On September 11 the Russians were treated to the spectacle of the Turks returning in large numbers to their advanced positions, and with immense effort dragging up the mortars and siege guns. Clearly a fresh attack was in prospect, and next day the bombardment commenced, half of the guns targeting St Nicholas and the rest being aimed at the road along which must come any Russian reinforcements. The mortars had been very well sited behind the Turkish-held ridge, the shells falling with great accuracy, and compelling the Russian gunners to withdraw into shelter. Even so, it was supposed that this project of Suleiman was merely intended to distract attention from movements elsewhere.
This view was, however, incorrect. The Turkish victory in the third battle of Plevna had emboldened the high command at Constantinople, and as a result orders were issued to Mehemet Ali, at that time still in command on the Lom, and to Suleiman at Shipka, that steps must be taken to strike a decisive blow. Mehemet Ali’s operations have already been described; Suleiman now put in hand his preparations for an assault on Radetzky’s position, optimistic that the defences would have been considerably softened up by his bombardment.
The spearhead of the assault was formed by a task force of 3,500 volunteers, composed principally of regulars, with a few hundred Arabs. In three columns, they were to move during the night of September 16/17, each man wearing something white on his left arm for identification. Once in position, an attack was to be launched simultaneously, one column assaulting the south-east corner of St Nicholas, one the south-west corner, and the third, further south-west, was to aim for the summit through a break in the wall of rock. Once the height was taken, a general attack was to be launched, Redjib from the east and south-east, Salih from the south and south-west and Vessil from the west and north-west. Each of these had six battalions for the assault.1
The volunteers left the principal camp at about 11.00 pm, in two hours reaching the three groups of infantry which were already in position to follow up a successful attack. At 3.30 am they set off again towards Mount St Nicholas. The first column, from Redjib’s camp, was spotted by the Russians before it was half way to its objective, and came under heavy fire. The Turks replied with equal vigour, throwing themselves forward and up the steep rocks, hurling hand grenades as they ascended the bare slope of St Nicholas, before engaging the companies of the Podolsk Regiment in a murderous hand-to-hand fight. Colonel Doukhonine, in command on St Nicholas, reported back to Major-General Petrouschevsky, Dragomirov’s successor in command of the 14th Division, and the latter sent forward two companies of the Zhitomir Regiment to reinforce him. As the desperate struggle continued, Radetzky arrived to take personal charge of the battle, and fed in one company after another as they reached the scene. The Russian fire was concentrated on the first Turkish column, which sustained huge losses, but in spite of this the Turks continued to climb the mountain, and began entrenching themselves. A counter-attack by three Russian companies was thrown back, suffering heavy losses in their turn.
Stalemate had been reached on this part of St Nicholas, defenders and attackers both suffering heavy casualties during a prolonged exchange of fire. The Russian battery on the eastern side of St Nicholas poured a continuous rain of shells on the Turkish attackers, while the mortars and siege guns on the Turkish side kept up a continuous bombardment of the Russian positions. At this point the second column, unnoticed by the Russians, suddenly debouched on the summit from the south-west. Taken by surprise, the Russians switched their fire to this new assailant, which permitted the first column to establish itself on the south-eastern crest of St Nicholas. The arrival of the second column was wholly unexpected, for it was believed that the summit was completely inaccessible from the south-west. A correspondent of the Augsburger Zeitung testified to what had been a remarkable achievement:
On the following day I saw the men of this column; their clothes were in shreds; the buttons were either torn out or rubbed off; they all had their pantaloons in holes at the knee, and the bleeding sores which appeared beneath showed what unheard of efforts they had been obliged to make.2
Turkish officers observe an assault in the Shipka Pass. (Ollier)
Soon after sunrise the third column arrived on the summit, having suffered heavy losses when its advance was discovered. However, once there, it was able to resist the three violent counter-attacks made by the Russians, although Hamdy Bey, the commander of the column, was one of those who fell during the fierce fighting. Half an hour after sunrise, therefore, a Turkish standard had been planted on top of St Nicholas, and this success was reported to Turkish headquarters. There, Suleiman had been watching in the distance the progress of the volunteers, marked by the flashes of the heavy exchanges of gunfire. He telegraphed the news that Shipka was taken to Constantinople, from where it was transmitted all over Europe.
