“What do you think about détente?”
This was one of the most frequent questions I was asked immediately after my arrival in the West. I recall that at first I did not understand what was meant by this question; instead of the word détente, the Soviet press usually employed the clumsy construction “relaxation of international tension” or simply “defusion”. Nor did I know anything about Western debates on this subject. But as soon as I reacted negatively to this matter, or the allied issue of “socialism with a human face,” I could feel an instant coolness or even hostility from the centrist press, to say nothing of leftist publications. Subsequently, at first tentatively and then with increasing aggression, attempts were made to “compromise” me:
“Oh, he’s fallen under the influence of right-wingers….”
What right-wingers? I wondered, looking around and seeing none.
“He sounds like Solzhenitsyn….”
Ah, we got you there! Caught with your hand in the till at the scene of the crime.
But several years later, when my protective wave of “publicity” began to recede, the need to be careful disappeared. I was now referred to as a “right-winger” and even an “extremist.” And why not? I reject “moderate” improvements of the communist system; I do not even want socialism with a human face!
Admittedly, attempts were made at first to adapt me, break me down, and the methods used—in the civilized West at that—differed little from those of an average camp godfather. Shortly after I arrived I had dinner with the directors of the Ford Foundation. They listened attentively, and for a moment I thought that I could explain something to them, and they would do something sensible after hearing how things really stood in the Soviet Union. After all, they had hundreds of millions of dollars in their hands to be used for social projects. But at the end, the chairman asked one question only: What would you do if on one hand, you had information about the flagrant persecution of one individual, and on the other hand, publication of this information placed the reaching of an agreement on arms limitation under threat?
My God, if this was a camp godfather talking, it would be just the moment to tell him where to go. Hardly believing my ears—after all, this was the West!—I started to explain as politely as possible that the Soviet game of “arms limitation” was not worth a brass farthing, it was deceit from start to finish… and I saw the eyes of the formerly attentive foundation directors begin to glaze over. I did not receive any funds from them, or even a Christmas card.
How many such dinners and lunches I was to have. Even with Rockefeller. And they all openly measured me, adapted me—not to listen to what I had to say or learn something new, to understand the meaning of the system that was aiming rockets at them, but to readjust me to say what they wanted to hear. In any audience I addressed I waited, like a condemned man on the eve of his execution, for the inevitable question:
“Won’t a noise in the West harm those who remain in the USSR?”
And no matter how many hundreds of times I explained, poking myself in the chest, that I was the best example of the opposite, the same question would crop up again in the same audience. Finally, one of us would be found who cracked, unable to resist the temptation of “success,” who would confirm what everyone wanted to hear:
“Yes, it will….”
And this would be spread on the front pages of all newspapers. In case no sufficiently well-known Russian dissidents could be found to speak in favor of “socialism with a human face,” dissidents to suit the purpose were created on the spot. Some dubious Czechs, still hoping for a Prague Spring on a global scale, or some random émigrés from the Soviet Union, who were still paying their party dues a week ago—here they were, “real dissidents.” Good ones. Whole newspaper pages were devoted to them, they became professors….
Imagine for a moment Nelson Mandela, released as the result of a lengthy public campaign, facing this question at his first press conference: “How do you feel about apartheid with a human face?”
And imagine how annoyed everyone would be if Mandela replied negatively regarding both apartheid with a human face and any peaceful coexistence with it.
“Well, he’s an extremist, so what can you expect?”
Moreover, imagine that every television appearance by Mandela was to include a moderate “apartheidologist” from an American university—for balance. Or even better, a collaborationist from Pretoria: after all, you cannot show the public only extremist views, you must have balance!
“You suffered too much from apartheid,” he would be told sympathetically. “Of course you can’t be objective.”
“Objectivity” prompted helpfully by “moderate specialists on apartheid” would conclude that the black population of South Africa had no “tradition of democracy” (in other words, they are ignorant savages) so apartheid could not be repealed just like that, it needed to be reformed gradually. Therefore open condemnation of apartheid, introducing boycotts and creating obstructions is not only useless, but downright harmful. The right thing to do is to develop cooperation with it, exercise a “civilizing influence” on it while striving for changes by way of “covert diplomacy”….
It is impossible to imagine anything like this with regard to Nelson Mandela. And if at least one crazy Western public figure were to dare say something to this effect—naturally not to Mandela’s face, that is inconceivable, but at least behind his back or by implication—that kamikaze would disappear off the face of the earth, destroyed by public anger. He would be branded a racist, a lapdog of apartheid. Despite all the fine talk about freedom of speech and the press, no newspaper, no television channel or radio station would allow him to say so much as a word of self-justification.
Yet what is apartheid by comparison with communism? A local abomination, posing no threat to anyone outside South Africa. It aimed no nuclear weapons or columns of tanks at the heart of Western Europe; it did not try to impose on anyone its version of a bright future for all of humanity; it did not attempt to export its model elsewhere; it had no dedicated allies (secret or open) in every corner of the globe.
It would seem that the desire to rid the world of communism should take precedence over the perfectly humanitarian desire to see the end of apartheid. But it was we, not Nelson Mandela, who had to bear the offensive nonsense of the Western elite. It was we who had to force our way through the brick wall of resistance of the local establishment, defend ourselves from slander, put up with unconcealed hatred as if we were the only ones who wanted to be rid of communism. As if this were our local problem, which had nothing to do with anything else in the world.
Of course this was no Western naivety, as it was put politely in those days, nor even stupidity, as we sometimes said in exasperation. It was the conscious policy of the Western establishment, “stupid” only in the broad sense of the word, as stupid as the idea of socialism itself. To my amazement, the Western establishment was, and remains, pro-socialist; at best moderately social democratic. It does not really matter who is in power at any given time: the press and the money (funds such as the Ford Foundation) remain in the same hands as before. The establishment does not change, and its power in a democracy is much greater than the power of the government, especially in the life of the intelligentsia.
Moreover, it does not really matter what this or that political party calls itself; in our century, due to the fashions of the intelligentsia and the concentrated propaganda of socialists, the political spectrum has shifted so far to the left that today’s “conservative” in England is practically undistinguishable from the social democrat of the beginning of the century. Margaret Thatcher was an exception, representing not even the main body of her party, but a very small part thereof, and that of recent origin. Sir Edward Heath was and is a typical contemporary conservative—a colleague and fellow-thinker of Willy Brandt in the grandiose idea of transferring Western wealth to the “poor” South. This idea is so flagrantly socialist that one cannot but wonder how it could merit serious discussion anywhere apart from a congress of the Socialist International. Yet not only was it discussed seriously, it came about somehow that at this very time (the early 1970s), Western banks actually shelled out more than a billion dollars to third world countries in the form of loans, credits, and so on, knowing full well that this money would never be repaid. Now, in our time, these fantastic funds have simply been written off as “bad debts,” with no acknowledgement that this money belonged, in fact, to investors and taxpayers, whose consent to this socialist affair was never sought. In a word, suspecting nothing, we turned up with our human rights concerns, our prisons and psychiatric abuses, in a world where socialism as an idea had already won, while the only arguments behind the scenes were regarding which particular form of socialism would be the leading one. It would be as if you, seeing a house being burgled, reported this to the police, not knowing that they are in league with the burglars. Some picture, isn’t it?
“Soooo…” drawls the duty sergeant, “veeerry interesting. Are you sure the people you saw are burglars? Maybe they were the owners of the property simply moving house? Maybe it’s all in order. Anyway, who are you? A relative?”
I plead guilty that it took me a couple of years before I realized what was actually happening. At first I could not understand why I seemed unable to explain everything properly. Maybe it was my insufficient knowledge of English or something, but nobody understood. Or maybe I did not understand them? It was as though we were speaking in different languages, in which the words were the same but their meanings were completely different.
I was astounded by the habit of treating concepts in the abstract, out of context, thereby rendering them into senseless words or brief slogans, acting on the local public like a signal on one of Pavlov’s dogs: the gastric juices start flowing for no visible reason. For instance, the words peace and cooperation. They immediately produce radiant smiles—the gastric juices are at work. Yet neither word has any meaning outside a specific context. In an abstract sense, the most peaceful place on earth is a cemetery, while cooperation with, say, a criminal is deemed complicity and is punishable by law in any country. It’s simple, isn’t it? Yet I could not explain these simple truths to my interlocutors. The Pavlovian conditioned reflexes, developed over decades, proved impossible to overcome. To this day there is such an absurdity as the Nobel Peace Prize. Peace with whom?
In fact, that notorious détente, all that “defusion of international tension”—what does this dream mean? Why should one struggle with tension rather than its source? It has to come from somewhere. What sense is there in defusing it all the time if it is going to continue building up? But logic is powerless here; all you get in reply is yet another signal phrase: “There is no alternative to détente.”
And your interlocutor’s gastric juices make themselves felt.
You start to worry. “Wait a moment, what do you mean, there is no alternative? There is an alternative to everything in the world. After all, that is the very art of politics, to create alternatives.”
In reply you hear, “Political realities have to be acknowledged.”
Buzzzz… another signal. I remember spending an hour trying to convince another person that “political realities” have to be created, not acknowledged. In my case, for example, acknowledging the political realities in the USSR would have entailed joining the party, cooperating with the KGB. Instead of that, I created reality; and here I am sitting next to you in the West. It made no difference. Finally, his stomach rumbling, he retorted: “We need peace and cooperation.”
Do you think that I am exaggerating or simplifying? I am not. Our arguments with the local establishment about détente were just as ludicrous—like a dialogue between two deaf people—because none of the “détentists” even tried to substantiate their doctrine. They lied, fidgeted, tried to get away with slogan-like phrases, but could not manage to give a clear explanation of why détente was so necessary. In any case, it is impossible to explain why, for instance, you should supply credits, goods and technology to a totalitarian regime whose declared intention is your destruction. There are no adequate arguments in human logic to justify such a state of affairs. All that remained was to lie.
“The idea is to make it easier to influence the USSR and make them respect human rights,” the détentists would say, winking conspiratorially. “We will tie them to us, make them economically dependent on the West and exert influence.”
But as soon as the time came to “exert influence”—such as when the USSR breached the Helsinki Accords or invaded Afghanistan—it would emerge suddenly that “we depend more on them than they do on us.” Never mind that we cannot so much as boycott them, or introduce any embargo; on the contrary, they are in a position to blackmail the West.
What is this? Stupidity? Happenstance? Neither one nor the other, because straightaway, without pausing for breath, the offer came to enter into an even greater dependency on the USSR by building a pipeline to bring Soviet gas to Europe.
What concern can there be for human rights if the entire Ostpolitik of German socialists reduced the problem to trafficking in people. A whole industry came into being: for every released political prisoner the authorities of the GDR received 40,000 marks, thereby stimulating more unmotivated arrests.
“We Germans have to care for our eastern brothers above all else.”
So they “cared”—in exchange for massive injections into the economy of the GDR, certain selected individuals would be granted merciful permission to visit their relatives in the East. It was enough to make one shed a tear, to see old men and women meeting each other thanks to détente… while at the same time, “eastern brothers” were being shot at the Berlin Wall, were blown up on mines, had dogs set on them. It was not even the done thing to notice the Wall in the middle of the city, let alone mention it. Heaven forbid! That would be “Cold War rhetoric.”
“Détente is peace and cooperation.”
What was this? Stupidity? Cowardice? No; treachery.
I had always thought that the détente of the 1970s was the brainchild of the Kremlin, but I was wrong; it was thought up by German socialists. My error was understandable: the rotation of periods of “tension” and its “defusion” are typical of the entire history of East-West relations and were always initiated by the Soviet side. Starting with Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) through the years of the “great alliance” of the Second World War and ending with Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence,” decisions about “defusion” and “pressure” were made in Moscow, while the West simply accepted its role in the game by default. In essence, it would always be ideal for the regime to keep up this kind of relationship with its “capitalist surroundings” when in reply to “increasing class struggle”, the West would react with increased friendliness. But this did not work out: frightened by the growth of Soviet influence, the seizure of new territories, increase of subversive activity, the West bristled, generally not for long, and a period of cold war would set in, to the curses of all of progressive humanity.
No matter what was claimed in leftist propaganda, Western policy toward the USSR was always passive, defensive rather than aggressive. Even at the height of the Cold War, the overriding doctrine of the West was containment, which left all the initiative in the hands of the Soviet leaders. Therefore, having tired of opposition and having exhausted most of its resources, but having played significantly on the nerves of its opponents, the Soviet regime would begin a “peaceful advance” for the purpose of receiving a pause for breath in the arms race, Western credits and technologies, and a more conducive atmosphere for the further expansion of its influence. There was no instance of the West rejecting this unsolicited “friendship,” although the regime never made any secret of the fact that its essence had remained unchanged. Khrushchev’s promise, “We shall bury you!” worried the West much more than the Berlin Wall, even though Khrushchev had not said anything really new; he had simply affirmed the Marxist dogma that “the proletariat is the grave digger of capitalism.” Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev, who never repeated anything in his own words, nonetheless stated time and again that “détente does not in any way change, nor can it change, the laws of class struggle.”144 But this sounded somewhat vague, so it did not upset anyone.
Naturally, all these “détentes” ended the same way—with the latest invasion, the Soviet seizure of this or that country, undisguised hostility toward the West, and threats. Just like a troop of monkeys when one of its members is carried off by a hungry tiger, Western countries would go into a brief period of unhealthy agitation and then calm down. Then it would all start over again, with the sole difference that with the passage of time the cycles became shorter. The regime was increasingly unable to cope with the pressure, its economy increasingly unable to survive without Western infusions. However, the periods of “rest” became increasingly dangerous, as without “tension” control would start to slip over various parts of the empire.
In other words, there were more than enough reasons to believe that the détente of the 1970s also came about on Soviet initiative. Moreover, it came in very handy for the Brezhnev leadership that had just crushed Czechoslovakia and found itself isolated as it commenced the “Kosygin reforms,” in other words just as it was in dire need of Western support. But facts are stubborn things. The little I was able to find in the archives on this matter amazed even me.
Let us go back to the document cited at the beginning of the first chapter (see §1.1—Who Cares?), the one dealing with a meeting between a “KGB source” and an authorized representative of one of the leaders of Egon Bahr’s SPD, the beginning of “unofficial contacts” between the German social democrats and the KGB (9 September 1969*, 2273-A).
They started this shameful policy in a shameful manner—concealed from their own people, like a conspiracy, and through KGB channels to boot. But this is not the main issue—after all, I will be told, there are many examples throughout history when necessary matters were dealt with in secret; rather, the main issue is that the document in question refutes all the lies conjured up later by the social democrats as justification for their new policy.
For example, the dependence of the FRG on its Soviet neighbor, which they later called a “reality” they had to “take into account,” was, as we were to see later, instituted by them quite consciously. Or look at their cries about how they are saving humanity from nuclear war with the aid of their Ostpolitik, all their assurances that there is no alternative to détente. But there was nothing really threatening Germany in 1969 (at least, nothing threatening it more than usual), and the notorious “international tension” had not yet taken a grip on the world. There was no need to seek any “alternative.” On the contrary, the tension escalated as a result of détente when, making use of Western goodwill, the USSR started to build up its arms toward the end of the 1970s.
