Bosworth 1485: A Battlefield Rediscovered

Another royal warrant, issued by Henry VII on 29 November 1485, gave compensation to a number of villages on the Warwickshire/Leicestershire border: Atherstone (£24 13s 4d, in two payments of £20 and £4 13s 4d), Mancetter (£5 19s), Fenny Drayton (£20), Witherley (£13) and Atterton (£8 10s) (Figure 3.2). These payments were ordered on the grounds that these places had ‘sustained losses of their corns and grains by us and our company at our late victorious field’. The implication is that some of Henry’s soldiers were present in these locations, presumably for billeting and provisioning on the days before battle, and in particular for water supply. Unlike Richard’s army, Henry’s had been on the march for some time. If it had brought any provisions and fodder with it, these would have been running out after 3 weeks. Therefore it is not surprising to find soldiers seeking local supplies in the named villages or at Merevale Abbey. The use of a number of places is also to be expected since, as in Richard’s case, an army numbering thousands would need to be distributed across a number of locations to avoid over-burdening one place. If troops were arriving in separate contingents from different directions, this distribution would also be expected. The relative levels of compensation might also suggest the relative numbers of troops in each place. For Atherstone we also suspect that the Stanleys had been based there.

As far as can be reconstructed, Thomas, Lord Stanley, Henry’s step father, had been with Richard until late July but had then returned to his seat of Lathom in Lancashire leaving his son in Richard’s company.²¹ According to The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde Thomas heard of Henry’s landing on a Monday. Presumably this was 15 August. This would fit with his being sent a letter of summons by Richard on 11 August alongside Henry Vernon and an unknown number of others. According to Polydore Vergil, Lord Thomas arrived at Lichfield 3 days before Henry – this would be 17 August – before moving on to Atherstone where he seems to have been on 20 August and 21 August. This itinerary is interesting in the light of the actual location of the battle. If Thomas was responding to Richard’s summons, a route via Lichfield makes sense if the intended destination was Leicester but not if it was Nottingham. This would suggest, therefore, that Stanley had found out, either by further contact from Richard or from his own scouts, that he should make for Leicester not Nottingham.

Polydore Vergil claims that Henry came to speak with Lord Stanley and his brother Sir William at Atherstone on 21 August. Yet when Lord Stanley testified before the bishops of Worcester and London on 16 January 1486 in support of a dispensation to allow Henry and Elizabeth of York to marry, he said that he had known Henry well from 24 August (‘circa vicesimum quartum diem Augusti bene novit’).²² This has been taken to indicate that he did not meet Henry before 24 August when both men were in Leicester. This is curious since it suggests that they had not met at all at the battle, even though Polydore accredits Lord Stanley with bringing Richard’s crown from the spoils and crowning Henry. It may be simply that Stanley did not want to prejudice the dispensation case by any suspicion of dubious behaviour before and on the day of the battle. It has also been suggested that the 24th is in fact an error for 22 August but this is rendered less likely by the fact that another testator, John Weston, prior of St John of Jerusalem, also claimed that he knew Henry from 24 August. The expression ‘bene novit’ might also be relevant. In other words, Stanley knew who Henry was and had met him but it was only from 24 August that he knew him well.

Polydore’s description of the meeting at Atherstone on 21 August suggests that Henry had an understanding with the Stanleys, although, as we shall see, this was not initially implemented by the latter on the day of the battle. If there was uncertainty on Henry’s part as to whether Thomas Stanley would support him at the battle, Richard was equally uncertain. Even though messengers had been going between the king and Lord Stanley, Richard cannot have been wholly sure that Stanley would be in his company on the day of battle. If on the eve of the battle Lord Stanley was still at Atherstone, this would have implications for his deployment on the following day since he would have had to skirt southwards of the field in order to join with Richard’s army. It is possible that he had already moved eastwards out of Atherstone on 21 August but had returned there to meet Henry.

Suggestions about the movements of Sir William Stanley are derived from the ballads but there are some problems. In outline, his journey seems to have started at Holt castle and proceeded via Nantwich and Stone to Atherstone, again a route compatible with the receipt of information that an engagement was to be near Leicester not Nottingham. It is also claimed by Polydore Vergil that William met Henry at Stafford on 18/19 August, at Lichfield on 20 August, and at Atherstone on 21 August. It may therefore have been the presence of his troops at Atherstone, as well as those of his brother, that prompted the equal highest sum of compensation to be paid to its inhabitants in November. The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde suggests that William camped near his brother’s forces close to the battlefield on the night of 20 August. The same source claims that on 21 August William went to the field, presumably for reconnaissance. If this is true, it would point to the location already having been decided upon at least in outline, and for William Stanley to have brought back vital information and ideas to his brother as well as to Henry and his commanders. Intriguingly, in The Song of the Lady Bessiye, it is Sir William Stanley who decides on the location of the battle beforehand. We read here that a herald has been sent to him by Richard asking him to bring 10,000 men. Sir William replies ‘Say, on Bosworth feilde I wyll hym meete, on mundaye earlye in the morning’.²³ Whilst the name of the battle is anachronistic, the idea of a leading soldier being used in reconnaissance is credible.

Battle was given only 24 hours after Richard left Leicester. This makes it highly likely that the general location of the battle had been decided, or at least anticipated, by the king. We can even speculate that there had been contact between heralds of each side to assign a day and location. This was not unknown in the late medieval period. This could explain why Richard did not set out from Leicester until 21 August in order to avoid too many nights in camp. It would also explain how it was possible for all parties to reconnoitre the field and to decide how they would deploy their troops and guns on the following day. Assignment of a battle location in advance is not unprecedented: it is particularly prominent in accounts of the Agincourt campaign, for instance.

Commanders had to have some idea of where to take their troops. The French chronicler Molinet gives no location for the battle but writes as though the place of battle was decided upon in advance (‘la lieu fut prins et journée assignée ez octaves de l’Assumption Notre-Dame, pour combattre puissance contre puissance’).²⁴ His wording can be taken to mean that both sides had agreed to it. Similarly we read in Polydore Vergil that ‘Richard, hearing that the enemy were approaching, was the first to come to the battlefield (‘locum pugnae’), the village of Bosworth, a little beyond Leicester. There he pitched his camp for the night’.²⁵ The precise wording ‘place of battle’ again suggests that he knew where he was going. The wording of an entry in the York House Books for 23 August, the day after the battle, is also relevant here. We see that news was brought back by John Sponer ‘sent unto the feld of Redemore to bring tidings of the same to the citie’. This suggests that Sponer had known where to go.²⁶

A field which was pre-arranged, or a situation where there was at least some idea of an approximate location, also makes sense in terms of military preparations. Drawing up troops and guns took time. The usual assumption is that deployment started at first light on 22 August (sunrise was at 5:00 am GMT). It is most likely that guns were put in place at that point since they would have been vulnerable to attack if put into position during the night. At Blore Heath and Barnet, guns had been fired during the night, but it seems that the army was already in place also to defend them.²⁷ Scouts would be active even in the hours of darkness, as they were at Agincourt. Based on a study of the inquisitions post mortem David Baldwin has suggested that there was some military activity on 21 August which led to some deaths.²⁸ This may reflect reconnaissance activities by both sides. Likewise on the day before the battle of Tewkesbury there was some skirmishing between the herbergers and scouts sent out in advance of the main movements.²⁹ The attainder of Richard at Henry’s first parliament spoke of Richard assembling his host on 21 August. ³⁰ If Richard’s artillery was being drawn up into place during the night or early morning, the information on its location would be useful in helping Henry and his commanders decide on how best, and where, to deploy their troops.

In order to take up positions on the morning of 22 August the armies had to move from their respective camps. This also points to an already decided location for the battle. It is clear that Richard intended to establish a defensive position against Henry which the latter would be forced to attack. From what we have gleaned from the various sources, therefore, Richard’s army was camped to the east, presumably close to the Roman road, and including Ambion Hill, and perhaps also Shenton, Stoke, Sutton and Dadlington where there were water supplies. Henry was camped in and around Fenny Drayton, Witherley, Atterton, and Mancetter. The Stanleys had been at Atherstone and may still have been there on the evening of 21 August although it is possible that they had also moved eastwards towards the field.

No narrative account is explicit on a starting time for the battle. Polydore Vergil has Henry ordering his soldiers to arm in the early morning (‘bene autem mane’), implying that it was already light. This wording is echoed by Hall and Holinshed as ‘in the morning be time’. The Crowland Continuation tells us that how Richard’s chaplains were not ready to celebrate mass nor was breakfast ready ‘at dawn on the Monday morning’. This notion is confirmed by a reminiscence of the reign of Queen Mary, which was said to derive from a gentleman named ‘Bygott’ (probably Sir Ralph Bigod) who was in Richard’s service at the time of the battle.³¹ We have to allow for moralising, such as we find in the account of Richard’s sleep being disturbed by nightmares as expressed in the Crowland Continuation and by Polydore Vergil.³² But it could imply that Henry pressed Richard to give battle earlier than the latter had expected and, most importantly, before there had been opportunity for Lord Stanley’s troops to be integrated into Richard’s battle array, as the king had surely hoped.

The only narrative which comments on the movement of troops to take up their first positions is the chronicle of Molinet, presumably based on information from French participants. He tells us that the French made their preparations by marching against the English who were in the field a quarter of a league away.³³ At this time, a league in France, which was where Molinet was writing, was 2.6 miles (4 km).³⁴ A quarter of a league would therefore be 0.65 miles (1.1 km). That is a credible distance between the armies as they drew up from line of march into battle array, which is surely what Molinet is meaning. His wording also implies that Richard had already drawn up his troops. This is to be expected since Richard had the bigger army and a larger quantity of artillery and would have sought to establish an initially defensive position which he would then goad Henry into attacking by using his guns and an arrow storm.

No source comments on the weather but the lack of mention suggests that conditions were as one would expect for that time of year. Polydore Vergil comments that at the start of the battle Henry moved his men so that the sun was to their rear. ‘There lay between each army a ‘palus’ [marsh] which Henry skilfully put on his right so that it might stand as a protection for his men. By doing this, he simultaneously left the sun to his rear’. Taking this at face value, we can suggest it was sunny. Hall develops this idea so that Henry’s movement to put the sun behind his men put it instead in the faces of Richard’s army. Since Henry was approaching from the west, facing into the sun, it would suggest that he carried out a flanking movement to avoid the sun in his troops’ faces, but to make full sense this would need Richard’s army to turn 180° also.

