40

The Congress of Berlin

Although Gorchakov had stoutly declined to release the terms of San Stefano until they had been officially ratified, they were known unofficially, and the governments of the other Great Powers reacted strongly. The conclusion of the treaty concentrated their minds, and Austria brought forward a revised proposal for the congress to be held in Berlin. This followed a suggestion from Gorchakov, to which Bismarck had no objection. France and Italy agreed as well and so, provisionally, did Britain. Derby told Parliament that British acceptance was subject to the submission of the whole of the treaty to the congress. He told Münster on March 6 of another concern, as the ambassador reported to Berlin:

Lord Derby also fears that public opinion might imagine (rightly or wrongly he would not say), that the congress, if held in Berlin, would assume a more Russian complexion. If it were certain that Prince Bismarck was to be its President, much of the distrust concerning it would disappear; but there was a fear that out of courtesy and under pressure of his other engagements Prince Bismarck would concede the office of President to Prince Gorchakov, and this was not desired.1

What was evident to everyone concerned was that a great deal of negotiating would have to be done to get all parties to Berlin with a respectable chance of getting a generally acceptable settlement. Bismarck, for his part, made it clear that he would insist that no questions should be discussed that did not arise immediately out of the terms of the treaty. He would himself have preferred that a congress be held at Baden-Baden rather than Berlin, since he disliked the idea that he would be saddled with a certain amount of responsibility. He also made it clear that there could be no congress without British participation.²

The potential sticking point was Britain’s insistence that the whole of the treaty must be before the congress, to which Gorchakov replied with an evasive answer on March 19. In the meantime the risk of war between Russia and Britain appeared during March to be increasing, both sides actively making preparations. Among these was an attempt by Disraeli to create a league to protect common Mediterranean interests, consisting of Britain, France, Austria, Italy and Greece, which his Cabinet received with scepticism. He also raised the desirability of obtaining a naval station in the Eastern Mediterranean to protect British maritime interests, with which the Cabinet (but not Derby) did agree. On March 27 Disraeli went further, proposing to the Cabinet that the reserves should be called out, troops brought from India, and suitable naval stations be occupied (apparently Alexandretta and Cyprus). The Cabinet approved the calling out of the reserves, and also in principle the other proposals. Disraeli, like Gorchakov, was playing with fire; he cannot have been surprised that at the end of the Cabinet meeting Derby asked Northcote to give Disraeli his resignation. He was replaced by Salisbury, whose position at the India Office was taken by Hardy, the Secretary of State for War. The latter was succeeded by Frederick Stanley, Derby’s younger brother.3 Derby, whose health had been affected by the long struggle to avoid war, went with a good deal of relief.

At Constantinople, Layard and Hornby were getting ready for war. The ambassador was told by Abdul Hamid that if given advance notice Turkey would fight alongside Britain. The admiral was preparing plans to carry the war into the Black Sea, as he explained to the Admiralty:

If I went, I should try to go up by night, taking as many colliers as I could. My object would be to prevent the Russians communicating with Sulina, Kunstedje, Varna, Bourgas and Midia … If two or three fast corvettes, say honest 12-knot ships, could be sent up by night, they would be very useful. I have nothing of the sort here at present.⁴

He was also concerned with the safety of Gallipoli; his second in command, Sir Edmund Commerell, was planning, with part of the fleet, to operate in cooperation with the Turkish army if the Russians made a move there, and this was expressly approved by the Admiralty.

Meanwhile Salisbury communicated to all the Great Powers a circular setting out the British position on San Stefano, which argued that signatories to the treaties of 1856 and 1871 could not lawfully withdraw from their obligations unilaterally; that the effect of the treaty was the suppression of Turkish independence; and that it was not compatible with British interests. The firm note which it struck ensured a favourable reception in Britain; Gorchakov and Shuvalov were not at all happy about it, the former complaining that the circular stated what Britain did not want, but not what it did want. This was a view shared by Andrassy.⁵

Throughout April Disraeli pursued his discussions with the Austrians, but Andrassy was reluctant to commit himself to anything like the extent that Disraeli required, even after a direct question was put on April 20 as to Austrian willingness to insist on limiting the new Bulgaria to the region north of the Balkans. By the end of the month the discussions petered out. Meanwhile another effort was made to defuse the situation that existed at Constantinople when Bismarck was asked to mediate the withdrawal of the Russian army and the British fleet from their proximity to the capital. Both sides were keen on such a deal, although neither could be seen to suggest it, the British because Hornby’s fleet was not of much use where it was, and the Russians because their troops were in a decidedly exposed position. The suggestion was that the fleet should return to Besika Bay, and the Russian army should retire to Adrianople. Bismarck agreed to help, adopting the proposal as his own, but the negotiations beame bogged down in detail, and in the end neither force was withdrawn until after the Congress of Berlin.⁶