Finally, let us not forget the simple fact that Germany is a member of NATO, and in 1969 the social democrats—members of the ruling coalition of the FRG—were actually committing treason in conducting such negotiations with Moscow behind the backs of their allies. Being a democracy, it stands to reason that nobody could forbid them from changing their former stance of supporting NATO or even from becoming allies of Moscow, but in order to do this they would be obligated to quit the coalition and openly declare their new choice. By doing neither of these things they became, essentially, agents of Moscow influence in NATO. As a result of this policy Germany did not achieve anything substantial, but East-West relations became infected by the virus of capitulation for a long time.
Meanwhile, the Andropov-recommended line of a balanced approach to relations “with both parties” was no more than a game. At that time, in May 1969, the KGB forwarded the following document to the CC (27 May 1969*, 231-Z):
Pursuant to the decision of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU (St-57/59) in October 1968, the Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR forwarded photocopies of archive documents to the Ministry of State Security of the GDR regarding the Nazi past of the West German chancellor, [Kurt] KIESINGER.
At present, the Ministry of State Security of the GDR is requesting the loan of original documents for use in preparing measures for the compromising of KIESINGER.
We find it feasible to grant the request of our German friends and lend them the indicated documents concerning the Nazi past of the chancellor of the FRG, KIESINGER, that are stored in the State Archive Administration of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Moscow’s game is perfectly clear: if Chancellor Kiesinger refuses to cooperate under threat of blackmail, it can dispose of him by placing its stake on his “big coalition” partners, the social democrats. As we now know, that is exactly what happened, and in the same year Willy Brandt became chancellor while Kiesinger retired as a result of “measures” implemented to “compromise” him (not without the assistance of his social democratic “partners,” who instigated an artificial government crisis). It is much harder to understand the motives of the social democrats who willingly stuck their heads in the Soviet noose. It stands to reason that later they said a great deal about their honorable intentions to protect human rights, which was allegedly impossible without making certain concessions to the USSR, without a “mutually beneficial” game with Moscow…. Yet this is all just a smoke screen, if not to say an outright lie, as the main concessions to Moscow were precisely in the sphere of human rights. It suffices to recall that this entire game was devised a mere half year after Soviet tanks crushed the Prague Spring and the world was still voicing its indignation about it. At such a moment the very offer to establish “special relations” with the aggressor were a solid concession, if not outright betrayal. It is not surprising that, starting on such a note, the new Ostpolitik betrayed the cause of human rights, turning the Germany of the early 1970s into a second Finland. For example, here is another document illustrating the activities in “defense of human rights” of the FRG government by 1972, Andropov’s report to the CC (30 April 1972*, 1176-A):
On 5 March 1972, senior academic employee of the Institute of General History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Doctor of History Mikhail Sergeyevich VOSLENSKY, born 1920, Russian, not a party member, single, traveled to Germany at the personal invitation of the president of the FRG, [Gustav] HEINEMANN.
On April 29 of this year, the state secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the FRG, [Paul] FRANK, advised [Valentin] FALIN, the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, that VOSLENSKY had applied to the authorities of the FRG for a 2-3 year extension of his visa, and requested support in obtaining an extension of his Soviet passport for the same period. VOSLENSKY based his request on a desire to engage in academic activity, without expressing any political motives. According to FRANK, VOSLENSKY’S behavior raises certain suspicions, pursuant to which the government of the FRG is not interested in an extension of his stay in that country. At the same time, the West German side is unable to make an unequivocal refusal of extending his visa, as it fears that VOSLENSKY may make a public appeal and, as a desperate measure, apply to the police, asking for political asylum with all the resulting consequences.
In the complex political situation in the FRG at the moment, such a course of events, in FRANK’S opinion, would be highly undesirable. On this basis, FRANK states that in the West German view it would be feasible to extend the validity of VOSLENSKY’S West German visa for 2-3 months. …
Allowing for the fact that VOSLENSKY is in the FRG on the personal invitation of President HEINEMANN, it would seem feasible to take up FRANK’S suggestion regarding the extension of VOSLENSKY’S visa on the condition that the West German authorities shall take steps to prevent any undesirable actions on his part.
At the same time, acting through the Soviet ambassador in Bonn and with recourse to the possibilities of the KGB to pose the question of the unpublicized removal of VOSLENSKY to the Soviet Union should such a need arise.
In other words, in 1972 the German leadership was in an active conspiracy with Moscow and against its own people, even the police, with regard to those very same “human rights.”145 By 1974 the “confidential cooperation” was so strong that the forced expulsion of Solzhenitsyn from the USSR, for example, was practically decided together by the Politburo and the socialist leaders of the FRG (and seemingly in secret from their coalition partners) (7 January 1974* (Pb). The reader will recall what a headache the matter of Solzhenitsyn was to the communist leadership: on one hand, the Politburo seemed to support the idea of dealing with the matter in court, and on the other hand they all (especially Andropov and Gromyko) understood that such a blatant violation of human rights would undermine their successes in international affairs. They were particularly worried by the imminent conclusion of the contract of the Helsinki Accords, whereby in exchange for the “recognition of post-war borders” (i.e., legalization of the Soviet occupation of a good half of Europe) they were to give all kinds of guarantees regarding the protection of human rights—naturally with no intention of honoring them. But it is one thing to breach agreements after they have been signed; what to do before this is another matter. Solzhenitsyn’s arrest at that time could have ruined their entire game, and expelling him against his will (as Andropov suggested) would be difficult without a country willing to accept him. That is where they thought of Brandt—who better to ask for help than the party most interested in détente? Andropov reported the following in a personal message to Brezhnev (7 February 1974*):
As I reported to you by telephone, Brandt has declared that Solzhenitsyn may live and work freely in the FRG. Today, on February 7, comrade [Boris] Kevorkov will fly for a meeting with Bahr for the purpose of discussing the practical issues relating to Solzhenitsyn’s expulsion from the Soviet Union to the FRG. If Brandt does not fail at the last minute and Kevorkov’s negotiations are concluded satisfactorily, by February 9–10 we should have an agreed-upon decision, of which I shall advise you immediately. If the indicated agreement is reached, then I believe that no later than February 9 it would be feasible to adopt an Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR depriving Solzhenitsyn of Soviet citizenship and his expulsion abroad (a draft of the Order is attached). The implementation of Solzhenitsyn’s expulsion in that case could be carried out on February 10–11.
All this must be done as quickly as possible, because according to operative documents, Solzhenitsyn is beginning to guess our intentions and may issue a public document, which would place both us and Brandt in a very awkward situation.
Two days later he was able to report success:146
On February 8, our representative had a meeting with BRANDT’S authorized representative to discuss the practical issues linked with SOLZHENITSYN’S expulsion from the Soviet Union to the FRG.
As a result of this discussion, the following decision was reached upon the suggestion of the representative of the FRG [italics mine—V.B.]. On the evening of February 12 comrade FALIN, the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, will call Secretary of State P. FRANK (specifically him), requesting a meeting on an urgent matter at 8:30 a.m. on February 13.
On February 13, comrade FALIN will be received by FRANK and advise him of SOLZHENITSYN’S expulsion. (The text of the advice is forwarded separately simultaneously with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.) The cabinet meeting will start at 10 a.m. BRANDT will instruct BAHR, FRANK, and the representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to make a positive decision. At the request of the West German authorities, SOLZHENITSYN should arrive on an ordinary passenger aircraft to Frankfurt by 1700 hours local time on February 13.
From the moment SOLZHENITSYN disembarks from the aircraft, the Soviet representatives have no further involvement in the action. … If at the last moment BRANDT, despite all his assurances [italics mine.—V.B.], changes his mind for whatever reasons, then SOLZHENITSYN will remain under arrest and the Procuracy will institute proceedings on his case.
Such “cooperation” merits the name only in the sense of the way agents “cooperate” with their center. What we see here is collusion, a conspiracy.
It stands to reason that when the Helsinki Accords were signed, the German social democrats knew full well that the USSR had no intention of fulfilling its obligations regarding human rights, and they were not inclined to protest against this. Without doubt, despite all their public declarations, détente was not tied up with human rights in their eyes. The change of chancellors in 1974 brought about no alteration of this policy. The point was not who was chancellor, but what party he belonged to. Moreover, by 1977, at the culmination of the global campaign for human rights in the USSR, when it had been joined by the new president of the USA, Jimmy Carter, the German social democrats were refraining from mentioning this problem as fundamental to Ostpolitik. Carter and his stance frightened them half to death: what if the problem of human rights really became central to relations with the USSR?
The leadership of the Social Democratic Party experienced great concerns with the start of Carter’s activities. The lack of clarity regarding the course of the new administration to the USSR in matters of détente, bilateral relations with the USSR, and the key areas of economic and financial policy hampered the development of the program of the social-liberal coalition and exerted a negative influence on the commencement of the activity of [Chancellor Helmut] SCHMIDT’s cabinet, advised the Soviet embassy in its report for 1977 (21 June 1977).147
Brandt and Bahr hastened to Washington to instruct Carter in the intricacies of European politics, and every mention of the accursed human rights was accompanied by endless caveats. The Soviet ambassador in Bonn, FALIN, reported the following to Moscow (2 March 1977*, No. 74):148
On the one hand, [the Americans] are obliged to be seen as champions of “human rights” and cannot allow themselves to be outshone by either their internal competitors or their allies. After the publication of Carter’s letter to Sakharov, Chancellor Schmidt (20.02.77) declared that the motives of the president are the same as those of West Germany, and that the government of the FRG “shall continue to take all adequate steps to ensure that persons expressing differing views shall not be subjected to discrimination and persecution.” In the same vein, German statesman Hans-Dietrich Genscher described the implementation of human rights “global in scope” as the central concern of the liberals and reiterated his suggestion to institute an “international court on human rights.”
On the other hand, according to reliable data, the leadership of the SPD of Germany was alarmed by Carter’s crusade regarding the question of dissidents. If Schmidt spoke of “adequate steps,” then Bahr, who was going to the USA, was charged with giving the new administration a comprehensive explanation of the social democrats’ perception of such “adequate steps” that would not throw détente overboard. This subject will probably be raised by Brandt and [Horst] Ehmke in their forthcoming meetings with Carter and [Cyrus] Vance. … Even more frank concern regarding the developing situation was expressed by West German politicians from the government camp in unofficial discussions. …
It is easy to understand that it was they and their European socialist allies spreading the lie that noise in the West would harm dissidents, despite the opinion of the dissidents themselves, just like other lies about us, thereby becoming KGB channels for “compromising measures.” Moreover, they hurried to tell their Soviet “partners” about their successes in this field (21 June 1977):149
For your information, Schmidt, Brandt, and Werner have done useful work with H.-D. Genscher, bringing him closer to a better acceptance of social democratic foreign policy concepts. The social democrats stress that under this influence the foreign affairs minister has shown greater restraint in making hostile statements regarding the USSR.
So all the forces of European socialism were brought to bear to save détente from… problems of human rights. Simply speaking from us, a handful of people prepared to sacrifice our liberty (and occasionally our lives), who defended those rights. These forces are still powerful enough, but in those days they were gigantic. It is enough to recall that in 1977 and 1978, when our campaign reached a critical moment150 and our arrested friends—members of the Helsinki Groups—were hanging by a thread, most European governments were socialist. To say nothing of the press, the intelligentsia, trade unions, and business circles.
Is it surprising that they “won”? Or, to put it more succinctly, betrayed us and the idea of human rights? It cost them little effort to join forces and make Carter turn away from his human rights line regarding the USSR. But that was not all. Long before the Belgrade Conference, which was to examine observance of the Helsinki Accords in the fall of 1977, European socialist parties met in Amsterdam behind closed doors and decided not to demand too much from the USSR at that conference. And half a year later in Belgrade, they did not demand anything. The conference, on which many placed great hopes in expectation of a firm line by the West, got away with a communiqué that made no mention of repressions in socialist countries.
This betrayal was a blow from which our movement never recovered completely. Dozens of Helsinki monitors were incarcerated in prisons and camps, and many died there,151 paying with their lives for the deceit called the Helsinki Accords—for the solemn promise of the West to tie together questions of security, cooperation, and human rights in its relations with the East.
Actually, they betrayed not just us and not just the idea, but their own countries, their own civilizations. And in the end themselves: unaffected by the struggle for human rights in socialist countries, détente turned into a simple capitulation, and the idea of “socialism with a human face,” now that the face had been sacrificed, turned from Utopia into a conscious deception. Who did these Bahrs and Franks expect to become with the reinforcement of Soviet influence in Europe? Moscow’s quislings and gauleiters? Such naivety. For purposes like that, the Kremlin leaders had their own Erich Honeckers in reserve. But following in the footsteps of all socialists who helped the communists seize power, these Bahrs and Franks would have ended their days in the gulag.
As I said by the Berlin Wall on 9 May 1977, “There were no machine-gun toting convoys standing behind the delegates in Amsterdam, they were not menaced by guard dogs: they chose to relinquish their freedom willingly.”152
Yet another “human rights”–oriented excuse for détente—care for the “eastern brothers,” which may have been quite sincere at the start—was sacrificed very soon to that very détente and turned into a propagandistic camouflage. I am willing to concede that in signing the Moscow and Warsaw pacts in 1972, the social democrats showed that they still believed their slogan of “influence through rapprochement.” However, it soon became clear that that it is one thing to come to power through various manipulations, and another to retain that power while preserving your aims and principles. Socialist ideas are only good in theory. In practice, the popularity of the SPD soon began to fade, and by 1977, according to the assessment of the Soviet embassy in Bonn (21 June 1977*), “its authority was at its lowest ebb since coming to power.”
In political circles there were unending discussions about the future of the West German social democracy, and also about the survivability of the social-liberal coalition as a whole. As can be seen from the numerous meetings and discussions of representatives of the Soviet embassy in social democratic circles, the leadership of the SPD was doggedly seeking ways to achieve positive results in its foreign and domestic policy and increasing the trust of the electorate in its political course. In these circumstances foreign policy activity… is seen by the leadership of the SPD as one of the decisive prerequisites of increasing the influence of the party in the country.
Simply speaking, the social democrats became hostages to their own Ostpolitik, the success of which was wholly in the hands of Soviet leaders. Naturally, such “rapprochement” suited Moscow, allowing it to not simply “influence” the FRG government, but dictate its own policy to the Germans. Even Brezhnev’s visit to the FRG was turned into an event that that NATO country awaited with much greater trepidation than would have been the case in Warsaw (21 June 1977*, p. 3.):
The leadership of the SPD has great hopes regarding the successful visit of L.I. Brezhnev to the FRG. It expects that new impulses for further improvement in Soviet–West German relations shall dispel the unfavorable impression that in the activity of Helmut Schmidt’s cabinet since May 1974 there has been little discernible movement in the political sphere of these relations. Soviet-American dialogue regarding the conclusion of the second agreement on strategic arms limitation, the visit of comrade L.I. Brezhnev to the FRG, and the constructive passage of the Belgrade Conference must, in the view of the SPD leaders, become important mutually linked stages on the path of the further deepening of détente.
It is worth noting that in preparing for comrade L.I. Brezhnev’s visit, the social democrats are avoiding active participation in noisy anti-Soviet campaigns around the issue of “human rights” and criticize their organizers from the CDU/CSU.
