In the aftermath of World War II, when DDT and other chemical insecticides became widely available for use in the U.S. for agriculture and public health, legislators began to realize the limits of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to regulate novel synthetic insecticides. Congress held several hearings to discuss further legislation. Industry representatives bridled at the idea of further regulation, and scientific opinion regarding risks of insecticides varied widely. But chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT and the organophosphate insecticides taxed the regulatory power of the FFDCA, and Congress revisited the mounting challenges of synthetic insecticides by holding hearings, which led to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in 1947. Despite wide-ranging hearings and the passage of the FIFRA, lawmakers returned to the subject of pesticides again in 1951 in hearings regarding food additives, with further legislation in the form of the Miller Amendment and the Delaney Clause.
The FIFRA hearings brought together representatives from government agencies (USDA and FDA), industry (the Agricultural Insecticide and Fungicide Association), and, to a limited extent, consumers. Among those who appeared before the congressional hearing was S. R. Newell, then assistant director, Livestock Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, USDA, who characterized the bill as follows: “The broad objective of this bill is to protect the users of economic poisons by requiring that full and accurate information be provided as to the contents and directions for use and, in the case of poisons toxic to man, a statement of antidote for the poisons contained therein. It is also designed to protect the reputable manufacturer or distributor from those few opportunists who would discredit the industry by attempting to capitalize on situations by false claims for useless or dangerous products.”1 It should be noted that the “users of economic poisons” referenced here were farmers not consumers or the public at large. Newell noted unanimous agreement on the need for such a bill and general agreement that the Insecticide Act of 1910 no longer met the needs for effective regulation, largely as a result of the emergence of new pests, new insecticides, and new controls that had emerged over the course of the previous thirty-five years. New insecticides, such as DDT, inspired questions. It is worth noting, however, that the Insecticide Act of 1910, like the Pure Food and Drug Act, served primarily as a labeling law (see chapter 1). Newell suggested that the insecticides industry would react favorably to registration: “Experience over many years indicates that many manufacturers would welcome the opportunity to check their products and the claims made for them with the administrative body. Recent experience in the examination of labels applying to DDT amply demonstrates this fact.”2
Newell’s optimism regarding industry cooperation with pesticide registration was not shared by all. L. S. Hitchner, executive secretary of the Agricultural Insecticide and Fungicide Association (the national pesticide trade organization), stated his preference for free market competition over federal regulation: “Let us take DDT. I do not think the Bureau of Entomology or any government department or agency today is in position to set and freeze standards. Normal competition has given the American farmer the highest quality of goods in a highly competitive industry, and setting of standards, in my opinion, would be impossible.”3 Note that like Newell, Hitchner made specific reference to DDT. But Hitchner restricted his statement to the “quality” of insecticides, which presumably referred to their efficacy against target organisms rather than their potential toxicity to nontarget organisms, including humans. Moreover, Hitchner questioned the ability of government or industry to standardize insecticides, though he acknowledged that two older insecticides, arsenate of lead and calcium arsenate, were in fact standardized. He argued that state experimental stations could educate consumers in the use of pesticides, while dismissing standards: “For example, New York State today is having dealer conferences all over New York to educate buyers on insecticides. There is no simple way of arriving at a standard on two or three thousand chemicals. I wish we could, but it just seems to me to be impossible.”4 Hitchner argued that education provided by the state experimental stations obviated the need for federal standards, which would be impossible to develop anyway.
Hitchner returned the theme of state sovereignty later in his testimony when he challenged the consolidation of regulatory authority in the office of the secretary of agriculture by citing slow acceptance of oil sprays: “When oil sprays were first introduced, they were vigorously opposed by several of the state agricultural colleges and official workers of the government. The companies that introduced those hired their own entomologists, their own pathologists, and went from farm to farm getting the material used over the vigorous objection of the experimentstation people, who were in a rut on new development. Today there are millions of gallons of those oil sprays in commercial operation.”5 Once again, Hitchner assumed that reticence to adopt oil sprays stemmed from fear of new technology rather than safety concerns. But concentration of authority troubled the industry representative most: “You are definitely giving a man a right to say ‘You cannot use cryolite; you have to use arsenate of lead’; or ‘You can’t use arsenate of lead, you have to use DDT.’” He continued: “The best example on that is where we made a survey on DDT, where we got 48 States to send their directions for use, and if you read the 48 reports there is hardly one State that agrees with any other at the present time. Under this power, if they had the right to refuse registration, we would not be able to sell in a lot of those States our materials. It is a very dangerous precedent.”6 Again, Hitchner used state sovereignty to set independent directions for use (and the ability of companies to market insecticides accordingly) to undercut registration and centralized authority.
Representative Walter K. Granger of Utah turned this argument on its head, when he commented on Hitchner’s statement: “It seems to me there is another horn to that dilemma, too. I assume that the Secretary Agriculture, before he would disapprove the registration, would have competent chemists—I assume he would—to ascertain what it was, and instead of taking the bureau’s idea and their chemists, the public would be forced to take what your chemists said; would they not? That would be the case of another individual saying what the situation should be.”7 Hitchner continued to resist central authority: “There you have an awfully concentrated amount of authority in one man.”8 But not all organizations were so resistant to further regulation of insecticides. Russell Smith of the National Farmers Union urged the committee to report the bill without substantial amendment, and he praised the extension of the bill to cover rodenticides and for the secretary of agriculture to provide a definition of what constituted “pests.” Finally, he appreciated additional labeling safeguards, particularly the designation “highly toxic to man.”9
Several speakers attributed the need for new legislation to the increasingly “scientific” nature of new insecticides. Dr. E. L. Griffin, who was assistant chief of the Insecticide Division, Livestock Branch at the USDA, referred to technical (or scientific) challenges in voicing his support for the new act: “The insecticide, fungicide, and rodenticide business has changed very markedly since 1910. It is now a highly scientific business. The products coming on the market are new and unknown products in a good many cases, and in our opinion they need a lot more careful supervision than is possible under the present act. We believe that this act should be brought up to date, and we believe that this is a good act.”10
When the new insecticide bill (H.R. 1237) came up for debate in the House in May 1947, August Andresen (Republican, Michigan) introduced the bill and noted that it had the support of the insecticide industry, distributors, USDA, and farmer’s organizations. Some of the manufacturers were resistant to registration, but for the protection of the public, this was a necessary part of H.R. 1237.11 The only interchange of note occurred when Representative Frank B. Keefe (Wisconsin) asked why administration of the act would fall to the USDA rather than the FDA, which already administered the FFDCA. Andresen deflected Keefe’s question by pointing out that the USDA administered the Insecticide Act of 1910. Keefe pressed his point noting that the new act would require separate testing facilities in two agencies. The chairman of the Agriculture Committee, John W. Flannagan, Jr. (Virginia), suggested that the act would primarily affect farmers and that it was currently administered by the USDA in the form of the Insecticide Act; the new act only amended the old one. Without further debate, H.R. 1237 passed the House and went on to the Senate, where it passed without further debate.12
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, signed into law in 1947, dictated the licensing of the so-called economic poisons prior to their sale in interstate or international commerce. The law also stipulated that prominent warning labels detailing instructions for use be included on highly toxic pesticides. Furthermore, FIFRA required manufacturers to color powdered insecticides to prevent confusion with other household products, for example, flour, sugar, baking soda, and salt. Adelynne Whitaker emphasized that FIFRA assured consumers of quality pesticides while protecting them from accidental poisonings. Registration required manufacturers to test insecticides to determine efficacy before marketing their products. Yet public health officials were disappointed that FIFRA’s registration clause did not reinforce the FFDCA and control pesticide residues. In his critique of an earlier version of the bill, Paul A. Neal of the PHS recommended a consideration of public health aspects and called for coordinating toxicity testing between PHS, FDA, and USDA.13 FIFRA in its final form did not incorporate Neal’s recommendations.
Though federal officials, consumers, and even manufacturers questioned the efficacy of FIFRA in addressing potential damage to the environment and health, like the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, FIFRA served as a critical initial step in the development of more comprehensive regulation. Nevertheless, according to environmental scientist John Wargo, the primary risk-management strategy reinforced by FIFRA after World War II was simply labeling. By requiring labels with instructions for use, the law implied that those who used pesticides could avoid adverse effects by following the directions. Despite the clear notes of concern regarding DDT and other new pesticides sounded during the FIFRA hearings, the law failed to address potential risks to health and the environment.14 Wargo criticized the legislation as preferential to pesticides manufacturers: “This approach may have done far more to protect the entitlements of the pesticide manufacturers rather than either public health or environmental quality. It sheltered manufacturers from uncoordinated state regulations, and may simply have served to provide the public with a false sense of security that pesticide risks were being well contained by USDA. The reality was that USDA registered pesticides whenever asked.”15
By 1951, concern regarding possible risks associated with insecticides and other chemicals that were finding their way into the food supply inspired a new round of congressional hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food Products, which took place in the nation’s capital and around the country from April 1951 to March 1952. Congressman James J. Delaney of New York chaired the hearings, which became known as the “Chemicals in Food Products” or the “Delaney Hearings.” Another key member of the committee was Nebraska Congressman A. I. Miller. Yet it was the committee’s chief counsel, Vincent A. Kleinfeld, who examined witnesses utilizing his comprehensive and encyclopedic knowledge of the FFDCA and its amendments as well as the prepared statements and exhibits.