Deployments

First let us look at how the troops were drawn up at the outset, starting with Richard’s army. Molinet’s account is the most explicit. He speaks of Richard preparing his battles ‘where there was a vanguard and a rearguard’ (‘où il y avoit avangarde et arrière garde’). The vanguard was commanded by the duke of Norfolk. Molinet also puts Sir Robert Brackenbury in this vanguard, and gives it 11–12,000 men. He does not name the commander of the rearguard. He tells us that Richard had his guns fire on the earl of Richmond and that this led the French to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of Richard’s battle (‘de coste à la bataille dudit roy et non point de front’). This could be taken as meaning that there was a third battle under the king, but it is also possible that the author was simply speaking of Richard’s army as a whole.³⁶

De Valera reports in his letter that Richard ordered his lines and entrusted the van (‘el avantguarda’) to his grand chamberlain (i.e. the duke of Norfolk) with 7,000 fighting men. Since two independent sources – Molinet and de Valera – assign the vanguard to Norfolk we have no reason to doubt that was the case, even though this is less explicit in the Crowland Continuation. Here we are told that ‘the earl of Richmond with his knights advanced directly upon King Richard, while the earl of Oxford … with a large force of French as well as English troops, took up his position opposite the wing (alam) where the duke of Norfolk was stationed’. The author adds that, at the position (loco) where the earl of Northumberland stood with ‘an adequately large and experienced force’, there seemed to be no fighting.

Can we assume, therefore, that the earl of Northumberland was assigned to the command of the rearguard? In no source is Northumberland explicitly mentioned as commander of this part of the army. Furthermore, we are faced with the problem of de Valera’s narrative. In this, the ‘Lord Tamorlant’ with ‘King Richard’s left wing (‘el ala yesquierda’) left his position (‘su lugar’) and passed in front of the king’s vanguard with 10,000 men’, then turned to fight the king’s van.³⁷ Tamorlant is close linguistically to Northumberland. Given that the rearguard was often positioned on the left, this could be taken to be confirmation that the earl was its commander. However, de Valera’s account is suggesting that ‘Tamorlant’ led his troops against the king rather than simply doing nothing as the Crowland Continuation has it for the earl of Northumberland. This leads to the possibility that ‘Tamorlant’ is to be interpreted as Thomas, Lord Stanley. We shall discuss this more fully later, but we do need to mention here an interesting problem. Given that Richard hoped that Lord Thomas would join his army, how did the king intend to deploy the troops which he would bring? Would they have formed a separate battle, perhaps the rearguard? Had Richard been forced to adjust the organisation of his battles when Stanley did not join him at the initial deployment? Might this also be true for Henry if he had expected Stanley to form an additional battle for him?

Polydore Vergil’s account, despite being longer than those of the earlier writers, provides no real assistance here. He does not distinguish between the battles of the king’s army but simply tells us that Richard set up a ‘line (aciem) of astonishing length composed of both foot and horse’. He adds that he ‘stationed his archers in front like a wall’, putting the duke of Norfolk in command of them. The king himself followed behind with ‘a choice company of soldiers’.³⁸ There is no mention of a third group or of the earl of Northumberland. Polydore’s phrasing could imply that from the viewpoint of Henry’s army, Richard only had one battle and that different kinds of troops were mixed up within it, although Polydore places the archers in the front. The reference to Norfolk being in command of the archers ‘in the front’ is interesting and not found in any other source. Was this the vanguard? Polydore does not say that Norfolk was on the right, but it is interesting to note that in his account of Agincourt, he places the archers on the right flank under the command of the duke of York, to whom other accounts of the battle ascribe command of the vanguard.³⁹ Since an arrow barrage is an early phase in the fighting, it is not impossible that archers predominated in the vanguard. This has further implications if it reflects the nature of the troops which Norfolk had recruited, although it is also possible that archers from other companies had been added to this archer group in the vanguard. Molinet’s reference to Richard’s use of guns also implies there were gunners.

The early narratives are uninformative on Henry’s deployment. De Valera is completely ignorant of how Henry drew up his troops. If we link his narrative on Richard’s deployment to the account in the Crowland Continuation, this would place the earl of Oxford on Henry’s left so that he could face Norfolk on the right of Richard’s army, the traditional place of the vanguard. As we saw, Molinet claims that Richard’s guns were focused on the earl of Richmond and caused the French to concentrate their troops against the flank rather than the front of Richard’s army. These comments could be interpreted as suggesting Henry only had one battle, or that he had two, one under himself and one under Oxford. Note, incidentally, Molinet’s description of Richard’s army as ‘the English’ and Henry’s army as ‘the French’. Is he implying that the French in Henry’s army were grouped together? Can we assume that they were under the command of the earl of Oxford since they had crossed with him and with Richmond himself? The Crowland Continuation comments that Oxford’s division consisted of ‘a large body of French and English troops’.

Not surprisingly, Polydore Vergil provides a much fuller description of the deployment of Henry’s army. Because of the shortage of men, he claims, Henry drew up one line (‘aciem simplicem’) in front of which he put his archers under the command of John, earl of Oxford. It is immediately apparent how close this is to his description of Richard’s army save for a comment on Richard’s longer battle line. Polydore adds that on his right wing Henry placed Gilbert Talbot and on the left wing John Savage. Polydore therefore implies that Henry had only one battle with wings.

The reference to Oxford as commander of the archers in the front raises similar issues to those noted for Norfolk but in this case we have the added interest of the nature of the French troops, some of whom were archers. No narrative account makes mention of the types of troops in Henry’s French recruits. There is therefore no mention at all of pike formations, or of the particular contribution which the French soldiers made. All we have to go on is the claim made by one of these soldiers after the battle that in part we were the reason why the battle was won (‘et en partie fusmes cause de gaigner la bataille’).⁴⁰ The soldier states ‘Richard came with all his battle which was estimated at more than 15,000 men, crying, “These French traitors are today the cause of our realm’s ruin”’ (‘il vint a tout sa bataille, lequelle estoit estimee plus de XVM hommes en criant: ces traictres francois aujourd’uy sont cause de la perdicion de nostre royaume’). According to Michael Jones, ‘this seems to be a reference to Richard’s cavalry charge’, which Polydore has Richard make against Henry when he sees him alone with a small bodyguard. In fact, the mention of Richard’s advance with all his battle of 15,000 men makes it surely a reference to the mêlée as a whole. The letter of the French soldier does not put Richard on horseback.

Battles were fought mainly on foot in this period but small groups of cavalry were often put on the wings. Two early sources, de Valera and the Crowland Continuation, mention wings in Richard’s army, and it is surely what Polydore is alluding to when he tells us that Richard’s line contained both foot and horse. In Henry’s army, the troops under Gilbert Talbot on the right wing and John Savage on the left wing, might also be taken as cavalry although this is not explicitly stated. However, we can draw on the fact that in his account of Agincourt, Polydore places the English cavalry on the left and around both flanks of his army. Since this is not found in sources written closer to 1415, it reflects customary deployments of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Commanders would fight on foot, as the letter-writing Frenchman suggests was the case for Henry. He describes Henry as being on foot: ‘he wanted to be on foot in the midst of us’ (‘Il voult estre a pye au milieu de nous’). But it was common for the main commander to have a horse ready to hand to mount during the fight. This provided a vantage point as well as making it feasible to ride to see what was happening in different locations. Thus it is not surprising to read in Polydore that Richard, spurring on his horse, attacked Henry (‘calcaribus equum … incurrit’), Polydore also has Richard brought a swift horse when the battle turned against him. In Molinet’s account, it is whilst trying to flee that Richard’s horse became stuck in the marsh. We would expect Richard to have been accompanied in his attack on Henry by his household, similarly mounted. These highly trained and well-horsed men-at-arms had the capacity and training to fight as heavy cavalry against similar groups in the enemy army, using the couched lance as in the tournament, but we would not expect this in a battle. Rather, they would fight as light cavalry, for special attacks, as Richard’s on Henry and his bodyguard, and to drive back archers. They also fulfilled a valuable reconnaissance function as well as being essential in a pursuit.

Polydore does not speak of a second battle or rearguard for Henry but he does comment, after mentioning the line and wings, that ‘Henry, relying on the help of Thomas Stanley, followed along with one squadron of horse and a handful of foot’ (‘Ipse autem, fretus auxilio Thomae Stanlei, cum una equitum turma paucisque peditibu sequebatur’).⁴¹ This reflects Henry’s hopes that Lord Stanley would commit to him, thereby providing a second battle. In this interpretation, we can suggest that Henry initially formed a small unit which stood on the field, effectively as a rearguard. This explains why Richard saw Henry with just a small bodyguard and launched a mounted charge against him.

A crucial question is where the Stanleys were as the battle lines were being drawn up. There had certainly been contact during Henry’s exile between him and his step-father. As we saw, according to Polydore, Henry had gone to Atherstone on 21 August where the brothers Thomas, Lord Stanley and Sir William Stanley were encamped. Polydore’s account of the ensuing meeting gives the impression that there was agreement between them on how battle should be given against Richard. However, Polydore’s account of the following morning suggests that Thomas, Lord Stanley did not commit himself as wholeheartedly as Henry might have hoped.⁴²

‘Bene autem mane militem se ad arma expedire iubet simulque mittit ad Thomam Stanleium qui iam ut medius loco pugnae appropinquarat cum suis copiis accedat ad milites ordinandos. Is respondet ut ille suos in aciem ducat dum ipse instructo exercitu adsit’

In the morning, he [Henry] ordered his soldiers to arm. At the same time he sent to Thomas Stanley, who had already arrived in the middle of the battlefield (literally, midway in the place of the fight), that he might come with his troops to put them in array. He replied that he would bring his battle line when the earl was there with his army drawn up.

The wording suggests that this exchange happened before Henry deployed his soldiers from line of march into battle array. The tense of ‘appropinquarat’, which is a shortened form of the pluperfect, suggests that Lord Stanley had already arrived. The translation of the italicised phrase is problematic. When had Stanley arrived at the battlefield itself? As noted earlier, the movements of the Stanleys are not wholly certain. If they were still at Atherstone on the night before the battle then they had quite a long distance to cover on the morning of 22 August to reach the field. If ‘medius’ means ‘in the middle of the battlefield’, is Polydore implying that Stanley was already positioned between the two armies of Richard and Henry? The phrase in italics has often been translated as ‘midway between the two armies’. Bennett, for instance, translates as ‘Thomas Stanley, who now approached the place of the fight midway between the two armies’. In the mid-sixteenth century translation of Polydore’s Anglica Historia the passage is given as follows: ‘… sending withal to Thomas Stanley who was now approchyd (i.e. had already approached) the place of fight as in the mydde way betwixt the two battaylles…’.⁴³

Yet there is no mention of ‘armies’ in the original Latin text, only ‘loco pugnae’ – literally, ‘the place of battle’. Whatever the precise meaning, the impression which Polydore wished to give was that Stanley was on or close to the field yet did not commit himself to Henry at this point. Lord Stanley’s reply was a delaying tactic. Polydore tells us that Henry was taken aback by Lord Stanley’s reply and was filled with ‘no little anxiety’ but still hoped to rely on the help of Thomas. This last comment by the chronicler is of course made with the benefit of hindsight.

