In his booklet of 1973 and its various revisions we find Williams developing and expanding the Ambion hypothesis, in which he is followed by later authors.³⁶ Despite strongly criticising Hutton’s work he takes many of the central propositions of that book without question, providing little carefully referenced argument. He also massively expands the marsh from the depiction given by Burne. Williams claims, in a phrase reminiscent of Hutton, to have undertaken a ‘close study of the topography, drainage and field names’ of the area. Thus from the ‘geological features’ he claims the north and south sides of Ambion Hill were marshy and that ‘it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the marsh extended right round the eastern and southern slopes of the hill and ended at the rising ground to the north of Bradfields Bridge (Figure 1.13).’³⁷

Williams shows Richard’s army deployed on Ambion Hill, with Northumberland to the rear to counter the Stanleys, who are shown towards Near Coton.³⁸ Such a deployment on a hilltop runs completely contrary to the evidence in the primary accounts, which suggest the action took place on a plain beside a marsh, and that Richard formed an unusually wide battle array. The size and shape of the top of Ambion Hill would give little room for the manoeuvring of such an army.