Over the course of many days of hearings in several venues, including Washington, DC, Washington state, and California, with a transcript of more than 2,700 pages, several critical issues emerged. Congressmen repeatedly returned to their concerns regarding the widespread use of DDT and its potential health effects. Nevertheless, scientific uncertainty permeated the hearings. The views of scientists and public health officials on DDT and other synthetic insecticides ranged widely. Some scientists noted the lack of concrete evidence of harmful effects associated with DDT, and others cited anecdotal evidence of effects from mild to profound in connection with DDT and other chemical insecticides. Yet most participants agreed that the new insecticides had significantly boosted crop yields and contributed to public health since their introduction in the years following World War II. Thus the Delaney Hearings provide a useful index to congressional interest in pesticides, broad-based uncertainty among scientists, and a sense that such chemicals had quickly emerged as critical to American food production and public health. There was, however, general recognition, particularly among state health officials, that the Insecticide Act of 1910 and the FFDCA of 1938 required revision.
In his analysis of the significance of the Delaney Hearings in the development of pesticides policy, Christopher Bosso has argued that industry initially resisted the hearings on the deeply entrenched view that any publicity constituted negative publicity. In the case of the Delaney Hearings, Bosso recognized that industry fears were justified, given Delaney’s stated intent for the committee: assess possible dangers to public health and decide whether the threat warranted federal regulatory reform.16 In revisiting the Delaney Hearings, I point to how scientists and those charged with the responsibility to evaluate scientific evidence evaluated risks associated with exposure to pesticides, particularly chlorinated hydrocarbons and organic phosphates, which had proliferated since the passage of FIFRA in 1947. To a certain degree, the views of witnesses correlated to their primary association. To the surprise of no one, industry and USDA representatives defended the value and safety of new insecticides, but there were notable exceptions: scientists from academia, the PHS and the NIH conveyed considerable uncertainty regarding risks in the face of the committee’s pointed questioning.
One of the first witnesses proclaimed the importance of new insecticides to the food supply. K. T. Hutchinson, who was assistant secretary of agriculture, quantified losses due to pests: “Notwithstanding the large losses caused by pests, which for insects alone are estimated to approximate $4,000,000,000 annually, without the use of pesticides it would be impossible to produce needed food. The importance of controlling pests is being recognized, and more farmers and livestock producers are using the essential aids to protect the investments they make to produce crops and domestic animals. That the control of pests is one of the most effective ways to increase yields and supply high-quality products is becoming generally accepted.”17
Numerous state health officials submitted statements to the hearing. Most focused their concern on additives and substitutes that were being introduced to food products deliberately, but some also cited the potential risks of chemicals that entered the food supply inadvertently, such as insecticides. R. L. Cleere, executive director of the Colorado Department of Health, articulated worries about the pesticides: “Our department is in accord with any legislation to control the use of harmful chemicals which may find their way to the consuming public in foods. Today many new insecticides, rodenticides, and fungicides are being used which are definitely toxic and their toxicity levels on the end products have not been ascertained.”18 In addition to uncertainty regarding the new insecticides, Cleere noted the lack of legislation in Colorado: “Colorado has no definite legislation as yet on this matter. There has been no organized work of a State nature on toxicities. Our food and drug laws do prohibit poisonous, adulterated foods, knowingly marketed as contaminated by poisonous or harmful substances and resulting in sickness or death from eating such articles of food or drink. This would apply to known poisons; but what about some of our present day insecticides, etc.?”19 Another state health official, Carl E. Weigele of New Jersey, recommended extensive testing before market release.20 Interestingly, Weigele used the New Drug section of the FFDCA (§ 201 (p)) to support the practicability of such toxicity testing without burdening private industry. George A. Spendlove of the Utah Department of Health expressed similar sentiments in this statement: “Our department feels very strongly that Federal legislation should be enacted providing, as in the case of new drugs, that chemicals introduced in foods shipped in interstate commerce should first be demonstrated to be safe to the satisfaction of the FDA.”21
One of the clearest (and most alarming) presentations on DDT came from a Connecticut physician named Morton S. Biskind. Before receiving his M.D. at Case Western Reserve University in 1930, Biskind earned a master’s degree in pharmacology in 1928. Though he served as a research fellow at Case Western Reserve University, as a member of the headquarters staff of the council on pharmacy and chemistry in the AMA, and as head of the endocrine laboratory and the endocrine clinic at Beth Israel Hospital in New York, Biskind restricted his statement to his direct clinical experiences with patients over the course of two and a half years. He argued:
The introduction for uncontrolled general use by the public of the insecticide DDT, or chlorophenothane, and the series of even more deadly substances that followed has no previous counterpart in history. Beyond question, no other substance known to man was ever before developed so rapidly and spread indiscriminately over so large a portion of the earth in so short a time. This is the more surprising as, at the time DDT was released for public use, a large amount of data was already available in the medical literature showing that this agent was extremely toxic for many different species of animals, that it was cumulatively stored in the body fat and that it appeared in the milk. At this time a few cases of DDT poisoning in human beings had also been reported. These observations were almost completely ignored or misinterpreted.22
Biskind proceeded to describe what he called “Virus X,” a syndrome comprising many symptoms—acute gastroenteritis, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, diarrhea, running nose, cough, sore throat, pain in the joints, muscle weakness, insomnia, headache, hypersensitivity, numbness, twitching of voluntary muscles, loss of weight, and psychological effects, among others.23 Several of Biskind’s patients had complained of these symptoms in association with encounters with DDT and other pesticides. Biskind had described these cases in a series of articles published in 1949.24
In the midst of Biskind’s statement, Congressman A. I. Miller, who was also a doctor, interrupted to ask if Biskind had published these findings in scientific medical journals. Biskind responded that he had, but Miller countered by citing the findings of the AMA: “Generally the theory that DDT is highly toxic in concentrated doses is accepted, of course. But the American Medical Association, a group that goes through these poisons with a fine-toothed comb, has not reached the conclusions that you are now giving to the committee. Is that true?”25 When Biskind replied that he was aware of the findings, Miller asked if he could identify any large group of scientific men who accepted Biskind’s conclusions. After admitting that he could not, Biskind cited three scientists who agreed with him. Miller then queried the chairman whether the record should be encumbered with something of doubtful standing as far as scientific men were concerned. Delaney countered that Biskind should read his statement. Miller noted his reservations once again: “It is true that what he says has not been accepted by a majority of the scientific men. I maintain that there is only a very small segment that accepts this viewpoint; and if there were a large segment that accepted the viewpoint, then the Government would have no right to permit DDT to be used any place. It is their fault, if they accept this man’s viewpoint and findings. I am inclined to be sympathetic with him, because I think there is something to it, but if what he says it true, then it goes counter to the other large group of scientific men that says that it is safe to use, and has been given the green light by Government agencies.”26 Before Biskind could resume, Congressman E. M. Hedrick, another physician, questioned Biskind: “As a matter of fact, lots of people have been exposed to DDT with apparently no injurious effects; is that not correct?”27 Biskind answered it was true. Hedrick wondered whether the people Biskind had described had been hypersensitive to DDT. Biskind replied: “I do not think that there is any question that they are. But I think that the number that are, is far larger than ordinarily supposed.”28
Biskind resumed his statement by describing several additional patients who had experienced a variety of symptoms in association with exposure to DDT through various pathways. Patients had encountered DDT in their foods, as dusts in aerosol sprays, and even from wallpaper and clothing impregnated with the chemical. Biskind based his original research on more than two hundred cases, but he had learned of many additional cases. He argued that exposure to DDT was virtually universal and that it was impossible to separate the effects of direct exposure and those that occurred following ingestion of contaminated food. Even specimens of mother’s milk from patients with a history of exposure showed DDT. Cow’s milk offered no alternative, Biskind argued, since USDA reports indicated that samples contained 0.5 to 25 ppm of DDT.