In other words, Stanley preferred to keep up a pretence to both sides that he would offer his support, but refused to commit in advance to either of them. We would expect that, as he prepared for battle, Richard had also contacted Thomas Stanley, all the more so if the latter was already on or near the field. Such contact is not mentioned in Polydore but it is claimed by Edward Hall. According to the latter, the king sent a pursuivant to Lord Stanley ‘commaundyng hym to avaunce forward with hys compaignie and to come to his presence’, threatening to kill his son if he did not.⁴⁴ This notion is also found in The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde. This poem also claims that a similar message was sent to Sir William Stanley who sent a hostile response. This led to Richard promising to kill all knights and esquires between Lancaster and Shrewsbury, obviously an example of poetic licence!

The same poem also claims that the Stanleys formed their own battle organisation, with Sir William taking command of the vanguard, Lord Thomas the rearguard, and his son Edward a wing. But the poem also claims that they responded positively to Henry’s request to have use of the Stanley vanguard. This is not too different, perhaps, from the account of Polydore Vergil that Lord Stanley had 5,000 men of which 3,000 fought at the battle under Sir William. We shall return later to the issue of the participation of the Stanleys in the battle. We can conclude that both Henry and Richard had hoped for their commitment and it was not given to either of them at the outset of the battle. If Lord Stanley had made an agreement with Henry on 21 August then he had cold feet on the next morning, or else he considered it best to keep up the pretence that he might support either side. He did not draw up in the initial deployments but held off.

Movements and actions

This is also suggested by de Valera’s account of the movement of ‘Lord Tamorlant’ to whom Richard had given command of the left. This author tells us that Tamorlant ‘left his position and passed in front of the king’s vanguard with 10,000 men, then, turning his back on earl Henry, he began to fight fiercely against the king’s van, and so did all the others who had plighted their faith to earl Henry’. In other words, Tamorlant made to advance against Henry’s army but then ordered his troops to about-turn, so that they then attacked Richard’s army instead. Their attack on the king’s vanguard is specifically mentioned although, as we saw, de Valera does not name Norfolk as commander of this part of the army.

Who was Tamorlant? Based on linguistic similarity and his role as commander of a distinctive part of the army, it could be the earl of Northumberland. If so, de Valera is reporting that the earl switched sides in the battle. As we have seen, the Crowland Continuation does not go as far as that but claims that no action occurred in the place where Northumberland was posted. Molinet’s account lies half way between these interpretations:

‘the earl of Northumberland, who was on the king’s side with 10,000 men, ought to have charged the French but did nothing except to flee, both he and his company, and to abandon his king Richard, for he had an understanding with the earl of Richmond, as had some others who deserted him in his need’.

Even if Tamorlant is not Northumberland, and therefore that the latter did not switch sides in the battle, there is enough to suggest that the earl did not enter into the fray on behalf of Richard. The wording and ordering of both the Crowland Continuation and Molinet suggests that Richard’s vanguard was already effectively defeated when Northumberland decided to withdraw. This fits with the earl’s command of the rearguard, such a division having the possibility of entering the battle as a new, fresh force. Certainly the prisoners taken at Bosworth, and the dead, seem to be linked to Norfolk’s division or the king’s, suggesting that those were the main groups which engaged. It seems therefore that Northumberland and his men either joined the enemy or simply fled without engaging. If the latter, then it is easy to see how rumours developed of treasonable action, a suspicion fanned by the relative lack of Henrician revenge against Northumberland for being on the opposing side at the battle.

But could de Valera’s Lord Tamorlant be Lord Stanley? The use of the correct title (lord as opposed to earl) may suggest this. Furthermore, Molinet follows his account of the capture of Norfolk by saying that ‘the vanguard of King Richard, which was put to flight, was picked off by Lord Stanley, who, with all of 20,000 combatants, came at a good pace to the aid of the earl [of Oxford]’. Molinet then goes on to tell us of Northumberland’s flight, as mentioned above. The Crowland Continuation makes no mention of any action by the Stanleys but does comment on Richard’s order to execute Lord Strange. Since the latter was the son of Lord Thomas, Richard’s alleged order during the battle to kill Strange would appear to fit with a surprise move by his father in support of Henry as well as with an earlier tactic to put pressure on Stanley to fight for the king rather than for Henry. It would also explain the reluctance of the executioners to act when things were so uncertain and it was evident Richard’s supposed allies were switching sides. If Lord Tamorlant was Lord Stanley, the implication is that he had been in Richard’s army when it deployed and had acted, as de Valera suggests, first by advancing towards Henry and then turning to fight Richard’s men. The problem with this is that there is no supporting evidence that Lord Stanley was within Richard’s initial deployment. He had held off joining Richard as he had also held off joining Henry. It is possible, of course, that de Valera was confused about the actions of the earl of Northumberland and Thomas, Lord Stanley and that Tamorlant is in fact a confusion or a conflation of the actions of both men. We shall return later to the role of the Stanleys in the battle.

The phases of the battle are made more explicit in the account of Polydore Vergil. He too suggests that it was Henry who made the first attack. Both armies were in sight of each other, and therefore the soldiers put on their helmets, awaiting a signal for battle. This must have been an audible signal (presumably a trumpet sound, as noted by Waurin at the battle of Tewkesbury⁴⁶) since Polydore says that the soldiers awaited it with cocked ears. A marsh (palus) lay between the two armies. Henry moved his men, skilfully (‘de industria’) keeping the marsh on his right as a protection. The author is keen here to suggest Henry pursued a clever military tactic which put him in a stronger position. However, by doing this, he simultaneously left the sun to his rear. When Richard saw the enemy pass by the marsh, he commanded his men to attack.

This must indicate a skirting movement, and is to be expected of the commander of a smaller army keen to place his men in a less exposed position. It has similarities with, and hence may refer to the same manoeuvre as, Molinet’s comment that Richard’s guns forced Henry’s army to mass against the flank rather than the front of Richard’s army. (Polydore makes no mention at any point of the use of guns by either side.) Commanders often used natural features to defend their flanks. At Blore Heath, the Yorkists placed themselves in front of a wood which also gave them protection on one side.⁴⁷ Vegetius noted the advantages of having to one side ‘a mountain, sea, river, lake, city, marshes or broken country … so that the enemy cannot approach from that direction’, adding that it was wise to put all the cavalry and light infantry on the side which had no protection.⁴⁸ Taking Polydore literally, therefore, Henry moved first before there was an arrow exchange. Richard’s response was to order his men to action. ‘They raised a sudden shout and first attacked the enemy with arrows’.⁴⁹ This fits very neatly with the advice in the fourth-century military treatise of Vegetius of which Richard is known to have possessed a copy. Vegetius urged that the war cry should not be raised until both lines had engaged each other. ‘It is a mark of inexperienced or cowardly men if they cry out from a distance. The enemy are more terrified if the shock of the war cry is made to coincide with the blows of weapons’.⁵⁰ Polydore immediately has Henry’s own archers shooting back. This is therefore a typical early battle stage of arrow exchange.

After the exchange of arrows, Polydore has Henry’s men engaging with the sword – in other words, a mêlée. He does not speak of other weapons used but we can only assume that the whole range of staff weapons was deployed at this stage in hand-to-hand fighting. ‘Meanwhile’ – an implication that this action was occurring simultaneously – the earl of Oxford ordered his own men not to stray more than ten feet from the standards. This reinforces the idea of at least two different divisions within Henry’s forces. Oxford’s order, ‘fearing lest his men be outflanked in the fight’, reflects his desire to keep close formation during the mêlée. In the mêlée it was common for men to become detached in small groups. There was a natural ergonomic tendency to move away from the main group as they struck out at their enemies and were struck in return. Once in small fighting clusters, they could easily be picked off by other enemy troops coming to the aid of their companions. In his account of Tewkesbury Polydore has Edward IV recalling his men to the standards when he sees that they are being hard pressed by the numerically stronger enemy, so that they might put up better resistance when packed tightly together.⁵¹

There may also be an implication in Polydore Vergil’s account of a feigned retreat by the earl of Oxford. Certainly the author implies that the return to the standards made Richard’s men think Oxford was breaking off from the fighting. Therefore they did the same themselves, although this comment allows the author to claim that Richard’s army was not keen to fight and preferred to see their leader dead than safe. In Polydore’s narrative, Oxford then renewed his attack on the enemy but focusing all his men on the one objective. Elsewhere, some (possibly of Oxford’s company – the meaning is unclear) grouped themselves into a wedge and ‘pressing forward together’ renewed the fight. In other words, Henry’s army was regrouped to launch a new, focused attack which presumably triggered a further mêlée.

Whilst this was happening, the implication is that Richard and Henry were not personally engaged in the fight. This would be standard practice for commanders at the outset of battles, and fits with the idea that the early stages of the engagement were between the vanguards under Norfolk and Oxford. Polydore follows his account of Oxford’s regrouping order and movements by telling us that Richard was informed by his scouts that Henry was at a distance (presumably from the main force under Oxford) and only had a small bodyguard. This stimulated Richard to ride towards him. Using the standards to confirm that it was indeed Henry, Richard charged, attacking him ‘from the flank, riding beyond [or perhaps, forward] of the battle array’ (‘ex altero latere ultra acies’). This wording emphasises that Henry was behind the main group fighting under Oxford. Henry threw himself into the fight, but first blood went to Richard and his men. Henry’s standard was knocked to the ground and its bearer, Sir William Brandon, killed. However, the account does not say that it was Richard who committed this act. It does say, however, that Richard came up against John Cheney, who threw himself in the way and unhorsed him.

No further comment is provided by Polydore on Richard at this point. Rather the author turns the narrative to the aid which was now brought to Henry, ‘when they almost despaired of victory’, by Sir William Stanley. The implication is that William had not previously been engaged in the fight and that Richard had launched his attack whilst William, and his brother, were still standing off. The attack on Henry appears to have prompted William to intervene, perhaps because he saw that Richard had rendered himself exposed by leaving his main army with only a handful of men. According to Polydore, William’s reinforcing of Henry’s army put fear into Richard’s men who then fled. Richard is described by Polydore as being killed ‘fighting in the thick of the fray’. It is likely that he had become trapped close to Henry’s lines with few companions.

Whilst Polydore does not say that it was Sir William’s men who killed Richard, the text certainly reads as though his intervention in support of Henry was crucial in bringing about victory. Polydore then tells us that Oxford routed the remainder of Richard’s army, killing many in the flight, but that a good number simply did not fight because they had only been there under compulsion. As we saw in Chapter 2, this was an argument which several put forward later to excuse their support for Richard.

It is interesting that Polydore makes no mention of the involvement of Thomas, lord Stanley in the battle, although he credits him with crowning Henry later with Richard’s crown found amongst the spoils. After Polydore’s account of the exchanges between Henry and Lord Stanley before the battle, there is no further reference to the peer, although as we have seen, his brother’s intervention is seen as crucial. The involvement in the battle of Lord Thomas remains opaque. The only reference we have to his role in the battle is in Molinet where he is involved in the rout: ‘the vanguard of King Richard, which was put to flight, was picked off by Lord Stanley, who, with all of 20,000 combatants, came at a good pace to the aid of the earl [of Oxford]’. This suggests that Lord Thomas only engaged personally when it was clear that Richard’s cause was lost, and most likely after he knew that Richard had been killed. If the deployment in The Ballad of Bosworthe Fielde is to be trusted, then the fact Thomas was in command of the rearguard of his own troops could also explain his lack of activity. The battle was over before he needed to commit himself. That said, it is possible that he had authorised the entry of his brother into the fight when Henry had come under direct attack. If so, then we can argue that he continued to hedge his bets even at this stage.