Shuvalov, who with Derby had worked tirelessly to avoid a warlike situation from developing, was now deprived of the steady flow of Cabinet information which arose from his equivocal relationship with Lady Derby. Salisbury was polite but cold, at first declining for the moment even to state how Britain wished to revise the San Stefano treaty. The new Foreign Secretary was, however, sympathetic to Shuvalov’s plan to go back to St Petersburg to discuss the situation at first hand, not least because he felt that if Gorchakov retired, as seemed likely, he would much prefer Shuvalov to succeed him rather than Ignatiev. Accordingly, he relented, and gave the ambassador a note of the British conditions; the removal of Bulgaria from the Aegean, support for Greece, and the preservation of Turkish independence. Bulgaria was to be limited to the north of the Balkans; Russian territorial claims in Armenia were to be reduced; and the position as to the war indemnity clarified. Shuvalov was to be away for two weeks; he pleaded that nothing controversial should be done in that time.

The British fleet passing through the Dardanelles. (Ollier)

The reference to Greece was significant. The Greeks, unlike the Serbs, had taken no part in the war, and were beginning to regret the fact, as it appeared that they might not make the kind of territorial gains that they desired, particularly in Thessaly. In February the Greek government announced that it had ‘resolved to occupy provisionally with its army the Greek provinces of Turkey’.7 This particular scavenger had, however, left it too late; there would be no support forthcoming for an attack on Turkey at this time, and the government climbed down on an assurance that ‘an Hellenic question be discussed at the Congress.’ Notwithstanding this, there were insurrectionary movements in Thessaly which continued until May. The territorial arrangements of the Treaty of San Stefano were, of course, extremely disagreeable to Greece.

Shuvalov’s trip to St Petersburg was of crucial importance; it has been said that ‘the question of peace or war rested temporarily in the hands of a skilful, ambitious, and mildly unscrupulous ambassador,’ and this was certainly the case. Having seen Bismarck en route he arrived at St Petersburg on May 12. He found the Russian capital in a considerable state of excitement, but in spite of this he achieved a good deal. Through Loftus, he obtained a British assurance that the provisions as to Serbia and Montenegro would not be interfered with if Britain got her way on other matters; and he overcame Ignatiev’s influence with Alexander to get agreement to a limited Bulgaria. On his way back through Berlin, therefore, Shuvalov asked Bülow now to move to establish a formula for the Congress; Bismarck agreed to this, the basis being a ‘free discussion of the entire Treaty of San Stefano.’⁸

The proposals which Shuvalov brought back formed the basis of an Anglo-Russian accord, the terms of which were quickly agreed. Russia agreed effectively with the British position as to a divided Bulgaria, the boundary of which was to be the line of the Balkans. The northern part was to be politically autonomous, while the southern part administratively so. In Asia, Bayazid was to be restored to Turkey; the San Stefano provisions for Montenegro and Bessarabia were to remain. Britain accepted the terms of Bismarck’s invitation to the Congress. The agreement, in spite of the reservations of Disraeli and the Queen, was signed on May 30.⁹

Events now moved swiftly. On June 4 an Anglo-Turkish Convention was concluded, by which if Russia retained at the Congress her conquests in Asia, Britain would defend the Ottoman Empire against further attack, and would be allowed to occupy Cyprus. This was to remain a secret until the Congress had completed its deliberations, although it appears that in fact its terms were not as much of a surprise as had been thought; hints had been dropped earlier, especially to the French, the power that was most likely to be concerned with Britain’s acquisition of a key point in the Middle East. Finally, on June 6 an Anglo-Austrian agreement was signed. This secured Austrian support for the British position as to the boundaries of Bulgaria, British support for Austria’s position as to Bosnia and Herzegovina (whatever that turned out finally to be) and an agreement to cooperate in negotiations over the withdrawal of the Russian army.10

With these agreements behind the curtain having been concluded, the way was clear for the opening of the Congress. The British delegation was led by Disraeli, supported by Salisbury and Lord Odo Russell. Disraeli was handicapped by his imperfect command of French, and was persuaded by his colleagues that he should therefore address the Congress in English. Count Münster offered Bismarck an insight into the personalities involved, and in particular the Prime Minister:

Your Highness will find it very difficult to keep up a serious conversation with this very vain man, who is already showing the weakness of age. At the same time he frequently expresses witty and illuminating ideas, but fails in the higher conception – moral grip. His Private Secretary, Mr Montagu Corry, is devoted to his Chief. He is a very pleasant man, but is vain, and spoilt by Society. He has great influence with Lord Beaconsfield. He uses every bit of gossip to retain his influence with his aged Chief, and is therefore to be handled with great caution … Lord Salisbury is known to Your Highness. His experience at Constantinople and during late years has been of the greatest use to him. Before long he will be Prime Minister, and a leading figure in England.¹¹