The news was, however, premature. Although Vessil and Salih had, as arranged, attacked the Russian positions as soon as the assaulting columns had reached the summit of St Nicholas, their troops storming forward with immense courage, they failed to take any of the Russian positions in front of them, suffering heavy losses in the process. Everything therefore turned on the success of Redjib, who was due to attack from the east. Although the volunteers on St Nicholas shot down the gunners in the Russian batteries below them in an effort to facilitate Redjib’s advance, it did not come. For whatever reason, his troops remained in their positions and, with the defeat of the columns of Salih and Vessil, the volunteers on St Nicholas were totally unsupported. Radetzky put together an attacking column, led first by Colonel Tiajelnikov and then, when he was wounded, by Colonel Prince Khilkov. After a desperate struggle the Turks were thrown back, in some cases literally, as they retreated down the mountainside, suffering further heavy losses.
A remarkable opportunity had been wasted; the Augsburger Zeitung’s correspondent was scathing in his assessment of the reason for the failure:
A brilliant début degenerated into a total defeat. Why? Because the Pashas are always men who would allow themselves to be slain by the side of their cup of coffee before quitting it, and because the subordinate officers are worthless. With Turkish soldiers one would be able to conquer the world, on condition that their officers should be dismissed. Among the 800 wounded treated here today, only one officer was found.3
Casualties on both sides had been heavy; the Russians had lost over 1,000 officers and men killed and wounded, while the Turkish loss was much greater. In his official report of the battle, Radetzky estimated that the total of the enemy casualties was of the order of 3,000 men.4 After the failure of the attack there was a lull in the fighting, while Suleiman pondered his next step. On September 20, having established some fresh mortar batteries, he renewed the bombardment, concentrating his fire on St Nicholas. This continued for ten days, in the course of which the Russians learned how to protect themselves against this form of cannonade. When this became apparent to the Turks, they changed target, now aiming at the road up which all the Russian supplies and ammunition came. After some early Turkish success in this process, Radetzky ordered that such movements must take place only at night, which effectively put paid to Suleiman’s efforts to disrupt his communications.
At the beginning of October Suleiman’s insidious campaign in Constantinople finally bore fruit, when Mehemet Ali was dismissed as commander in chief, and replaced by Suleiman. His position as commander of the forces in front of the Shipka Pass was taken by Raouf Pasha, until then holding office as Minister of Marine, as well as a subordinate position under Suleiman. He appears to have disapproved of Suleiman’s elevation, at first resigning his post before retracting this and taking up his command.
If the members of the council in Constantinople expected an immediate increase of activity on the part of the army in the Quadrilateral as soon as Suleiman arrived, they were to be disappointed. He soon decided that the Tsarevich’s army occupied a position far too strong to be attacked, while the position of his own army at Kadikoi was unsatisfactory due to the difficulty of obtaining sufficient supplies. On October 19 he withdrew the divisions of Nedjib and Fuad to Rasgrad, leaving only Assaf’s division and Mustapha’s column to cover the railway. Suleiman’s passivity surprised the Russian high command; in anticipation that he would pursue the aggressive policy he had adopted at the Shipka Pass, the 2nd Grenadier Division had been earmarked to reinforce the Tsarevich. This order was now revoked, and the division was sent to Plevna. Thereafter on both sides preparations were made for a winter campaign. The Turks were issued with warm cloaks, and a programme of building winter huts was put in hand. On the Russian side supplies of sheepskin coats began to arrive, and there too the soldiers were set to work building their winter quarters.5
By mid November the desperate situation of Plevna had concentrated the mind of the War Council on the possible steps that might be taken. The assembly of Mehemet Ali’s relief army had begun, but it would clearly take time to put it sufficiently in order to be able to advance. Considerable dissatisfaction was felt at Suleiman’s inaction, and he was ordered to take immediate steps to assist Osman. Suleiman accordingly embarked on a series of reconnaissances in force at various points on his line, the most significant being at Pirgos on the Danube on November 19. Here his troops gained a temporary advantage, driving the two Russian companies holding Pirgos back to Metchka, before reinforcements arrived to restore the position. Suleiman had, however, learned enough from this action to conclude that the Russians had few troops immediately south of the Danube, and that another thrust in this area might succeed in reaching the recently completed bridge at Batin, over which passed the Tsarevich’s line of communications.