It is only in Polydore Vergil that we read of Richard’s attack on Henry yet this account gives no detail on Richard’s death. Such a lacuna suggests that the nature of Richard’s end was not known to Polydore nor perhaps to Henry. The Crowland Continuation also simply says that Richard fell in battle ‘like a spirited and most courageous prince’, and not in flight. In this narrative the king’s body, with many wounds, was found amongst others slain, another indication that the exact details of his end were not known. De Valera also has Richard killed whilst fighting, refusing to heed Salazar’s advice that he should flee since his supporters were acting treasonably. Polydore also tells us that ‘the story goes that Richard could have saved himself by fleeing’, and that a horse was even brought to him when it was clear the battle was not going his way, but that he refused to escape. Molinet is the only writer to advance any detail on the king’s death and also the only one to suggest that Richard was trying to get away. In his account Richard, abandoned by the earl of Northumberland, found himself alone on the field. He sought to flee with the others but his horse jumped into the marsh (‘palus’) from which it could not recover. Richard was approached by a Welshman carrying a halbard with which he was beaten to death.⁵²

Given the body of Richard III recently excavated in Leicester, an examination of the wounds will be valuable, but it is unlikely that we will ever know under what precise circumstances, or by whom, Richard was killed. We can suggest, however, that his death would have diminished the desire of his supporters to fight on, since without a clear successor there was no cause to support. Whilst Molinet’s account is attractive, and Henry certainly did have Welsh soldiers in his army, it may also have been created with a suitable end for a child-murderer in mind, killed in the mud by a foot soldier of low rank and of fringe ethnicity (at least in the eyes of a French writer). That said, it is surely too much of a coincidence that the battle was fought in a wetland zone.

Reflections

Milner, editor of a modern English translation of Vegetius, observes that this was ‘the problem to which the Romans attributed their defeat by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BC’. Cannae was a much cited battle in late medieval contexts. It is found in the Faits d’armes of Christine de Pisan which was printed in translation by Caxton in 1489.⁵⁴ Christine mentions that Hannibal had used several ploys. One was to make certain he had the sun and wind at his back, which meant that the Romans were troubled by the sun and dust which affected their vision.⁵⁵ Another was the use of a feigned retreat, which led the Romans into a trap, and a third was a pretended panic which allowed the Romans to take prisoners, who then suddenly revealed weapons from under their clothes.

So did Henry actually do what Polydore Vergil suggests, or was the author simply introducing classical allusions for effect, much as Walsingham did in his account of Agincourt?⁵⁶ The significance of having the sun in one’s face is apparent in other medieval battles, such as in Juvenal des Ursins’ account of Agincourt, where the French, with the sun in their eyes, had to lower their heads, thereby proving easy targets for axe-wielding Englishmen at the front and archers attacking at the rear.⁵⁷ It is also clear that tales improve in the telling. Hall’s version specifically adds that the sun on Henry’s back meant that it was in the face of their enemies.

Polydore’s account of the battle reads as a series of reminiscences which the author presumably picked up from those present. But most importantly, the account is peppered with references to defections from Richard, that his army did not care whether he lived and died, and that Richard himself knew how unpopular he was. There is therefore a strong moralistic tone. This is further developed in the work of Edward Hall with its two long invented speeches for Richard and for Henry (a phenomenon also seen in Hall’s account of Agincourt, with speeches for Henry V and for the French constable). There is a similarly nationalistic tone. Hall has Richard inveigh against the French and the Welsh. But Hall’s narrative of events is essentially that of Polydore Vergil. Richard placed his archers in front of his army ‘like a strong fortified trench or bulwark’. Norfolk and Surrey were given command of the van (the addition of the son alongside his father no doubt reflecting the subsequent fame of Surrey, the victor of Flodden), Richard followed with a strong company, with wings of horsemen on either side. The battle commences exactly as Polydore has it, although more poetically and in a longer winded manner in almost all sentences. A notable exception is that Lord Stanley is introduced by Hall into the fight at first mention of the mêlée and again to assist the earl of Oxford in the final rout. In other words, Hall wished to give Thomas a greater role in the battle. Holinshed follows Hall verbatim save for an additional clause on the draining of the marsh.

Taking all the accounts together, we can suggest that Richard took up a defensive position which Henry (or perhaps more accurately, the earl of Oxford in command of the vanguard) attacked, and that Henry (or Oxford) took care to move his men into a more protected position. This appears to have been in response to the effects of Richard’s guns, and also in the knowledge that there was no certainty that the Stanleys would join Henry as his second battle/rearguard. The next phase seems to have been an arrow exchange. This was a common early stage of a battle in this period, as we see in contemporary accounts of Barnet and Blore Heath, and Towton. Polydore’s account of the latter has the fight begun by the archers but soon they used up their arrows and they came to the hand to hand fighting. At Barnet too he claims that ‘first the work was done at a distance with arrows, then they fought at close range with the sword’. In the case of Tewkesbury, we read in Waurin’s account that Queen Margaret’s army defended itself against the arrows of Edward IV’s army with ‘gunshot as well as arrows’ (‘de trait dengins comme de sajettes’). This is an important comment since it suggests that artillery and bows might be used in tandem.⁵⁸ The narrative accounts of Bosworth do not suggest that this was the case there but we are very much at the mercy of scant evidence. The arrow exchange at Bosworth is mentioned only in Polydore Vergil and even there, no comment is made on its effectiveness. This is curious since Henry had large proportions of archers in his army, and Richard presumably had no shortage of this kind of soldier. Was the exchange simply not of interest because it was a commonplace action? Can we say the same about the guns, which are ignored by Polydore Vergil? Why should Molinet mention them yet imply that only one side had them? Was it simply to explain the initial moves of Henry’s force? In all cases we are at the mercy not only of the limitations of the information which authors had at their disposal, but also their own decisions on what to include and exclude.

Given the nature of Henry’s dynastic challenge to Richard and the general interest of writers in men of renown and status, it is not surprising that the accounts tend to concentrate on hand-to-hand fighting. Phases of the mêlée are described, with two separate attacks by Oxford suggested, divided by the calling back of his soldiers to the standards to relaunch an attack on Richard’s vanguard. Accounts also suggest that this second attack gained the advantage over Richard’s vanguard under the duke of Norfolk, and that the involvement of the earl of Northumberland was unsubstantial. We also read that Richard launched a small-scale mounted charge against Henry, who appeared to be without much protection away from his main force. This prompted the entry of Sir William Stanley into the fight on behalf of Tudor. Richard’s supporters attempted to withdraw, but Richard refused to join them and was killed. The exact circumstances of his death cannot be known from the narratives.

Defections

At the battle itself, Richard could not rely on the loyalty of those who remained. Troops were present at the field of battle but never engaged. This is a factor which needs to be taken into account in the discussion on army sizes since it means that numbers are not the only determinant. There is the lingering problem of the involvement of the earl of Northumberland. Both the Crowland Continuation and Molinet’s chronicle suggest he did nothing. The latter suggests that the earl, as well as others, had a secret agreement with Henry.⁶² De Valera says the same about ‘Lord Tamorlant’, who was with the king and then turned to fight against him. Earlier in his text de Valera mentions that before Henry entered England he had assurance that ‘Lord Tamorlant’, one of the leading nobles of England, and other leading men had given him their sealed undertakings that when it came to the battle they would aid him and fight against Richard. This led Goodman and Mackay to consider that Tamorlant was the earl of Northumberland.⁶³ They argue, however, that Northumberland’s action in the battle was confused by de Valera’s informants, and that the commander who turned his troops against Richard was in fact Lord Stanley. As we have seen, the Stanleys did not commit themselves until well into the battle. This can be seen as a defection in the sense that Richard had summoned the Stanleys to his army and yet they did not fight for him, finally throwing in their lot with Henry.

Whether Tamorlant was the earl of Northumberland or Lord Stanley, the point is the same. Richard was not loyally supported at the battle. There certainly had been contacts between Henry and Northumberland before the invasion. The two men knew each other from the 1460s, both being resident in the household of William Herbert, earl of Pembroke.⁶⁴ His inaction was a factor in the defeat. His stance may have influenced others, especially other northern supporters. According to the Crowland Continuation, ‘many northerners, in whom, especially, King Richard placed so much trust, fled even before coming to blows with the enemy’.⁶⁵ Polydore speaks of men ‘furtively slinking away from the battlefield’ even as the fight began.⁶⁶ John Rous claimed that Richard died shouting ‘Treson, Treson, Treson’.⁶⁷ Fabyan observed that the battle would have been sharper if the king’s party had been loyal, implying treason or, at best, cowardice:

‘and sharper shulde haue ben, if the kynges partie had ben fast to hym. But many towarde the felde refusyd hym, and rode vnto that other partye. And some stode houynge a ferre of, tyl they saw to the wyche partye the victory fyll.’⁶⁸

It is not surprising, therefore, that rumours should have abounded after the battle. The meeting of the York city council on 23 August heard that Richard had been killed ‘thrugh grete treason of the duc of Northfolk and many othre that turned ayenst hyme’. This may have been an expression of suspicion of anyone from south of the Humber since the city council also believed that ‘many othre lordes and nobilles of this north parties’ had died alongside Richard.⁶⁹

In fact, that was not true. As Colin Richmond has noted, very few of Richard’s supporters can be shown to have fallen in the battle.⁷⁰ All of this needs to be set within the fragile political context of Richard’s short reign which had seen a major rebellion at the outset and continuing insecurity and uncertainty. We have noted in the discussion of his preparations the high level of military alert throughout the reign, and also his threats of coercion in order to engage armed support. We see a certain ruthlessness in his earlier military actions. In Waurin’s account of Edward IV’s attempts to enter York in March 1471, Richard proposed killing the town rulers if they opposed the royal army.⁷¹ He also was behind the execution of the Bastard Fauconberg at Pontefract in September 1471 despite the latter holding a royal pardon. Such incidents, as well as summary executions during the coup of 1483, and the disappearance of the princes, make his treatment of Lord Strange more credible, especially the order to kill him during the battle. Commanders who behave in this way are not usually respected, supported or successful.

Aftermath

We would wish to know how long the battle lasted since this has implications for the archaeological footprint. According to information provided to de Valera (the closest we have to an eye-witness account), Richard ‘sustained the battle for a long time’. The Great Chronicle of London calls it a ‘sharp and long fight’.72 These are unspecific terms aimed at indicating the nature of the fight rather than its precise length. Only Polydore Vergil gives any precision, putting it at ‘a little more than two hours’, and this is copied by Hall and Holinshed.⁷³ But Polydore was perhaps influenced by the Vegetian definition of a pitched battle as a struggle lasting 2–3 hours.⁷⁴ Comparisons with what is said of other battles can be helpful in placing Bosworth in context. A report in the Paston letters on the first battle of Albans (1455) says that it was done within half an hour, the same length of time Waurin ascribes to the battle of Blore Heath and another chronicler to the battle of Northampton. Barnet, on the other hand, lasted 4 hours according to Waurin, and 6 hours according to John Warkworth.⁷⁵ According to a letter sent by the bishop of Exeter to the papal legate 9 days after Towton, that battle lasted from sunrise to 10 o’clock at night, well over 12 hours.⁷⁶ Comparatively, then, Bosworth was not a long battle yet nor was it over very quickly. This confirms the view that it saw various movements and phases.

