The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 shocked the world, as if there had been no Soviet expansion in practically all parts of the globe. This amazement, shock, and bewilderment were something disgustingly deceptive, as in a man who marries a prostitute and then finds out—horror of horrors!—that she is not a virgin. Sovietologists and politicians tripped over one another offering their theories aimed at explaining Soviet behavior by any means to hand. The left, as was customary, saw this as a “hyperreaction to the hostile behavior of the West”—NATO’s decision to place new rockets in Europe. The right muttered something about “Russian imperialism”, and the “grandiose drive of Russia toward warm seas.” Poor things, they’re freezing in their Siberia and want to get warm. Meanwhile it was perfectly clear that this occupation was just the latest (and not at all obligatory!) stage of the usual Soviet scenario of “liberation”; it merely showed that the Soviet strategists did a bad job with the scenario and had to send in troops to correct the miscalculation. By the time of the occupation, Afghanistan had already been practically swallowed by the Soviet Union, something the West had stubbornly refused to notice. And it would not have “noticed” if it were not for the Kremlin’s miscalculation or, to be more precise, the desperate resistance of the Afghan people.
The history of relations between the USSR and Afghanistan is probably the best illustration of the fact that the Soviet system was incapable of existing peacefully with the rest of the world, and is an excellent picture of what would have happened in Europe if détente had triumphed. Actually, of all the world’s nonsocialist countries, Afghanistan was probably the country most friendly to the USSR: it was one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and was a kind of Asian Finland for six decades. The Kremlin was in no hurry to export revolution there, knowing that Afghanistan would not escape, and simply “promoted progress” in that country: roads were built, industry was created, and specialists were trained. From a Marxist point of view, it was impossible to demand that a backward, feudal state become socialist immediately. First of all, the relevant social prerequisites had to be established: industrialization, the growth of the proletariat, and, naturally, its “avant-garde.” Just so, a careful householder does not slaughter a piglet too soon but fattens it up so it will be ready for the table in time for the feast.
The feast was on its way: the Soviet “peaceful advance” of the 1970s, having neutralized the opposition of the “forces of imperialism,” brought a whole lot of third world countries into the bosom of the socialist commonwealth. Now it was Afghanistan’s turn to embark on the path of progress, having thrown off the shackles of monarchy. This historical “change of social formations” occurred in the summer of 1973 by means of a virtually bloodless palace coup d’état, performed with Moscow’s approval by Mohammed Daoud Khan, a relative of the king. Having proclaimed a republic and become its president, Daoud Khan was not a communist but rather a moderate social democrat, no more radical than European socialists. Moscow saw him as a sort of Alexander Kerensky: his historical role was to prepare political conditions for further progress. Once more, the Kremlin strategists were in no hurry—Daoud Khan suited them fine for a transitional stage, especially since communist groupings were quarrelling continually among themselves and could not unite. The International Department of the CC reported this in June 1974 (21 June 1974, 25-S-1183):214
Leaders of progressive political organizations in Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak [sic] (Parcham) and Nur Taraki (Khalq), who maintain unofficial contacts with the CC CPSU through the resident of the Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in Kabul, acting shortly after the establishment of a republican regime in July 1973, advanced progressively minded elements in the CC of the republic, the government, and the army and started an unprincipled internecine struggle for reinforcing the positions and influence of their groupings for the right to “represent the communist party” in the land.
In its message to its Afghan “friends” the CC wrote:215
The interests of reinforcing the national independence of the country call for closing ranks between forces, united currently in Parcham and Khalq, in order to serve the interests of workers, peasants, and all strata of Afghan society on the basis of cooperation with the republican regime and the government of the republic headed by Mohammed Daoud.
However, four years later the “plans allegedly made by leftist forces” were implemented with the full support of the Soviet Union in the Saur [April] Revolution. The incessant infighting of communist groupings received short shrift: the stake was placed on one of them (Khalq), leaving the second one (Parcham) at the mercy of their class brothers. Its leader, Babrak Karmal, was appointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia and thus escaped repressions, which descended immediately on the heads of his colleagues, but he did not give up and, just like Trotsky, continued his struggle in exile.
In fact, these were just trifles. The main purpose had been achieved: yet another progressive “people’s democratic republic” had appeared on the map of the world, thereby confirming the thesis of the replacement of the balance of forces in the global arena in favor of the forces of peace, progress, and socialism. The next step was a “Friendship Treaty”, massed economic aid, military advisers, supplies of “special property” (armaments)—all of this gratis, or at a quarter of the actual price. The progressive regime began decisive construction of a “new life” after destroying thousands of “reactionaries,” “religious believers,” and “revisionists.” And nobody, you will note, was concerned by the movement of communism “toward warm seas,” just as there was no particular worry in the world about its progression in South Yemen, Somalia, or Ethiopia.
Yet there was one small detail overlooked in the heat of class struggle: the attitude of the Afghan people toward progress and socialism. Suddenly, like a bolt from the blue in March 1979, came the news that Herat, the third largest city in Afghanistan with a population of two hundred thousand, was in the hands of “insurgents.”
The news clearly caught Moscow by surprise. Nobody really knew what was going on. Brezhnev was ill, so an emergency meeting of the Politburo was called in his absence on 17 March under the chairmanship of Andrei Kirilenko. Andrei Gromyko reported the following (17–18 March 1979*, Pb):
It is worth noting that I had a conversation at 11 a.m. today with [Hafizullah] Amin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Taraki’s deputy, and he did not express any particular concern about the situation in Afghanistan, but said with Olympian calm that the situation is not all that serious, that the army is in control, etc. In a word, he made it clear that their situation is stable.
[…]
As for Kabul, the situation there is generally calm. Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan and Iran is closed, or, to be more accurate, half-closed. Large numbers of Afghans who previously worked in Iran have been deported and are naturally very dissatisfied. Many of them have already joined the insurgents.
The measures we intend to implement to aid Afghanistan are outlined in the papers you have before you. I would like to say that we have assigned Afghanistan an additional 10 million rubles in currency for the purpose of guarding its borders.
As Pakistan is the main entry point for terrorists to cross into Afghanistan, it would seem feasible for the Afghan government to send a protest note to Pakistan or make a declaration, that is, to issue a document of some kind. But the Afghan government has not done so. This does seem very strange.
I asked Amin what measures he considers to be necessary for us to take. I told him approximately what aid we could render. He made no other requests, merely said that he has an optimum evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan, and that Soviet aid shall be of great assistance and that all the provinces are under the control of the legitimate government. I asked, “Do you not expect any unpleasantness emanating from neighboring countries or the internal counterrevolution by religious activists and so forth?” He replied firmly that there is no threat to the regime. At the end he sent his regards to the members of the Politburo and personally to L.I. Brezhnev. That was my conversation with Amin today.