Remember that at that time even certain communist parties (French, Italian) were not particularly reticent in criticizing repressive Soviet policies. Therefore the SPD was much more reliant on Moscow than European communist parties, and the FRG was somewhat like Bulgaria. But why speak of Moscow? Even the insignificant marionette GDR was able to dictate policy to its “Western brother.” (21 June 1977*, pp. 4–5):
The SPD leadership is working hard to deprive the opposition of one of its main arguments that the government headed by Schmidt has “painted itself into a corner” in German affairs and has demonstrated its total lack of efficacy. The chancellery is using various channels to inspire the GDR to discussion on a wide range of measures, achieving success which would allow it, acting in the interests of the FRG, to “create a positive balance” in relations with the GDR. The political and ideological aim of these measures is characterized quite frankly—the creation of such a close net of intermixed mutual interests that the GDR would be unable to break it without losses to itself under any circumstances. As H. Werner declares, “so that the opposition between the FRG and the GDR shall gradually grow into good-neighborly existence, into relations between loyal neighbors.”
The chancellor is fully aware of all the difficulties in resolving this matter and does not nourish any great illusions. The leaders of the SPD continually stress the need to show care and patience in relations with the GDR, and most importantly not to jeopardize the already existing “fundamental changes” by demonstrative and senseless actions. What is meant here in the first place is the increased possibility of meetings between FRG and GDR citizens. Visits by FRG citizens to the GDR rose to 8 million in 1976, which is seen by the SPD leadership as “an improvement of the situation of people in a divided Germany” and one of the main achievements of FRG policy in German affairs since 1969.
Thus, care for “eastern brothers” devolved into a rather paradoxical situation wherein the model of successful socialism in the GDR was sustained by the money of West German taxpayers, eight million of whom were allowed to pay one annual visit and see it for themselves. It is easy to see whose “influence” prevailed in this “rapprochement.” Even the Soviet embassy report does not conceal the irony of this “main achievement” of the social democrats over seven years of détente.
Toward the end, when neither human rights nor the influencing of the GDR could be advanced seriously as a basis for policy, as a rational reason for détente, they proclaimed a different scheme altogether: peace and disarmament. But this also sounded unconvincing: in 1969, when the social democrats devised and began to implement their Ostpolitik, the threat of war in Europe was much less than it was as a result of that policy by 1980. Nonetheless, even despite such results, they continued to champion détente with obsessive stubbornness, always attempting to ensure the spread of Soviet influence in the country, within the party, often with their own money (16 March 1977, No. 99/360)153 by using such means as the following:
A propaganda channel such as the social democratic Friedrich Ebert Fund, which may enable, using its lines and funds, trips to the USSR by an additional number of journalists from the FRG, and arrange appearances by Soviet lecturers before West German audiences. It could also be possible to establish necessary contacts with the SPD. As was noted by the SPD chairman, W. Brandt, the activity of the fund has been fully reviewed in recent years. It no longer engages in activities that may be perceived by the GDR as infringing on its interests, and functions under the supervision and instructions of the SPD government. In Brandt’s opinion, the fund could serve as a channel for contact between countries under the control of the SPD and the CPSU.
Not even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which exercised a sobering effect on Western public opinion, had much influence on the policy of the German social democrats. Their main aim remained saving détente. Saving it from whom? Brezhnev? No, from (1 February 1980*, Pb 182/2): “thoughtless and hypertrophic reaction, which does not correspond to events and would thereby precipitate an even worse situation.” It was not by chance that the Politburo applied directly to Brandt with a personal message immediately after the invasion, expecting justifiably to overcome the arising political isolation with his assistance “The main issue,” they wrote, “is to find a common language in the matter that has long been your and our concern—how to save the matter of reinforcing international security.”
However, this search for a “common language” was conducted in the most unexpected spheres. By 1981, for example, the theoretical journal of the SPD, Neue Gesellschaft, and the editorial board of the CC CPSU journal Kommunist were cooperating on questions concerning the theory of building socialism (27 January 1981, St 247/13). What for? What bearing does this have on peace or international security?
In fact, what was this policy of détente, Ostpolitik or whatever? It can hardly be explained simply by stupidity, cowardice, or even infiltration of the SPD by the KGB (although all three surely played their part), if only because this policy was accepted not only by the Germans. Practically all the socialist and social democratic parties of Europe supported it to some extent. Moreover, even nonsocialist governments, for example those of France (Valery Giscard d’Estaing) and the USA (Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger), saw no alternative to détente. To be more precise, they did not even seek it, accepting fully the game and arguments of the socialists.
What were the aims of the European socialists in creating this game and trying to force it on the world? After all, it was not like the harmless games of leisured politicians, but an extremely dangerous adventure that could have cost the peoples of Europe their freedom. It prolonged the life of communist regimes in the East for at least ten years. Hundreds of thousands of people did not have to lose their lives in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Central America, and the Middle East. Why were they condemned to die? In the name of “socialism with a human face,” a Utopia into which they intended to herd an unsuspecting humanity, the socialists sentenced the peoples of the USSR and Eastern Europe to ten years of slavery. They did it for the sake of “convergence,” as a result of which, they thought, Soviet communism would acquire a human face, and the West would become socialist. Generally speaking, they did it for the eternal dream of Mensheviks to return the Bolsheviks to the bosom of social democracy, the wish of an idiot for a hybrid of a kindergarten and a labor camp.
Yet as we know from the history of their relations, the Mensheviks propose, and the Bolsheviks dispose. History knows of no instances of the former outsmarting the latter and countless examples of the use of the former by the latter. As I was once told rightly by an old social democrat, a man of exceptional honesty, social democracy only has the right to exist while the basis of its policy is consecutive anticommunism—otherwise it mutates into “Kerenskyism.” That is why the first stage of the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s was so successful for the West, as European social democracy maintained strict anti-Soviet positions. It is said that Brandt—until then a firm anticommunist, mayor of the “frontline” city of Berlin—“broke” when he saw that the Allies were prepared to sacrifice Berlin and take no action against the raising of the Wall in 1961. He writes about this himself:154
“In the following years my political views were under the significant influence of this event, and as a protest against the situation in which this event occurred gave birth to my so-called East policy beginnings in the field of détente.”
Maybe it was so—I was not there, and do not presume to judge. But even then, he should have thought about the example of Alexander Kerensky, whose “détente” with Lenin ended up bringing the Bolsheviks to Berlin.
No matter how, by the end of the 1960s the positions of European social democracy had begun to drift to the left, toward cooperation with communists. That was also influenced by purely tactical considerations (joint campaigns against the Vietnam War, apartheid in South Africa, Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile), the Khrushchev “thaw,” and the schism between Moscow and Beijing, as a result of which the Soviet model of communism began to seem like the lesser evil. The temptation to cooperate became even stronger with the appearance of “Eurocommunism,” which reawakened the socialists’ old dreams regarding the evolution of communism toward social democracy. But I believe that the main role was played here by cynical, conjunctural reasons: it was only the growth of communist influence, just like the growth of Soviet influence, that made social democracy acceptable, if not an alternative in Western eyes.
In fact, by the 1960s they should have become convinced that socialist ideas, remaining the religion of the elite, found no resonance among the general public and thus their favored “third way”—to maneuver moderate social democracy between the “extremes of communism and capitalism”—was chosen by the West merely as the “lesser evil.” Only the growth of Soviet influence could make them desired middlemen in East-West relations, “saviors of mankind” so to speak, allowing them—as they thought—“to influence both sides,” gradually ironing out the ideological inconsistencies and thereby bringing opposing worlds to peace and cooperation—to “convergence.”
This way, declaring that the aim of their policy of détente was to ensure peace and security, improve the situation of people in the East, and respect human rights and other benefits, the socialists lied only in part. Yes, these were their dreams, but not entirely disinterested dreams, because they made no mention of the fact that realization of the dream required involuntary acceptance of their version of socialism and of them as our more or less permanent ruler-saviors.
Furthermore, by keeping silent about all this, and realizing that the majority of people would not accept their Utopia willingly, they practiced the deliberate reinforcement of Soviet influence, in secret from their people and allies, as well as from their partners in various government coalitions. Like some of our intelligentsia, who with naive self-confidence engaged in games with the KGB—“We’re smarter, we can outplay them”—European social democracy embarked on secret games with Moscow and, as was to be expected, got tangled in the web.
Understandably, Moscow was only too happy to take part in these games: if the Bolsheviks had learned anything from their history, it was how to use the Mensheviks to their own ends. In essence, all the “breathers,” beginning with the New Economic Policy (NEP), were gained by them at the cost of drawing in various “reforming” leftist movements to implement their policies, frequently by means of creating “united fronts” with them—naturally under communist leadership. By a clever combination of official cooperation with unofficial infiltration of its agents and leftist radical activists into the ranks of “moderate” movements, Moscow simply manipulated them. It was the same this time.
On one hand, Soviet leaders were extremely enthusiastic in greeting such cooperation in the name of peace, progress and socialism. Even Brezhnev, speaking at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU, stressed the enormous significance of closer relations with Western socialists. The head of the International Department of the CC, Boris Ponomarev, writing in the journal Kommunist, was even more enthusiastic about positive changes in the social democratic movement resulting from a number of international debates.155 In a special article devoted to the conference of the Socialist International in 1976 (appearing in World Marxist Review), he wrote,156 “The permanent and broad-scale cooperation between communists, socialists and social democrats may become one of the decisive factors for peace and social progress.”
On the other hand, the KGB received a special assignment to concentrate its activity on these parties. The then head of the intelligence administration of the KGB, General Kryuchkov, instructed all his residents in Western Europe as follows (I quote from the English edition of the book by C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky) (26 August 1977*, No. 644/54):157
The new correlation of forces on the international stage, the development of the process of détente and far-reaching changes in international circumstances have obliged the leaders of the Socialist International (SI) along with its constituent parties to take the appropriate corrective measures with regard to their political course and tactics.
The latest Congress of the Sotsintern (November 1976) on the whole endorsed the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and expressed its intention of promoting the implementation of the Final Act.
A resolution of the Congress dealing with international détente stated: “It is possible and necessary to broaden, strengthen and consolidate détente on a wider scale.”
In general terms the Congress took up a constructive position on questions of disarmament. The resolution stated: “Disarmament and the imposition of controls on armaments and arms deals is of vital importance for the whole world with regard to an escalation of the arms race and a worsening of the economic situation in most countries.”
The Congress spoke out in favor of a prompt conclusion to the talks between the USA and the Soviet Union with the aim of obtaining agreement on a qualitative and quantitative reduction of strategic arms, and underlined the great importance of the talks taking place in Vienna on the mutual reduction of arms and armed forces.
In contradistinction to the period of the “Cold War”, the leadership of the Socialist International now refrains from unilateral and oversimplified treatment of the foreign policies of the countries of the socialist community and acknowledges the positive role of the Soviet Union in developing the process of détente.
On the other hand, the social-democratic leaders of the important Western European countries which play a leading role in the Sotsintern, are adhering to their previous line regarding the need to consolidate NATO. They are also playing a part in the conversion of the EEC [the European Economic Community] into a military-political alliance, promoting in this context the demagogic slogan: “Let the Europe of monopolies be transformed into a Europe of workers.” […]
An analysis of the activities of the new leadership elected at the latest Congress of the Socialist International (BRANDT, CARLSON) enables us to conclude that it is making active efforts to develop its new program. […]
In particular, by widely promoting the theory of “Democratic Socialism as a Third Way” (in contradistinction to capitalism and communism) for the development of Society, the Social Democratic leaders have put forward a “Socialist Strategy for the Third World” and have launched a new campaign to increase their influence in different sections of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
[…]
… The question of the normalization or the development of collaboration with the communist and workers’ parties was sidestepped in the Congress resolution. As is well known, on this question there are deep differences of opinion within the international Social-Democratic movement. Nonetheless the Sotsintern has been compelled of late to refrain from imposing sanctions against those on the road of contacting or collaborating with the Communists.
[…]
In the process of studying these problems, it would be expedient to consider and evaluate the possibilities open to you for initiating active measures, the purpose of which would be to support and increase the operations of those leading activists and functionaries who are speaking out in favor of widening and strengthening the process of détente, curbing the arms race, and in favor of international cooperation.
[…]
The Centre would be interested to have ideas from Residencies on how we can exploit to our advantage:
- divergences between the parties of the Sotsintern on individual questions of ideology and tactics (differing approaches to the solution of economic problems, to capitalist monopolies, to the political concept of a “United Europe,” to cooperation with Communist Parties);
- rivalry between leaders of the German Social-Democrats, the French and Australian Socialist Parties, the Swedish Social Democratic Workers’ Party and the British Labour Party for the leading role in the Socialist International;
- contradictions between the pronouncements and the actual policies of Social-Democracy;
- specific examples of selfish neo-colonist policies by the social-democrats of the industrially developed countries towards Third World countries etc.
In other words, the entire gigantic machine of communist secret services in Europe was ordered to open a hunting season on the heads of socialists and social democrats, in order to turn these movements into a tool of Soviet policy:158
Submit proposals for a wider and more purposeful exploitation of existing agent-operational resources with a view both to obtaining the necessary intelligence and to implement the active measures. In particular, ideas should be submitted on the direction in which further work with existing agents and confidential contacts from within the ranks of the Social-Democrats should proceed; information should be communicated to us which might open the way to us to recruit either as an agent or as a confidential contact other prominent, active figures in the movement, whom we can use to penetrate its leading bodies and means of propaganda and information.
How could the loose-mouthed intelligentsia from socialist parties withstand such formidable pressure? In the words of Vladimir Vysotsky, it was like “a schoolboy fighting a gang of rabble.”
However, I do not intend to reduce the entire problem of the betrayal of European social democrats to KGB infiltration, leaving them the morally easy position of simpleminded idealists. General Kryuchkov was right when he spoke of the Mensheviks’ traditional “gulf between words and deeds,” which they, in his view, “are unable to bridge.” More specifically, they do not even want to bridge it; not for nothing did Lenin brand them “social traitors.” This gap is not accidental; it arises from a tendency of the intelligentsia as a whole, and especially the left, to cover up its far-from-disinterested aims with fine words. Let us assume that the problem of human rights in communist countries was not a peripheral issue, a humanitarian problem of détente that could be ignored for the time being on the road toward “convergence.” Yet as we recall, the ideas of the social democrats presumed changes on both sides of the Iron Curtain; the mandatory condition for its realization was, therefore, the appearance of the “human face” in the Soviet model of socialism. And even the most simpleminded idealist should have understood that if the Soviet regime refuses to acquire that face, the entire idea of détente becomes meaningless. Just as the Helsinki Accords become meaningless, making a substantial concession to Moscow—by legalizing its postwar territorial expansion—precisely in exchange for respect for human rights.
Meanwhile, the key moment of the test of the Helsinki deal was the repression of Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups headed by Yuri Orlov, although the text of the Helsinki Accords envisaged the right to public monitoring of their observance.159 By arresting Orlov and his colleagues, the Soviet Union threw an open challenge to the whole world—and the West, having swallowed this pill, capitulated. Even the same simpleminded idealist could not fail to understand that by continuing the policy of détente after this, continuing its cooperation with the USSR as though nothing had happened, the West betrayed its own principles. No KGB infiltration could change this situation, nor excuse such behavior.