Biskind worried about other chemicals, including chlordane, BHC, and parathion. He acknowledged that these chemicals posed a dilemma: “We are dealing with double-edged swords, for the very substances now promoted to increase the size of our crops in the long run turn out to be detrimental to agriculture itself. All these substances and the fantastically toxic parathion, too, inhibit the growth of certain plants, and compounds of the DDT group also persistently poison the soil, so far as present evidence goes, for 5 or 6 years and possibly indefinitely.”29 The dire threat of parathion, in particular, extended beyond the risk to humans: “Parathion is everywhere admitted to be deadly for man and all other animals. One manufacturer warns that sprayed areas may not even be entered with out a mask and protective clothing for 30 days after application. Failure to heed this precaution has already resulted in numerous serious accidents to men. What happens to the birds and other wildlife who cannot read?”30
In his conclusion, Biskind exhorted Congress to take action against the use of certain pesticides on crops: “It is my opinion that the use on crops or in food establishments of any sort, of the chlorinated cyclic hydrocarbons—which include the DDT group of compounds and the organic phosphates of the parathion group—should be, and, if we want to survive, must be—specifically forbidden by law.”31 In response, the chief counsel, Kleinfeld, asked a few questions beginning with, “Doctor, I think you testified that the views, which you have here expressed are not generally recognized by the medical or scientific profession; is that correct?”32 Biskind admitted that this was true. Kleinfeld then asked Biskind to cite his publications regarding DDT and to indicate any other scientists who had conducted experimental work on the insecticides he discussed. Finally, Kleinfeld requested that Biskind read aloud the text of a press release issued on April 1, 1949, by the Federal Security Agency and the USDA after a meeting that included representatives from appropriate divisions of the U.S. Army and Navy as well as the FDA, the PHS, the Office of the Surgeon General, and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau. The statement dismissed concerns regarding DDT: “It is well recognized that DDT, like other insecticides, is a poison. This fact has been given full consideration in making recommendations for its use. There is no evidence that the use of DDT in accordance with the recommendations of the various Federal agencies has ever caused human sickness due to the DDT itself. This is despite the fact that thousands of tons have been used annually for the past 4 or 5 years in the home and for crop and animal protection.”33 After a few more questions of a general nature, the committee dismissed Biskind.
For information regarding the toxicity of DDT to humans, the Delaney Committee called on Wayland Hayes and Paul Neal of PHS. In their statement, Hayes and Neal acknowledged that DDT was a highly toxic in large amounts and noted the symptoms of acute toxicity.34 Having clearly established the acute toxicity of DDT to animals, Hayes reviewed the medical literature regarding its toxicity to humans, including his inhalation and ingestion experiments (see chapter 2). From this research, Hayes noted: “No objective or subjective symptoms were found in spite of thorough physical examinations, including neurological, biochemical, hematological, psychophysiological, electroencephalographic and electrocardiographic studies.”35
Despite the extensive testing with animals, Hayes and Neal stated, there was no evidence of harmful effects of the ingestion of DDT: “We have found that although a great deal of animal experimentation has been carried out with DDT there are no bona fide scientific reports of human cases following the ingestion of small amounts of DDT, although, as just noted, acute poisoning following large doses has been encountered.”36 With this statement and many others, the PHS scientists directly challenged Biskind’s testimony. To contradict Biskind, Hayes and Neal deployed several strategies. First, they undermined the scientific validity of two British studies on which Biskind based his symptomology for DDT by questioning the methodology, the reproducibility, and the general environment (postwar England). But Biskind’s anecdotal evidence of DDT poisoning in his patients struck Hayes and Neal as particularly problematic. For example, if more than a third of Biskind’s patients exhibited symptoms associated with DDT poisoning, as he testified, Hayes and Neal rhetorically wondered why other doctors were not reporting similar numbers of poisonings in their patients. To counter Biskind’s claims, they reported on a surveillance program that began in 1945, when DDT was released for public use, and continued until November 1947. Of forty reported cases, none yielded a diagnosis of DDT poisoning after toxicological investigation and hospitalization, in some cases. Moreover, they reported, “To the best of our knowledge, there have been no substantial cases of DDT poisoning in this country resulting from the ingestion of food containing DDT as a residue.”37 While acknowledging DDT’s significant toxicity, Hayes and Neal reiterated and expanded this point in their conclusion: “In summary, it must be emphasized that DDT is a toxic substance and can cause injury if not properly handled. Undisputed cases of acute illness have been reported. It is also true that there are accurate reports of the presence of DDT in the body fat and milk of human beings. There is, however, no authentic report of liver injury or other chronic poisoning in man resulting from DDT.”38
Hayes and Neal, who fielded many of the questions over the course of the hearing, yielded little ground from their initial assertion of the safety of DDT as a residue in food in low quantities. Even in the case of the USDA’s recommendation in 1949 to limit use of DDT in dairy barns, Neal pointed to the lag between experimental work and publication as one reason the PHS did not have information on the storage of DDT in fats. But Kleinfeld pressed the point:
KLEINFELD: “And I suppose that is why no objection was taken to the use of DDT in dairy barns and on dairy cattle; is that correct?
NEAL: “I think that is a question for the Department of Agriculture, but from my memory I can tell you, sir, what I remember of it. It was that if you used DDT in the barns in dairies and you kept it off the cow’s food it was thought that very little absorption would occur.”39
There were other instances wherein Neal or Hayes directed Kleinfeld to another branch of government or dismissed a question as falling outside the realm of science. For example, Kleinfeld questioned Hayes about a recent paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association that suggested the possibility that DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons had adverse effects on the functions of adipose tissue. Kleinfeld quoted from the paper and asked Hayes if he agreed with the statement. Hayes replied: “I agree with the statement, but you notice he says they may have.”
KLEINFELD: “Yes. I asked if you would agree with that statement—that it may have.
DR. HAYES: Yes; it may have
MR. KLEINFELD: Pardon me?
DR. HAYES: I say it may have. But there is no proof in the literature that it does.
KLEINFELD: Is there any proof that shows that it does not?
HAYES: No. It is just that we are quoting from a scientific journal and they are discussing the possibilities.
KLEINFELD: That is correct.
HAYES: And that is one of the possibilities which must be considered.
KLEINFELD: Which should be considered before a chemical is used on a food product?
HAYES: I believe that is a legal question, not a medical one.
KLEINFELD: I would think the ordinary person would answer that question, sir; but if you do not want to, let me ask you another question.40
Having raised scientific uncertainty to qualify the findings of a paper that could have important implications for the food supply, Hayes dismissed the important questions of what should be considered before a chemical is used on a food product as a legal question (and implied that such questions fell outside his purview).
At other times, Hayes deflected questions by referring to existing federal legislation or recommendations. After again referencing the J.A.M.A. article, Kleinfeld asked Hayes if he believed that DDT should be used in dairy barns. Hayes responded, “That has already been prohibited after a decision made jointly by the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agriculture, the Public Health Service, and perhaps others.”41 Similarly, Hayes deflected a question regarding the development of resistance to DDT in houseflies, noting that he was no entomologist, after he acknowledged that researchers in the U.S. and abroad had revealed that houseflies did develop DDT resistance.
Wayland Hayes’s testimony before the Delaney Hearings was vitally important in part due to his position as the chief of toxicology for the PHS. Few government scientists had better access to the full range of data regarding the potential health effects of DDT and other chemical insecticides. No one was better placed to provide Congress with a clear sense of potential human health effects of exposure to DDT. Hayes made it clear that DDT was a highly toxic chemical that in large doses could sicken humans. He acknowledged acute effects, but he knew of no definitive studies that had shown chronic effects in humans as a result of small exposures. Although he conceded that the USDA, FDA, and the PHS had recommended against the use of DDT in dairy barns, Hayes offered no indication of his view of this action though surely concern regarding chronic effects of exposure to DDT in cow’s milk inspired the recommendation. By parsing questions as scientific or legal, concerned with other scientific specialties, or covered by existing legislation, Hayes characterized (in one individual) exactly the fissures that delayed a coordinated response to the risks of chemical insecticides, let alone legislation. As the hearings proceeded, other scientists would present potential DDT residues as a real threat to public health leaving Congress no clear path toward reasonable legislation.
One of the recurring issues as the hearings proceeded was the considerable gulf that existed between science and policy. Scientists accepted a degree of uncertainty, while legislators sought “proof” of threats to human health and safety before enacting laws restricting use. Occasionally members of the committee expressed their frustration over the failure of scientists to clarify the safety of DDT. As part of his prepared statement, Frank Princi, who was an associate professor of industrial medicine at the University of Cincinnati, endeavored to capture for the committee the scientific uncertainty related to DDT: “[DDT] has been subjected to more scientific investigation than any other organic material. Yet, despite this knowledge, there is still sharp disagreement concerning the hazard associated with its use. On the one hand, we are told that it is the safest of insecticides; and, on the other, it is suggested that its toxicity may have been underestimated and that it is probably responsible for such conditions as suicidal tendencies, aplastic anemia, pneumonia, leukemia, virus X, arteriosclerosis, and even cancer.”42 Princi’s comment reveals the wide range of conditions anecdotally associated with DDT, but he identified extrapolation from animal data to humans and real-life exposures as a critical element of scientific uncertainty: “Much of this controversy had developed because of attempts to translate the results of animal experimentation into human experience without appropriate consideration of the variability of animal species. Other diversities of opinion have developed because of a lack of understanding of the actual conditions of exposure which result from ordinary methods of use of the material. It is suggested that these questions cannot be resolved fairly and adequately by any single government agency.”43 Insofar as gaps existed between different scientific specialties, there were also fissures between government agencies. Regulation of problems that cut across different agencies proved particularly difficult.