Some two or three hours later we received information from our comrades that disorder has broken out in Herat. One regiment, as I have already said, the artillery one, opened fire on its own forces, and part of the second regiment has gone over to the insurgents. Consequently, government forces are left with around half of the 17th division. … Our comrades also report that tomorrow and the next day new masses of insurgents, backed by Pakistan and Iran, may enter Afghanistan.
About half an hour later our comrades informed us that the senior Soviet military adviser, comrade Gorelov, and the charge d’affaires, comrade Alekseyev, have been invited to meet with comrade Taraki. What was the subject of the meeting with Taraki? First, he made a request for military technical equipment, ammunition, and rations, all of which are envisaged in the existing documents we have circulated to the Politburo for consideration. As for military aid, Taraki said in passing that assistance on the ground and in the air may be required. This can be interpreted to mean that we shall have to send in our troops, both ground and airborne.
I think that first of all we have to proceed from the main issue in rendering aid to Afghanistan. We have lived alongside them for 60 years in peace and with good-neighborly relations. If we lose Afghanistan now, and it distances itself from the Soviet Union, it will be a severe blow to our policy. Of course, it is one thing to resort to extreme measures if the Afghan army remains on the side of the people, and quite another if the army refuses to support the legitimate government. And finally, if the army opposes the government and thus our forces, the matter will become very complex. Comrades Gorelov and Alekseyev report that the attitude of the leadership, including comrade Taraki, is not particularly accommodating.
[Dmitry] USTINOV. … We have advised comrade Taraki that certain forces should be sent to districts where insurgency has occurred. He replied that this would be difficult, as there is unrest in other places as well. In a word, he expects significant action by the Soviet Union with both ground and airborne forces.
ANDROPOV. They hope that we shall hit the insurgents.
KIRILENKO. The question is who our forces will be fighting if we send them there. With the insurgents, and they have been joined by a large number of religious adherents, they are Muslims with numerous ordinary people in their midst. So in the main, we shall have to fight these people.
KOSYGIN. What is the Afghan army like, how many divisions does it have?
USTINOV. There are ten divisions, numbering more than 100 thousand men.
ANDROPOV. We know from operative data that around three thousand insurgents are heading for Afghanistan from Pakistan. They are mainly religious fanatics drawn from the ordinary people.
KIRILENKO. If the people rise up, then apart from those coming in from Pakistan and Iran and who are mainly terrorists and insurgents, the bulk that our forces will be fighting shall be ordinary Afghans. Admittedly, these are religious adherents, followers of Islam.
GROMYKO. At present, it is hard to determine the correlation between government supporters and insurgents. Judging by everything, the events in Herat erupted very violently, more than a thousand people were killed. But even there the situation is not sufficiently clear.
ANDROPOV. Of course, the insurgents that have penetrated into Afghanistan shall first of all rebel and try to attract the Afghan people to their side.
KOSYGIN. I consider that the draft resolution that has been submitted requires serious amendment. First of all, there is no need to put off the supply of arms until April; it should be done immediately, now, in March. That is the first issue.
The second is that it is necessary to give the Afghan leadership some moral support, and I suggest implementing the following measures: advise Taraki that we will raise the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles for one thousand cubic meters. That will enable them to cover the losses they have with regard to the acquisition of armaments and other materiel. I believe we should supply arms to Afghanistan free of charge without naming any 25 percent.
ALL. Right.
KOSYGIN. Thirdly, we envisage giving them 75 thousand metric tons of grain. I think this should be revised and raised to 100 thousand metric tons. These measures, in my opinion, should be included in the draft resolution and thereby show the Afghan leadership moral support. We need to fight for Afghanistan as, after all, we have lived in perfect harmony for 60 years. Of course, the struggle with the Iranians, the Pakistanis, and the Chinese is powerful, but Iran shall render assistance to Afghanistan, it has the means to do so, the more so that they profess the same religion. This must be borne in mind. Pakistan will also agree to such a measure. No need to say anything about the Chinese. So I believe we should adopt a comradely resolution and render serious aid to the Afghan leadership. As I have said, there is no need to talk about payment at this stage, especially, as is noted here, in freely convertible currency. Whatever hard currency they have, we will still get nothing from them. …
There is another question I would like to raise: whatever you might say, both Taraki and Amin are concealing the true state of affairs from us. We still have no detailed knowledge of what is going on in Afghanistan. How do they assess the situation? They continue to draw a picture in bright colors, but we really see what kind of events are occurring there. They are probably good people, but they still hide quite a lot from us. It is hard to understand why. …
Furthermore, I think it is necessary to send an additional number of qualified military specialists there and let them find out in detail what is going on in the army.
I also consider it necessary to find a broader political resolution. Maybe the draft of such a resolution could be drawn up by comrades from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the International Department. It is obvious that Iran, China, and Pakistan will come out against Afghanistan and resort to all means and measures to hinder the legitimate government and discredit all its actions. This is precisely where our political support of Taraki and his government shall be needed. Naturally, Carter shall also speak against the Afghan leadership.
If the need arises to send in forces, whom will we be fighting, who will rise up against the current Afghan leadership? They are all Muslims, people of the same faith, and their faith is so strong, religious fanaticism is so prevalent, that they may unite on that basis. I think we should tell Taraki and Amin straight out about the mistakes they have made in this period. After all, they are still executing people who disagree with them; almost all the leaders of not just the top, but also the middle level of the Parcham party have been done away with. Of course, it is hard for us to formulate a political document right now; that will be the task of the comrades I have mentioned, say within three days.
USTINOV. Everything Alexei Nikolayevich has said is quite right, it must be done faster.
GROMYKO. Documents should be prepared faster.
KOSYGIN. I think we should not encourage the Afghan leadership to ask us to bring in our troops. Let them form special units that could be sent to hot spots to quell the insurgents.
USTINOV. I believe we should not mix our forces with the Afghans in the event that we do send in troops.
KOSYGIN. We need to form our military units, devise appropriate instructions for them, and send them in on a special command.