It must be said that the West understood this dilemma perfectly. For instance, the British Daily Mail on the eve of the sentencing wrote:160
The trial of Yuri Orlov in Moscow for the ‘crime’ of monitoring his country’s fulfilment of its obligations under the Helsinki Agreements to further human rights shows what a farce those agreements were, and how naive the faith of so many Western politicians in a détente which is only respected on one side of the Iron Curtain. … The British Foreign Office finds the fact that the trial of Professor Orlov is taking place ‘very disturbing’. … It would be much better if the Western nations showed that the era of gutlessness is over in those areas where it counts. … It is not by gestures but by resolute action that the global chess-players in the Kremlin are likely to be impressed.”
Usually moderate circles were just as condemnatory.
The Financial Times:161
In retrospect, it now appears that not just the trial of Dr. Orlov but the Helsinki agreements themselves were a kind of play in which the Soviet authorities pretended that an ideological system imposed through force could honor solemn human rights commitments without undermining its own existence. …
The challenge to the Western signatories of the Helsinki agreements in the trial of Dr. Orlov has been laid down…. It is now up to the Western powers to decide how to react.
The Economist:162
The cruel pretense of a “trial” inflicted on Yuri Orlov in Moscow this week, ending with the maximum sentence of 12 years of jail and banishment, sheds a fierce light on the Soviet regime’s cynical view of its international obligations.
“Nobody imagined, in 1975, that the Soviet government would meet all its Helsinki obligations immediately. But it was reasonable to hope for signs of movement in the right direction. At the Belgrade review conference Russia had ample opportunity to display such signs; and entirely failed to do so.
“The most blatant of its anti-Helsinki actions has been its persecution of the groups of Soviet citizens who have undertaken to monitor its compliance with the 1975 promises.
“But the sentencing of Mr. Orlov, the Moscow group’s former head, serves sharp notice that Mr. Brezhnev sees no present reason to even feign a minimal compliance with his 1975 promises.
“To all who hope to see the eventual emergence of a true east-west détente, it should now be clear that non-communist Helsinki signatories—governments and peoples alike—have a duty to use all possible means to induce the Soviet regime to start complying…. Every Western scientist or other professional person now faces the question: Should I ignore the persecution of among the bravest of my Soviet colleagues, or should I help to end it by suspending all professional contact until their government stops flouting its Helsinki promises?”
And in fact, hundreds of scientists all over the world declared their boycott of the USSR, refusing official contacts and exchanges. Public indignation regarding the punishment of the Helsinki monitors was so great that, as we recall, even communist parties could not disregard it. Not just the larger parties such as the French and Italian, but even smaller ones that were much more dependent on Moscow expressed their open disagreement. It was only the social democrats and socialists, who at that time headed most European governments, who limited themselves to expressing “concern” as in the statement issued by the European Community:
With regard to the recent sentencing of Soviet citizens monitoring observance of the Final Act signed in Helsinki, including the case of Yuri Orlov, the governments of nine countries—members of the European Union, wish to declare the following:
“These nine countries have joined efforts in a persistent aim to support détente in Europe. They have demonstrated their decisiveness by active participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and after that conference.
“These nine countries that consider that the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is a program for action for achieving détente reiterate that this document, signed by the heads of these countries or governments, obligates the participating countries to observe human rights and fundamental freedoms, and affirmed the right of the individual to know his rights and obligations, and to act accordingly.
“For this reason, the governments of the nine countries find that an individual being persecuted and sentenced for demanding observance of the Final Act in his own country to be a breach of the Final Act.”
Even the Labour government of Great Britain, which was seen as the most conservative by its socialist colleagues, did not exceed verbiage. Foreign Secretary David Owen stated that “Orlov’s sentence is ‘severe and unfounded’ and that this threatens the entire policy of détente.” Baroness Llewelyn-Davies, speaking on behalf of the government of Prime Minister James Callaghan in the House of Commons,163 said:
Her Majesty’s Government have stated that they regard the treatment of Professor Orlov as harsh and unjustifiable and are concerned at its effect on the good relations between East and West which are so important to us all…. The Soviet Union is one of the two great States of the world and… we must not cut off relations with her, however strongly and rightly we feel about human rights. To contemplate the alternative is really too horrible and we must not give up easily on this matter.
However, such a dramatic posing of the question had nothing to do with reality. Nobody declared war on anybody. On the contrary, just at that time a Soviet trade delegation was visiting England.
“Mr. Vladimir Kirillin, the Soviet deputy premier now in Britain with a trade delegation, yesterday called on Mr. Callaghan, Prime Minister, to discuss Anglo-Soviet trade relations and the progress of détente,” reported the Daily Telegraph on 20 May, three days after the sentencing in Moscow.164 “Mr. Callaghan expressed disapproval of the treatment and sentencing of Dr. Yuri Orlov, founder of the Moscow Helsinki group, while maintaining the need for normal state and trade relations with the Soviet Union.”
This was too much even for the Sunday Mirror, which traditionally supported Labour:165
So great was the severity and illegality of the trial that even the British Communist Party was shocked. It has asked the Soviet authorities to rescind the sentence. That is one better than the British Government. We have made no formal protest though we are parties to the Helsinki Agreement and the United Nations Covenant on Human Rights. Our position is clear. We are frightened of the Soviet Union, so we do not wish to offend them. We also think that official protests would do no good…. Also, the bullies in the Kremlin are not always as resolute as they look…. The Kremlin caved in. The Russians respect only strength and determination. There is no more point in appeasing the Kremlin than there was in appeasing Hitler. There is no difference between the barbaric dictators of Moscow and the fascists.
And this, I repeat, are English Labourites, considered to be moderate socialists. What could be expected from the others? Of course, they did express “concern” and hinted at “damage to détente,” naturally in deprecatory tones. Some even received replies via Soviet ambassadors, depending on past good behavior (3 July 1978, St 114/39):
A telegram addressed to comrade L.I. Brezhnev has been received from the chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party, R. Steen,166 and the General Secretary, I. Leveros, requesting a review of the case of Soviet citizen Yuri Orlov, sentenced for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.
R. Steen belongs to the moderate circles of the party, which supported the establishment of official contacts with the CPSU for the development of good-neighborly relations and cooperation between Norway and the USSR.
We deem it feasible to send R. Steen and I. Leveros a reply through the Soviet ambassador in Norway regarding the indicated question.
And in fact the inquirers were sent several pages of bare-faced, shameless lies, which seemed to have satisfied them.
Others, like the head of the Austrian socialists, Bruno Kreisky,167 did not get even this much. He sent Andropov an incredibly obsequious letter (4 August 1983, 110-A):
I have received, and continue to receive, numerous appeals from friends and acquaintances to intercede for Soviet citizen Yuri Orlov, who has been incarcerated since the beginning of 1977. … Naturally, I am far from wanting to interfere in the internal matters of the USSR. So if I make this request, it is only out of compassion and in the firm hope of your magnanimity. I presume that such a goodwill gesture at this time of increasing tension in this matter will have a positive effect in which, as I know, we are both interested.
“Yuri Vladmirovich,” writes an assistant, “I believe that Kreisky’s intercession for the dissident Orlov should remain unanswered.” And lower, in Andropov’s hand: “I agree. Andropov.”
In all honesty, I too would leave such a servile request “unanswered”—simply out of a feeling of revulsion. Explain to me, why did he prostrate himself like that, as if asking for a loan of money? In other words, My friends are driving me crazy; I would never have dared on my own accord. I ask for your magnanimous pardon for bothering you with such a trifle. We have a full understanding of your “internal affairs,” and so on. Is this any way to ask, especially when international agreement requires that you demand an answer? So Andropov treats him accordingly, as the master would a lackey catching at his sleeve in the doorway: ”Can you spare a coin, kind sir?”
Not for nothing did the “détentists” insist so stubbornly on “quiet diplomacy” with Moscow in matters concerning human rights; speaking publicly would have required expressing oneself more honorably, pretending to be an equal partner in the game, which is something Moscow would never have tolerated. They hoped that this way, nobody would recognize the nature of their master-and-lackey relationship; at the same time, when they occasionally rescued someone’s head from the block as a gratuity, it could be boasted of to all and sundry as a “an achievement of détente.” Something was needed to justify their “special relationship” with the Kremlin.
On the other hand, following its chekist habit of subverting a partner, Moscow also insisted on this “quiet diplomacy,” perfectly aware that confidentiality in relations is the first step toward subversion. Let us say that in September 1973 the CC responds through its ambassador to the General Secretary of the British Labour Party, Ron Hayward, that his appeal to Mikhail Suslov on behalf of refuseniks Eugene Levich, Alexander Lerner, and Vladimir Slepak shall not be granted—their cases will not be reviewed for another two or three years. But—take comfort—the question of two others shall be decided at the end of 1973 or the beginning of 1974. So Hayward will not remain empty-handed; he will have something to boast about.168 However, the CC instructs its ambassador, “Stress the confidentiality of this information.” Only for you, boys! See that you justify our trust. And the other side, glad to serve, keeps his honorable silence. One may, of course, boast secretly to interested parties. But—hush!—not a word to anyone, don’t spoil the game.
It stands to reason that the Labourite brothers did not realize just how delicately and professionally they were being had by Moscow. And they did not seem to try very hard. After all, at that time they were holding talks about establishing “special relations” with the CPSU. Their delegation (members of parliament William Simpson, Edward Short, and Ian Mikardo, headed by Hayward) was telling Moscow enthusiastically of its aim to “achieve a turn for the better in relations with the USSR” and that it was “critically evaluating certain aspects of the former policies of the Labour Party leadership.” On behalf of all the delegates, Hayward spoke of striving toward détente, especially in relations with Moscow. The aim of the visit was “… to establish contact with the CPSU, exchange views on international problems. Similarity of views was noted, as well as the closeness of positions regarding matters of détente (economic cooperation, the all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation, the significance of agreements with the GDR and Poland, aid to Vietnam, support for developing countries, support of Allende in Chile).”
Naturally, ideological differences were also noted—on the matter of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the “lack of clarity in positions regarding the People’s Party of China.” But these were mere trifles by comparison with the similarities. Enthusiasm was unbounded. Even such Soviet demands as Labour’s closer cooperation with the British Communist Party and its refutation of “anti-Soviet slanderous campaigns” did not meet with any serious objections from the Labourites. It is hard to cooperate with the British Communist Party, they said, but they were prepared to maintain “good personal relations with the communists.”
“The tone of the response is much softer than before,” noted Moscow in a detailed report to… the General Secretary of the British Communist Party,169 John Gollan.
With such a “similarity of views,” what price human rights? Even a mention of this problem or a public intercession for someone was viewed as an “anti-Soviet campaign.” Moscow did not allow anyone to look good on their own account (26 December 1980*, St 243/57).
The chairman of the Social Democrats of Denmark (SDPD), Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, sent a telegram to the International Department of the CC CPSU in which, on behalf of his party, he requests consideration of the “family reunification” of Soviet citizen Victor Brailovsky, recently arrested and undergoing investigation on charges of systematic dissemination of slanderous claims and defaming the state and social system of the USSR.170
In view of the circumstance that the leadership of the SDPD and the CPSU have interparty links, we would deem it unfeasible to leave A. Jorgensen’s telegram without a reply. The reply can be made through the Soviet ambassador in Denmark.
In view of the fact that Jorgensen’s telegram was reported widely in the Western media, it must be borne in mind that our reply might be publicized similarly.
After giving Jorgensen a detailed “explanation” regarding the kind of miscreant he is championing, the CC did not refrain from issuing a rebuke:
At the same time, we cannot but express regret that the fact of the sending of your telegram, before we received it, has already caused speculation in the media of some countries.
Remember who the master is! Do not expect favors if you do not want to play by our rules.
Thus Moscow quickly turned human rights into an instrument for subverting European socialists, by selective rewards only for those who had moved to closer “rapprochement” with them. And what of the socialists? Can it really be that they did not understand where their games with Moscow were leading? If at the start of détente this might be accepted by stretching a point, then by 1977 the “gulf between words and deeds” would have been obvious to the village idiot. And really, after the demonstrative punishment of the Helsinki Groups—can you still maintain “quiet diplomacy”? Continue “rapprochement”, seeing that your “influence” is nonexistent? Yet note that under the guise of talks regarding the need to improve interstate relations, the rapprochement was actually interparty, with the CPSU. By the beginning of the 1980s, most socialist and social democratic parties had established special interparty relations with the CPSU, meaning, apart from all else, very extensive contacts at the level of regional and even local party units. How much closer could they be? And the result? At the very least it facilitated greater KGB infiltration, which reached a fantastic scope in some parties: for example, in the cases of Finland and Germany it would be hard to say where the KGB ended and social democracy began. The Japanese socialists, as we recall, became so close to the CPSU that they even conducted their electoral campaigns with Soviet money (3 March 1972, St 33/8). And after all that—to continue to believe in rapprochement-influence?
Of course, by 1978 it was not just in the leadership, but among the party rank and file that there could be no more simpleminded idealists. What was there to do? Make an honest rejection of détente, admit its failure?
On the contrary, in April 1978, several weeks prior to the trials of the Helsinki monitors, when there were no doubts as to their outcome, the Socialist International conducted a conference in Helsinki (what better place for it?) devoted wholly to disarmament, and even invited a Soviet delegation headed by Boris Ponomarev to attend. Not a word about human rights, not a hint of the imminent trials; from now on, détente had only one meaning—disarmament. As might have been expected, many high-flown words were spoken—but now about “saving humanity from a nuclear catastrophe.” Those attending listened sympathetically to Ponomarev’s blaming the arms race on “NATO countries, headed by the USA” and offering salvation through… dialogue with Brezhnev.171 And what do you think? The following year, in October, a delegation of the Socialist International actually went to Brezhnev to discuss disarmament! The trouble was, it was too late to disarm: two months later Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. A period of “black reaction”, and Cold War began, so unbearable for the progressively minded part of humanity, and the détentists lost power in practically all European countries. They had to retreat into deep opposition and take up the so-called struggle for peace.
So they did not manage to establish socialism in all of Europe, having sold it to the Soviet regime. They were unfortunate, just like the gypsy in the old joke who decided to stage an experiment—stop his horse from eating. The amazing outcome is that success seemed so close, and the horse practically refused to eat of its own accord, but then… it died…. Practically everyone forgot about the Helsinki Accords that were so triumphantly signed by thirty-five countries in 1975. Certainly they were never formally revoked, and the 1980 Madrid conference to “check” them dragged on for almost five years. But who except us paid any attention to that? The condemned Helsinki monitors remained in prisons and camps (by then four of them had already perished), and the Soviet Union continued to make use of the unilateral advantages granted to it by those accords. Finally, toward the tenth anniversary of their signing we—a large group of dissidents—issued an appeal for the termination of this mockery of common sense and a denunciation of the accords that had become a farce.
“We have done our best to make the Helsinki Agreement serve peace and democracy. However, we can no longer associate ourselves with the agreement which not only failed to serve its humanitarian purposes, but even to protect its most sincere supporters, an agreement which has turned into a repressive tool in the hands of Soviet authorities. We appeal to the Western governments to make the Helsinki Agreement null and void.