That said, the key target for Henry in the battle was Richard. Once Richard was dead then there was no incentive for supporters to continue to fight. This is also what Polydore notes after the death of Warwick at Barnet: ‘after the earl’s death, the rest were turned to flight and captured everywhere’. We would therefore expect a flight from the field. This is emphasised in Molinet’s account. Here Richard’s vanguard turned to flight led by the chamberlain (Norfolk) and is picked off by Lord Stanley. After Northumberland’s lack of engagement both he and his company take to flight.⁷⁷ In the Crowland Continuation the northerners took to flight without engaging.⁷⁸ In The Song of the Lady Bessiye the duke of Norfolk fled to a hill on which stood a windmill, and was killed there by Sir John Savage, with the duke’s son, the earl of Surrey, being taken prisoner.⁷⁹ It would be relevant, therefore, to discover whether there was such a windmill-topped hill in the vicinity of the field. We can also recollect that Savage was in command of the left wing of Henry’s army, a light cavalry group. This might also be significant in terms of the movement of troops.

There is ample suggestion of flight although less of pursuit. Molinet’s wording can be taken to indicate Lord Stanley’s involvement in the rout. This is not surprising if Thomas had played little or no earlier role but wished to show his loyalty to Henry. Polydore claims that the earl of Oxford routed the front line (‘in prima acie’, probably meaning the vanguard) and they were killed in their flight. Yet this author also claims that many on Richard’s side stopped fighting of their own accord. They had only been present at the battle, the writer claims, out of fear of Richard. They were allowed to leave the field without suffering harm.⁸⁰ Polydore claims that the numbers taken prisoner immediately after the battle was high since once Richard was killed, everyone surrendered to Henry, including the earl of Northumberland and the earl of Surrey. In comparison with other battles, such as Towton and Tewkesbury, where many were killed in flight, the pursuit at Bosworth appears from the narratives to have been limited in scale and length. Several key supporters, such as Radcliffe, Lovell, Lincoln and Surrey got away but many troops must simply have surrendered.

The immediate aftermath of battles is an under-researched area. It is in these areas where archaeology is helpful since we might expect paraphernalia to be abandoned and discarded by those fleeing the field or wishing to hide their previous allegiance. We might also expect scavenging of the camp sites. A great deal of personal effects, money and weapons might be left in a camp during the battle, although sometimes camps were broken before battles and possessions held in the baggage train behind the battle lines. This may be what is mean by Polydore’s comment that after his crowning Henry took up his baggage and went to Leicester. No narratives tell us of post-battle raids on the camps but in the seventeenth century it was claimed that the Stanleys had in their house at Knowsley hangings which came from Richard’s tent at the battle, which a grateful Henry Tudor had given to them.⁸¹ The use by Polydore, of the word ‘spolia’, amongst which was found the crown which Thomas, lord Stanley used to crown Henry, may also suggest a raid on Richard’s camp.

A recurrent theme in the narratives is a crowning of Henry immediately after the battle, on or close to the field, as a symbol of his victory. This was certainly the report made to the York City Council where Henry is described as ‘so proclamed and crowned at the feld of Redemore’.⁸² There is some inconsistency on who performed the crowning. The Great Chronicle of London, uniquely, has Sir William Stanley winning possession of Richard’s helmet with the crown upon it. He takes this to Henry and puts it on his head saying ‘Sir I make you king of England’.⁸³ In Polydore Vergil it is Thomas Stanley who places on Henry’s head Richard’s crown which had been discovered amongst the spoils.⁸⁴ That Polydore gives this role to Thomas is surely influenced by the fact that William had been executed for treason in 1495.⁸⁵ Yet interestingly, that had not stopped Polydore giving William credit for his intervention in the battle, a further reason for believing that to be an accurate account.

In Polydore the crowning is part of an extended scene where the author has Henry climbing a nearby hill. There he praised his soldiers, thanked his nobles, implying some kind of post-battle oration, and ‘ordered the wounded to be tended to, and the dead to be buried’.⁸⁶ This is the only reference in any early narrative to mass burials and does not in itself give any guide to location, scale or procedure. This omission is not surprising since mention of burials is very rare in battle narratives. The famous exception is Agincourt. Here Waurin tells us that on the day of the battle and for the next 4 days the dead lords and princes were ‘taken up and washed’, and then taken for burial in their own lands and churches. This extended to the rank and file: ‘all who could be recognised were taken up and carried away in order to be buried in the churches of their lords’. Subsequently (although the chronology of this is not defined and it could be a while after the battle), ditches were dug for those who had not been taken off by their friends. Also buried in them were those who had died from their wounds in towns, in hospitals and in the villages and woods nearby. We need to be aware of a desire to link this act of mass burial to the initiative of the Burgundian faction: it was a politicised account. It claims that the burial pits had to be consecrated by the local bishop.⁸⁷

No account of Bosworth tells us that Henry left men behind to deal with the dead whilst he moved on to Leicester with the bulk of his army. Yet this must have happened. Unless there were very few bodies to bury, the burials would be spread over a couple of days. There would also have been a great deal of activity in stripping the bodies and clearing the field of weapons and other reusable materials. The involvement of servants is to be expected, and perhaps of local populations. Some wounded were presumably taken to Leicester or to their homes. The narrative sources are silent on this and on whether any were lodged in local villages at least in the initial stages of recovery or death.

There is only one documentary clue to a possible location of burials of the battle dead. By a signet letter of 24 August 1511, Henry VIII authorised the issue of letters patent to the churchwardens of the parish church of Dadlington so that they could raise alms within the dioceses of Lincoln, Chester, Worcester and Norwich. The purpose of this fund-raising was as follows:

‘for and towardis the bielding of a chapel of sainte James standing upon a parcel of the grounde where Bosworth feld, otherwise called Dadlyngton feld in our countie of Leicester was done and towardis the salary of a prist … to sing in the said chapel principally for the soules of all suche persones as were slayn in the said feld.⁸⁸

There has been debate on whether this was a new chapel on the field itself or rather the parish church of Dadlington. Since the latter is dedicated to St James, it was the church which was meant. The word ‘beilding’ can mean repair and maintenance as well as new building work. There is no certain evidence that any building work was ever carried out although Parry has suggested that the current structure does have signs of it.⁸⁹ The timing is interesting since Henry VIII visited Merevale Abbey in 1511. It is tempting to see this as well as the permission to collect alms as part of an official programme of commemoration. Philip Morgan has suggested that this was undertaken to avoid any danger of the place becoming a focus for Yorkist opposition, a phenomenon which he sees at other battlefields where chapels were developed.⁹⁰

The text of the indulgence which was to be given to those who contributed money contains additional and interesting wording.⁹¹

‘Charity hath caused our sovereyne lord the kynge to consider how gracious howe meritorious & how plesande a dede it is to almyghty god and what great reward they shall have of god for it that prayeth for ye soules of them that weyr sleyne at Bosworth feelde … the king desirynge all his subiectes and lovers favourable to receive ye messengers of Seynte James chappell to ye wheeche ye bodyes or bones of the men sleyen in ye seyde feelde beth broght and beryed and to get or send summe thynge to ye same chapel for ye buyldynge & meyntenaunce of it …’

The implication is that the bodies had been brought from the field at some point, although it is unclear whether this was in 1485 or latter. Whatever the case, it would imply that the battlefield was not far away, and perhaps within the parish, although, as we have observed, men would have been killed in the rout as well as on the field itself. The dioceses where alms were to be collected might also give an insight into the geographical origins of the soldiers who fought at Bosworth. These dioceses were Lincoln, Chester (i.e. Coventry and Lichfield), Worcester and Norwich. These reflect areas from which the Stanleys drew their troops, as well as the source of the duke of Norfolk’s men and areas through which Henry travelled raising men as he went. Therefore this would suggest the burials were of the dead of both sides. It would need archaeological work at Dadlington churchyard to discover whether bodies from the battle were buried there, either immediately or later, perhaps being moved from temporary grave pits nearer the field.

Daniel Williams argued that the indulgence was not actually for a chapel at Dadlington, noting that the place name was not given in it.⁹² He claimed that the chapel of St James was actually that at Towton field, which had recently been granted to Henry Lofte. He further suggested that the bodies of the Bosworth dead were to be removed to this chapel although he does not go so far as to say this actually happened. Despite the lack of specific mention of Dadlington in the indulgence, it does not seem credible that the dead of Bosworth would be moved so far away. Furthermore, the wording of the indulgence is close to that in the signet letter of Henry VIII, suggesting that the two texts relate to the same place – the church of St James at Dadlington. Williams’ interpretation is therefore untenable.

What can we say about deaths at the battle? Polydore Vergil is the only writer to give the number of dead on Richard’s side: ‘about a thousand’. This contrasts with his view that on Henry’s side only 100 men died. Amongst these, he claims, the only man of noble rank was William Brandon who had carried the battle standard.⁹³ Molinet says that only 300 were killed in total from both sides.⁹⁴ De Valera has it that 10,000 were said to have perished on both sides.⁹⁵ It is potentially instructive to compare these estimates with what is said on other battles. The claimed death rates at Towton (1461), ranging from 28,000 to 36,000, are exceptional. For the second battle of St Albans (1461) the figure given in the English Chronicle is 1,916, such an odd figure that it may reflect a herald’s listing. For the battle of Mortimer’s Cross (1461) the same source cites 4,000 Welshmen killed. This number is also found in Warkworth’s account of the dead of Barnet (1471). More usefully, we can compare Polydore’s figures for Bosworth with his figures for other battles where he gives them. For Northampton (1460) he suggests the mortalities were almost 10,000, the figure he also gives for the battle of Barnet. His figure for Towton is 20,000, and for Stoke (1487) 4,000. Therefore this would suggest that, in Polydore’s view, the death rate at Bosworth, at only 1,000, was low. This has implications for the way the battle was fought and also for the potential archaeological record.