In this way the basic decision was made by the Politburo regarding the sending of Soviet forces into Afghanistan back in March 1979—that is, nine months before the NATO decision to place new rockets in Europe and with no hankering after “warm seas.” If they had any geopolitical aim, it was fully covered by the simple formula “we cannot yield Afghanistan to the enemy” (that is, the Afghan people). However, the atmosphere changed rapidly, new information continued to flood in regarding the situation in Afghanistan, and the “extreme measures” had to be delayed. This was influenced particularly by Kosygin’s conversation with Taraki, which took place through an interpreter the next day, 18 March, at the insistence of the Politburo, and was fully read out to the Politburo by Kosygin upon its completion (18 March 1979*, No. 242):
KOSYGIN. Please tell comrade Taraki that I want to pass on greetings from Leonid Ilyich and all the members of the Politburo.
TARAKI. Thank you.
KOSYGIN. How is comrade Taraki, does he not get too tired?
TARAKI. No, I don’t. There was a meeting of the Revolutionary Council today.
KOSYGIN. That’s good, I’m glad to hear it. Please ask comrade Taraki to describe the situation in Afghanistan.
TARAKI. The situation is bad and getting worse. […]
[…]
KOSYGIN. Do you have support among the workers, the city bourgeoisie, and officials? Is there anyone on your side?
TARAKI. We have no active support from the population. They are almost all under the influence of Shia slogans. “Do not believe the ungodly, but follow us”—that is the basis of their propaganda.
KOSYGIN. What is the population of Herat?
TARAKI. 200–250 thousand. They behave according to circumstances. They’ll go wherever they’re led. Now they are on the side of the opposition.
[…]
Propaganda should be mixed with practical aid. I suggest that you put Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft, and nobody will be any the wiser. Your forces could advance from the direction of Kushka and of Kabul.
KOSYGIN. Kabul still has to be reached.
TARAKI. It is not far from Kushka to Herat. Troops could be airlifted to Kabul.
KOSYGIN. If troops are sent to Kabul and they advance on Herat, we do not want to disappoint you, but this would be impossible to conceal. The whole world will know about it within two hours. Everyone will start screaming that the Soviet Union has launched an intervention in Afghanistan. Tell me, comrade Taraki, if we airlift weapons and tanks to Kabul, will you be able to find crewmen or not?
TARAKI. Very few.
KOSYGIN. How many?
TARAKI. I have no precise data.
KOSYGIN. And if we were to make a quick airlift of tanks, the necessary ammunition, and mortars, will you be able to find specialists capable of using these weapons?
TARAKI. I cannot answer this question. You can get an answer from Soviet advisers.
[…]
KOSYGIN. We have decided to send you emergency military materiel, to undertake repair of helicopters and aircraft—all of this gratis. We have also decided to send you 100 thousand metric tons of grain and to raise the price of gas from 21 dollars per one thousand cubic meters to 37.82 dollars.
TARAKI. That is fine, but let us talk about Herat.
KOSYGIN. Very well. Would you be able to form several divisions in Kabul comprised of advanced people, on whom you can depend, and not just in Kabul but other places? We would supply the necessary arms.
TARAKI. We have no officer corps. Iran sends soldiers to Afghanistan in mufti. Pakistan also sends its men and officers into Afghanistan in Afghan dress. Why can’t the Soviet Union send in Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civil clothing? Nobody would recognize them.
KOSYGIN. What else can you say about Herat?
TARAKI. We want you to send us Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens so that they could drive tanks, as all these ethnic groups exist in Afghanistan. Let them wear Afghan clothes and Afghan badges, and nobody will recognize them. In our opinion, this is very easy work. Judging by Iranian and Pakistani experience, this work can be done easily.
Needless to say, this discussion and the next (not believing his ears, Kosygin rang again) depressed the Politburo. It seems as though for the first time they realized what an unpleasant situation they had landed in in Afghanistan. The more so as in the second call Taraki was even more frank (17–18 March 1979*, Pb):216
KOSYGIN. Talking about Kabul, today’s telegrams show that the situation there is practically the same as in Iran: there are protests, people are gathering in groups. Large numbers of men armed with Chinese weapons are passing into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran. …
USTINOV. With regard to Tajiks, we have no such separate units. It is hard to say at this time how many of them serve in the tank units of our army. … When I spoke to Amin, he also requested bringing troops into Herat to crush the opposition. …
The Afghan revolution encountered many obstacles in its path, said Amin in his conversation with me, and its preservation depends only on the Soviet Union.
What is the matter, why did things turn out like this? The fact is that the Afghan leadership underestimated the role of Islam. It is under the banner of Islam that soldiers are deserting to the other side, and the absolute majority of them, with maybe a few exceptions, are religious believers. That is why we are asked to help in routing the attacks of the insurgents in Herat. Amin said, with no great certainty, that they can rely on the army. But just like comrade Taraki, he appealed for help.
KIRILENKO. So they have no guarantees regarding their army. They are hoping for a single solution, specifically our tanks and armored vehicles.
KOSYGIN. Naturally, in reaching a decision about aid, we must give serious thought to all the possible consequences. This is a very serious matter.
ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have thought about this question in depth, and reached the conclusion that we must give very, very serious consideration to the question of the purpose of bringing our troops into Afghanistan. It is quite clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready to reach a socialist decision on all these matters. Religion is very powerful there, the rural population is virtually illiterate, the economy is backward, and so on. We know Lenin’s teachings about a revolutionary situation. But what situation can one talk of in Afghanistan? There is no such situation in that country. For that reason I consider that we can retain the revolution in Afghanistan only by force of our bayonets, but that is unacceptable to us. We cannot take that risk.
KOSYGIN. Maybe we should instruct comrade [Vladimir] Vinogradov, our ambassador in Iran, to see prime minster [Mehdi] Bazargan and point out the inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
I support comrade Andropov’s suggestion regarding the exclusion of such a measure as taking our forces into Afghanistan. The local army is unreliable. Therefore our army, entering Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Whom shall it fight? The Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot them. Comrade Andropov noted rightly that the time for revolution in Afghanistan is not yet ripe, and all that we have done with such difficulty over the past few years toward international détente, arms reduction, and much more—all that shall be wasted. Of course, this would be a great gift for China. All nonaligned countries will be against us. This action will have serious consequences. The meeting between Leonid Ilyich and Carter would be canceled, and Giscard d’Estaing’s visit at the end of March would come into question. I ask you, what do we have to gain? Afghanistan with its current government, a backward economy, and an insignificant rating in international affairs? On the other hand, we must also bear in mind that sending in troops would be legally unjustified. According to the UN Charter, a country may appeal for help, and we could send in troops if that country faced aggression from without. Afghanistan is not threatened by any aggression. This is their internal matter, a revolutionary civil strife, battles between one group of the population with another. It must also be said that the Afghans have made no official request to us regarding the sending of troops.
[…]
ANDROPOV. We should not delay in publishing an article about Pakistan and its support of the insurgents.