“We still believe that peace can be and must be based on human rights. Therefore, until the Soviets prove by concrete actions their readiness to observe these basic rights, any peace or arms control agreement with them would be self deception.”172
Need it be said what indignation our appeal aroused among all of progressive humanity?
Any picture of the détente of the 1970s remains unclear and incomplete unless we touch upon—if only briefly—the role of the USA in this game. It is impossible to understand this role without at least a general understanding of American political culture and the psychological atmosphere prevalent at the time. I must admit that I may not be very objective; I did not like America from the very first moment I found myself there. It was enough for me to see, at one of my first appearances in one of the universities in February 1977, all those eternally shining eyes, burning with enthusiasm, to realize that I would never be able to explain anything to these people.
Later, having lived there for several years, I specified and supplemented my first impression, but did not reject it. On the contrary, when I was finally leaving America, I explained to my friends that I constantly felt myself overqualified to live there. And this, strange as it may seem, creates an additional burden on the nerves, just like having to live in an institution for mentally retarded adolescents.
In saying such negative things about American society, I am not claiming in any way that they are true of all Americans. It is an enormous country, composed of people of many ethnic origins, with a large number of relatively recent migrants who still retain their former culture. Even among bedrock Americans you will find all kinds of people. Furthermore, as we shall see later, it was in America that there were those who were able to withstand the spread of Soviet influence throughout the world. The problem is that they themselves were somewhat besieged, on the periphery of social life as a heterogeneous minority, while the main herd dominated (and continues to dominate) the life of the USA.
Apparently it takes living in America for a while to get a sense of Europe and its culture as a distinct and integrated entity. Normally, living in Europe, we do not feel this, do not notice anything that is common to the French and the English, Italians, and Germans; but once in America you rejoice to meet a Chinaman, and will find more in common with a Japanese than with the locals. The cause does not lie in that, as is usually said, Americans are a young nation that has not yet built up its own culture; I do not think they will build it up even in a thousand years’ time. For this is not what they are doing; they are engaged in what their Declaration of Independence defines with the quaint expression the “pursuit of happiness.” I do not undertake to translate this expression correctly. In any event, in a literal Russian translation “pursuit of happiness” sounds too mocking, presuming the futile nature of such a pursuit, and totally unsuited to be classed as akin to constitutional law.
Meanwhile, it was this senseless “pursuit” of the phantom of happiness in which that eternally young America was engaged. It was back in Roman times that cynical Europe reached the conclusion that you cannot run away from yourself and can only better your lot through persistent labor. The ones who fled to the New World did not believe this, blaming Old Lady Europe for all their misfortunes. Is it any wonder that their descendants have a sacred belief in the “American dream”—that is, that you can start your life afresh, from scratch, like turning the page of a book? And if happiness is not found, pack your gear, saddle up, and “go west, young man!” The average American family does not live in one place for more than five years. So what “accumulation of culture” can there be if the past in America means two weeks ago, and the preceding five years are considered antiquity? Every five years America rediscovers the world, life, sex, religion—all this without any link to the discoveries of the past five years. It is an ensorcelled country, where life is three-dimensional with the fourth dimension unknown—moving forward in a state of permanent amnesia. There is a feeling that your footsteps produce no echo, and your body casts no shadow. Even applying the greatest efforts, you are unable to change anything or even leave any tracks, as if you had spent your life walking along the water’s edge at the seashore.
And if one’s only purpose in life is to pursue happiness, success at any price, then one cannot have any principles or concepts; after all, they exist only in time. In fact, what is the worth of a reputation if a person is reborn every day? What is the worth of concepts if every five years the world is reinvented once more? A person speaking of principles and concepts is looked upon as a madman. It is deemed normal, good, and successful to be a “pragmatist,” an opportunist, a conformist.
America is really a land of conformists, ruled by constantly arising epidemics of a feverish nature; all of a sudden, everyone starts jogging, because it is allegedly good for one’s health. It does not matter that the man who invented this craze died at the age of 55 while jogging—40 million Americans continue to jog, making the earth shake. Or salt is suddenly declared to be the source of all ailments—so just try getting salt on the table in any American restaurant. Should you ask for it, you will be suspected of suicidal tendencies. I do not know, but it is quite possible that at the beginning of the century America was truly “the land of the free,” but hearing this today is laughable. It is hard to imagine a nation more enslaved by any craze, even the most idiotic ones, by any petty charlatans who thought it up. In the final instance, enslaved by its pursuit of success. Yet even success, perceived so three-dimensionally, temporally, can only be purely material, not going beyond the framework of the old Russian saying, “It is better to be healthy and rich, than sick and poor.”
But while we say this ironically, it is not perceived as funny by Americans; such is the program of their lives. Health is their main concern, or rather obsession, reaching absurd heights, as if death is not the inevitable end of human life, but only the result of one’s sins: failure to follow the right diet, exercise, and doctor’s orders. And wealth is the natural measure of success, that someone who has “made it in America” (another obscure expression in Russian eyes—made what?) immediately buys a limousine one and a half blocks long, and if he “made it big,” a whole skyscraper.
The American mass media is aimed at the most primitive crowd, the rabble, first by artificially creating celebrities, blowing them up from nothing, and then just as artificially bringing them down by trumpeting a scandal—again out of nothing. It is all false, fake, empty, wavering like a mirage in a desert, and there is nothing real, genuine, and stable that could continue to exist, even if you close your eyes for just one minute. Or switch off the television.
Is it surprising that in the midst of this pursuit of happiness, most Americans are very unhappy people, dissatisfied with their fate, frequently burdened by problems they have created themselves, endlessly trying to “find themselves” and finding nothing? Hence the preponderance of various gurus, psychoanalysts, sects, and similar saviors of people from themselves, which are regarded as essential by a good third of the American population. At times it seems that Americans, unable to bear the burden of freedom, simply seek someone to enslave them.
In a word, this is an anticulture that no evolution, no “accumulation” shall develop into a culture. This is also due to the circumstance that America has no social stratum that usually promotes culture—no intelligentsia—and that its replacement, “intellectuals,” are simultaneously the most illiterate and the most repellent part of society. I do not undertake to judge what it was like earlier (after all, this country gave the world numerous outstanding writers and scientists in the past), but what I encountered was truly awful. It is not enough that they possess all the abovementioned specific features of American anti-culture in full, if not in excess, but apart from these delusions, and with no justification at all, American “intellectuals” suffer from all the sins of the European intelligentsia: overweening narcissism, belief in their “enlightening” mission, and the right to a privileged, elite position. And invariably, leftist tendencies of the most primitive variety. At least the European intelligentsia with its leftist sympathies, apart from its “class interest,” are supported by concepts from a two-hundred-year-history of public debates, revolutions, and wars, so it is possible to polemicize with them. Their American counterparts have nothing to lean on except bare emotions that can reach hysterical levels. To hell with debates, beware of having your eyes scratched out; for they are, naturally, the voice of conscience and their opponent is an enemy of the people by definition. They sympathize, while you are hard-hearted and merciless. The only catch is that for some reason their sympathy is always very selective, which is why in their purview “some animals are more equal than others,” as was noted keenly by George Orwell.
I do not think that communist ideology would ever have been able to conquer the USA—simply because this ideology is too complex, too conceptual, and presumes at least some knowledge of history. It is a sickness of culture, of intellect, and there is simply not enough of either in America to produce an epidemic. (However, if it were to establish itself, a totalitarian system would remain there forever because of the Americans’ incredible conformism). The American left, like the American subculture, is three-dimensional. Imported, one may assume, at the time of the French Revolution, it remains on the level of the ideas of the age of the Enlightenment, unaffected by anything new over two hundred years. The American elite still believes the myth of the “noble savage,” the innate good nature of Man, ruined by bad institutions. It professes some kind of completely antediluvian egalitarianism, but probably only one in a thousand can name the original source. As followers of a socialist Utopia in the most general, masonic version, they know nothing of the subsequent development of socialist ideas, especially not their downfall. It is like a sanctuary in honor of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the same sense that North Korea is a sanctuary in honor of Stalin.173
Then again, it is just as hard to say whether they believe all this nonsense as it is to determine whether Andropov really believed in communism. It is advantageous to profess these views in today’s America, and for people in intellectual professions it is simply vital for career advancement. For however our Utopian rebels may position themselves as opponents, protectors of popular interests, they mutated into the establishment long ago and wield more power than the authorities, the government. Unity of interests has turned them into a deceitful, brass-necked clique, holding on to their positions and privileges with the same tenacity as the Soviet nomenklatura. And woe betide the daredevil who seeks to defend his own opinion against the will of this intellectual mafia.
It is amusing that European leftists still have not realized to what extent their fellow thinkers have subjugated America, and by inertia continue to criticize it for something it no longer represents. In their imagination it is still a land of cowboys, “cops and robbers,” and “tough guys” who shoot anything that moves, while their leftist ideas and formations, attitudes, and social benefits have triumphed there since the 1960s, much more so than in old, conservative Europe. What talk can there be of “tough guys” if the generations that have grown up since then are unable to cope with stress, a traumatic situation, or themselves without the help of a psychoanalyst. Even the death of a neighbor’s dog can plunge them into deep depression.
All this would be of mere academic interest to us if the USA, by virtue of its geographic specifics, had not become “the leader of the Western world” at the most critical moment of confrontation with communism. And although America honorably withstood the early period of the Cold War at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s (the creation of NATO, the Berlin blockade, the Korean War, etc.)—by the end of the 1960s it was creaking at the seams.
As it happened, American “intellectuals” of the 1940s and 1950s were leftists, a significant part of them were even pro-communist (although they had not yet managed to enslave all society, as happened later). The outburst of dismay among the American establishment at the recently published memoirs of Stalin’s main butcher and super-spy, Lieutenant-General Pavel Sudoplatov, provides ample evidence of this. The most amazing aspect of this situation is not so much the names of famous physicists—J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard and others—who willingly shared atomic secrets with Stalin, but rather the ease with which Soviet intelligence was able to operate in American leftist circles. Agents from their midst were not sought, but selected.
As for the physicists, I see the current indignation of their colleagues as spurious: as if their pro-Soviet sympathies were not known before the general’s revelations. It is sufficient to recall that the entire Manhattan Project was their initiative: the possible fear that the atomic weapon could end up in Hitler’s hands worried them to such an extent that they, forgetting their pacifism, simply forced the American president to sanction the creation of the atom bomb. But the real news that the weapon fell into Stalin’s hands did not concern them at all: on the contrary, from that moment they became pacifists again and “opponents of atomic weapons”—Western ones, of course.
However, despite all the evil they perpetrated, I am more disgusted by their current protectors than by Oppenheimer and company. The latter at least believed in what they did and were prepared to risk their lives for their convictions, while their protectors are simply preserving their cozy position in the elite, totally unashamed of barefaced lies. They are certainly not concerned about the good name of their late colleagues, but the need to take responsibility for the common fault. The participation of American leftist intellectuals in Soviet atomic espionage is just one example of their complicity in the communists’ crimes. And to admit this would mean admitting that the anticommunist campaign of the late 1940s and early 1950s, popularly known as “McCarthyism,” was no witch hunt. It is regrettable that, like everything in America, it took on a hysterical nature, but in fact it is indisputable that it was fully justified.
The bogey of McCarthyism, shamelessly exploited by American leftist intellectuals for a good fifty years, was the instrument whereby the self-proclaimed elite became the establishment, occupying a practically dictatorial position in American society. It was akin to emotional blackmail: they had suffered unfairly, so everyone now owed them. Nobody could dare to challenge them or even remind them of their responsibility for the past: this would be declared renewed persecution, renewed McCarthyism. Everything was turned upside down: being pro-Soviet, or even a communist, became respectable, if not to say mandatory; being an anticommunist was shameful and practically criminal.
So the present turmoil in the American establishment is not surprising: its very legitimizing of its supremacy has come under question, the whole myth of its unfair suffering. And is that suffering not a myth? After all, at a time when their spiritual brothers were enslaving entire peoples, destroying millions to the benefit of their common ideology, all these people had to face were questions, moreover public ones, in the presence of their lawyers, the press, and with observance of all procedural formalities, such as: “Are you a member of any communist group?”
That was all. I remember how glad I was in 1967 to finally say to my judges’ faces everything I thought of their political system, thereby earning three years in the camps. I never thought of myself as a sufferer. They, however, faced no threat of camps, or torture, or destruction. At worst a loss of their jobs. It’s curious how the majority of them broke so shamefully, pointing fingers at their friends and neighbors and lying under oath. Only a few refused to speak. Suffering heroes indeed! But for a good forty years their “tragedy” featured in the press, on television, in the cinema. Dozens of Hollywood films were made on this subject, the last one as recently as 1990: Guilty by Suspicion starring Robert De Niro.
Not a word about the tragedy of hundreds of millions who really suffered under the communist yoke. Just look at the productions of this citadel of the American left—Hollywood—for the past forty years from this angle, and you will see that there has not been a single film that gave an honest and serious depiction of the main tragedy of our century. These are either open Soviet apologetics, or a more refined, sophisticated lie, relying on the ignorance of the general public. A historian forced to judge our times by Hollywood films will not understand anything. Most likely he will reach the conclusion that we spent the entire century under the permanent threat of fascism, or the threat of crazed American generals. And if communism existed in our world at all, it was very distant, as an innocuous background. Even the ageless James Bond does not fight the KGB, but is most frequently in an alliance with them against some mythical super-corporation headed, as a rule, by a lunatic capitalist. There is no hint that communism itself could threaten mankind in any way—just our reaction to it. Not the opponent, but our resistance to the opponent.
As for the opponent, he only elicits sympathy. At the very least compassion, a feeling of fellow suffering, as a “deluded idealist” or “Red”). Even Pasternak’s “Doctor Zhivago”, the penalty for reading which was imprisonment in the USSR, was turned into a sloppy tearjerker. There is no sympathy for the millions of victims of these idealists, let alone remorse. Where it is impossible to avoid mentioning victims, there are not just lies, but monstrous lies. The best example of this is The Killing Fields, a film about the best-known communist crime in our time, in Cambodia. You cannot hide the skulls, but you can avoid explaining to viewers who killed a good half of their countrymen. So try and guess: where did they come from, and why do they murder people? Throughout the entire film you cannot determine that they were simply communists, and seemingly even greater idealists than their Moscow (or Vietnamese) colleagues: at least those shamefacedly buried their victims in the ground, they didn’t display them for the entire world to see.
The whole purpose of the film is pure disinformation. First, to justify the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam. As though the fault does not lie in communism, because Vietnamese communists put an end to the slaughter in Cambodia. Rejoice and be glad. Second, to justify the treacherous role of the American left in this tragedy. So we have as the hero a left-liberal correspondent of a left-liberal press saving a Cambodian family. Forget that it was they who facilitated the victory of communism in Southeast Asia by their hysterical antiwar campaign, due to which three countries vanished off the face of the earth, and the red killers were able to create pyramids of human skulls. All this is negligible compared to a marvelous human feat—the rescue of one family. Tears cloud the eyes of viewers; what an honorable act! Even Goebbels would have shed a tear watching this film.