On November 26 Suleiman launched an attack over the Lom with a force of some forty battalions, with fifty-four guns, some regular cavalry and 500-600 Circassians. Commanded by Assaf, the force was divided into three columns. On the right Salim Pasha was to attack Pirgos; in the centre Ibrahim Pasha was to attack Metchka and support the third column, led by Osman Bey, whose objective was Trestenik. The Russian position to be attacked was commanded by Lieutenant-General Firks. On the left at Metchka Major-General Tsitliadzev had a brigade of the 12th Division, with sixteen guns, while at Trestenik Major-General Fofanov had the other brigade of the 12th Division, the Bessarabian Regiment from the 33rd Division, and forty-four guns. The rest of the 33rd Division was in reserve.6
The Turkish assault at Metchka. Key – A, B) Russian batteries, C, D) Second and third lines of Russian entrenchments, E) Russian advance posts abandoned at the start of the action, F) Turkish skirmishers advancing against Pirgos, G) Pirgos road, H) Pirgos village, I) Monitor Nicopol, J) Turkish reserves, K) Russian batteries at Parapan. (Russes et Turcs)
The Turkish assault went in at 8.00 am, and quickly overran the Russian outpost line, except at Gol-Tchesme, where two battalions held out. Salim took Pirgos, and advanced along the bank of the Danube between the river and Metchka, occupying the village but failing in two assaults on the Russian entrenchments behind it. In these he was joined by Ibrahim. Meanwhile Osman, after a lengthy struggle, drove out the garrison of Gol-Tchesme, which fell back on Trestenik with heavy loss. Firks, fearing that the considerable numerical superiority of the Turks would lead to the loss of Trestenik, ordered Tsitliadzev to launch a counter-attack on Salim, which he did with immediate success. His advance drove Salim first out of Metchka, then back to Pirgos and finally, at about noon, down the road to Rustchuk. He was unable to exploit his advantage, however, as Ibrahim, who had fallen back in the direction of Trestenik, advanced again towards Metchka, threatening to outflank Tsitliadzev, who was obliged to break off his pursuit of Salim to meet this danger. Meanwhile Osman Bey continued his movement on Trestenik. The battle was fought in appalling weather. In bitter cold, and high winds, icy rain beat down on the combatants. By 3.30pm Tsitliadzev was making progress against Ibrahim, and Firks, who had been able to reinforce Trestenik, reckoned that the time had come for a general counter-offensive. The Russians advanced all along the line, and Assaf retreated across the Lom. He had sustained total casualties of about 1,200; the Russian loss in killed and wounded was 766.7
Thwarted in this endeavour, Suleiman now prepared to assault the opposite end of the Tsarevich’s line, calculating that this would have been weakened as the Russians withdrew forces to meet the threat from Assaf. His earlier reconnaissances had indicated that Tirnova might not be strongly defended on its eastern side, and he resolved to launch a major attack on Elena. From there he would move on Tirnova, obliging Radetzky to retreat from the Shipka Pass, through which Raouf could then advance to join hands with him. Suleiman also sent an order to Mehemet Ali to support him by making an advance in the west towards Lovtcha. His intention was extremely ambitious, since he hoped in this way to oblige the Russians to concentrate against him, and for this to provide Osman with an opportunity to break out of Plevna.