USTINOV. I assume that we shall implement measures of support as we agreed yesterday.
ALL. Right.
USTINOV. Only excluding the sending of troops.
KOSYGIN. In other words, we are not changing anything regarding aid to Afghanistan, apart from the matter of sending troops. They should be more responsible in deciding questions concerning state affairs. If we do it all for them, what will be left for them? Nothing. We have 24 advisers in Herat. They will have to be evacuated.
ZAMYATIN. As for the propagandistic reinforcement of this measure, we have a prepared article about Afghanistan. There is also an article about Pakistan and support of the Afghan insurgents by China. These articles should be sent to the press today.
ALL. Right.
CHERNENKO. Comrades, we need to decide who will invite comrade Taraki.
KIRILENKO. That should be done by comrade Kosygin. Let him phone Taraki and invite him to either Moscow or Tashkent, whichever he prefers.
And the machine went into action. On the next day, an extended meeting of the Politburo was called217 with all the secretaries of the CC (including the still-young secretary for agriculture, M.S. Gorbachev). By some miracle Brezhnev was reanimated and, reading visibly from a piece of paper, expressed approval of “… all those measures that were envisaged by the draft decision of the CC CPSU, introduced on Saturday, all the measures that were implemented on Saturday and Sunday.” He recited them in order. “The question was raised regarding the direct participation of our forces in the conflict in Afghanistan. I believe the members of the Politburo determined correctly that at this time we should not be drawn into this war.”
That was the end of the first phase of the Afghan crisis. The situation stabilized somewhat (two days later the insurgent regiments in Herat were ruthlessly crushed by tanks and air strikes, hastily sent from other towns), and then, by the summer, the atmosphere began to worsen once more. However, from that moment and up to the day of the Soviet invasion, all the efforts of the Soviet leadership were directed at… avoiding this invasion. Reading through their documents now, you can almost feel the breath of doom; the old men in the Kremlin felt instinctively that the Afghan adventure would be the beginning of the end of their regime, and resisted to the last. This collective wisdom was even set out in their “political document,” which analyzed the reasons for the March crisis (12 April 1979, Pb 149/XIV):
Therefore our decision to reject the request of the DRA leadership to send Soviet military units into Herat was correct. This line should be continued also in the event of new antigovernment manifestations in Afghanistan, the possibility of which cannot be excluded.
But the situation began to slip out of the old-timers’ hands, and the more they dug in their heels, the closer they slid to the edge of the precipice. Like an incantation, they repeated all the arguments against an invasion, sinking deeper and deeper into the quicksand of the crisis.
Brezhnev offered Taraki a whole range of measures to strengthen the regime in Afghanistan, from the creation of a “united national front” headed by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the expansion of “political work among the masses”, up to work with the clergy for the purposes of its “stratification” so that at least part of the clergy, even if it gave the government no open support, would at least refrain from attacking it. As an old party worker, Brezhnev instructed Taraki as follows (20 March 1979, Pb 486):
It is important for the command personnel to be sure of the stability of its position. You cannot expect much from the army if commanding cadres are changed frequently. This is understandable, especially if changes in command are accompanied by arrests. When many commanders see their colleagues arrested and disappearing, they naturally begin to feel unsure of their own future.
But on the matter of Soviet forces, he was adamant:
Regarding the question you posed in a telephone conversation with comrade Kosygin and later here, in Moscow, about the possibility of sending Soviet military units into Afghanistan. We have studied this question thoroughly, weighed up all the pros and cons, so I will tell you directly: this should not be done. It would only be to the advantage of the enemy—yours and ours. … I would like to hope that you will show an understanding of our position.
Obviously, no public statements should be made—either by you or by us—that we have no intention of doing this, for clear reasons of feasibility.
Everything was in vain: Taraki listened, thanked Brezhnev for received aid and for the good advice, then went back to pleading for Soviet forces. If not forces, then tank drivers and helicopter pilots. If not supplied by the Soviets, then maybe by some other countries? Kosygin lost his temper, and probably snapped at Taraki (20 March 1979, Pb 499):
I cannot understand this harping on about pilots and tank drivers. To us, this is a totally unexpected question. And I very much doubt that socialist countries will be forthcoming. The issue of sending men who will climb into your tanks and shoot at your people is a very acute political matter.
Yet a month later, upon the supply of Soviet military helicopters, the question arose again, and once more the Politburo was forced to adopt a special resolution: “On the Unfeasibility of the Participation of Soviet Military Helicopter Crews in Suppressing Counterrevolutionary Manifestations in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” (21 April 1979, Pb 150/93), with the following instruction to the chief military adviser:
Convince Amin that the available military helicopters manned by Afghan crews, acting together with units of land forces and combat aviation, are capable of solving issues concerning the suppression of counterrevolutionary manifestations. Supply the Afghan command with the necessary recommendations on this matter.
In May, due to the “activation of counterrevolutionary activities of reactionary forces,” the Afghans requested assistance again. And again they were offered “special equipment” to the sum of 53 million rubles (for 1979 through 1981). The Politburo reported through the Soviet ambassador in Kabul (24 May 1979, Pb 152/159) that what they were given was to include:
… 140 cannons and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of these, 50 to be rapidly dispatched), 48,000 small arms, around 1,000 grenade launchers, 680 aviation bombs, and also to be rapidly dispatched in June–July 1979, medicines and medical equipment to the sum of 50 thousand rubles….
As immediate aid in May of this year, 100 incendiary tanks and 150 single cluster bombs were supplied. Obtaining gas bombs with a nonlethal toxic substance does not appear possible.
Nonetheless, by June there were some Soviet units in Afghanistan, although they took no part in combat activity. The situation had deteriorated so much that Boris Ponomarev had to make an emergency flight there. On 28 June, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev reported to the Politburo that (29 June 1979*, Pb 156/IX):
The situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) continues to deteriorate. The actions of insurgent tribes are increasing and acquiring an organized nature. Reactionary clerics are stepping up antigovernment and anti-Soviet agitation, and preach the idea of the creation of “a free Islamic republic” in the DRA, similar to that in Iran. …
[…]
Send an experienced general with a group of officers to assist the chief military adviser for direct work in the ranks (in divisions and regiments). The main task of this group shall be providing assistance to commanders of compounds and units in organizing combat actions against the insurgents and improving the management of units and subdivisions. Additionally, post-Soviet military advisers to the battalion level, including to the governmental brigade of guards and to tank brigades (40–50 persons, including 20 political advisers), as well as military counterintelligence advisers to all the regiments of the DRA.