Keeping the road clear for the guests to the banquet at the Royal Palace, Berlin. (Ollier)

The Congress which opened on June 13 has been described as ‘one of the most brilliant political assemblies of modern times, not unworthy of comparison with the congresses of Vienna and Paris,’ and those participating included most of Europe’s leading statesmen.12 Bismarck led the German delegation, with Bülow and Prince Hohenlohe, then serving as ambassador in Paris. Gorchakov, in spite of his infirmity, was the first member of the Russian delegation, although frequently Shuvalov, the second Russian member, was effectively its leader. Salisbury unkindly observed of Gorchakov that ‘if some kindly fit of gout would take him off we would move much faster.’ The third of the Russians was Oubril, their ambassador in Berlin. The flamboyant Andrassy led the Austrian delegation, supported by Count Karolyi, the ambassador at Berlin, and Baron Haymerlé. The French delegates were Waddington, the Foreign Minister, and Count Saint Vallier, the ambassador to Berlin. From Italy came Count Corti, the Foreign Minister, and Count de Launay, the ambassador to Berlin. The composition of the Turkish delegation had caused some difficulty at Constantinople, where it was decided that the responsibility for what could not be other than an unfortunate outcome should not be taken by a pure Turk. Accordingly, the chief of the delegation was a Phanariot Greek, Caratheodory Pasha. The second delegate was Sadullah Bey, the ambassador at Berlin, and the third was the unfortunate Mehemet Ali – unfortunate because Bismarck appeared greatly to resent a German-born individual representing Turkey. Indeed, Bismarck throughout treated the Turkish delegation disrespectfully, making it clear that the function of the congress was not to save territory for the Turks but to ensure international peace.¹³

Although much had been done to hammer out agreements between the Great Powers before the Congress assembled, there were still a number of key issues that remained to be settled. Of these, perhaps the most important was the evolution of an agreement between Austria and Russia. In addition there were the questions of the Russian occupation of Bulgaria, the Straits issue, the future status of Batum, Armenian reform and of course the Cyprus Convention. Even where understandings had been reached beforehand, the Russians and Turks were prepared to argue every point. Nor had other key relationships been clearly defined, such as that between Austria and Turkey.14

The sitting of the Congress of Berlin. (Ollier)

Crowd outside the Radziwill Palace, waiting to see the plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Berlin. (Ollier)

There were also a number of peripheral issues, such as the Roumanian treatment of the Jews. Since 1866 Austria, England, France and Germany had been pressing the Roumanian government to improve the condition of the Jews, and latterly Germany had been particularly active. As to Serbia, deserted by the Russians, there was no option but to seek Austrian support; this, Andrassy was prepared to give, but only on his terms. Then there were the ambitions of Greece, which were supported by the French, not least because it gave them something to do beyond listening, and agreeing with what was decided by others.

All this meant that Bismarck had, as president of the Congress, a lot of work to do. When the delegates arrived, they were greeted by a Chancellor unfamiliar in appearance, Bismarck having unexpectedly grown a beard. He was hopeful that a week or ten days would suffice to produce a general agreement but it took all his considerable skill to achieve the compromises necessary to keep the Congress moving. The most difficult question was of course the future of Bulgaria, and Bismarck put that first on the agenda. Discussion of the issue effectively began on June 17; the British attitude was uncompromising, due to the publication in the London Globe of the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement, which had caused public fury at home to which Disraeli felt obliged to respond. Over the next nine days, the issue was hotly discussed. Disraeli told Corti that he took ‘the gloomiest view of affairs’ and that if the British view did not prevail, he would wreck the Congress. He chose Corti, because the latter was well regarded by Bismarck, for whom the message was intended. Famously, Disraeli put it about that he had ordered a special train to enable him to stage a theatrical departure. Bismarck took this calmly, and visited Disraeli to broker an agreement as to the frontiers of the new Bulgaria, whereby the Sanjak of Sofia and the port of Varna would be included.

The Radziwill Palace, meeting place of the Congress of Berlin. (Illustrated London News)

After the Bulgarian question had been settled, Bismarck, who had now shaved off his beard, proposed that the boundary changes affecting Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia and Roumania should be next on the agenda. Andrassy was concerned to achieve the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina but only if this was proposed by another of the Powers; he did not want it to be Germany’s suggestion, however, because he did not want to appear to be publicly beholden to Germany or, if it came to that, to Russia. In part his problem was domestic, because in Austria and Hungary there was a strong body of opinion that was opposed to the inclusion of more Slavs within the Empire. Bismarck sardonically observed:

I have heard of people refusing to eat their pigeon unless it was shot and roasted for them, but I have never heard of any one refusing to eat it unless his jaws were forced open and it was pushed down his throat.15

Andrassy got his way; in return for his support to Britain during the discussions on Bulgaria, Salisbury proposed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seconded by Bismarck and it was generally agreed.