Progress Map No 3 – Third period of the Campaign. From the fall of Plevna to the conclusion of peace at San Stefano, December 10 1877 to March 3 1878
Russian patrols soon picked up the fact that a Turkish force was concentrating around Osman Bazar, and steps were taken to reinforce the garrison of Elena, which at the beginning of December consisted of a brigade of the 9th Division, commanded by Major-General Dombrovsky, with a dragoon regiment and three batteries. An advanced position in front of Elena, based on the Mareni ravine, covered the roads. On the night of December 3/4 the Russian outposts reported the fires of an enemy camp, and gave the alarm. There was no suspicion of the fact that Suleiman had skillfully assembled a force of 20,000 infantry, 8,000 Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks, and twenty guns. At 6.30 am on December 4 the Turks advanced on Mareni, which was held by two battalions, with four guns and three squadrons. Demonstrating against the Russian centre, Suleiman sent an attacking column around the left, and once this was engaged sent a further column against the Russian right. A battalion of the Orel Regiment now came up, and led by the regimental commander, Colonel Kleveshahl, delivered a bayonet charge. This momentarily drove the Turks back; but the heavy preponderance of numbers meant that the battalion was soon surrounded, and Kleveshahl wounded. An eyewitness described the outcome:
A revolver in each hand, the heroic leader performed prodigies of valour, but, receiving a second wound, fell from his horse, and, placed on an ambulance stretcher, was being carried off the field, followed by several other wounded officer, when the Turks threw themselves upon the group, killed the bearers, finished several of the wounded, and were about to do the same by the colonel. But struck with his brilliant uniform, for he still wore that of the Guard from which he had just been transferred, they thought they had taken an officer of very high rank, and lavished attention upon him.8
Only one officer and a few soldiers managed to cut their way out, the whole of the rest of the battalion being killed or captured.
Dombrovsky sent up all reserves to assist what remained of the detachment at Mareni. A counter-attack could make no headway against vastly superior numbers and the Russians slowly fell back into Elena, where Dombrovsky had a well fortified position. He put the battered troops from Mareni in the second line; his first line was held by seven companies, with a battery of nine guns on a height on his left and another of fifteen guns on the right. Suleiman sent a column at 10.00 am around Dombrovsky’s left, in the mountains between Slatavitza and Elena, and another to the south of the town. In spite of brilliant charges by the Russian cavalry, the turning movements penetrated into the rear of the defenders, and Dombrovsky had no choice but to order a retreat, abandoning nine of his guns as he did so. He fell back to a position at Jakovitza, having lost about 1,800 men killed or wounded; in addition, the Turks had taken some 500 prisoners, a sufficiently unusual circumstance for Greene to remark on it, adding that they were sent to Constantinople and well cared for.9 The Turkish losses were of the order of 2,000 men killed and wounded, having achieved a considerable victory, described by Hozier as, after the victories at Plevna, ‘the most brilliant success gained by the Turks in Europe during the whole war.’10
So far so good; but Suleiman’s advance had been based on a plan whereby the Turkish force at the Shipka Pass would cooperate. No help, however, had been forthcoming from that quarter, nor was likely to do so. This force had been drastically weakened by the detachment of a large part of the force to join the army assembling under Mehemet Ali at Sofia. With only about 12,000 effective troops available, and with deep snow lying on the mountains around the pass, it was in no state to make any headway in this sector. Nor was the command of the force in the slightest way encouraging. Raouf had now been appointed military governor of Adrianople, and his place at Shipka had been taken by Ahmed Eyoub Pasha. Layard, writing to Lord Derby on November 27, was trenchant in his observations on the appointment:
Ahmed Eyoub Pasha was recalled, it is generally believed, from his command in the Army of the Danube on account of his having left Mehemet Ali Pasha without support, notwithstanding the instructions which he had received, in the attack on the Russian positions at Bejir Verbovka, thus causing its failure. He has the reputation of being slow, incompetent, and obstinate. I have not yet been able to ascertain how he has obtained his new command – probably through some intrigue. It is to be feared that his former jealousy of Mehemet Ali Pasha will not have diminished, and that he will not be disposed to afford much help either to that general or to Osman Pasha.11
On the same day Layard had reported that the War Council at Constantinople had been dissolved, ‘Namyk Pasha admitting that it was the cause of more mischief than good, and that the Sultan had done right to put an end to it.’12
The lack of any support from the Shipka Pass seems to have paralysed Suleiman, and although in holding Elena and Slatavitza he had what Hozier described as ‘the two keys of Tirnova,’ he did nothing to exploit his victory. To do so he must act fast, for although for the moment Suleiman had the odds very much in his favour, the Russians had immediately set about bringing up reinforcements to restore the position. During the night of December 4/5 Prince Mirsky, the commander of the 9th Division, who had arrived at Jakovitza with a battalion from his 2nd Brigade, was reinforced by the 4th Rifle Brigade from Tirnova, and next day the 2nd Brigade of the 11th Division arrived.