For the purposes of ensuring security and protection of the aircraft of the Soviet air squadron at the Bagram Airfield, and with the consent of the Afghan side, send a paratrooper battalion disguised in the uniform (overalls) of aviation technicians. To ensure security of the Soviet embassy in Kabul, send a special squad of the KGB of the USSR (125–150 persons) in the guise of embassy service personnel. In August of this year, upon completing their training, send a special squad of the GRU of the Central Command of the armed forces to the DRA (Bagram Airfield) for deployment in the event of a sharpening of the situation to guard and defend particularly important government sites.
Using the channels of the KGB of the USSR and the GRU of the General Command, send targeted information to the Indian leadership regarding plans for the inclusion of Indian Kashmir, as well as Afghanistan, into a “global Islamic republic,” in order to stimulate the Indian government to take active steps toward countering the anti-Afghan activity of Pakistan.
Increase propaganda in the Soviet media condemning attempts at interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, Iran, China, and the USA under the slogan “Hands off Afghanistan.” Assist with the publication of such materials in the press of other countries.
Whether the Soviet leaders wanted it or not, the Rubicon had been crossed. In making this decision they undertook complete responsibility for life and death in Afghanistan. After this, the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became purely academic.
By an ironic quirk of fate, the need for invasion arose, but not for the reason expected. By the fall, the “insurgency” began to subside, as though it had exhausted its force, and did not threaten to overthrow the regime. There was even a degree of stability, but the Afghan “leadership” fought among itself. In September, Taraki was deposed by his faithful deputy and minister of foreign affairs Hafizullah Amin and soon killed, despite the will of Moscow. This was followed by purges among the leadership, punishments, and, the Kremlin felt, changes in the political orientation of the new leaders. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev reported on this at the end of October (29 October 1979, No. 0937):218
The situation in Afghanistan after the events of 13–16 September of this year, as a result of which Taraki was removed from power and liquidated physically, remains highly complex. Aiming to ensure his retention of power Amin, while making such cosmetic gestures as starting the development of a draft constitution and releasing some previously arrested persons, is in fact increasing the scope of repressions in the party, the army, the state apparatus, and public organizations. His plain intention is to clear the political arena of practically all prominent party and state activists whom he perceives to be his real or potential opponents.
[…]
Alarming signals have been received regarding Amin’s setting up of contacts with representatives of the rightist Muslim opposition and chiefs of tribes that are hostile to the government, in the course of which he exhibits readiness to reach agreement with them regarding their cessation of armed conflict against the current government on conditions of “compromise,” which would be detrimental to the progressive development of the country.
It has been noted recently that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to conduct “a more balanced policy” toward Western countries. Among other things it is known that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are reaching the conclusion that there is a possibility of a change in the political course of Afghanistan in a direction favorable to Washington.
Amin’s conduct in the realm of relations with the USSR clearly exposes his insincerity and duplicity. He and his entourage claim that they wish for further expansion of cooperation with the Soviet Union in various spheres, but in fact allow actions counter to such cooperation. Agreeing outwardly with the recommendations of Soviet representatives, including with regard to the preservation of unity in the PDPA and the DRA, and declaring readiness to reinforce friendship with the USSR, in practice Amin not only refrains from taking measures to suppress anti-Soviet attitudes, but actually encourages them. For example, on his initiative, word is being spread about the participation of alleged Soviet representatives in an “assassination attempt” on him during the events of 13–16 September this year. Amin and his closest cronies do not hesitate to make slanderous allegations about the participation of Soviet representatives in the repressive actions taking place in Afghanistan.
Amin is a power-hungry and exceedingly cruel and dishonest individual. In view of the organizational weakness of the PDPA and the ideological ignorance of its members, it is quite possible that Amin may attempt to change the political orientation of the regime in order to secure his personal power.
[…]
There are still rational forces in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Afghan army who express serious concern regarding the present situation in the country, which may lead to the loss of the achievements of the April Revolution. But these forces are isolated and actually find themselves in an illegal position.
It is hard to say now to what extent Moscow’s fears regarding Amin’s “more balanced policy” toward the West were justified, and its involvement in his “assassination attempt” was an invention. One thing is certain: Amin was not the Soviets’ candidate, he was not trusted, and he behaved too independently. Not only did he slip out of control, but he seemed to believe that he could dictate his own rules of the game to Moscow. After the invasion and the killing of Amin they declared him a CIA agent, which cannot be taken seriously. Maybe he simply tried to stabilize the situation by demonstrating his independence, a certain distancing from Moscow, while conducting talks with the opposing side—who knows? In the situation of the time this may have been a sensible approach. But the prospect of surrendering Afghanistan, and not just to some “insurgents” but to their bitter enemies, was too frightening for the Soviet leaders. It was one thing to lose the revolution, and quite another for their ideological enemies to have a base on their borders, posing a lethal threat to their power in central Asia. Without doubt, Amin’s fate was sealed from that moment, and invasion became inevitable. This can be seen from the decisions made by the Politburo in October pursuant to the aforesaid report (31 October 1979*, Pb 172-108, p. 4):
Continue working actively with Amin and the current leadership of the PDPA and the DRA, giving Amin no reason to think that we do not trust him and wish to have nothing to do with him. Use the contacts with Amin to exert the relevant influence on him, and at the same time determine the true nature of his intentions.
In other words, Moscow set about forming a new crew of “leaders” out of the “rational forces” in the party, the army, and the state apparatus, and—to give it its due—went about this with great skill. Babrak Karmal was taken out of mothballs, still continuing his intrigues in Prague, and even managed reconciliation between Parcham and Khalq, then—lo and behold!—the “government of national unity” emerged. By December, in record time, everything was ready, including the development of the plan for the military part of the operation. I do not undertake to judge Amin’s treachery, but the Soviet leaders were certainly guilty of the height of treachery in this instance, easily outstripping their Eastern brothers: on 6 December the “personal guard” Amin had asked for in vain since the summer arrived on the doorstep without warning. As Andropov and Ogarkov reported to the CC without batting an eye (6 December 1979*, Pb 176/82):
… H. Amin, has lately been insisting on the need to send a Soviet army infantry battalion to Kabul to guard his residence. In view of the existing situation and H. Amin’s request, we deem it feasible to send a specially trained squad of the GRU of the Central Command of the armed forces to Afghanistan, numbering around 500 men in a uniform not disclosing its affiliation to the Armed Forces of the USSR. […]
As the question of sending the squad to Kabul was agreed upon with the Afghan side, we deem it feasible to transport it by aircraft of the military transport aviation in the first ten days of December of this year.