It was however, Princi’s comment about the scientific uncertainty surrounding DDT that drew the ire of A. I. Miller. Miller initially requested from Princi a simple clarification: “You state, of course correctly, that there is sharp disagreement among the experts,” to which Princi responded, “Yes, sir.” At that point, Miller’s frustration boiled over and he responded sharply: “That does not help this committee. We are at sea when experts disagree. Why cannot we get some experts up here who can say DDT is or is not harmful under certain limitations? Have you any opinion, as an expert, on the question of DDT?”44 Princi replied, “In my opinion DDT, in the manner in which it is now used and in the quantities to which persons are presently exposed, is apparently innocuous.”45
Miller again returned to the problem of scientific uncertainty, when he asked if Congress would be on sound ground if it said to insecticide manufacturers that “[they] must prove to the satisfaction of either a group of scientists that might be set up that the chemicals are not harmful to the human being before they are to be used in commercial food for the public.” Princi took exception to the word “proof”: “It is difficult for me to answer that question since you have used the word ‘proof’ because …”46 Miller interrupted Princi: “Then let’s put it another way. Who should have the burden of proof that it is not harmful?” With the question framed in a way to avoid the issue of scientific uncertainty, Princi replied decisively with a concise iteration of the precautionary principle: “The burden of proof certainly should fall upon the supplier or manufacturer. I think there is no question on that.”47
Scientific uncertainty also proved challenging beyond the realm of human health effects. The problem of insects developing resistance to DDT arose in the testimony of Charles E. Palm, who was a professor of entomology at the New York State College of Agriculture at Cornell University. In his prepared statement, Palm underscored this problem, noting that DDT had become ineffectual against houseflies in New York dairy barns as a result of evolving resistance. He worried that houseflies were developing resistance to other insecticides too.48 When pressed, Palm noted that he had found flies resistant to the recommended dosage and even much higher dosages. Moreover, the Cornell entomologist noted that resistance to one chlorinated hydrocarbon conferred a measure of resistance to all chemicals in the class.49
Several of the members of the committee seemed to fully appreciate the implications of Palm’s statement; namely, that flies could develop resistance to all of the insecticides within the class of chlorinated hydrocarbons. The phenomenon was not restricted to New York but was a general difficulty across the United States. Palm indicated that resistance had developed in as little as three years.50 Congressman Walter Horan noted that such was the case in his home state of Washington.51 In response to further questioning regarding insecticide resistance, Palm introduced the committee to two concepts—the “balance of nature” and biological control—only to dismiss them in favor of DDT, which growers found more reliable.52
Like other witnesses, Palm argued that agricultural productivity in the United States depended on chemical insecticides. He also believed that insecticides were “chemical protectants used in the production and protection of food and not as chemical additives.” Entomologists could make recommendations concerning the type, quantity, and timing of particular insecticides to minimize residues and risks to consumers. As one example, Palm cited increased yields of Irish potatoes without evidence of DDT residues. He also noted that entomologists consulted with the FDA and the USDA regarding problems, but he stressed the difference between insecticides and drugs (also regulated by the FFDCA of 1938). Palm exhorted the committee to maintain existing distinctions between insecticides and drugs in order to provide farmers with insecticides quickly. Public health could be protected with the addition of research facilities, which would decrease the time to appraise health hazards while insuring “the use of pesticides in their beneficial roles of providing adequate supplies of food and fiber as well as essential roles in reducing insect vectors of pathogens causing diseases of man and animals.”53 With his final statement, Palm spoke for many, if not all, economic entomologists. Namely, chemical pesticides provided extraordinary benefits in the service of both public health and food production. Risks could be managed with additional research facilities at least in the theoretical sense.
Another economic entomologist, George C. Decker, who was head of the Economic Entomology Section at the Illinois Natural History Survey and the Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, presented a view largely in accordance with Palm’s. Decker, however, underscored the general lack of evidence regarding health risks associated with insecticides. He noted that despite the use of millions of pounds of pesticides each year for the previous five years, there were very few recorded deaths attributable to insecticides and all were due to operations hazards or misuse. The general counsel, Kleinfeld, pressed Decker to acknowledge potential criteria of safety other than death, and he asked whether it was possible to say that no acute or chronic illnesses had been caused by the annual use of millions of pounds of insecticides. Decker answered the question in the abstract: “No one can answer that question with assurance and certainty. The circumstantial evidence would indicate that there is little, if any, of that, in my opinion. It seems to me, sir, that in studying accidents of any kind, the fatalities are an index of the other injuries.”54 Kleinfeld persisted in pressing the point that there could be illnesses in the absence of fatalities and that these illnesses might not register in vital statistics or even newspapers for a long time. Decker held his ground, arguing that any serious problems should have appeared in the media in the four to five years since the introduction of DDT.55 Still, Kleinfeld argued the subtler point regarding the possibility of chronic illnesses associated with the ingestion of very small amounts of an insecticide over a very long time, to which Decker finally acceded: “That is correct. I cannot deny that.”56
Up to this point, one can certainly understand why members of the Delaney Committee found themselves in a state of confusion regarding the risks of chemicals, particularly insecticides, in food products. In point of fact, PHS toxicologists and economic entomologists demonstrated a considerable degree of agreement regarding the significant benefits and the relatively minor and, for the most part, manageable risks associated with insecticides. Thus the testimony of John Dendy, head of the Analytical Chemistry Division of the Texas Research Foundation in Renner, Texas, may have caught the committee off guard. Dendy concluded his brief prepared statement with four conclusions: there was widespread contamination of both animal and human foodstuffs with DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons, contamination was spread and intensified by the continued use of chemical insecticides, continued use of DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons posed an ever-increasing hazard to the public health, and existing laws and/or enforcement procedure were insufficient to prevent the development of this serious hazard to human health. He asserted that the Texas Research Foundation planned to continue its research into these conditions.57 E. H. Hedrick of West Virginia, expressed his appreciation for Dendy’s clear exposition: “For the record, that is about as forthright a statement on DDT, about the results of DDT on human beings as I have ever heard.”58 And yet, when Hedrick asked Dendy if the present law was sufficient, Dendy noted that he was not a lawyer (and by intimation unqualified to render an expert opinion on legislation), but he could comment on the law’s inadequacy in its original writing for allowing indiscriminate use of insecticides or in its enforcement for permitting contaminated products to be consumed by individuals.59
Just as he hesitated to give his opinion on legal matters, Dendy also deferred to doctors on matters concerning human toxicity. When Congressman Miller asked him what concentrations of DDT would be injurious to humans, Dendy noted his lack of medical credentials, but he then proceeded to elaborate on the implications of biomagnification: “Well, that puts me on a spot, not being a medical man, and to date no one yet has established the so-called LD-50 evidence in all these insecticides, because, first of all, in any specific species, whether they are rabbits, white mice, or human beings, each individual has a specific tolerance and it does not exactly correspond to its next-door neighbor, even its litter mate, so an LD-50 is difficult to establish, and men who are well qualified have not established that. Milk containing small concentrations of DDT has been found by most of the investigators in the field. Even though the intake is small, the fatty accumulation in the tissues as the result is magnified as high as 34 times the original intake. In other words, with a diet of 10 parts per million you could expect, in some instances 340 ppm.”60 By suggesting that LD50s had not been established for all insecticides and that they could vary across species and even individuals, Dendy turned the discussion back to scientific uncertainty, but he reframed the problem in terms of its implications for human health by explaining how DDT magnified within organisms, including humans, which meant that small exposures (10 ppm) could build up in tissues to levels as high as 340 ppm. Dendy’s testimony provides a very early example of a specific concern—biomagnification—regarding the environmental implications of the widespread use of DDT and other insecticides.61 In these comments, he anticipated one of Rachel Carson’s central arguments in Silent Spring.