Mirsky was sensitive to the criticism at the Imperial headquarters as to the extent of the casualties which his division had sustained in the fighting around Elena and Jakovitza. Describing the events later rather defensively to Captain Richard von Pfeil-Burghausz, a Prussian officer who had been granted a commission in the Russian army, he explained the critical situation that could have led to the fall of Tirnova:
Now, I ask you whether our losses, which were certainly great, were not counterbalanced by the preservation of our chief place in Bulgaria, the fall of which just before the surrender of Plevna would have made the much desired junction of Osman and Suleiman Pasha practicable. The consequences of this could not possibly be stated. Now, what followed? This defeat was grist to the mill of my enemies in the Grand Duke’s headquarters. Only my most gracious Emperor saw what had really been done, and he at once sent a hundred crosses of St George for the men.13
On December 5 Suleiman, who had been trying to contact the Turks at Shipka, made a half-hearted advance, sending a column to occupy Minde on his right and launching an assault on Jakovitza. The attack lasted no more than an hour before it was broken off. His determination appears to have deserted him completely, and the opportunity was lost. The Russians continued to bring up reinforcements, so that by December 8 they had the equivalent of three and a half divisions in position to bar any further advance on Tirnova.
Having evidently concluded that he was going to make no further progress here, Suleiman returned to his earlier project of an attack on the extreme left of the Tsarevich’s army. In doing so, he reckoned that the Russian positions on the northern end of the line would have been weakened by the dispatch of reinforcements to the southern end. He was able to put together a large force for the operation, assembling over sixty-eight battalions, or 40,000 men, which he placed under the command of Fazli Pasha, in place of Assaf, who had been sacked after his failure on November 26. On December 10 Suleiman personally accompanied a reconnaissance in force to test the strength of the Russian positions. On the following day the Turkish forces began to concentrate for an assault, thirty-eight battalions crossing the Lom and a further thirty battalions emerging from Rustchuk.
Suleiman’s hope that the position between Metchka and Trestenik might be less strongly held was disappointed; the whole of the XII Corps was now in line there, supported by the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Division. At about 10.00 am on December 12 the Turkish artillery on the heights between Pirgos and Metchka, consisting of twenty guns, opened fire and the infantry advanced down into the ravine. Here they were met by a furious artillery fire from the Russian batteries behind Metchka, and were forced to retreat. Fazli brought up reinforcements, and launched another attack, supported by a heavy artillery bombardment on the Russian left; this too failed, as did three other assaults on the Russian right. Grand Duke Vladimir, watching the battle from Trestenik, was waiting his moment for a counter-attack. At about 1.00 pm he judged that the time was ripe, and launched the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Division against the Turkish left. The attack was supported by the 2nd Brigade of the 12th Cavalry Division, which in fact came into action first, and got into some difficulty on the plateau of Gol-Tchesme before the infantry stormed the Turkish shelter trenches. With these troops practically in Fazli’s rear, Vladimir sent forward the 2nd Brigade of the 33rd Division against the Turkish troops in front of Metchka. Sweeping down on the Turkish infantry sheltering in the ravine, the Russian troops drove them up the opposite slope with the bayonet; as they retreated, the Turkish infantry were raked by the Russian artillery, and suffered heavily. Their retreat across the Lom continued under heavy fire not only from the guns of Vladimir’s Corps, but also from the Russian batteries over the river at Parapan, and from the captured Turkish monitor now renamed Nikopol.
Suleiman’s assault had proved a total failure, and an expensive one. His losses amounted to nearly 3,000 men, of whom some 800 were killed. The total Russian casualties amounted to 799 men. The bulk of the Turkish casualties had been caused by the shrapnel of the Russian artillery.14 This was effectively the end of the campaigning on the Lom; apart from the garrisons of the fortresses, the troops that Suleiman had so unsuccessfully employed in an effort to relieve the pressure on Plevna were withdrawn to Roumelia. Overshadowed by the battles around Plevna, and the more spectacular fighting in the Balkan mountains, by its operations the Tsarevich’s army had successfully carried out its task of protecting the left flank of the Russian invasion of Bulgaria, and of masking the Turkish fortresses of the Quadrilateral.