This was the spetsnaz (special forces) squad that, on the night of 28 December, stormed and took Amin’s palace. So after all, Tajiks and Uzbeks were found in the ranks of the Soviet army, and it was not difficult to dress them in Afghan uniforms.
When it came to really delicate issues, the Soviet leaders displayed incredible secrecy, trusting nobody, even their closest allies. Very frequently there was no trace of these issues whatsoever in their documents. It is not surprising that there was not a single paper in their secure archives containing the resolution regarding the invasion of Afghanistan in black and white, and even less so that there was nothing about Amin’s removal. Yet these decisions were made by the entire Politburo—it could not be otherwise in the Soviet system, in which every crime was bound by a “bloody surety,” as in Dostoyevsky’s Demons.
The decision regarding the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces and the coup d’état in this “democratic republic” was made on 12 December 1979 by Politburo members Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko, Chernenko, Arvids Pelse, Mikhail Suslov, Kirilenko, Viktor Grishin, and Nikolai Tikhonov, with the participation of nonvoting candidate-member to the Politburo Ponomarev. But even those who for reasons of distance or illness could not be present had to sign this resolution at a later time: Dinmukhamed Kunaev on the twenty-fifth, Grigory Romanov and Vladimir Shcherbitsky on the twenty-sixth. The document itself, if it warrants that name, is an ordinary sheet of paper on which someone (probably Chernenko) wrote by hand an insignificant text, in which the word Afghanistan is not mentioned at all. It runs as follows:
Regarding resolution “A”
Approve the reflections and measures presented by comrades Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko.
Permit them to make amendments to these measures that do not alter them in principle.
Questions requiring CC decisions should be submitted to the Politburo in a timely manner.
Implementation of all these measures shall be the responsibility of Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko
- Instruct comrades Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko to keep the CC Politburo informed of the accomplishment of the intended measures.
Secretary of the CC L.I. Brezhnev
This is the historic decision of the Politburo (12 December 1979*, Pb 176/125) that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Afghans, starting with unfortunate president Hafizullah Amin, as well as tens of thousands of servicemen drawn from all the corners of the multiethnic Soviet Union.
However, it seems that they conferred again about Amin on 26 December at Brezhnev’s dacha (as usual, he was unwell) in a closer circle. This was followed by yet another meaningless piece of paper with the following typewritten text, certified by the signature of K. Chernenko dated 27 December:
At a meeting on 26 December 1979 (at the dacha) attended by comrades L.I. Brezhnev, D.F. Ustinov, A.A. Gromyko, and K.U. Chernenko, comrades Ustinov, Gromyko, and Andropov reported on the progress of the implementation of CC CPSU resolution No. 76/125 dated 12/XII-79.
Comrade L.I. Brezhnev expressed a number of wishes while approving the plan of action scheduled by the comrades for the nearest future.
It was deemed feasible that the same composition of the Central Committee of the Politburo of the CC should act according to the reported plan, giving careful thought to every step of action. On matters requiring decisions, the CC CPSU should be advised in a timely manner.
Who knows what details of the operation they were itemizing on the eve of the coup in Kabul? It was only in 1992, when the Soviet regime fell and tongues became loosened, that the Russian press began to carry detailed accounts by participants in these events—out of work KGB and spetsnaz officers and former “advisers.”
We now know that the operation went under the code name “Operation Storm-333” and was carried out by the special battalion of the GRU and two special groups of the KGB. Ironically enough, Taraki’s requests did not disappear without trace: the spetsnaz battalion, comprised almost exclusively of Central Asians (which is why it became referred to commonly as Muslim), began to be formed immediately after the March 1979 events, at the beginning of May. The personnel were recruited mainly from intelligence and tank units. The main criterion was knowledge of Eastern languages and physical fitness. Only the leader, Colonel Vasily Kolesnik, was a non-Asian.
On 10–12 December the entire battalion, some five hundred strong and dressed in Afghan uniform, was delivered to Bagram Airfield, and on the twenty-first it was sent to “guard” Amin’s Tajbeg Palace, where he had moved even before the first assassination attempt.
The “Muslim” battalion and its attendant KGB special units were located in the gap between the lookout posts and the Afghan battalions. Commanders were summoned to the Soviet embassy by the senior military adviser, General [Soltan] Magomedov and head of the KGB apparatus in Afghanistan, one General [Alexander] Bogdanov. Only there were they informed of the aim of their sudden redeployment:219
Bogdanov was interested in the guard plan of the palace and then, as if in passing, suddenly suggested we think about a plan of action if we were not to guard, but seize the palace.
The planning of combat operations lasted all night. Everything was considered at length and in scrupulous detail. It was clear that this was the real purpose of their presence in Kabul.
On the morning of December 24 colonel Kolesnik set out a detailed plan for seizure of the palace. After long discussions, the battalion command was told to wait. The waiting took quite some time. It was only in the second half of the day that word was received that the decision has been affirmed. The plan was not signed. All that was said was—act!
Meanwhile, on 25 December at 1500 hours Moscow time, the incursion of Soviet forces into Afghanistan began.
The first to cross the Amu Darya River were scouts, and then the rest of the units of the 108th motorized rifle division crossed the bridge. Forces were moved through Pul-e-Khumri and Salang Pass toward Kabul. At the same time, military transport aircraft began to airlift the main forces of the airborne division and the airborne regiment of the special-purpose guards to the Kabul and Bagram airfields. The transportation of personnel and technology required 343 flights over 47 hours. In all, 7,700 personnel, 894 units of combat technology, and 1,062 metric tons of miscellaneous cargo were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. This was the invasion watched by alarmed Americans via their satellites. But the main part of the operation could not be seen from space:
On 26 December, a reception was held for the purpose of establishing closer relations between the command of the Afghan brigade and the “Muslim” battalion. Pilaf was prepared and all sorts of herbs were purchased at the market. Admittedly, there were problems with liquor. The KGB men came to the rescue. They had brought along a case of “Posolsky” [Ambassadorial] cognac and various delicacies. In other words, it was a grand spread. Fifteen men from the guard brigade arrived, led by the commander and the political officer. Attempts were made throughout the reception to get the Afghans talking. Toasts were raised to Soviet-Afghan friendship and to combat cooperation. The hosts drank considerably less. At times the soldiers serving the tables at the reception filled the Soviet officers’ glasses with water. […] When the time came to part, if it was not as close friends, then at least as good acquaintances.