Moreover, in another prescient statement, Dendy noted the gaps between professions, for example, between chemists and physicians. Specifically he wondered when the medical profession would indicate whether or not DDT produced death in human beings. Despite extensive research conducted on the detection of DDT, as a chemist, Dendy believed that he had struck a barrier in the medical profession. In Dendy’s opinion, lack of coordination contributed to the problem. He elaborated on this point: “Yes, remember, sir, there has been much work done on it, but the lack of coordination of the individuals doing the work, their unwillingness to share information with one another, has been the chief draw-back. There are only two sides of this fence. You have to talk relatively freely with those individuals who are on your side of the fence and those who are on the other side of the fence are rather hesitant, and this was our objective.”62
The benefit of insecticides to agricultural productivity was a consistent undercurrent during the hearings, but the Delaney Committee also heard from at least one farmer who wondered about the risks of the new insecticides. In his prepared statement, Louis Bromfield, the owner of Malabar Farms in Lucas, Ohio, argued that the effects of new insecticides on humans and animals were largely unexplored: “Certainly their use should raise grave doubts. Put in the simplest terms, what is poisonous to the organic structure of an insect must also be poisonous in sufficient immediate quantities or in sufficient accumulated quantities to other life as well.”63 Bromfield could testify to the benefits of insecticides, but he found the risks to be more worrisome, arguing that the nation had “plunged into the wholesale use of all these poisons with little or no research concerning their ultimate effects upon health, vitality, and the powers of reproduction” to the detriment of “virtually every citizen.”64
Unlike other farmers who testified, Bromfield spoke as someone who had used insecticides and as a citizen concerned about their rapid proliferation and potential health effects. He implicated the chemical manufacturers for their blind promotion of insecticides. Meanwhile, he was aware that insecticides could lose their effectiveness as insects developed resistance (or immunity). When Kleinfeld asked Bromfield whether an overuse of insecticides upset the natural balance of nature, Bromfield relayed the tendency of insecticides to kill all insects, harmful and beneficial alike. He noted that destroying ladybugs led to an explosion of aphids. Furthermore, it appeared that many birds and fish were dying as a result of spraying. As birds and beneficial insects died off, the insect population could double, triple, and even quadruple.
Despite his evident reservations regarding the overuse of DDT, Bromfield resisted its removal from the market or restrictions on its sale. Limited use of DDT in specific areas (feeding barns and loafing sheds) could be effective and safe, according to Bromfield. He extended the notion of specificity to target insects also. DDT, Bromfield acknowledged, was or had been in the past a “great fly killer,” but he had decided to shift to chlordane since DDT had become almost ineffective. Bromfield’s testimony clearly reflects his deep-seated ambivalence regarding DDT and other synthetic insecticides. The rapid development of resistance in flies and other target organisms seemed to necessitate application of greater concentrations with increasing frequency, both of which meant greater exposures. Bromfield attempted to minimize these risks by limiting his application of DDT to specific areas and by targeting specific pests (predominantly flies and lice).65
Members of the Delaney Committee must have found the wide disparity in testimony regarding DDT confusing. Many of the witnesses deferred to physicians and toxicologists to clarify what risks existed and their severity. Yet when individuals who studied human health effects testified, they couched their statements carefully. For example, Harold P. Morris of the nutrition unit at the National Cancer Institute at NIH noted the challenges to establish whether a particular compound induced cancer in animals. Morris concluded: “In summary, I have pointed out: (1) That a large number of chemical compounds induce cancer in animals. (2) That there is no way of predicting their cancer-inducing properties without a biological test. (3) That the careful testing of chemicals for cancer-producing properties in animals is exceedingly difficult to evaluate. Any test for cancer is influenced by a very large number of environmental and hereditary factors which the experimenter must seek to control and evaluate.”66 Despite the difficulties inherent to the analysis of compounds for carcinogenicity, Morris believed that any estimate of the possible injurious properties of chemicals added to nutrients should include testing for cancer-causing properties in several species of animals prior to approving their use in food. With that said, he sharply criticized a recent article in the British Medical Bulletin regarding the carcinogenic action of heated fats and lipoids on the grounds that the researchers used the rat as their model. Due to the nature of its stomach, the laboratory rat was unsatisfactory, and Morris discredited studies that used rats. As a result, Morris’s lab had never successfully reproduced the results of the British study. Such statements must have added to the committee’s growing sense of confusion in light of the fact that the vast majority of laboratory toxicity studies utilized rats, mice, rabbits, or dogs.
The committee heard from another expert on environmental cancer: Wilhelm C. Hueper, chief of the Cancerigenic Studies Section of the Cancer Control Branch of the National Cancer Institute and chief of the associated laboratory. More important, Hueper was widely regarded as a leading expert on occupational and environmental cancers (see chapter 2). But when asked in what capacity he was appearing before the committee, Hueper replied that he was testifying as a private citizen, basing his testimony on his experiences and training of the previous twenty-five years. In response to Miller’s questioning, Hueper noted that cancer incidence was rising in general due to the growing population and the increase of older age-groups in the population, but both lung cancer and leukemia had increased in recent years. Men seemed to be particularly vulnerable to lung cancer, presumably as a result of occupational exposures. Hueper proceeded to review specific dyes and other chemicals, including arsenic, that caused cancers. He noted that arsenical insecticides could be carcinogenic if levels rose to chronic arsenicism. Turning to chlorinated hydrocarbons, Hueper adopted a cautious tone. Kleinfeld asked, “What is the evidence, if any, that these chlorinated hydrocarbons may be carcinogenic?” Hueper replied: “I think we have to get away from the word ‘carcinogenic’ here. We have to use a more neutral term and say ‘tumor-producing,’ leaving it open whether the tumors produced are actually carcinomas or not, or cancers or not.”67 When Kleinfeld asked him to identify the lowest level of chlorinated hydrocarbons to cause tumors if ingested, Hueper stated: “I think I should emphasize that we have no record of human cancer from exposure to DDT, although we have evidence of cases of severe liver poisoning from exposure to other more powerful liver toxic agents like chloroform and carbon tetrachloride, but none of those chlorinated hydrocarbons so far, as far as we know, has caused cancer in men.”68
Despite Hueper’s refusal to directly link chlorinated hydrocarbons to cancer, Kleinfeld continued to press, citing considerable evidence that DDT was accumulating in the fat of people not directly exposed to it. Kleinfeld asked: “Would such an accumulation of DDT in the fat of the ordinary person, young or old, well or sick, possibly create some hazards?” Hueper replied: “I think on the basis of the evidence we have right now we cannot say. We have to wait, perhaps, 10 or 15 years to see whether such evidence may be forthcoming.”69 It is fair to say that no one in the U.S. was better positioned than Hueper to render an informed opinion on the possibility that chlorinated hydrocarbons might cause cancer, but as of January 1952, he believed that such a case would require ten to fifteen years of research. Historian Robert Proctor has suggested that the medical profession regarded Hueper as a maverick in his unrelenting effort to track down industrial carcinogens. More significant, Proctor noted that Hueper’s views had lost favor in the realms of science and politics. By the 1950s and 1960s, medical researchers regarded environmental carcinogenesis as rather out-of-date; researchers considered nonchemical factors, such as viruses and genetics, as more significant in the etiology of cancer. More important, according to Proctor, in the era of postwar conservatism, Hueper’s prolabor and perceived anti-industry stance of cleaning up the workplace and the environment garnered little support.70
In 1948, Hueper became the founding director of the Environmental Cancer Section of the National Cancer Institute (NCI), the research arm of the PHS. Research Hueper had initiated before he achieved his position at the NCI resulted in his departure. Specifically, he accepted a consultancy at the Baltimore plant of the Mutual Chemical Company to investigate the link between chromium dust and lung cancer. The NCI funded Thomas Mancuso of the Ohio Health Department to study chromium dust at an Ohio plant. In 1951, Mancuso and Hueper jointly published a paper that confirmed elevated lung cancer rates at the chromium plant. When they attempted to publish another paper that suggested the possibility that the risk of cancer extended to the population outside chromium plants, the chief of the Industrial Hygiene Division at NCI ordered Hueper to remove his name from the paper. Hueper acquiesced but complained to the surgeon general, who shut down all of Hueper’s activities outside the laboratory. Moreover, Hueper had to “discontinue work on chromium, end his field work, and cease all contact with industry and with state and local health agencies.”71 Environmental scientists Benjamin Ross and Steven Amter have suggested that the strictures placed on Hueper were the result of express or implied threats against other PHS programs (by the 1950s, Clarence Cannon, who in 1937 had redirected pesticide research from the FDA to the Industrial Hygiene Division, had become chairman of the House Appropriations Committee). When Hueper resumed research on chromium two years later, his superiors shut down his program after less than six months.72 Frustrated by political pressures on his research and advocacy, Hueper resigned from his prominent position in cancer research in 1964.