It is impossible to be certain how many people died at the battle. The Crowland Continuation mentions the deaths of the king, Norfolk, Brackenbury, John Kendall, the king’s secretary, Sir Robert Percy, controller of his household, and Walter Devereux, lord Ferrers, ‘and many others’. Of the 29 men attainted at the parliament which met on 7 November, however, only nine had been killed at the battle or soon afterwards. There are few Inquisitions post mortem for those who met their death on or shortly after 22 August.⁹⁶

Indeed, there was some confusion on who had been killed. In a proclamation issued by Henry at Leicester on 23 or 24 August, the names of seven dead were given in addition to Richard himself: John, duke of Norfolk, John, earl of Lincoln, Thomas, earl of Surrey, Francis Viscount Lovell, Sir Walter Devereux (Lord Ferrers), Sir Richard Radcliffe, Sir Richard Brackenbury, adding ‘with many othyr knights, squires, and gentilmen’. In fact, Lincoln, Lovell and Surrey had not been killed but had escaped although later London chronicles considered that Surrey had been captured on the field. Ratcliffe’s fate remained uncertain for some time.⁹⁷ On 23 August Henry issued an order to Robert Rawdon, one of his sergeants at arms, to arrest Ratcliffe and Bishop Stillington. ⁹⁸ It was clearly thought that they would make for York since that was where Rawdon went, appearing before the city council on 27 August. Ratcliffe was excluded from pardon on11 October, and also listed in the act of attainder at the parliament, but he was probably dead by 20 September. Indeed, it is possible that he had been killed at the battle but his body not recognised.

This level of confusion on fatalities reminds us that battles were chaotic affairs. What exactly happened to the earl of Northumberland after the battle? The York city council believed that he was making for (or indeed had already reached) Wressle by 25 August, and sent a letter to him on the 26th.⁹⁹ Yet in transcripts made by Drake of, now missing, folios of the York House book, it seems that already by 24 August, the city council had sent a messenger to Wressle and had been told by Sir Henry Percy who was there (the earl’s son – which suggests that he could not have been at the battle in person?) that the earl was with the king at Leicester.¹⁰⁰ The Crowland Continuation has him captured whilst the king was going to Leicester and Richard’s body was being taken there.¹⁰¹ Vergil says that after the battle Northumberland was amongst those that ‘voluntarily submitted’ to the new king and would have done so before the battle, had they not been prevented from doing so ‘if Richard’s spies, flying hither and thither, would have let them’.¹⁰² In recognition of Henry’s trust of the earl, Polydore says that he was not taken prisoner, ‘being a willing friend’, unlike the earl of Surrey, taken at the same time, who remained under custody ‘for a long time’.¹⁰³ The exact date on which Surrey was captured is not known.

Despite its confusion on the fate of Ratcliffe, the author of the Crowland Continuation was aware that the earl of Surrey and William Catesby were captured following the battle, and adds that the latter was beheaded at Leicester. This was in fact the only execution of a Ricardian supporter by Henry. It occurred on 25 August, with Catesby drawing up his will at this point. Given his support for Richard the wording is interesting.

‘I doubte not the king will be good and gracious lord to them [i.e. his family] for he is callid a full gracious prince. And I have never offended hym by my good and free will: for God I take to be my juge I have ever lovid hym.’¹⁰⁴

Catesby was pursuing the same line as we see in some chronicle narratives – that he had only supported Richard because he had been forced to do so. Whilst Catesby was executed, his body was allowed to be given to his family and was buried near the altar of the church of Ashby St Leger, where his home lay. The attainder expressed in Henry VII’s first parliament was removed in 1495.

The Crowland Continuation also notes that two esquires from western England, father and son called Brecher, were captured after the battle and were hanged, although the location of this is not given. This was William Bracher, one of the yeomen of the crown who had benefited much from Richard’s patronage, but as Horrox observes, ‘the reasons behind his unusual gains and the brutality of his treatment after Bosworth are unknown’.¹⁰⁵ Polydore is unique in mentioning that Lord Lovell, Humphrey and Thomas Stafford and their companions fled to sanctuary at St John’s in Colchester.

Whilst all sources agree the duke of Norfolk died at the battle, Molinet puts forward the view that the duke was not killed in action but captured during the battle with his son and taken before Henry. The latter then sent him to earl of Oxford who had him executed.¹⁰⁶ Norfolk’s body was taken to Leicester – presumably immediately after the battle – where it was interred initially. It was later moved to the priory of Thetford and, after the Dissolution, to Framlingham church. One of Norfolk’s sons-in-law, Robert Mortimer, was also killed at the battle, but we do not know how many of the duke’s company as a whole met their deaths.¹⁰⁷

As for Richard, we can be certain that his body accompanied Henry and his men to Leicester on the evening of the battle. Polydore tells us that after the crowning on the hilltop, Henry took up all his baggage and reached Leicester in the evening. This would suggest that he had broken his camp before the battle and had kept his baggage train with his army. (This would also have permitted an easier getaway in the case of defeat.) A processional entry is implied by Crowland who speaks of Henry wearing his crown. If this arrival in Leicester was in daylight to maximise the publicity effect, then Henry had to have reached Leicester before sunset, which was around 8.09 pm GMT. This timing has implications for the length of the battle. The stripping and denigration of Richard’s body is a constant theme in narratives. There are minor variations of detail as we would expect with oral communication: this was a story well worth telling! Such treatment and public display was to be expected given the tone of pronouncements made against him by Henry and his supporters. Had Henry been killed, we would have expected much the same bodily insult and public display. The treatment of Warwick the Kingmaker and his brother the Marquis Montague in 1471 was similar, both in terms of stripping them naked and displaying the bodies later in open coffins at St Pauls, to prevent the problem of pretenders (as Polydore puts it). The stripping of Richard seems to have taken place on the field, and it is tempting to see it as a parallel, and complementary, ceremony to that of Henry’s crowning close to the field.

The Crowland Continuation claims that Richard’s body was found among the dead and was subject to many insults, and was then taken to Leicester with a noose around the neck. Polydore speaks of Richard’s naked body ‘slung over a horse, its head, arms and legs dangling’. In The Great Chronicle of London the king’s body is also described as naked save for something to cover the ‘pryvy membyr’, which is reminiscent of de Valera’s letter where Henry is said to have ordered the body to be covered from the waist down with a black cloth of poor quality. In The Great Chronicle, Richard’s body was trussed behind Norrey pursuivant as a ‘hogg or an othyr vyle beest’ might be. Covered in dirt, he was taken to a church in Leicester for ‘all men to wondyr uppon’ before he was finally buried.¹⁰⁸ This public display is also mentioned by Molinet.

Molinet’s ignorance of the geography of England is apparent in his comment that Richard was buried without royal solemnity in the entrance of a church in a village.¹⁰⁹ A similar explanation no doubt lies behind de Valera’s view that Henry ordered Richard’s body to be laid in a little hermitage near where the battle had taken place and to be exposed for 3 days for all to see.¹¹⁰ Leicester may not seem ‘near’ to the battlefield to us, but for someone in distant Spain it was. Distances are always relative. Even a London chronicler could write that Richard was taken ‘all naked to Leyciter, fast by the ffeeld’, where ‘fast’ means ‘close to’.¹¹¹

Henry, we are told by Polydore, spent 2 days at Leicester to refresh his soldiers and prepare for his march to London. He tells us that Richard was buried 2 days later, presumably 2 days after Henry’s arrival in Leicester. The implication is therefore that Richard was buried on the day Henry left Leicester, 25 August.¹¹² This is consonant with a 3-day exposure of the body noted by de Valera. Even if Molinet is technically correct that Richard was buried without royal solemnity, he was interred in accordance with the rights of the church. The location was the church of the Franciscan friars (Greyfriars), although there has been a theory put forward based on the Frowyck chronicle that the body was first interred in the church of St Mary in the Newark and moved to Greyfriars later.¹¹³

During the 3 days Henry was at Leicester a proclamation was drawn up announcing the victory and Richard’s death. The same proclamation also ordered all soldiers to return home in peace. Henry was keen to have a military stand-down as quickly as possible as this was a way of minimising the possibility of resistance. Indeed, it is possible that the erroneous deaths announced in his proclamation were deliberate in order to emphasise the extent (or more accurately, the desired extent) of his victory. The proclamation is undated but, since we know from the York city records that it was read out at that city on 25 August,¹¹⁴ it would appear that no time had been lost in drafting the text or in making arrangements for its circulation. Although we have evidence only of York’s receipt of the proclamation, its wording indicates it was distributed more widely. When Windsor herald presented it to the city council at York, he also communicated orally to the mayor Henry’s desire to be as good and gracious lord to the city as any of his predecessors.¹¹⁵ This conciliatory stance was therefore decided upon early in the day. Henry’s desire for clemency is also noted in the Crowland Continuation. Indeed the author claims that Henry received praise once it was known that he had not put to death many after the battle, and was seen as ‘an angel sent from heaven … to free then from the evils which had hitherto afflicted them beyond measure’.¹¹⁶

If large numbers of prisoners had been taken at the battle and had been taken to Leicester on the same night, or rounded up later, they were all released save for those deemed to be Richard’s closest associates. We must also assume that Henry’s agents were soon at work hunting down the key individuals not killed or captured at the battle. Given the level of defections, however, might it have been that those who had previously supported Richard were present at the acclamation of Henry? We can wonder whether it was obvious by sight which common soldiers had fought for Richard. If they had worn badges or heraldic symbols of Richard or his captains, these could easily be discarded. It does not seem that in medieval warfare the defeated common soldier was targeted by his victorious opponents unless he continued to offer resistance. Bosworth was not a battle where there had been a proclamation of ‘no quarter’ as had been the case at Towton. Where leading captains fled, then presumably their close retainers and servants accompanied them, but most soldiers would simply have returned to their homes. This was true for Henry’s men too. We know that some accompanied him to London, such as his French troops, although they returned to France in September.¹¹⁷ But surely not all did so. The logistical difficulties of keeping a large force in being were considerable and avoided wherever possible. How armies were disbanded is an under-researched area. With an emphatic defeat, the soldiers of the losing side had every incentive to get away as quickly as possible. Would they have been disarmed by the victors? This does not seem to have been the practice in medieval battles save for prisoners taken formally, although Polydore Vergil may be implying this in his comment that, as soon as Richard was dead, everybody cast away their weapons and voluntarily submitted to Henry’s power.¹¹⁸

As soldiers, whether defeated or victorious, made their way home, the countryside would experience large numbers of troops engaged in random and diffuse movements. Henry and his advisers were well aware of the danger not only of armed men at large but also of continuing political divisions. Henry’s proclamation announcing his victory ordered that ‘no manner of man robbe nor spoyle no manere of commons comyng from the feld, but suffre theme to passe home to ther cuntrees and dwelling places with their horses and harnesse’. This was an effort to stop his supporters revenging themselves on Richard’s army. Those who had supported Richard were to be allowed to return home in peace. This confirms the fact that the majority had not been killed or taken prisoner. The proclamation also added that ‘noe manner of man take upon hym to goe to noo gentilmanz place neither in the cuntree nor within cities nor borows, nor pike no quarells for old or for new matters but kepe the kings peace upon payne of hanging’. Anyone who claimed that they had been robbed was invited to approach the king’s sergeant, Richard Borow, for a warrant ‘unto the tyme the kings pleasure be knowne’. In other words, Henry did not want the political or the armed struggle to continue. This clemency was intended to emphasise his legitimacy as king.