Having formed on the basis of lies and betrayal, and even been raised on this propaganda, the American elite was a natural ally of the USSR long before détente. In the USA, as distinct from Europe, the basis was not merely ideological sympathies—the overwhelming majority of American intellectuals had no idea what communist ideology consisted of, even those who proudly proclaimed themselves to be Marxists—but rather stemmed from opposition to their own government. The Vietnam War, which did not differ substantially from the Korean War one half to two decades earlier, served as the catalyst for such social attitudes. Paradoxical as it may sound, America was pro-Soviet at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s because it became anti-American: the antiwar hysteria, blown out of proportion by the leftist elite to the degree of paranoia, divided the country, making anti-American sentiments more widespread than in Europe. But if the elite needed this hysteria for self-affirmation, to seize leading positions in society, millions of young Americans, like the biblical herd of Gadarene swine possessed by devils, followed meekly in their wake out of simple conformity. Marijuana, rock, eternally open mouths, clear eyes shining with idiotic enthusiasm, and “protest.” “Rebellion” became the fashion, necessary for success, which later changed to jogging in the morning, ecology, and the obsession with health.
For the rest of the world this was a catastrophe: not only was it left without a leader—which was neither here nor there—but it was betrayed by that leader.
Naturally, all this did not occur without Soviet help and would not have escaped their attention. Both the war in Southeast Asia and the antiwar hysteria were fanned and supported by Moscow, and with success in both directions, the time had come for decisive action. The game of détente suggested by European social democrats came in very useful: there remained practically no obstacles in the path of the Soviet “peace offensive.” As Brezhnev said, launching his “Peace Program” at the XXIV Party Congress in March 1971: “The balance of forces on the world arena has shifted to the side of socialism.”
It must be remembered that in communist Newspeak, “peace” has nothing to do with what normal people take it to mean, but with the victory of communism throughout the world. The CC documents leave no doubt that the class nature of the foreign policy of the USSR did not change in the period of détente—which in their conception “is a form of class struggle, aimed at reinforcing global socialism, the international communist, workers’, and national liberation movements, the entire anti-imperialist front” (24 July 1973*, St 88/1).
Despite existing opinion, a purely military victory over the class enemy was never considered preferable by Moscow. The doctrine demanded “liberating humanity from the shackles of capitalism” in the process of “class struggle,” not in the process of nuclear destruction. It presupposed revolutions and even revolutionary wars, but those that would result in power passing to the “victorious proletariat,” i.e., their fifth column. And from a purely pragmatic point of view, if they needed something from the West by the start of the 1970s, it was industrial potential and not endless expanses of scorched earth. Thus “liberation” should start with local forces, “friends,” and the glorious Soviet army could only put a brilliant end to it, coming to the assistance of “class brothers.”
Correspondingly, the aim of Soviet foreign policy has always been the “reinforcement of the positions of global socialism, creation of favorable possibilities for the activities of the international communist, workers’ and national liberation movements.” Soviet sights were always set on gaining Europe and its industrial base. Strictly speaking, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia occurred by mistake: according to Lenin’s plan (and that of Marx even more) it should have happened in the industrially developed countries of Europe, which would ensure the subsequent victory of socialism worldwide. While planning his revolution in St. Petersburg, Lenin was actually trying to speed it up in Europe, but was mistaken. The workers’ unrest in Germany, Italy, and France did not amount to a revolution, and the Red Army was still bogged down near Warsaw. It remained for Russia to build socialism “in one separately taken country.”
Nonetheless, Lenin’s pupils and successors knew full well that without European industry there could be no serious talk of socialism. They could “create favorable possibilities for the activities” of their European friends only by the destabilization of a Europe that had calmed down by that time. Hence the seemingly contradictory acts by Stalin, supporting Hitler in his coming to power and in the creation of the Wehrmacht on one hand, and on the other giving assistance to republican Spain in the civil war. In Stalin’s estimation, Hitler should become the “icebreaker of the revolution”: having broken the “old order” in Europe and produced a political polarization (the consolidation of antifascist forces under the leadership of “friends”) he should have ensured the Red Army the honorable role of the liberator of the European continent from Nazism and the shackles of capitalism at the same time.174 But as a result Hitler upstaged Stalin, who had to engage in a long defense (for which he was unprepared), and in the meantime the Americans entered the war (and acquired the atomic bomb at the end). Although Stalin put an end to the war in Berlin, he had no luck in achieving a glorious liberation of all Europe.
The postwar confrontation, while not changing the substance of Soviet aims, shifted the emphasis of Soviet foreign policy; it was pointless to think of destabilizing Europe while its stability was assured by the American presence, the nuclear umbrella, and economic influence (the Marshall Plan). It may be stated without any exaggeration that this is what saved Europe from communism—which is why the USA became the number one enemy of all of progressive humanity, and the “struggle against American imperialism” its main concern (just as the “struggle for peace” and nuclear disarmament were directed against the real advantages of the USA). The purpose of this struggle was not just to change the social system in America itself or to undermine its influence in other parts of the world, but to make it leave Europe. But global confrontation has its own rules, and if, as it emerges now, Stalin precipitated the Berlin crisis in order to deflect American forces from the Korean War,175 then the Vietnam War, although not pursuing the same aim, did decrease American influence in Europe.
To be more precise, not that war as such, but the antiwar frenzy around it: this factor brought about the narrowing of the gap between socialism and communism, just like the spread of pro-Soviet attitudes in America itself. The USA ceased to be an effective counterbalance to the USSR, enabling the latter to launch its “peaceful offensive.” But if its allies in Europe were social democrats, in the USA they were the left-liberal circles, which Soviet policy deliberately aimed at. Long before the adoption of the “Peace Program,” Soviet official delegations were instructed as follows (23 April 1970, St 96/126^):
Use the stay in the USA to further contacts with liberal and opposition circles that are promoting the normalization of relations on the basis of the USA’s rejection of the policies of the “Cold War” and the arms race… activate the interest of business circles… and criticize as widely as possible the obstacles set by the USA along the path of improved relations, firstly the arms race, intervention in Southeast Asia and support of Israel.
This was also the time of the (28 April 1970*, 1128-A; §1.4—Intellectual Shenanigans) “measures to support [the Negro protest movement],” which interested the Kremlin leaders only because it would “create certain difficulties for ruling US circles and shall distract the attention of Nixon’s administration from the conduct of an active foreign policy”. Everything was calculated to force America into détente, or, at least, into self-isolation. By 1973, with the ceremonious signing of the “Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (1972) and the “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War” (1973) the situation had become even more acute: the Arab oil boycott dealt a huge blow to the economic situation of the West, and the war in Southeast Asia grew more hopeless.
“The turn toward the relaxation of international tension is occurring at a strategically profitable moment for us,” reasoned the CC (24 July 1973*, St 88/1),176 “under the conditions of the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, the enforced adjustment of contemporary capitalism to circumstances resulting from numerous defeats of aggressive imperialist policies, the crisis of the monetary system of capitalism, relative weakening of the positions of American imperialism throughout the world, the fall of the prestige of the political system of the USA, in the situation of the sharpening of internal class, national and also interimperialist contradictions, and the growing interest of capitalist business circles in establishing trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union.”
So after Brezhnev’s visit to the USA, the CC adopted “a broad program of propagandist measures” in which its strategy is reflected quite precisely. At an emergency meeting called by the CC for all leaders of “Soviet public organizations and Soviet representatives in international democratic organizations,” the following instructions were issued “regarding the purposes of their work under contemporary conditions, and also on questions of the development of links with public organizations and movements in the USA for strengthening our influence on broad circles of the American public” (24 July 1973*, St 88/1, pp. 7–8):
All organizations conducting information and propagandistic work are charged with an all-round increase in the advance of our propaganda. Highly significant changes in the international situation should not give rise to unsubstantiated illusions, complacency, and passivity. It is necessary to point out that there are certain forces in the world that oppose the defusion of international tension and that there are still dangerously explosive pockets of aggression and war. Avoiding stereotypes inherited from the period of the “Cold War,” concentrate attention on a comparative analysis of both systems. In every possible way, explain the advantages of socialism, socialist ideals, its moral and spiritual values and ideas, without ignoring the actual difficulties of our development. …
Conduct a decisive advance against anticommunist, anti-Soviet, Zionist, and militarist forces, all those who oppose détente and support a return to the “Cold War” and the arms race, and those who sow the seeds of discord and distrust between nations.
Constant attention must be paid to exposing the attempts of hostile ideological centers to revive concepts aimed at encouraging the “erosion” of socialist ideology (including “theories” of convergence and deideologizing in their various versions). Rebuff any attempts to interpret international détente as an affirmation of such theories. At the same time, consistently instill the thought of the unacceptability of mixing the “Cold War,” which is a definite but far from fatally unavoidable stage in interstate relations, with ideological struggle, which is a form of the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, stemming from the difference between two social systems.
Exposing by argument the provocative meaning that bourgeois propaganda attributes to the well-known thesis of “the freedom to exchange ideas, information, and people,” indicate that the Soviet Union has always championed the development of cultural contacts that facilitate the mutual spiritual enrichment of people, and has achieved considerable success in this field. …
In all spheres of propaganda, expose the inadequacy of various forms of petit bourgeois leftist movements that have found favor among some young people in the capitalist world, the pointlessness of the so-called “rebellion of youth” unconnected with the liberating work of the proletariat, and attempts to ignore the real problems and contradictions of capitalist society. Stress that only socialism opens the way to the genuine liberation of the younger generation. Rebuff firmly “technocratic” and other theories and views aimed at providing grounds for the pretensions of the intelligentsia to a special role in the leadership of contemporary society and various forms of speculation regarding “creative freedom” under socialist conditions.
This plan was approved, embracing practically all spheres of the activity of mutual relations.177 The most important feature of it was the extensive use of Western mass media to spread Soviet propaganda.
The USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) received the following instructions:
- Employ the new opportunities for increasing contacts and links with the television and radio organizations in the USA, France, and the FRG, among other things for the promotion of Soviet TV materials and the preparation of joint programs, paying special attention to the establishment of direct contacts with local TV and radio stations;
- Organize the invitation of prominent American TV and radio journalists to the USSR for the purpose of preparing radio programs and TV films about the Soviet Union under the aegis of the State Committee;
- Upon agreement with the Department of Propaganda [and Agitation] of the CC CPSU… conduct consultations with television and radio organizations of fraternal socialist countries on questions of coordination, including propagandist appearances in the USA and other capitalist countries of Europe, determinations of the basic propagandist directions with allowance for the specifics of individual European countries, and clarification of the time schedule of broadcasts;
- Organize regular counter-propagandist appearances exposing the conjectures and insinuations of bourgeois radio propaganda of Maoist, Zionist, and revisionist views.
The Novosti Press Agency was instructed to:
- Prepare articles by party, state, and public figures of the USSR for influential American publications, explaining various aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU;
- Cooperate with prominent American journalists in preparing materials at their request;
- Continue joint cooperation with American TV and radio organizations ABC, CBS, NBC, and also the television service UPI [United Press International] in the preparation of reports, informative materials, and TV programs devoted to the achievements of the Soviet Union and the lives of Soviet people. Prepare and promote the TV films The ‘Pravda’ Newspaper, The Supreme Soviet, Secretary of the Party Committee, Progress and Protection of the Environment, and others.
The State Cinema Committee was assigned a task: “Develop specific offers of the joint staging of Soviet-American productions.”
The State Press Committee was to “perform the systematic translation into Russian of books by progressive American writers and publicists and collections of addresses by prominent public figures and journalists that give an objective description of political and socioeconomic processes and who support cooperation with the Soviet Union.”
The Academy of Sciences of the USSR fared even worse:
- Study the possibilities of attracting leading American scientists to the Pugwash movement, envisaging the possibility of individual approaches by prominent Soviet scientists;
- Expand studies of the economic, political, and social situation in the USA, the problems of the struggle of workers’, communist, nationalist, and other mass movements in the USA, increase study of the contemporary state of American philosophical, economic, historical, sociological, legal, and psychological sciences, literature, and literary criticism, and also the ideological struggle in the field of science and the arts;
- Prepare a situational analysis on issues of Soviet-American relations, on the basis of the new stage of their development and influence on the global situation, and also the relations of the USA with West European allies in new circumstances;
- Activate contacts with scientific institutions in France, the FRG, Japan, and other countries concerned with American Studies.
In other words, this was simply an intelligence-gathering and analytical role, as if the Academy of Sciences were a KGB department. Intelligence academicians Georgy Arbatov, Yevgeny Primakov (recent head of the intelligence service of Russia, currently risen to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs), Inozemtsev, and Mikhail Millionshchikov were charged with regularly working on the American elite, and for this purpose Soviet-American “scientific” colloquiums and symposiums were held on problems of bilateral relations and other “various problems of sociological and humanitarian knowledge.”
This was a massive offensive of Soviet propaganda and disinformation, using all channels and methods, public and state structures. This included sister cities, and work “on the creation of a broad public organization in the USA calling for the development of friendly relations with the Soviet Union.” Everything was grist to the mill: youth and women’s organizations, associations of war veterans, and professional unions—all these were invoked to the achievement of that aim.
Even the main tourist administration was obligated to “… implement measures for a comprehensive explanation to tourists from the USA and other countries of the achievements of the Soviet people in communist construction and the practical steps of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government in the implementation of the Peace Program, making active use of propaganda lectures, meetings with the Soviet public, showings of Soviet films, and visits to cultural and visual events.”
As for Soviet tourists to America, they were obligated to participate “… in informative-propagandistic work among the American population, bearing in mind the organization of meetings with the American public, press conferences, and the presentation of lectures and addresses on radio and television.”
At the same time, stringent measures were in force to prevent any Western influence on the Soviet population. Any “cultural exchange” became a deception under the unrelenting control of the Ministry of Culture over its ideological content; Soviet propaganda was exchanged for Western “progressive culture.” Repressions of dissidents did not diminish. The rules of the game set by Moscow really were, as noted by Ronald Reagan, “a one-way street.” Soviet propaganda, disinformation, and subversive activity appeared to be legalized under the guise of the free exchange of people and ideas, and were legitimate aspects of the “ideological struggle.” Any attempts by the West to counter this or conduct its own ideological struggle were unacceptable as “interference in the internal matters of the USSR” and “a return to the practices of the ‘Cold War.’”
It is easy to imagine the confusion in the minds of clear-eyed Yankees created by this avalanche of deceit, moreover, sanctioned by their own government in the name of the honorable cause of protecting peace. Its influence on the American elite is beyond doubt.
In 1980, when détente was a thing of the past, one of its architects, former US president Richard Nixon, wrote:178
The Soviet Union today is the most powerfully armed expansionist nation the world has ever known, and its arms buildup continues at a pace nearly twice that of the United States. There is no mystery about Soviet intentions. The Kremlin leaders do not want war, but they do want the world. And they are rapidly moving into position to get what they want.
In the 1980s America for the first time in modern history will confront two cold realities. The first of these is that if war were to come, we might lose. The second is that we might be defeated without war. The second prospect is more likely than the first, and almost as grim.
It is a pity that he had this epiphany too late, when his policy of détente had already borne the aforementioned fruits. Moreover, in 1980 he was still unwilling to acknowledge the link between détente and this result. Were it not for the tragedy of the situation, his explanations would have sounded comical. On one hand, he seems to understand that the substance of the communist system, its ideology and aims, have not changed, that, as he writes,179 “Neither Brezhnev nor his predecessors engaged in negotiation to achieve peace as an end in itself. Rather they sought peace so that they could use it to extend communist domination without war in all areas of the world.”