Despite the professional challenges he faced throughout his career, Hueper provided critically important insights that would continue to resonate with legislative and regulatory efforts to control additives to foods.73 When Miller asked him for his suggestions regarding the use of chemicals in foods, Hueper responded with a prescient statement that anticipated the direction of legislation and regulation: “I would feel that the uncontrolled use of any known or suspected agent with carcinogenic properties is not advisable, and that certain control measures should be taken.”74 On further examination, Hueper noted that the general population was probably exposed to materials in food more than through any other product, including cosmetics and medicines. On the basis of that view, he recommended toxicity testing for chemical additives to foods even in small doses.75 Although the size of the committee was somewhat diminished on the day of Hueper’s testimony, due to illness and other committee meetings, a few key policy makers took his recommendations to heart as they contemplated novel regulation.
Throughout the hearings, testimony kept returning to DDT and its potential toxicity for humans. Even the small sample of expert testimonies analyzed to this point reveals a wide range of views regarding risks associated with novel insecticides. Entomologists, toxicologists, and farmers presented widely divergent views with respect to DDT from fairly harmless, when used properly, to extremely toxic and becoming more so as the chemical accumulated within organisms. It has also become clear that the primary link between government regulators and end users was the USDA. Within the USDA, it was the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, based in Orlando, Florida, that was responsible for the analysis of the new chemical insecticides. On May 22, 1951, the committee heard the testimony of Fred C. Bishopp, assistant chief of the BEPQ in charge of research. Two other scientists, Edward F. Knipling and W. C. Shaw, accompanied Bishopp to offer additional insights and clarifications. From the outset, Bishopp acknowledged concerns regarding the release of new and highly poisonous insecticides for public use, but like other entomologists, he suggested that they were comparatively safer than the insecticides they replaced: “Some people have been apprehensive of the release of new and highly poisonous insecticides for public use. Actually, many of these materials are no more poisonous than nicotine, arsenicals, and sodium fluoride that have been used as insecticides for many years. The newer materials—including DDT, benzene hexachloride (BHC), toxaphene, and chlordane—have, to a considerable extent, replaced these older insecticides and are used on a much larger scale. Nevertheless, probably fewer accidental deaths from acute poisoning by the new materials occur today than were caused by the older insecticides in the past.”76 Bishopp argued that new insecticides underwent greater scrutiny than in the past before a manufacturer would release the chemical to the public and before it would be registered by state or federal agencies. Despite field and laboratory studies that concerned formulations, mode of action, effectiveness under varying ecological conditions, toxicity to plants and animals, and spray residues, Bishopp acknowledged that such analysis did not necessarily cover all fields of public interest before the product became available for public use. Bishopp was confident that additional research would lead to the development of more efficient pesticides that were essential to achieve crop production requirements necessitated by the “national emergency.”
When he turned to specific insecticides, Bishopp offered a clear statement of the potential risks of DDT: “Although certain information on new insecticides is lacking, one of the most pressing problems is the dissemination of the authentic available facts to the public. It must become more widely known that DDT and related compounds, although of relatively low acute toxicity to man, are persistent and therefore residues on crops must be reduced to a minimum.”77 With this statement, Bishopp addressed one of the constant sources of confusion regarding the toxicity of DDT; namely, that the persistence of the chemical within organisms had the potential to increase its toxicity over time. What Bishopp referred to as the “[organic] phosphate insecticides,” like parathion and HETP, were quite different in that they were highly poisonous, but the residues rapidly degraded. It was the organic phosphates, he noted, that were responsible for most of the serious accidental insecticide poisonings that occurred in the previous two years, although he attributed them to workers failing to use respirators and protective clothing.78 Thus, Bishopp characterized the trade-offs between DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons and the organophosphates. DDT presented relatively low toxicity, but it persisted and accumulated in the environment. Organic phosphates with high toxicity posed serious risks to operators, but given their rapid rate of decomposition posed minor risk to the food supply.
Like other experts, Bishopp testified to the extraordinary gains in food production that resulted from the widespread application of chemical insecticides, or rather, he suggested the abysmal state of crops in the absence of insecticides.79 He also cited several specific cases in which DDT had significantly controlled an insect outbreak. A potential outbreak of velvetbean caterpillar in 1946 provided one example; Bishopp noted that prompt application of several insecticides lessened loses to several crops, but DDT produced faster action: “Dust mixtures containing from 2.5 to 5 percent DDT applied at rates of 12 to 20 pounds per acre gave faster action against the caterpillars than cryolite or calcium arsenate and resulted in generally higher control.”80 In another case, insect control promoted tomato yields: “In California, during 1945, approximately 66,500 acres of tomatoes were treated by airplane with 10 percent DDT, at 65 pounds per acre, in the dust form, for the control of the tomato-fruit worm, using 4,322,500 pounds of a DDT insecticide.”81 Certainly these two cases bolstered Bishopp’s case that DDT provided effective control against insect outbreaks. And yet it is remarkable that Bishopp, the head of research at USDA’s BEPQ, recounted spray campaigns that applied DDT at 12 to 20 pounds per acre in the first example and 65 pounds per acre in the second. Recall from chapter 2 that the FWS and the PHS tested for potential wildlife effects using concentrations of DDT at 5 pounds per acre or less (and typically less than 2 pounds per acre and often half of 1 pound per acre). Bishopp’s statement signaled profound disparities between recommended rates of application and actual rates. Even if the high rates of application were somehow justified, the sheer volume of DDT applied (4.3 million pounds on tomatoes in California alone) boggles the mind. Unfortunately, these are the only two instances in which Bishopp cited the actual application rate of DDT. In numerous other examples, he noted the monetary savings in millions of dollars or dollars of cattle per pennies of DDT.
In addition to asserting the considerable benefit of DDT to meeting the nation’s growing demand for food production, Bishopp also noted the demonstrated benefit of the chemical in the fight against infectious diseases, namely insect-borne disease: “The development of DDT and other new insecticides for controlling disease-carrying insects represents one of the most important advances in medical history. The control of malaria, typhus, encephalitis, dengue fever, yellow fever, filariasis, and other diseases has improved the health of man and increased his life expectancy throughout the world.”82 Bishopp noted that malaria, which he called the “most important disease of man in the world,” could be effectively and economically controlled by spraying residual DDT, BHC, or chlordane in homes. Statistics from the World Health Organization supported this claim, and Bishopp concluded by noting, “The almost complete elimination of malaria from the U.S. was hastened by the spraying of 800,000 homes with DDT during 1950 by the U.S.P.H.S. and the State Health departments.”83 Bishopp could enumerate the benefits of DDT to agriculture and public health at great length, and it is clear that such benefits were profound.
And yet Kleinfeld intended to clarify the risks of DDT as well. To that end, Kleinfeld focused on USDA’s recommendations regarding DDT residues in milk and cited the following paragraph from a 1945 paper in Science: “These preliminary observations prove that with continued oral administration of DDT to goats and rats, there is eliminated in their milk a toxic substance which produces symptoms indistinguishable from DDT intoxication. The data strongly suggest the need for more intensive research on the toxicity of milk from dairy cows ingesting DDT residues either from sprayed or dusted forage plants or from licking themselves after being sprayed or dusted with this insecticide.”84 This statement contradicted one of Bishopp’s statements, and Kleinfeld asked Bishopp whether it was safe to assume that DDT applied as a dust or wettable powder in water would not be absorbed by cattle. In responding, Bishopp noted that the Science paper was based on ingestion or more specifically experimental feeding and that the USDA recommendations noted that there was a hazard in connection with feeding crops that carried DDT to dairy stock in any considerable amount. When pressed, Bishopp elaborated on this point: “There was no reason to assume that the spraying of barns, that is, putting down a persistent residue, on the walls and ceiling or spraying the cattle with the wettable powder, which is really just technical DDT, should result in any contamination of the milk.”85
Kleinfeld next asked Bishopp to expand on his statement that the Oklahoma Experimental Station had found that dairy cows sprayed with DDT excreted the chemical in their milk. In this case and many others, Bishopp deflected the question to Edward F. Knipling, also of the BEPQ in Orlando (see chapter 2). Knipling explained that the work in Oklahoma involved what he called “excessive doses of DDT,” which greatly exceeded the recommended doses for insect control on dairy cattle. The BEPQ replicated the studies using DDT as recommended and generally used. They reported the results of this research at the Texas Entomological Society meeting in February 1947, and Agricultural Chemicals, the trade journal of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association, reviewed the paper in its April 1947 issue. Knipling noted that the research at the Texas Experimental Station did not merit an official release, given that the public consumption of DDT would not exceed 0.25 ppm.86
Kleinfeld next turned to the USDA’s official publication, “The New Insecticides for Controlling External Parasites of Livestock” dated April 1949, which recommended against DDT application to dairy animals producing milk for human consumption due to the appearance of the chemical in milk at potentially hazardous levels as judged by the FDA. Nor should DDT be used in places where milk could be contaminated by the chemical.87 When Kleinfeld asked Bishopp if he believed the statement to be a sufficient and direct recommendation to dairy farmers not to use DDT as described in the statement, Bishopp deflected the answer to his colleague Knipling, noting that the USDA issued more direct statements to farmers within circulars. At this point, Miller demanded clarification: “Well, I took it from your testimony this morning that you think there is little or no harm that comes from the use of DDT around dairy barns. Am I correct in that assumption?”88 Bishopp acknowledged that he ought to qualify his answer. Again, Miller pressed him to be clear, and Bishopp responded: “We are definitely recommending against the use of DDT in dairy barns and on dairy cattle, dairy plants, milk houses, and all such places as that.”89 This statement addressed Miller’s concern that Bishopp on behalf of the USDA was defending the use of DDT in dairy barns, but Knipling seemed to feel that the issue still required clarification, and his comments shed light on a fundamental fracture in the history of toxicological regulation.90 Namely, the USDA could and did conduct research on potential pathways for contamination of milk and other agricultural products, but it was the responsibility of the FDA to determine the levels of contamination that would be hazardous to humans.91
The cloud of uncertainty surrounding the toxicity of DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons did not extend to other chemical insecticides, for example, the organophosphates. Kleinfeld examined Bishopp on the use and toxicity of parathion. Bishopp rejected the notion that the chemical was widely used, noting that its use was more or less restricted to certain extensive crops, such as wheat, and specific infestations, including green bugs and fruit insects. Typically, the USDA recommended the use of parathion only in cases where less hazardous chemicals failed to control insects. Kleinfeld sought to establish on the record that parathion was extremely toxic so he pressed Bishopp with a series of questions regarding the toxicity of the chemical.92 Despite recognizing the risks, including eight deaths and forty-eight cases of severe toxemia, Bishopp admitted that the USDA had not recommended against the use of parathion on fruits.