Henry left Leicester on 25 August. Interestingly, he did not follow the main road to London which passed through Northampton but instead made a detour to Coventry. This was presumably to ensure the support of this major town, which had in the past strong Lancastrian associations, but it also leaves open the possibility that Henry wished to revisit the battlefield again en route. The town council of Coventry sought his good favour by various gifts.¹¹⁹ According to Fabyan and other London chronicles Henry was met by the alderman and citizens outside the capital on 28 August.¹²⁰ He made a formal entry to the city on 3 September. Twelve days later writs were issued for parliament to meet on 7 November. There, 29 men were attainted, including Richard who was referred to as ‘late in deed and not by right king of England’. This contrasts with the 113 attainders in the parliament held after the battle of Towton. Henry’s policy of conciliation was already evident before parliament met. On 24 September 1485 he had issued a proclamation to this end. This noted that ‘many and divers persons of the north parts of this our land, knights, squires, gentlemen and other’ had been in field against him but that he had been informed that they repented of this. Moved by pity and by the need to defend the north against the Scots, Henry pardoned all in the counties of Nottingham, York, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, city of York and bishopric of Durham for offences committed before 22 September. The only exceptions were Sir Richard Ratcliff, Sir James Harrington, Sir Robert Harrington, Sir Thomas Pilkington, Sir Thomas Broughton, Sir Robert Middleton, Thomas Metcalfe and Miles Metcalfe. Indeed, the support of the northerners was crucial at this point since commissions of array against the Scots were to be issued by 20 October. ¹²¹

The choice of 22 September as the limitation is interesting as it is exactly one month from the battle. Does it indicate the date by which Henry considered the struggle completed? Interestingly, many rewards were given to supporters around this point in September for services to Henry both whilst in exile, and during the ‘last victorious march’ and the ‘victorious field’.¹²² Henry’s intention to date his reign from 21 August had already been implemented in royal dating. It was confirmed at the parliament by the act of attainder where Richard and 28 others were accused of assembling a host on 21 August ‘in the first year of the reign of our said sovereign lord’ to plot the destruction of the king. The charge continued that they had kept this host in being, with banners displayed and weapons suitable for giving battle against the king, from 21 August until 22 August, ‘when they led them to a field within the county of Leicestershire and there by premeditated intent traitorously levied war’.¹²³ Since Henry already claimed to be king, he could argue that Richard had commenced formal war against him on 21 August when he marched out of Leicester with his army. The fact that his banners were unfurled was an explicit statement of open war within contemporary practices and the laws of war.

News of Bosworth travelled slowly and inconsistently. For instance, on 20 October the bishop of Imola wrote to Pope Innocent VIII from Mainz that ‘according to common report as heard by me on my way, the king of England has been killed in battle. Here some people tell me he is alive and reigning but others deny it.’¹²⁴ But it is also interesting to note that Henry’s clemency was noted abroad. On 6 December Giovanni de Gigli, collector of Peter’s pence in England, wrote to the pope that a general amnesty had been issued for all offences against the king, and that the ‘king himself is deemed most prudent and clement. All things appear disposed towards peace’. He claimed that the earl of Northumberland had been captured and imprisoned but had then been set at liberty on security from the lords and commons. The earl of Surrey was still under arrest but Giovanni had heard that he would soon be released. A postscript added that the bishops of Bath and Salisbury had been released and fully pardoned.¹²⁵

The battle of Bosworth was a defining moment in history, and its political aftermath is easily studied. As we have seen, however, the events of 22 August itself are not easy to reconstruct from the narrative accounts. Suggestions have been made based on these accounts but it is difficult to see how historical methodology could by itself cast further light on the battle. A way forward would be to carry out fuller comparison with other battles, but even then, the nature of medieval narration presents limitations. Chroniclers were not writing their works in order to tell twenty-first century historians the precise details of what happened. They therefore omit mention of matters which are of interest to us, such as what happened to the battle dead. Archaeological investigation is therefore an important additional means of extending our knowledge, and also of making historians rethink the narratives, a topic to which we shall return in the conclusion.

The battlefield location

Bosworth occurs similarly in other London-based chronicles of the early sixteenth century,¹²⁷ and a town chronicle of Calais of this period places the battle at ‘Bosworthe hethe’.¹²⁸

As we saw, a signet warrant of Henry VIII issued in August 1511 authorised the raising of funds for the ‘bielding’ of a chapel of Saint James ‘standing upon a parcel of the grounde where Bosworth feld, otherwise called Dadlyngton feld … was done’.¹²⁹ There is no other known contemporary reference to the event being linked to Dadlington. This is the first known use of ‘Bosworth field’ in an administrative source, and therefore we might argue that it had become the official name for the battle by 1511. The name of Bosworth also appears in the chronicle of the Londoner, Robert Fabyan, where he has the armies meet at ‘a village in Leycetershyre named Bosworth, nere unto Leyceter’.¹³⁰ Fabyan died in 1513, and his work was printed 3 years later. This brought the Bosworth location to a bigger audience than any other source we have so far considered. It also explains how Bosworth came to be used by Polydore Vergil.

‘Meanwhile Richard, hearing that his enemy were approaching, was the first to reach the place of the fight a little beyond Leicester – Bosworth, which is the name of the area (‘id pagi nomen est’). There he pitched camp …’¹³¹

Hall, writing in English, followed Polydore quite closely, suggesting that he had access to the text. Indeed, in his list of sources Hall mentions ‘Polidorus’ as well as Fabyan.¹³² Richard marched ‘to a place mete for two battayles to encounter by a village called Bosworthe, not farre from Leycester and there he pitched hys felde, refreshed his souldioures and toke his rest’. At the end of his account Hall writes ‘This battaill was fought at Bosworth in Leycestershire the. xxii. daye of August in the yere of our redempcion a. M. CCCC. lxxxvi’.

These wordings were followed by Holinshed, with an important addition to the first mention of Bosworth concerning the place of Richard’s camp. Richard ‘marched to a place mete for two battails to encounter, by a village called Bosworth, not farre from Leycester, and there he pitched his field on a hill called Anne Beame (i.e. Ambion), refreshed hys Souldiours and tooke his rest.’¹³³

The choice of Bosworth as the name for the battle in the 1490s is interesting. The fact that it first appears in an urban chronicle may suggest that Bosworth, with a market, was a place known to those with trading and commercial interests. Furthermore, the manor of Bosworth was held by one of Richard’s northern supporters, Sir Marmaduke Constable (d. 1518), who had been granted it by the king for his good service against the rebels of October 1483.¹³⁴ The ballads have Constable as present at the battle, and this is made likely by his suing for a pardon from Henry VII, which he received on 18 November 1485. By the following May he was a knight of the king’s body.¹³⁵ Sir William Catesby had also held some land in Bosworth which was granted in 1489 to Sir David Owen, a knight of the body to Henry VII.¹³⁶

Despite the dominance of Bosworth as the name of the battle over the centuries which have followed, no historian has ever considered seriously that the battle was fought at or even close to that place. Debate has instead focused on the other locations which are mentioned in sources written closer to the date of the battle. The first dated reference to a location is in the York House book. It occurs in a record of meeting of the city council of York on 23 August, which we have already drawn on when looking at Richard’s army. This tells us that John Spooner, sergeant of the mace, and others had been ‘sent unto the field of Redemore to bring tidings from the same to the city’.¹³⁷ Another mention of Redemore was found in the York House book by Francis Drake in the eighteenth century. The original pages are no longer in the book and known only by the transcripts which Drake made and which he published in his history of York in 1736.¹³⁸ In these he notes that an entry for 24 August speaks of Henry the seventh ‘so proclaimed and crowned at the field of Redmore’.

The same location is also mentioned in a short note in Latin entered in the surviving York House book immediately before the record of the council meeting of 23 August. It is not clear when the note was entered. It simply notes that on ‘Monday 22 August 1485 at Redemore beside Leicester, there was a battle between our lord king Richard III and various of his nobles on one side, and Henry earl of Richmond and various of his nobles on the other side’. In Latin the wording is ‘apud Redemore’ with ‘iuxta Leicestre’ added as an interpolation. The entry goes on to speak of deaths at the battle: John, duke of Norfolk, Walter Devereux, Richard Ratcliffe, Robert Brackenbury, the king at Sandeferth beside Leicester (‘dominus rex apud Sandeferth iuxta Leicestre’) and others in the same field, with many other nobles, knights, squires and gentlemen were killed’.¹³⁹

This reference to Sandeford is intriguing. It is mentioned in only one other place, the transcripts which Drake made in the eighteenth century of folios from the York book, folios which no longer survive. This entry is under the date 25 August and is a record of a meeting on that day at which it was decided to send five of the city leaders to ‘the king’s grace Henry the VII’, beseeching him to be a good lord to the city and to confirm its privileges. It was also agreed that letters should be sent to the earl of Northumberland and Lord Stanley in the hope of their support in the approach to the new king. It was also ordered that a proclamation of the new king, which had been delivered to the mayor and city council by Windsor herald, should be issued in the city. The proclamation follows under the title ‘Copia proclamationis Henrici regis Anglie VII’, although the text is given in English, and there is no doubt that the publication of the proclamation was in English. The first part concerns troops returning home after the battle, and has been discussed earlier. The second piece of news which the king wishes to have published is as follows:

‘And moreover the king assertayneth you that Richard duc of Gloucester late called king Richard was slayne at a place called Sandeford within the shyre of Leicester and brought dede of the feld unto the towne of Leicester, and ther was laide oppenly that every man might se and luke upon him’.

Sandeford need not necessarily be the place of the battle itself but indicate the place where Richard was killed in a rout. This would make sense of the double naming in the Latin entry in the surviving York House book, although there is strong evidence to suggest he died on the field. The proclamation does not otherwise give a location for the battle. Yet no place called Sandeford has ever been found. An intriguing interpretation has been put forward by Tim Thornton.¹⁴⁰ He suggests that Sandeford was not a place but was chosen as the name of a location for Richard’s death by Henry and his advisers in order to fit with prophecies. As Thornton notes, ‘Sandford was a long-established name for an expected battle, made popular through the prophecies associated with the name of Thomas the Rhymer of Erceldoun’, a thirteenth-century writer. In this tradition, there would be a ‘terrible battle at Sandford, which is then described as the last battle’. The battle of Barnet of 1471, as we have seen, had already been linked to the tradition by being called Gladsmuir. In Holinshed we find it called ‘Gladmore heath’, something that is repeated by Norden in 1598 on his map of Hertfordshire. It is known that Henry VII was interested in prophecy but what is interesting is that, if Sandford was the name deliberately given by Henry and his advisers to the battle as soon as it had happened, it was soon dropped.

No further references to Sandeford have been found in connection with the battle. Since it occurs within a royal proclamation, however, we can be sure that it was a location – real or imagined – which Henry wished to associate with his victory in its immediate aftermath. If a real place which simply remains unidentified, then its name suggests a relatively wet area where roads crossed watercourses, entirely consonant with what other historical sources suggest about the topography of the area in which the fighting took place.