Direct preparations for storming Amin’s palace began on the morning of 27 December. The KGB personnel had detailed plans of Tajbeg. So by the start of operation “Storm-333”, the spetsnaz personnel from the “Muslim” battalion and the KGB group had a precise knowledge of seizure object NI […], the best approaches, the duty regime of the guard service, the general number of guards and Amin’s bodyguards, the location of machine gun “nests”, armored vehicles and tanks, the layout of rooms and labyrinths in the palace and the radio and telephone communication center […] The personnel of the “Muslim” battalion and the special units of the KGB were told that H. Amin was guilty of mass repressions, thousands of perfectly innocent people were killed on his orders, he had betrayed the cause of the April Revolution, entered into collusion with the American CIA, etc. This version did not fool many, because in that case it would have made more sense for Amin to invite in Americans, and not the Soviets.
And what of the duplicitous Amin? Although in September he had deceived Brezhnev and Andropov (promising to let Taraki live when the latter had already been strangled, as a result of which the Soviet leaders had spent two or three days haggling with Amin over the already dead leader of the April Revolution), strangely enough, he believed them. Or perhaps he reasoned that winners are not judged, that one makes friends with them. Maybe, like the Sunday Mirror, he did not doubt that Russians “respect only force.” For whatever reason, though, he surrounded himself with Soviet military advisers, he only fully trusted Soviet doctors, and in the end he depended on Soviet forces, calling constantly for their presence in Afghanistan. He had even less faith in “his own” Afghans.
At that time Amin, suspecting nothing, was in a state of euphoria over finally achieving his aim—Soviet forces had entered Afghanistan. During the day on 27 December he held a dinner for the members of the Politburo and ministers with their families in his opulent palace.
[…]
Quite suddenly, in the middle of the dinner, the General Secretary of the PDPA and many of his guests began to feel ill. Some lost consciousness, as did Amin. His wife immediately summoned the commander of the President’s guard…, who began phoning the Central Military Hospital… and the clinic of the Soviet embassy for help. The foodstuffs and pomegranate juice were sent off for testing. The Uzbek cooks were detained. When a group of Soviet doctors, who were working as advisers, arrived at the palace… they were unexpectedly searched. The officers were harshly ordered to surrender their arms. What had happened? They realized just what when they saw people lying in unnatural poses in the vestibule, on the stairs and in surrounding rooms. Those who were conscious were writhing in pain. The doctors knew at once that this was a mass poisoning. They started to render assistance, but at this point an Afghan medic came running up to them. […] He took them with him—to Amin. He said that the General Secretary was in a very bad condition. When they went up the stairs Amin was in one of the rooms, undressed to his shorts, his mouth hanging open and his eyes blank. Dead? They felt his pulse—it was barely discernible. Dying?
(The doctors), having no idea that they were upsetting someone’s plans, bent their efforts to the task of saving the life of the head of a “country friendly to the USSR.” Injections, gastric lavage, more injections, a drip…. It was a considerable time before Amin’s eyelids fluttered; he regained consciousness, and then asked in surprise: “Why did this happen in my home? Who did it? Was it an accident or sabotage?”
One KGB officer was to reminisce later:
… At first only KGB personnel stormed the palace. We yelled in fear, mainly swearing, which helped us not just psychologically, but practically. The soldiers of Amin’s guards took us first to be part of their own mutineers, but when they heard Russian speech, surrendered to us as to a higher and more just force. It emerged later that many of them had been trained at the Higher Airborne Command School in Ryazan, and probably remembered Russian swearwords for the rest of their lives.
The Soviet doctors did all they could. Those who had tried to resuscitate Amin huddled behind a bar. They were probably the last to see him alive:
The palace shuddered under continuous explosions. Along the corridor, illuminated by flames, came… Amin. He was wearing only white shorts and held jars of isotonic solution as if they were grenades in upraised hands that were wound around with tubing. It is hard to imagine what effort this must have cost him, and how painful the needles stuck in his veins must have been.
—Amin?!—cried the doctors, not believing their eyes. [One of them], jumping out of concealment, started pulling out the needles and steered him over to the bar. Amin leaned against the wall but tensed up immediately, as if hearing something. The doctors also heard a child crying—from one of the side rooms, knuckling the tears streaming down his face, came Amin’s five-year-old son. Seeing his father, he rushed forward and clenched his arms around Amin’s legs. Amin pressed the child’s head to him, and they both sat down against the wall. This was such a dreadful, heart-rending sight that [one of the doctors] turned away and stepped from the bar: “I can’t bear to look at this, let us leave.”
After the storming, Kabul radio broadcast a recording of Babrak Karmal’s address to the people of Afghanistan: “Today has seen the breaking of the torture machine of Amin and his henchmen—savage butchers, usurpers and murderers of tens of thousands of our fellow countrymen—fathers, mothers, sisters, sons and daughters, children and old people….”
But these were just words. The new regime differed little from the previous one. Karmal himself was at Bagram Airfield under the eye of an airborne regiment. At 0030 hours on 28 December he was phoned by Yu.V. Andropov. Speaking on his own behalf and “personally” from L.I. Brezhnev, he congratulated the new chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA on the victory of the second stage of the revolution.
It is amazing how many events hid behind one unprepossessing sheet of paper bearing the signatures of the members of the Politburo.
This has become known only now. The Politburo committee (the same Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev), which was charged to “inform,” naturally did not choose to describe what actually happened in its report, but set out the official version of events (31 December 1979, 2519-A):
Under incredibly difficult conditions that threatened the achievements of the April Revolution and the interest of ensuring the security of our country, it became necessary to provide additional military aid to Afghanistan, especially because we had received such a request in the past from the government of the DRA. Pursuant to the terms set out in the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, a decision was made to send the required contingent of the Soviet army to Afghanistan.
On the wave of patriotic feelings of quite broad layers of the Afghan population at the arrival of Soviet forces, which occurred in strict adherence to the terms of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, forces opposing H. Amin staged an armed military attack on the night of 27–28, ending with the deposition of H. Amin’s regime. This action had the support of the laboring masses, the intelligentsia, a significant part of the Afghan army, and the state apparatus, all of whom welcomed the creation of a new leadership for the DRA and the PDPA.
Exactly in the same spirit (and often using the same expressions) were all official Soviet declarations and messages (reports from the TASS news agency, instructions to all Soviet ambassadors and, separately, to the Soviet representative at the UN, the closed letter of the CC to party organizations of the CPSU, missives to heads of socialist countries, the letter from the CPSU to communist and workers’ parties in nonsocialist countries), which had been prepared and approved by the Politburo back on 27 December (27 December 1979, Pb 177/151), presumably while Amin was still alive (or maybe at the very time when Amin and his guests were imbibing pomegranate juice). Without exception everyone was told that this was a “temporary” matter and that the Soviet contingent that had been brought into the country was “limited.” The only difference was that “outsiders” were told nothing about Amin, as if he had never existed. “Insiders” were given the version about “healthy forces” among communists who had brought down the usurper for the purpose of rescuing the April Revolution. The most inside insiders—that is, members of the CC, the CCs of the union republics, and local and district committees, were informed additionally that:220
In implementing the indicated measures, the Politburo of the CC bore in mind the strategic situation of Afghanistan. The country is directly beside our borders, is a neighbor of the Soviet republics of Central Asia, has a lengthy border, and is not far from China. Therefore it is vital to guard the security of our socialist Homeland and observe our international duty.