When Kleinfeld asked Bishopp to provide a safe residue level for any one item of the typical American diet for parathion, Bishopp initially deflected the question to the FDA, but Kleinfeld persisted in soliciting his opinion. Bishopp replied that he believed the FDA published a statement that 2 ppm may be safe, but that he felt that level was a bit high, noting that toxicologists pointed out that parathion metabolized readily.93 Even in the case of parathion, one of the most toxic insecticides ever to reach general use, Bishopp noted that its toxicity could be mitigated by its quick rate of metabolism. Kleinfeld cited a paper, “Absorption of DDT and Parathion by Fruits,” presented at the 1949 meeting of the American Chemical Society that found parathion in the peel but not the pulp of harvested oranges, lemons, and grapefruit. Based on the weight of the peel, 3 to 5 ppm of parathion were found in the peel of Valencia oranges six months after treatment with standard dosage. Bishopp noted that Valencia oranges have “pretty thick skins,” but Kleinfeld countered by asking whether orange peel was sometimes candied and also used in animal feed. Bishopp acknowledged both potential pathways of exposure but argued that the parathion was pretty largely destroyed in those products between harvesting, processing, and consumption. Kleinfeld again pointed out that parathion was present in quantities of 3 to 5 ppm up to six months after treatment, which Bishopp acknowledged was a considerable amount of time. Despite Kleinfeld’s pointed questions, Bishopp’s testimony did little to clarify for the committee whether parathion actually posed risks to consumers even as Bishopp recognized the chemical as one of the most toxic in use with a safe residue level of 2 ppm (or less, in his opinion).
Even Arnold J. Lehman, director of the Division of Pharmacology at the FDA, could not clarify the risks associated with parathion. Lehman was present during the early days of the hearings, perhaps while he waited to be called to testify. Repeatedly, congressmen called on him to address aspects of chemistry and toxicology. During Lehman’s formal testimony, Kleinfeld asked him to describe parathion and its use as an insecticide. Lehman responded: “From my own standpoint, having the interest of the consumer in mind, parathion is probably a safer insecticide than DDT.”94 When Kleinfeld asked if he knew of reports of fatal poisonings, Lehman reported that there had been nine fatal cases of poisoning with parathion. Thomas G. Abernathy (Mississippi) focused the line of inquiry to whether parathion was harmful to a crop and to consumers after eating the crop. Lehman responded definitively: “I think I can answer the question. Parathion is a liquid. It penetrates the skin. It is very poisonous. Very small amounts will produce fatal poisoning.”95 Nevertheless, when Abernathy pressed the point and asked again if parathion could be used on crops, Lehman replied: “I think that it is safe for use.”96 Again Abernathy asked if any damage would result to the consumer in eating a crop on which parathion was used. Lehman responded: “No. There is no evidence that I know of.”97 At that point, Miller noted that he had asked his wife what she used on ants in their home, and he discovered some parathion sprays. He refocused Abernathy’s question: “Do you think that [it’s] harmful in spraying, as women do, all over the country, to get rid of insects. Is there danger in using parathion?” Lehman answered, “There is.” He added a facetious comment: “I hope Mrs. Miller is an expert in the use of insecticides”98 Miller noted that she was not and took the discussion off the record. When testimony resumed, they did not return to the toxicity of parathion. Lehman did not clarify why he believed that a highly toxic chemical like parathion was safe for use on crops and safe for people who ate the foods produced from such crops. Based on his publications, Lehman believed that parathion’s rapid decomposition would protect crops and consumers alike (see chapter 4).
In order to sort out the different views on the toxicity of insecticides, Kleinfeld sometimes introduced previous testimony into his questions. In the case of chlordane, a chlorinated hydrocarbon like DDT, Kleinfeld cited Lehman’s testimony in which he had testified that chlordane was at least “four times as toxic as DDT.”99 Lehman called chlordane “one of the most toxic of insecticides we have to deal with.”100 Chlordane, in Lehman’s opinion, had no place in the food industry where the possibility of contamination existed. Nor was the chemical appropriate as a household spray or in floor waxes. When Kleinfeld asked Bishopp for the recommended uses of chlordane according to the USDA, Bishopp read a lengthy statement by Ralph Heal, technical director of the National Pest Control Association. Heal argued that the pesticide control industry had used chlordane extensively and that only one employee had shown a sensitivity or allergic reaction in one particularly large firm with more than one hundred employees who spent roughly half their time applying chlordane. Such a record contrasted even with one of their least toxic insecticides, pyrethrum, to which 14 percent of employees developed an allergic response. Bishopp’s response to Kleinfeld offers a glimpse of the considerable extent to which USDA had become co-opted by the chemical companies. Historian Pete Daniel has extensively documented regulatory capture of the USDA, specifically the agency’s clearinghouse for pesticide approval, the Agriculture Research Service, by the pesticide manufacturers (see below).101 Bishopp’s statement, however, represents an early example of capture and a frank acknowledgment of industry ties.
It is unclear the extent to which Bishopp’s views prevailed among growers and, significantly, producers of food. One clear statement of dissent came from Dr. L. G. Cox representing Beech-Nut Packing Company. In his prepared statement, Cox noted the problems that Beech-Nut faced with the advent of synthetic insecticides like DDT. As early as 1947, Beech-Nut management undertook an extensive and expensive research program on pesticides residues. As a result of this research, Beech-Nut adopted a “near zero tolerance level” in baby foods. Citing the research of Fitzhugh and Lehman and the recommendations of the American Medical Association, among others, Cox noted that producing baby food necessitated caution: “Since we are manufacturers of baby food, we have had to take into account all those factors—prenatal, environmental, physiological, and structural—which may cause a baby to react to food residues in a manner different from the adult.”102 Such a statement reflects a sophisticated understanding of environmental exposures and dose-response. Cox’s statement suggests that infants were particularly vulnerable to environmental exposures. Acting on this concern, Beech-Nut adopted precautionary measures to ensure the safety of their products. Of particular concern was the lack of adequate analytical methods of residue analysis. Cox noted that Beech-Nut had good analytical methods for DDT, DDD, BHC, parathion, methoxychlor, and a few other insecticides not in general use. However, satisfactory analytical methods were lacking for chlordane, toxaphene, aldrin, dieldrin, and heptachlor. In light of this situation, Beech-Nut established an elaborate field survey program through its agricultural purchasing department, which the company enforced through a growers’ contract prohibiting the use of certain insecticides. Cox cited Lehman’s opinion that chlordane had no place in the food industry, in sharp contrast to Bishopp’s recommendations on behalf of the USDA.