The question of Russia’s Asiatic acquisitions had been largely covered by the agreement with Britain, except for the status of Batum. Salisbury now threatened to propose a change in the regulations affecting the Straits if Russia did not give up the port; ultimately, after the intervention of both Gorchakov, who spoke to Disraeli, and Bismarck, it was agreed that Batum should become a free port. Meanwhile the existence of the Cyprus Convention, with which Batum’s future was connected, began to be generally known. The Turkish government refused at first to issue a firman permitting the immediate occupation of the island by Britain, but was finally persuaded to do so on July 6. Time was pressing and Salisbury now had to hasten to Waddington to calm French reactions to the occupation of Cyprus; at Bismarck’s suggestion, Salisbury assured Waddington that Britain would leave France a free hand in Tunis, and this was enough to pacify the French Foreign Minister.

Plan of the hall of the Congress of Berlin, showing the seats of the plenipotentiaries. (Illustrated London News)

Meanwhile the other territorial questions had been settled. Russia got back Bessarabia, and Roumania got the Dobrudja as compensation. Serbia gained territory to the south-east, and Montenegro got Antivari. For the Greeks, however, there was no immediate satisfaction; all that the Congress did was to invite Turkey to reach an agreement with Greece as to any frontier adjustments.

The Congress concluded on July 13. Disraeli and Salisbury, claiming that they had achieved peace with honour, were welcomed back to London as the heroes of the hour. In spite of his almost criminal recklessness in bringing Britain to the edge of war with Russia, Disraeli had got away with it, and was rewarded with the Order of the Garter from a grateful monarch. And perhaps he deserved it; as Bismarck observed: ‘der alte Jude, das ist der Mann.’ In spite of Münster’s warning, the two men had got on well together, and could reasonably claim to have been responsible between them for winding up the Russo-Turkish War.

Professor Medlicott has pointed out that the ‘real clue to the proceedings and decisions’ of the Congress of Berlin was to be found in the agitated state of public opinion in various countries, and especially in Austria, Russia and Britain:

The determining factor in the various compromises arrived at was the desire of all the governments to appease this public excitement without recourse to war. The concentration of prestige and ability tended, on the whole, to have a steadying effect on the deliberations … only Bismarck, and perhaps Beaconsfield during the first fortnight, succeeded in establishing over the other delegates something of the personal ascendancy they enjoyed in their own cabinets. Bismarck’s vast reputation and achievements would have made him, in any circumstances, the outstanding personality, but the position of president gave him additional prestige which he exploited to the full. The other delegates were soon to find that his sweet voice and careful enunciation could not long disguise his determination to speak with the most outrageous bluntness wherever the acceleration of business made it necessary.16

The Roumanians had good reason to feel particularly discontented with the final settlement. After the Treaty of San Stefano they had protested about the provision by which Russia reserved the right to cede the Dobrudja to Roumania in exchange for Bessarabia. The Russian response was to occupy Bessarabia with far more troops than were required to protect the lines of communication, and to threaten that if Roumania refused to agree to the proposed exchange, the whole country would be occupied and the army disarmed. Prince Ghica, the Roumanian envoy in St Petersburg, took the matter up with Gorchakov, complaining that this was a breach of the convention that Russia would protect Roumania’s integrity. Prince Charles, in his memoirs, recorded the strikingly discreditable and disingenuous response:

Prince Gorchakov gave Prince Ghica the following curious explanation: when Russia signed the convention in view of a war against Turkey, she undertook by that article to defend the integrity of the Roumanian territory only against the Turks. The prescriptions of this article have no reference to Russia and her relations with Roumania.¹⁷

In Berlin, Roumania was allowed only to make a formal protest before the Treaty ratified the exchange.

For Turkey, the overall outcome, if less catastrophic than the Treaty of San Stefano, was of course seriously prejudicial. As Count Corti observed of the negotiations in Berlin: ‘Everybody was telling everybody else to take something which belonged to somebody else,’ and it was nearly always Turkish property which was concerned. Russia, on the other hand, had had to accept that part of the fruits of her victory had been taken from her. It could not, of course, have been otherwise. Russia had been militarily exhausted by the war, and reality compelled her to give up some of the gains which Ignatiev had wrested from the Turks at San Stefano. In the end, the two empires, having fought a bitter war at a fearful cost in human suffering, ended it by sharing in this way a feeling of humiliation.