Yet addressing the Congress of the USA upon returning from Moscow in 1972—speaking almost like Chamberlain in 1938—he declared,180 “… We did not bring back from Moscow the promise of instant peace, but we do bring the beginning of a process that can lead to lasting peace.”
After that he blames all his misfortunes on the “unjustified euphoria” of Western society. But what else could have been expected of it if even the president of the USA, moreover one with an anticommunist reputation, believes in the likelihood of establishing a firm peace with the USSR by means of agreements? Having conceded all possible Western positions, he tries to justify himself by claiming that he had been misunderstood, that détente had not been deemed an alternative to the Cold War but a supplement to it:181
The meaning of détente, as originally envisaged by my administration, has become so distorted, both by Soviet behavior and by misunderstanding in the United States, that the term has lost its usefulness as a description of Soviet-American relations. When détente is said to be the “alternative to the Cold War” it even becomes an obstacle to clear thought.
So who is guilty of this “misunderstanding” that almost cost humanity its future? The Soviet leaders with their improper behavior? But Nixon himself writes the following on the next page:182
If the Russians think they can get away with using détente as a cover for aggression, either direct or indirect, they will try. In recent years they have not only tried but succeeded, just as they have succeeded in using aggression as a cover for shifting the military balance in their favor.
In other words, nothing else could have been expected of them. Then was it the fault of the “misunderstanding” that arose in the USA? But it was precisely Nixon and Kissinger who created that misunderstanding.183
The hope arose that if the United States limited its own arms, others—particularly the Soviets—would follow. But the Soviets did not perform according to theory. In fact, during the same period when this arms-control doctrine was winning favor among American theorists, and the theorists were winning influence, the Soviet five-year plans were charting ever greater increases in military spending, clearly guided by coherent strategic objectives. The Soviets were not bogged down in theory; they were driving toward supremacy.
Yet who but Kissinger and Nixon fielded all these theories, this lunatic philosophy of arms control by means of treaties, agreements, and similar nonsense that did not oblige the Soviets to do anything?184
Whether directly or indirectly, trade with the Soviets strengthens them militarily. Even trade in nonstrategic times frees resources for them to use in other ways. We must never forget that doing business with the Soviets includes these costs; it is only justified when the benefits outweigh the costs. Trade with the Russians must be used as a weapon, not as a gift.
But in 1980 he was still trying to argue that his attempts to grant the USSR most-favored-nation status in trade was fully justified, even though that status would allow the Kremlin practically unlimited access to cheap credit. Then, probably trying to confuse us utterly, he adds:185
As long as the Soviets continue on their present aggressive course… we should remember that trade is something they want which we can give or deny, depending on their behavior.
The paradox of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy lies in that on one hand, they seem to comprehend the total absurdity of détente and even realize the danger of these games, but on the other hand, they crawl into the python’s jaws like mesmerized rabbits:186
The primary purpose of arms control is to reduce the danger of war. But arms control by itself cannot do this. Political differences, not arms, are the root causes of war, and until these are resolved, there will be enough arms for the most devastating war no matter how many arms control agreements are reached.
[…]
Trade and arms control must be linked with the settlement of political differences if the danger of war is to be reduced. Only if we use linkage in this way will we be attacking the root causes of war.
It might be possible to agree with this, but only if it is remembered that the main “political difference” in this case is Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that Soviet leaders have no intention of abandoning it in exchange for any benefits. It appears that Nixon understands this; in any case, he mentions it constantly throughout his whole book. Then what, in the perception of the Nixon administration, was the main benefit of a détente that outweighed the “losses”? Where is the quid pro quo? I fear the reality was much more transparent than all those dialectics that the former president of the USA produced to justify himself: simply speaking, finding itself in a difficult situation, America tried to buy off the Soviet aggressor.187
It was during the transition period between my election in 1968 and my first inauguration in 1969 that Henry Kissinger and I developed what is now widely called the concept of linkage. We determined that those things the Soviets wanted—the good public relations that summits provided, economic cooperation, and strategic arms limitations agreements—would not be gained by them without a quid pro quo. At that time the principal quid pro quos we wanted were some assistance in getting a settlement in Vietnam, restraint by them in the Middle East, and a resolution of the recurring problems in Berlin.
We should note that the danger in all these places was created quite consciously by Soviet aggression, which means that any payment for its removal was no smarter than paying racketeers. The idea was even more suicidal in that the payment in question gave the USSR strategic advantages: military advantage, credits, technologies, the appearance of a peace-loving, respected partner of the West. Such a strange deal, which, even if it may have granted the West a short breather, placed the future of mankind into the hands of the Kremlin bandits.
But as happens in dealings with racketeers, they did not even allow the promised breather: having received their ransom, the Soviet leaders did not even think of fulfilling their promises. The USA had to drink the bitter cup of its defeat in Southeast Asia and flee, practically abandoning its allies to the mercies of the enemy; Soviet influence in Europe reached its apogee in those years, and the terrorist movements supported by the USSR threatened political destabilization. It is impossible to say that in those years the USSR showed any “restraint” in the Middle East: it suffices to recall the massive Soviet aid to Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinian terrorists, the role played by the USSR in the destruction of Lebanon and the war against Israel in 1973. The Berlin problem, needless to say, simply became a permanent source of hard currency for the GDR.
In fact, let us calculate what price humanity had to pay for détente in that decade:
But the worst result of détente was the loss of the will to resist that afflicted the West. It could be likened to an epidemic of moral AIDS, due to which seemingly healthy countries lost immunity to harmful bacteria. And this was not least due to the positions of the USA—the European social democrats could not have managed it alone, as Nixon writes:188
Other nations have much longer experience than we have in the use of power to maintain the peace. But they no longer have the power. So, by default, the world looks to the United States. It looks today with nervous apprehension, as the bulwarks against Soviet expansion crumble in one nation after another, and as the United States appears so lost in uncertainty or paralyzed by propriety that it is either unable or unwilling to act.
Despite all their errors, it would be unfair to place all the blame on just Nixon and Kissinger. Coming to power in the thick of the antiwar hysteria, or, to be more precise, in the thick of the rebellion, when the old elite had all but capitulated and the new was trying to occupy leading positions at any price, the Nixon administration tried to stabilize the situation by compromise, first of all with the new elite. Even Soviet expansion in Europe, let alone in third world countries, moved to the back burner. They were simply sacrificed. America, which was literally being torn apart, had to be saved—hence the fractured nature of American foreign policy at that time. This led to Nixon’s downfall as a symbol of the total victory of the new elite and the subsequent destruction of the old institutions of presidential power, the army and the CIA.
Power switched to the institutions traditionally controlled by the left: to the press, television, public organizations, and—to the extent that it was controlled by the new elite—to Congress.189
Naturally, the sinfully conceived anti-American campaign—conceived in the sin of betrayal of Western interests in general and its own country in particular—this new elite was pro-Soviet (which, God forbid, cannot be said aloud in America even now without arousing the cry “McCarthyism again!”). Even Nixon, who did not curb his tongue all the time in describing the new elite, did not go that far:190
If America loses World War III, it will be because of the failure of its leadership class. In particular, it will be because of the attention, the celebrity, and the legitimacy given to the “trendies”—those overglamorized dilettantes who posture in the latest idea, mount the fashionable protests, and are slobbered over by the news media, whose creation they essentially are.
Everything would seem in order, but for some reason these “fashions” correlated invariably with Soviet interests, and frequently the basic directions of the massive Soviet propaganda described above. It does not really matter whether it is called a conspiracy or not; if the majority followed fashion out of conformity, the trendsetters certainly knew what they were doing. Their lies are too obvious, pro-Soviet “theories” were too persistently drummed into the heads of Americans, with the purpose of justifying any communist crime. Pick up any book about the Cold War at random and you will see it for yourself.191 Even the beginning period of “cold” after the war, when Stalin not only swallowed six European countries (not counting the Baltic states and one-third of Germany), but was preparing actively for the next round of “liberating” Europe, is interpreted by them as “Western paranoia.” Poor Stalin, you see, was only practicing defense, and was misinterpreted by Harry Truman and Winston Churchill.
“So what?” they say without a blink. “If the communists falsified the elections in Poland or Czechoslovakia, the Western allies did the same in Italy and Belgium.”
And in the period of détente they portrayed Soviet love of peace in response to the paranoia of the USA. At best they described the situation as the struggle between two superpowers for global supremacy, and not as the resistance of humanity to the communist infection, by which both sides seem to be equalized, and the writer appears as some kind of sage, floating above the conflict like an ethereal spirit over a vale of tears. Here is perhaps the most glaring example, quoted at random:192
Despite the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet split, the war remained essentially a bi-polar conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. The elite of each country—the dominant political and economic groupings, with their bureaucracies—were blinkered by universalist assumptions about their respective systems. While they used a variety of means, such as their alternation of tension and détente, their goal was always the triumph of their own ideology. In pursuit of that end they sought to control the behavior of their own populations and their satellites and client states. Armed with ideological fervor for either the “Free World” or the “Communist World”, they had no scruples about misleading their citizens and manipulating their alliances.
This lying ploy, which was subsequently dubbed the “doctrine of moral equivalence,” is very typical of the left, especially in academic circles. (The same method was used, for instance, in the 1980s for equating the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with the American operation in Grenada.)
The unwillingness of the left to admit, even now, the simple fact that there can be no “moral equivalence” with the totalitarian monster, that the only result will be the gulag and destruction, is indicative in itself. If in the 1920s and 1930s one could still speak of their naive faith in the ideals of socialism, their unwitting delusion, then after the war and more so in the 1970s and 1980s, we are faced with deliberate lies and falsifications. The difference is just as substantial as that between a murder in a fit of temporary insanity and a cold-blooded murder for gain. I think that this watershed came right in the years of détente, after which there were no more honest left-wingers.
Recalling that time and looking through the CC documents, there is no doubt that détente was the most dangerous period for our civilization. Full supremacy of communism over the world was but half a step away. Confident of their ultimate victory, the Kremlin leaders were sure that time was on their side, and there was no need to hurry; they were waiting patiently for their moment and removing the final obstacles. Strangely enough, our campaign for human rights was almost the only obstacle in their path at that time. This was all the more regrettable, since in their eyes it really was an insignificant one: from a Marxist point of view (and they had no other), the West was in their pocket because the “capitalists” and “their subservient ruling circles” had already capitulated.
However the game was a delicate one, it required care to avoid waking the victim—something like hypnosis, in which just the buzzing of an insect nearby might jeopardize all efforts. We were like a wasp buzzing around the head of the unconscious victim: you cannot risk swatting it, but leaving it alive is dangerous. Furthermore, we drove them from advance into defense, which was an absolute miracle in view of how few we were. The communists were never any good at defense. In any case, what defense can there be in an ideological struggle? The one who becomes defensive has already lost.
Another factor was their lopsided “Marxist” understanding of Western democracy, which took practically no account of such a classless force as public opinion or human conscience. No matter how strange it may sound in our cynical or downright shameless time, then, in the 1960s and 1970s, there were still enough people for whom the words “human rights” were not a meaningless noise. Moreover—and this may be even more important—such idealists were found both on the left and the right, and above and below, and were totally unpredictable from either the class or the political viewpoint. No matter how cynical, say, the leaders of the European social democrats were, especially the communists, their parties’ electorate also contained such idealists, and in sufficient numbers to make party leaders pay attention to them.
Our movement at that time was a very colorful mix, which did not fit into the customary definitions of “leftists” and “rightists.” If the rightist French government of Giscard d’Estaing threw itself into Brezhnev’s arms, the French leftist intelligentsia proved to be our closest ally. France was probably the first Western country in which the intelligentsia began to give thought to its responsibility for the crimes of communism because of a group of the “new philosophers” under the influence of The Gulag Archipelago. In the summer of 1977, during Brezhnev’s visit to Paris, this movement reached its culmination, marked symbolically by the “handshake of the century”: at a reception organized by the intelligentsia in the Theatre Recamier, Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron shook hands for the first time in many decades.
Yet in Germany or England, where the governments were leftist, our allies were instead the Conservative opposition, although they were not alone. There are always honest people of any political convictions whatsoever.
The most outstanding example was Italy: even Italian communists deemed it their duty to demonstrate their disapproval to Moscow. The liberals, the socialists, and later the radicals—all made their contribution to our task. In this war, public opinion was on our side, whether the establishment liked it or not.
In the USA, as we recall, the “elite,” who yearned for friendship with Moscow, also had to acknowledge this force. The question of human rights became the catalyst of differing forces and tendencies, and the struggle concentrated around the so-called Jackson-Vanik Amendment, forbidding the government to grant the USSR most-favored-nation status in trade specifically because of the civil-legal problem of emigration from the Soviet Union. Although the problem was a sufficiently narrow one, concerning a specific group of people, everyone understood its importance in principle. On the one hand this status, giving the USSR unlimited access to credit, would serve to strengthen Soviet military might, which was highly undesirable as such. On the other hand, the idea of somehow linking détente with political changes in the USSR was in the air, and requiring an obligation to observe human rights before there could be an increase in contacts between the East and West, especially in the economic field, was common sense. No matter how the establishment and the Soviets tried, they did not manage to quash the Jackson amendment.
Both sides tried with great persistence: the fate of détente seemed to hang on the outcome of these debates. At the height of the struggle, shortly before the final Congress vote, our old friend Zhores Medvedev put in an appearance as if on order.193 His ideas, as we recall, frequently coincided with those of Andropov by pure coincidence, and he was invited immediately to give evidence before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by its chairman, the well-known liberal senator J. William Fulbright. Stating straightaway that he was not speaking on his own behalf but “actually representing a certain group of liberals in the Soviet Union” (who on earth could he have meant? Maybe his brother?), Zhores Alexandrovich proceeded to tell the senators that:194
- pressure on the Soviet leadership is effective only when it proceeds from a “friendly” country that is an important trade partner of the USSR;
- the dependence of the USSR on foreign aid is greatly exaggerated, and limitations on trade shall mainly create difficulties for ordinary people; and
- the Jackson amendment, therefore, shall be seen by the Soviet government and the greater part of the population as a deliberate insult.
It will be considered by the Soviet Government to be some kind of provocation to stop all the good developments which have resulted from American policy over the last few years.