Contamination of crops with pesticides of known and indeterminate toxicity represented just one of the serious problems that Beech-Nut confronted. Certain pesticides corrupted the flavor of foods. BHC posed particular problems, and Cox cited separate cases in which the company rejected squash, peaches, celery, spinach, sweet potatoes, apples, and peanuts. The problem of off-flavors was particularly acute in peanuts. Beech-Nut researchers noted a degree of off-flavor in peanut butter containing 2 ppm of BHC after a five-month shelf life. Chlordane and lindane also caused off-flavoring.103
Costs of research and quality control, procurement, processing losses, and equipment had amounted to an average of more than $110,000 per year for the five previous years. Such costs inspired seven specific recommendations, including evidence of adequate toxicological testing, development of suitable pesticides residue analysis, information on the approximate range of residues on produce, guidelines for removing pesticide residues, a requirement that the FDA establish and publish a tentative tolerance in the Federal Register within ninety days following registration, FDA sample analysis following the publication of the tolerance, and a requirement that if tolerances were exceeded after a ninety-day warning period, the tentative tolerances would be made official and seizure proceedings instituted.104 If anything, Cox’s statement on behalf of Beech-Nut revealed that one food producer desperately sought oversight of the new chemicals that had proliferated on farms across America.105 Moreover, Cox revealed that Beech-Nut’s in-house scientific group had a sophisticated awareness of environmental exposures and the particular vulnerability of infants, which drove them to advocate precaution with respect to residues of the new insecticides. In both respects, Beech-Nut seems to have been quite progressive in its outlook and its willingness to underwrite precaution. Unfortunately, Beech-Nut’s precautionary approach to the new insecticides, as presented by Cox, seems to have been a single exception to the general incorporation of pesticides by food producers and distributors in America.
After hearing and questioning expert witnesses from industry, USDA, FDA, PHS, and other organizations, members of Congress could track several themes. Again and again, they heard that synthetic insecticides enabled farmers to produce crops and thus feed a growing nation. Scientific opinion on the risks of the new insecticides varied widely. On one hand, some scientists could point to specific problems with DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons, such as the development of resistance in certain insects and transfer of DDT from cows to calves, which led to advisories against its use in dairy barns. On the other, specific cases of poisoning in humans were rare. Toxicological analysis focused on symptoms of acute poisoning, but the chronic toxicity of DDT remained shrouded in scientific uncertainty. Notably, the leading authority on environmental cancer argued that not enough time had passed to determine if chlorinated hydrocarbons caused cancer in humans. The considerable toxicity of organic phosphates, however, provided a much sharper image of risk. Even as the BEPQ assistant chief questioned whether the tolerance for parathion should be 2 ppm or lower, he left no doubt that it was one of the most toxic chemicals known to mankind. Yet, unlike persistent chlorinated hydrocarbons, it metabolized quickly in the environment. Scientific uncertainty and sharp distinctions between science and policy provided few clear pathways for further regulation and often left members of Congress confused and exasperated. Nevertheless, political scientist Christopher Bosso has argued that the hearings established two major points for those seeking legislative reform: “(1) food and chemical industries did not have consumer health as their primary orientation, and (2) the FDA had no mechanism for knowing beforehand which chemicals reached the consumer, and with what effects.”106 As chairman of the committee, Delaney concluded the hearings with his observation that committee members on the whole supported premarket testing of food additives and strengthening of FDA regulatory power.
In the aftermath of the Delaney Hearings, Congress passed two major amendments to the FFDCA. The first was adopted by Congress in 1954 and it became known as the Miller Amendment (§ 408), named for Miller himself. As we have seen, certain legislators and regulators worried that feeding a growing American population required chemical insecticides, while others were concerned about the potential risks that these chemicals, particularly chlorinated hydrocarbons and organophosphates, posed to consumers. The Miller Amendment addressed public health concerns by allowing registration only if manufacturers presented data that demonstrated residue levels on food crops posed no danger to public health. This stipulation granted the FDA the authority to set tolerances for each pesticide and crop, specifically raw agricultural commodities, such as fresh fruits, vegetables, or milk.107 Yet the amendment limited FDA’s regulatory jurisdiction to pesticides used on foods; non-food uses remained under the USDA, even in cases where pesticides could contaminate the environment and eventually produce exposures in foodstuffs. Historian John Perkins argued that the Miller Amendment legitimated the use of insecticides by establishing “insignificant” legal doses. According to Bosso, “Congress thus assured the public that, while residues might remain in or on food, the levels were not sufficiently toxic to warrant concern.”108 Under this amendment, the FDA needed to weigh the benefits of insecticides against the risk. This state of affairs prompted environmental scientist John Wargo to argue, “This dual standard, necessitating the protection of both public and economic health, has become the essence of the nation’s pesticide control strategy, as structured by FIFRA and FFDCA.”109
In 1958 Congress approved the insertion of the Delaney Clause, which stated: “No additive shall be deemed safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal,” within the general safety clause of the FFDCA (§ 409).110 The Delaney Clause effectively prohibited the FDA, which set food tolerances, from approving any food additive shown to induce cancer in animals or humans. If a food additive (for example, an insecticide) caused cancer, the policy prohibited registration or set the tolerance for approved uses to zero, in effect banning the food additive. The regulatory power of this clause was not lost on legislators who supported the farm bloc: the FDA must ban any suspected carcinogen. Wargo has noted that in passing this legislation, Congress worried that this “zero risk” standard conflicted with the risk-benefit standard that balanced potential risks (toxic residues) with potential benefits (enhanced crop production).111 According to the environmental historian Nancy Langston, the Delaney Clause had the potential to be revolutionary by stipulating that “any substance known to cause cancer in test animals could not be added to food in any quantity whatsoever.”112 Thus, in Langston’s view, the Delaney Clause was a formal, legal expression of precaution, but its focus on carcinogens distracted attention from other hazards.
The first application of the Delaney Clause followed shortly after President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed it into law in November 1958.113 Barely one year later, HEW Secretary Arthur S. Flemming invoked the clause to advise consumers not to buy cranberries, much to the consternation of growers who objected to the negative publicity so close to Thanksgiving (when 70 percent of cranberry sales occur). Flemming noted that some cranberry products on the market had been contaminated with aminotriazole, an herbicide with USDA approval. In 1957 the FDA issued a warning that aminotriazole left unsafe residues on fruit, and it seized and froze contaminated berries for further analysis. Tests for carcinogenicity took two years and they revealed that aminotriazole caused tumors in rats. These findings precipitated Flemming’s announcement and one of the first cases of something approaching mass hysteria as some states banned cranberries or urged caution. Growers and the USDA attacked Flemming and the FDA, arguing that they had not been consulted nor given adequate notice of the announcement. Desperate countermeasures to reestablish consumer confidence included televised broadcasts of Vice President Nixon and other public figures eating generous portions of cranberry sauce during their Thanksgiving feasts. Despite such efforts, cranberry sales plummeted, and losses to the industry rose to a staggering fifteen to twenty million dollars during 1959 (growers found not to be at fault later recovered ten million dollars in indemnity payments from the USDA). Despite the rather conflicted results of the first application of the Delaney Clause, the hearings and resulting legislation served as a crucial (albeit partial) step in the regulation of chemical pesticides.
As we have seen, Congress, in the passage of FIFRA and the prolonged discussions of risks associated with chemical pesticides during the Delaney Hearings, had already begun to evaluate the testimony of toxicologists both in and out of government. Scientific uncertainty and lack of familiarity with the long-term effects of the newer insecticides stymied legislators’ efforts to draw general conclusions regarding risks associated with insecticides. Legislators were asking the questions that needed to be asked, but concrete answers remained elusive as the opinions of experts from the USDA, the FDA, industry, and academia diverged widely. Particularly unclear were the long-term risks associated with DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons. Certain target insects developed resistance to DDT, and evidence of transfer from cow to calf prompted USDA advisories regarding the use of DDT in dairy barns as early as 1949. One expert after another acknowledged the dangers of acute poisoning yet wondered about chronic toxicity. Evidence of risk to humans in particular remained murky. Even the nation’s leading pro-environmental cancer authority argued that not enough time had passed to determine the tumor-producing potential of DDT in humans. There was no question as to the toxicity and substantial risk of organophosphates, but many believed that their rapid decay offset risks. In striking contrast to most growers and food producers, officials at Beech-Nut Foods adopted a precautionary approach and tested for pesticide residues in its foods.
Despite the uncertainty about pesticides, Congress revised existing legislation to address potential risks. The Miller Amendment restricted residues in foods and empowered the FDA to establish tolerances for foodstuffs. Seeking to minimize the risk of cancer through pesticides, Congress approved the Delaney Clause, stipulating that the FDA set the tolerance for any carcinogenic food additive to zero and effectively prohibiting FDA from registering any food additive shown to be carcinogenic (including pesticides). The first test of the new legislation came when the FDA advised consumers not to purchase cranberries after some cranberry products revealed contamination by aminotriazole. As the market for cranberries collapsed in the midst of mounting consumer panic, the president and vice president attempted to allay fears and growers defended their product. The cranberry scare brought the problems of chemical food additives and the new legislation to national attention.