That Redemore was in circulation as the location of the battle is not limited to the surviving York House books. A set of notes made by an unknown citizen of London in the early sixteenth century includes the following under 1485: ‘this year the earl of Richmond and Jasper earl of Pembroke … came forth into England and met with King Richard III at Redesmore and there was King Richard slain …’.¹⁴¹

We also find the name in a text linked to the household of Sir Thomas Frowyk. The latter held office under the Yorkists as well as being a kinsman of Richard’s queen. It is possible that he died at the battle fighting for Richard since we find a writ diem clausit extremum for him dated 5 October 1485: ‘The same yere Kyng Richard was scelyne att Redmore feld viij mile beseide Coventr’ upon seint Bartilmewis eve.’¹⁴²

A copy of the 1533 printing of Fabyan’s chronicle includes a marginal note in a sixteenth-century hand against the account of the battle. This reads: ‘the battayle of Redesmore heath was between K.R. and K.H, the viith’.¹⁴³ So far, no other late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century mentions of Redemore as the place of the battle have been found.

There are other locations mentioned in the sources of the period. The Crowland Continuation speaks of ‘this battle of Merevale’ (‘ad hoc bellum Mirivallense’). As we saw, this author also tells us that on the night before the battle Richard set up his camp 8 miles (9.6 km) from Leicester, near (iuxta) to Merevale Abbey. This choice of site was made by the king once his scouts had reported to him where the enemy were likely intending to spend that night. Not surprisingly, this has led some historians to consider that the battle was fought closer to Merevale Abbey. This idea was fanned by the interpretation placed upon the warrants issued in November and December 1485 to compensate both the abbey and a number of villages for damage caused by troops ‘coming toward our late field’. The villages were Atherstone, Mancetter, Feny Drayton, Witherley and Atterton. It is worth noting the first two places, as well as Merevale Abbey, lay in Warwickshire and the rest in Leicestershire. Mancetter and Witherley are extremely close to the county boundary. This is interesting given the comment in the chronicle of John Rous, written around 1490, where the author claims that the two armies met ‘on the border of Warwickshire and Leicestershire’.¹⁴⁴ The Spanish commentator, de Valera, tells us that Henry ‘crossed as far as a town called Coventry [which was also in Warwickshire] near which Richard stood in the field’, although he does not give any more specific location or name to the battlefield.¹⁴⁵

In the act of attainder against Richard and his supporters in the parliament which met from 7 November all we find in terms of location is ‘in Leicestershire’.¹⁴⁶ This is explained by the legal nature of the document. A county location was enough to locate the offence since it placed it within the remit of a particular shrievalty. That said, there is enough evidence to suggest that the engagement, or at least some parts of it, took place close to the boundary with Warwickshire. No location is given in the narrative accounts of Molinet or Commynes, or in any of the Scottish chronicles. Rewards which Henry VII gave to his supporters after the battle speak simply of the ‘victorious field’ or the ‘late triumphant battle’ without giving any geographical location.¹⁴⁷

Another name found in an early sixteenth-century text is ‘Brownheath’. This occurs in a miscellany linked to Humphrey Lluyd. Within a set of genealogical notes, we find mention of Henry, the son of Margaret and the earl of Richmond, who defeated Richard III at Brownheath and became king. Elsewhere in the same manuscript, it is noted that Richard was killed in a battle near Leicester by Henry, earl of Richmond and other exiles.¹⁴⁸

Whilst the contemporary sources give some ideas to inform the archaeological search for the location of the battle, none is definitive. Indeed, the various references which have been outlined in this section suggest that there was a lack of precision and knowledge even at the time. Two points can be made about this. The first is that there was no set pattern in battle naming. This is shown by Morgan’s study of English battles across the whole medieval period. His suggestion is that ‘a novel official name [i.e., Bosworth] had overwhelmed a range of weakly recognised local names’.¹⁴⁹ Secondly, the choice of names for the battle is explained by the audience to which the authors were speaking. While the immediate reports of the battle might be expected to give local names, in the longer term, when very different audiences were being addressed, local names would be less important. As Burton noted in the early seventeenth century, on a national or at least a regional scale, one might expect the small town of Market Bosworth to be known, but villages like Dadlington – and certainly a local name like Redemore – would be meaningless.¹⁵⁰ A place as important as Coventry or Leicester might well have been known to well-educated foreign readers, whereas to them even the name Bosworth would be meaningless.

Furthermore we need to reflect more fully on the geographical extent over which a battle might be fought. Given the different phases, it can be argued that we are not looking for one place but several. Add to this the routes which the armies took to arrive at the ‘field’ and the routes they took as the departed. Then there are camps established on the eve of the engagement, and the locations where the dead were gathered and buried, with the added complication here of the possibility that bodies appear to have been moved to other sites later. All in all, therefore, the historian would be encouraging the archaeologist to cast his net widely for a complete understanding of the battle which has come to be known as Bosworth. But they would not be putting forward Ambion Hill as the location of the battle. As we saw above, that name first features in Holinshed’s Chronicles as the place where Richard camped on the night before the battle. This is a further indication of the local knowledge which Holinshed had gained by his own links to the area, as noted in Chapter 1. It also indicates that, by 1577, Richard’s presence at Ambion Hill was established in local traditions.

If the naming of the battle provides an apparent confusion of alternatives spread widely across the landscape, can the topographical details in the narrative accounts provide an alternative way in which the events can be accurately positioned in the landscape? The clues are very few, and it is this paucity of detail, alongside the lack of any physical monument comparable to that marking the place where Lord Audley died in action at Blore Heath, that is a major reason why the Bosworth battlefield has proved so difficult to locate in today’s landscape.

The presence of wetland on the battlefield is the most important clue, not least because it is mentioned in different ways in several documents. Molinet mentions a marsh when discussing Richard’s fate.

‘The king bore himself when he saw this discomfiture and found himself alone on the field he thought to run after the others. His horse leapt into a marsh (palus) from which it could not retrieve itself (ravoir). One of the Welshmen then came after him, and struck him dead with a halberd.’

As Richard is said to be ‘alone on the field’ it is reasonable to assume these events took place on the battlefield. In Classical Latin palus means a swamp, marsh, bog or fen. Molinet says later that Richard died in ‘the dirt and the mire’ (‘en enfange et bedare’), again implying muddy conditions. However, there is also the possibility – though not mutually exclusive – that mud was used by Molinet for rhetorical effect. Molinet wished to give Richard the death and burial he deserved. He emphasises how ‘a man who had killed several people [an allusion to events in his reign generally and not specifically at the battle] ended his days in iniquity and filth, and was buried without royal solemnity’.

Polydore Vergil refers to a ‘marsh’ (‘palus’), describing how it had a key tactical significance in the early stages of the battle, with Henry’s forces manoeuvring around it in order to attack the right flank of Richard’s army, though, in so doing, he simultaneously left the sun to his rear. When Richard saw the enemy pass by the marsh, he commanded his men to attack.¹⁵¹ The reference to the sun might also indicate that the action was fought on the west or northwest side of the marsh if, as seems likely, the battle was fought in the morning. Molinet’s and Vergil’s accounts are independent, but this cannot be argued for Hall’s later description of similar terrain:¹⁵²

‘Betwene both armies ther was a great marrysse which therle of Riche mond left on his right hand, for this entent that it should be on that syde a defence for his part, and in so doyng he had the sonne at his backe and in the faces of his enemies. When kynge Richard saw the earles compaignie was passed the marresse, he commaunded with al hast to sett vpon them.’

This was clearly based on Polydore Vergil, either directly from the Latin or from an English translation of the Historia Anglica made towards the end of the reign of Henry VIII:¹⁵³

‘Ther was a marishe betwixt both hostes, which Henry of purpose left on the right hand that yt might serve his men insteade of a forteresse by the doing thereof also he left the soon upon his bak. But when the king saw thenemys passyd the marishe he commandyd his soldiers to geave charge upon them.’

Holinshed’s account follows Hall in describing the marshy nature of the site. But what is vitally important is the comment which Holinshed adds:

‘Betweene both armies there was a great marish then (but at this present, by reason of diches cast, it is growne to be firme ground)’.¹⁵⁴

This suggests that Holinshed had actually visited the site or at least that he knew the area through his local service. The draining of the marsh had therefore occurred between the 1540s, when Hall’s book was published, and 1577 when the first edition of Holinshed’s chronicles was published. The second feature is the hill on which Henry was crowned. It is only mentioned by Polydore Vergil, but he gives it a very prominent place in both time and space. After the battle Henry is described as going to a nearby hill, from where he thanked his men and ordered the wounded to be tended.

Having gained his victory, Henry immediately thanked God Almighty with many prayers for the victory he had gained, then, overcome with incredible happiness, he climbed a nearby hill, where, after he had praised his soldiers and ordered the wounded to be tended to, and the dead to be buried, he gave his undying thoughts to his nobles and promised he would remember their support. Meanwhile, with a great shout, his soldiers acclaimed him as king and cheered him most willingly. Seeing this, Thomas Stanley promptly placed on his head Richard’s crown which had been discovered among the spoils, just as if he had been hailed as king in the traditional way in accordance with popular will.

Implicitly, therefore, the crowning was on the hill. This narrative is also found in Hall and Holinshed, where Henry goes to ‘the top of a littell mountaine’ after his prayers. A prose version of one of the ballads uses a similar expression: ‘then they removyd to a mountayne hyghe’. ‘Mountains’ also feature in The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde. Sir William Stanley looks down from one before the battle and sees the troops arrayed in the dale below, stretching over 5 miles (8 km). Richard looks towards the mountains and sees the banner of Lord Stanley but is never himself described as being on high ground himself. The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde also has Henry and his men moving to a ‘mountain on height’ after the victory, where Henry is crowned by Lord Stanley. A few other topographical elements are features in this ballad. At the meeting of Sir William Stanley with Henry a forest side is mentioned, as also the idea that he crossed a river. However, it would be dangerous to take this poetic language as a precise guide.

A third feature is a windmill which appears in The Song of the Ladye Bessiye. While the ballads are highly suspect as sources, the account of the duke of Norfolk having been killed beside a windmill during the rout of the royal vanguard should perhaps be given further consideration. It is an incidental reference to topography which seems to have little obvious purpose, suggesting it might have some genuine origin in oral history:

‘the Duke of Norfolke would haue ffled;
with 20000 in his companye
he went vp to a wind-mill,
& stood vpon a hill soe hye,
there he met Sir Iohn Savage, a valyant Knight;
with him a worthy companye:
to the death the duke was dight,
& his sonne, prisoner taken was hee.’

The other topographical clues come from the battle names themselves: Redemore, Sandeforde, ‘Bosworthe heathe’, Redesmore heath, ‘Brownehethe’. In contrast the reference to Dadlington provides a fairly broad canvas within which to work, taking us to a township covering more than 4 km². The rest pose even greater problems, with Bosworth and Merevale lying more than 12 km apart and the cities of Leicester and Coventry some 35 km. In the light of these potential leads from the accounts of the battle, in the next chapter we must explore what the landscape evidence itself tells us.