Therefore, I think that this amendment, if it becomes law, will not make the Soviet Union inclined to make further concessions, but will make the Soviet Government retreat from the position which it now has and emigration would slowly be diminished to an almost zero level. Other liberal reforms would be much more difficult, and I think that results in the Soviet Union will be more negative than positive.195
Furthermore, Zhores Alexandrovich told the senators, talk about political repressions in the USSR was also grossly exaggerated
… simply because foreign countries are paying much more attention to the domestic problems of Soviet life and want to support those who are repressed, and so even use some minor cases as examples of totalitarian practices of the Soviet Union. … The fact that the Soviet Union is not a democratic system is well known, and as such, the Soviet Government still uses force and repression against some groups of dissidents. But we cannot ignore the fact that other dissidents who also criticize the Government from a political and scientific and economic point of view, which was unimaginable some years ago, have been given the chance to freely express their criticisms and publish their works abroad in the foreign press without any serious consequences for themselves.”196
(And who might that be except his brother?) All this, naturally, is due to détente, which
would improve the liberal attitude of the government to opposition, and people who are in trouble now will find it less dangerous to criticize the government on political issues.197
Even censorship, which was still raging unabated,
is less and less effective and as soon as relations between the Soviet Union and other countries can be improved, the censorship will be even less efficient.198
He claimed further that the entire purpose of détente is to improve the standard of living of ordinary people:
The ruling group which dismissed Khrushchev made more serious steps to improve the economic situation in the Soviet Union and raise the standard of living within the country. I think this is the main reason why the Soviet Government wants to improve trade relations with the United States and other countries.199
As for communist ideology, it exists only for domestic consumption, as a means of control over the population:
The party as a whole is not as monolithic now as it was 10 years ago or during Stalin’s time. Even in the party you could find different attitudes on international and domestic policy. You could find liberals, conservatives, and new Stalinists, therefore, even in the party you could find different approaches to international and domestic issues. … I think that the Soviet Union now is a country where the political situation is changing, and it is changing mainly in the direction of some kind of democratization, slowly, very slowly, and the fact that this process is slow is disappointing. This disappointment is realized in the form of outcry from the West and from Russian liberals who want very quick changes. But I think that quick changes are unrealistic, and we must agree that even slow democratization of the Soviet Union is a very good sign of progress in the world, and the only hope that the relations between the Soviet Union and America can be improved in the future.
I hope that I will witness these results because I think that they are slow, but not hopelessly slow, and I think that within 3 or 4 or 5 years we will witness more serious changes within the Soviet Union. I think that if the obstacles to this development are not created by the other party, unnecessary obstacles which are neither in the American national interest nor Russian, I think that relations between our countries will be improved slowly.200
But if such unnecessary hindrances (for example, the Jackson amendment) shall be created, “failure in this direction could result in the emergence of more hard-line people”201 upon a change of the Soviet leadership.
Zhores Alexandrovich is even more frank in his written statement to the Senate committee:202
The limits on democracy that exist in the Soviet Union, cases of repression and persecution of dissidents, hypersensitive action by censors and other sad developments are not a necessary aspect of socialism as a system, but are a hangover from the past—the result of inertia. The pathological fear of communist aggression sometimes noticeable in the United States is also the result of inertia from the years of the “Cold War,” when even in America many democratic principles were violated. […] The inertia of the past, and especially the inertia of fear of closer cooperation among these countries, will weaken in the future. It is impossible to ignore the idea which is often put forward by the critics of the natural development of normal trade relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is the notion that the U.S.S.R. will receive great benefits from this development, and will thus strengthen its military potential, and that this amounts to strengthening an uncontrollable military enemy. Specifically, this idea was suggested by Andrei Sakharov in an interview with Western correspondents that he gave on August 21, 1973.
This idea is too abstract. […] Is it possible to call the current Western policy toward the Soviet Union a “new Munich”? I think this is a mistake.
Without regard to the Soviet Union, one can find numerous historical examples which show that when a totalitarian society meets economic problems “which it cannot solve for itself,” that this situation leads to militarization and, eventually, to military conflicts. A country that can solve its economic and other internal problems cannot be aggressive.
Could anything be clearer than that? But it was not enough for Senator Fulbright:203
The Chairman: If I may make an observation. You feel that better overall relations between the Soviet Union and this country will gradually tend to a democratization, I believe you said, within the party. There will be no opposition, but the party itself will undergo changes which lead to a less repressive internal policy, if I correctly understood you.
Dr. Medvedev: Yes, I think that if the policy of détente fails, this would create a more negative development within the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Communist Party in the Soviet Union. […] Therefore, I think that improvements between the Soviet Union and America would encourage those groups in the party who are more liberal than others.
[…]
The Chairman: You are saying within the Party, and even within the highest areas of the organization, there is considerable diversity? They are not all the same? It isn’t a monolithic government at all?
Dr. Medvedev: Yes. Second, it is not a monolithic government. … In the Politburo you could find some kind of moderate people who could be considered as pro-American, pro-détente persons, and some more hardliners who still believe that the Soviet Union must have a strong leader and must have a monolithic party.
[…]
The Chairman: You lead me to believe the Soviet Government is not interested in revolution in other countries; they are not a revolutionary country. They want stability in other countries; is that correct?
Dr. Medvedev: Yes, I think that they want stability in other countries.
[…]
The Chairman: I believe that not too long ago Erich Fromm said that the Soviet Union was reactionary, conservative. Do you think that is an accurate portrayal of it?
Dr. Medvedev: The Soviet Union is reactionary?
The Chairman: Reactionary, conservative, is the way he characterized it, I think. […] He was speaking of foreign relations. In other words, his view was inconsistent with what you said. They do not seek to inspire instability. They prefer friendly countries to have stable governments. They are not trying to generate revolution within those countries.
Dr. Medvedev: Yes, I think this is the case. They would prefer a stable government but would prefer the stable government mostly of a democratic kind of government, stable government, like, for example, Britain or America or others. They do not prefer stability like exists in Spain or—
The Chairman: Portugal?
Dr. Medvedev: Yes, or in Uganda or in other dictatorship countries. […]
The Chairman: Since emigration has been such an important issue here in this country, you said a good deal about the effect of our great interest in emigration. If I understood you correctly, you said emigration was not so important; it was the overall freedom to go and come, and especially to return. You considered that far more important. I would gather that you felt that what has taken place in the Congress has been negative in its effects upon the Soviet Government, that the Jackson amendment has been provocative and that they feel that this does not promote better relations, nor does it even encourage or promote greater freedom of emigration. Is that a correct statement?
Dr. Medvedev: Yes, this is correct.
[…]
The Chairman: Do you think that most-favored-nation status is all that important to the Russians? Is it important to them in a trade sense or is it a matter of prestige?
Dr. Medvedev: I think it is a matter of prestige and prestige not only for the Soviet Government but also for Russia, for the Soviet official description of the American Government. […] If this amendment is passed, this would be considered not from an economic point of view, but as a victory of conservative and reactionary forces in the American policy toward the Soviet Union. […]
[…]
The Chairman: To return to a question we discussed some moments ago, you feel that the concept of what we call détente—more normal relations between our country and Russia—would not lead to greater repression in Russia, as some have alleged, as those who oppose the movement toward détente have said. I believe you think that more normal relations would lead to greater internal freedom and greater freedom for trips, for example. Is that correct?
Dr. Medvedev: Yes; this is correct and I think that this would mean you could enjoy more influence on this issue, and your institutions like the American Academy and others could have more influence when they protest against some repressions of intellectuals in the Soviet Union, but worsened relations could influence the Soviet Union to become a more closed country where repression is much more likely as a means of internal policy, not to mention the possibility of increasing power for more conservative circles.
Now that subsequent events are known, it is amusing to read this testimonial—it is no more than a curiosity. But then, at the height of the struggle, there was little to laugh about: this was not said by Arbatov or Primakov, but a prominent “dissident scientist” who did not avoid making occasional references to his friendships with Sakharov and with Solzhenitsyn. And he did not say this just anywhere, but in the Senate of the USA, on which the fate of détente depended.
This was exactly what the left-liberal establishment of the USA wanted to hear. The Sovietologist brotherhood hastened to start writing about the “doves” and “hawks” in the Politburo, about the struggle between them, so God forbid doing anything that may hamper the “doves.” However, just who these “doves” and “hawks” were was unclear; even Dr. Medvedev did not venture this information. Having read the minutes of the debates in the Politburo, we now know that the number one “dove” was Andropov. He was also the number one “hawk.”
Luckily there were other people in America apart from those who wished to achieve a radical improvement of human nature in cooperation with the Kremlin. It was through their efforts that the Jackson amendment was passed, and the campaign for human rights in the USSR escalated. For this reason, the Helsinki Accords of 1975 included the mandatory obligation to observe human rights.
This seeming concession to public opinion was undoubtedly mere hypocrisy; both sides were perfectly aware that these promises would remain on paper. As we recall, at that same time Andropov was informing the Politburo that the Soviet regime could not survive without repressions, and several years later the arrests of members of the Helsinki Groups caused only “concern” to Western governments. But the degree of public disapprobation was so great that it was impossible to omit human rights from the Accords.
Furthermore, in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate USA, the idea of human rights was the only topic uniting a divided country, at least this is how it was perceived to be by the success of Carter’s electoral campaign, who declared it from his platform. Even the new American elite, which formed under the influence of the black civil rights movement, could not ignore it. The result was a paradoxical situation: the arrest of a small group of Helsinki monitors posed a challenge to the whole world and threatened the entire process of détente and all its “achievements.”
“What the Kremlin is signaling to the West is: Human rights are our business,” wrote the International Herald Tribune.204 “The Kremlin may be making a mistake here…. By simply canceling a third of it [the Helsinki Accords], the Kremlin is wiping out the rest of the agreement and forming an unbridgeable gap between the Soviet Union and the West.”
Thousands of Western scientists declared a scientific boycott of the USSR, parliamentary resolutions proliferated, and the US Congress gave serious consideration to the withdrawal of the USA from the Helsinki Accords, the termination of cultural exchanges and even the suspension of negotiations regarding nuclear arms limitation (SALT II).
“Let me say at the outset that though I was skeptical at the time of Helsinki, I firmly believe that it was worth a try,” stated Senator Bob Packwood.205 “For Helsinki represented a quid pro quo. We, with great reluctance, agreed to that in the volatility of the frontiers of all signatories in all states in Europe. The Soviets dearly wanted that, for it meant international recognition of the boundaries they established by force at the end of World War II…. The Soviet Union has not lived up to their side of the bargain. Therefore, the US should take the lead, and in concert with our allies, declare the Helsinki Accords what they have, in fact, always been—null and void.”
Finally the American Senate accepted Senator Jackson’s suggestion and nominated the arrested Helsinki monitors for the Nobel Peace Prize, a move that was supported by the parliaments of numerous countries.206 The reaction in the USA was much stronger than in Europe, and American representatives at the Belgrade Conference were practically isolated: they were the only ones to demand an open condemnation of the USSR. Sol Chick Chaikin, a representative of the AFL-CIO in the American delegation, became the target of vicious attacks by the Soviet representatives for “attempting to poison the atmosphere”: all he did was pass on an invitation for Sakharov from the head of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, to attend the forthcoming congress of American trade unions and—what impudence!—demanding a reply.207 The Europeans were not too pleased, either; everything had been going so smoothly, so properly without that Yankee….
No, it was not the capitalists, nor the “reactionaries,” who stood in the way of détente in America, but ordinary people—trade unionists like George Meany, who was the first to issue a verdict regarding this policy of capitulation and betrayal:208 “Détente is a confidence trick.”
This mighty old man, who started out as an ordinary plumber and finally came to head the association of sixteen million American workers, was to me the epitome of all that was good and deserving of respect that had once created a great country—a leader of the free world. At the same hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at which Zhores Medvedev spoke of the “doves” in the Politburo, Meany said the following:209
We live in strange times. We live in a time when a man whose whole political career was built on rabid anti-communism can become President and overnight be transformed into the chief advocate of unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union. We live in a time when the President of Pepsi-Cola is transported into ecstasy by Leonid Brezhnev, about whom he says he was tremendously impressed, “By the candor and sincerity of this man and by his clear commitment to pursue not only peace, but also… the enrichment of life in his country.”
Strangely enough, Meany—with no university degrees or academic titles under his belt—understood international politics much better than all American professors combined:210
I’m not blaming all the world’s troubles on Henry Kissinger, but I’m saying, in the final analysis, the cause of human rights in this world is dependent on the strength, the economic strength, the military strength, the moral strength of the United States of America. If we falter, freedom is shaken everywhere….
Alas, our success did not last long: by the end of 1979 both the Soviet and the Western establishments had rallied. Carter was unable to resist such pressure from all sides and “moderated” his course. The Washington Post wrote:211
That thrust has since been moderated, partly out of a growing recognition in Washington that the Kremlin would not shrink from taking vengeance on the intended beneficiaries of American concern. […] But there must also be acceptance of a requirement to match the promotion of human rights abroad with the particular foreign context in which they are necessarily worked out. This demands a measure of self-discipline at odds with the outrage Americans feel for foreign abuses, particularly for Soviet abuses. The United States cannot be in the business of helping create martyrs. It can only do what it can to widen the scope for individual liberty. It ought to strive, in so doing, to keep open prospects for progress on other fronts.
Thus we see the triumph of a viewpoint not too unlike the ideas of Zhores Medvedev and his “liberal” friends. But the crux of the matter was not in ideas, but in the coincidence of the interests of the left American establishment, their socialist “allies” in Europe, and the Soviet leadership. Carter simply capitulated under their combined pressure.
Even the scientists’ boycott, which was unprecedented in its scope, began to be evaded by 1979: a resolution of the CC admitted (3 April 1979, St 153/13)212 that it was “unfeasible to enter into polemics with the organizers of the new anti-Soviet campaign,” as “many leading American scientists and scientific centers are displaying an interest in Soviet science and cooperation with our scientific institutions.”
At the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR held talks with the leaders of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, the US National Bureau of Standards and the Phillips Petroleum Company. There were also talks between the USSR and the US on world oceans. At these talks the American side noticed the constructive approach to the further development of scientific cooperation. New long-term agreements were signed.
Meanwhile, the Western “human rights” organizations that had played such a vital role in our campaign were quietly taken in hand by the local left nomenklatura, which for the cause of more objectivity turned its attention to human rights—mainly in nonsocialist countries. An entire “human rights” field of bureaucracy sprang up, to which we were denied access because of our “lack of objectivity.” It became impossible to say anything critical of the Soviet Union without saying ten times more about South Africa, Chile, or Iran. Before you know it, some “Helsinki Watch” or other would issue a portentous report on violations of human rights in the world, on quality notepaper and for good salaries: three violations in the USSR and eleven in the USA. One can only guess where all these “defenders of human rights” came from.
The establishment adjusted, found ways to bury the whole subject, filled it with its fictitious activity: committees proliferated on the rights of American Indians, women, Mexicans, Micronesians and other “minorities,” real or imagined (in the report on the hearings in the Helsinki Committee of the Congress of the USA for 1979,213 I counted a good two dozen such organizations, leagues, funds, associations, and societies). “Human rights” as a subject was hijacked and became the banner of the left for a long time. We were no longer admitted there.
It is easy to imagine how the 1980s could have turned out without the annoying buzzing we provided which made the Soviet strategists waste so much time on us, and most importantly, lose the initiative in their “peaceful advance”, even if only briefly:
Generally speaking, what Lenin failed to achieve with his “global revolution,” or Stalin with his “war of liberation,” could have been managed by Brezhnev with his détente. But it was too late, the worst times had passed. Then came the occupation of Afghanistan, followed by the Polish events of 1980 and 1981 that shook the world. Détente was over. We were on the threshold of a new era—the epoch of Thatcher and Reagan, with their arms programs, active anticommunism, and dismantling of socialism in the West. The world entered the last lap of the stage of opposition.
And another ten years down the road, it was hard to believe that we had stood at the edge of the precipice and had not fallen into it due to a handful of people who refused to compromise their conscience.