Then the entire Soviet propaganda machine was instructed as follows: “Give a firm and well-argued rebuff to any possible insinuations regarding alleged Soviet interference in Afghan internal affairs.”
A particularly brazen and even insulting response was sent by Brezhnev via direct hotline to US president Carter: it suggests that the Kremlin psychologists intended to overwhelm or possibly frighten their critics with deliberate rudeness (29 December 1979, Pb 177/220):
Your claim that the Soviet Union played a part in the overthrow of the Afghan government is totally unacceptable and untrue. I stress categorically that the changes in the leadership of Afghanistan were brought about by the Afghans, and only the Afghans themselves. You can query the Afghan government on this issue. … I must also inform you in all clarity that the Soviet military contingents played no part in any military actions against the Afghan side, and we have no intention of doing so. …
[…]
And here is our advice to you: the American side could have made its contribution into halting military incursions from outside into Afghanistan.
No wonder that Carter was to say later that in those December days he learned much more about the Soviet Union than over his entire life. This was followed by the embargo on sales of grain to the USSR, the limitation of cultural exchanges, and subsequently the boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow and the increase in the military budgets of NATO countries. The Western reaction was quite strong, not least due to the arrest and internal exile of Andrei Sakharov, which astounded many no less than the invasion of Afghanistan. The détente of the 1970s with its rotten atmosphere of dreams about “socialism with a human face” and “convergence” receded into the past. The new decade began in a much healthier climate of resistance and the “conservative revolution.” The world was swinging rapidly to the right, socialist governments in Europe were disappearing one by one, and the forces of peace, progress, and socialism suddenly found themselves on the defensive.
It took a long time for Moscow to understand the scope of this catastrophe, pretending that nothing special had occurred. Let the West fret and fume. It’s happened before, then things will quieten down, and it will be back to the beginning, to détente. A plenum of the CC was held in June. The high vaults of ancient Kremlin halls resounded again with forceful speeches about the unconquerable might of the Soviet Union to deafening, lengthy applause.
Gromyko rhapsodized as follows:221
It is impossible to see certain tendencies in a proper perspective without taking fully into account the decisive factor of global development—the unswerving reinforcement of socialist positions, including those in the international arena.
As for the USA—what could one expect from those imperialists?222
The normal progress of Soviet-American relations is not assisted by presidential elections in the USA. Once every four years these elections, as a rule, result in an anti-Soviet witch hunt. The candidates, unable to offer any real programs for changing the serious faults of foreign and domestic policy and its obvious failures, compete in attacking and slandering the Soviet Union.
Incidentally, the choice of presidential candidates is poor. The foremost of them, Carter and Reagan, leave little to choose between them. No wonder there is a grim joke circulating among Americans: “The only good thing is that Carter and Reagan can’t be in the White House at the same time.” [Laughter in the audience.]
Brezhnev gave the following summary, which was followed by lengthy applause:223
We shall continue to spare no efforts in order to preserve détente, all the positive gains of the 1970s, to achieve a turn toward disarmament, support the right of peoples to free and independent development, protect and reinforce peace.
The following resolution was adopted in closing:224
The plenum of the CC expresses full approval of the measures taken for rendering comprehensive aid to Afghanistan in repelling armed attacks and outside interference, the purpose of which is to stifle the Afghan revolution and create a pro-imperialist bridgehead for military aggression on the southern borders of the USSR.
The plenum charges the Politburo of the CC, acting in the current situation, in which the adventurous actions of the USA and its flunkeys have caused an increased military danger, with pursuing the course of the XXIV–XXV Congresses of the CPSU toward the overall strengthening of ties between socialist states, support for the just struggle of peoples toward freedom and independence, peaceful coexistence, deceleration of the arms race, the protection and development of international détente, and mutual cooperation in the economic, scientific, and cultural fields.
At the same time, the plenum considers that the schemes of imperialists and other enemies of peace require unrelenting vigilance and the all-round strengthening of our country, in order to frustrate imperialist plans for achieving military supremacy and creating a global diktat.
Thus, to thunderous and lengthy applause, the Kremlin concluded the latest cycle from a cold war to détente and back: the program of the last stage of the Cold War, with its “arms race” and “struggle for peace,” was adopted.
However, their immediate and most important concern was to prevent a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which were to open in July. Essentially, the problem was not new: the decision made at the height of détente in 1974 by the International Olympic Committee to hold the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow had been debated hotly in the West for some years. The continuing Soviet expansion in the third world and, especially, the growth of political repressions in the USSR troubled the consciences of those who still retained them. There were inevitable comparisons with the 1936 Olympics in Berlin, which had given the Hitler regime a semblance of respectability and international acknowledgement. Maybe it was for this reason that the question acquired a symbolic significance: would humanity permit a repetition of its mistake forty-four years later? Would it enter, once more, onto the path of conciliation with a totalitarian regime and betrayal of its victims, or would it find the courage to oppose it?
The atmosphere became even more heated in 1978 after the trial of Yuri Orlov and the Helsinki Monitors, when public indignation tried to find a way out with some symbolic gesture at least. This is when the first voices were raised calling for a boycott of the Olympic Games, which was widely echoed by the press and public organizations. Committees and groups in support of this campaign sprang up in practically all Western countries, although not all of them insisted on a boycott; some of them advocated various conditions regarding the observance of human rights.
By 1979 there was a mighty chorus of voices that could not be ignored. Andropov reported the following to the CC (25 April 1979*, No. 819-A):
In order to discredit the XXII Olympic Games in Moscow, the special services of the opponent and foreign anti-Soviet centers are continuing to issue all kinds of insinuations regarding “violations of human rights in the USSR.” In individual cases they manage to inspire provocative actions by antisocial elements inside the country, to push them toward making irresponsible declarations of a slanderous nature aimed at increasing anti-Soviet hysteria in the West. Thus the notorious anti-Soviet Sakharov advises each foreign sporting delegation to hinge its participation in the 1980 Olympics on the release of one or two so-called “prisoners of conscience in the USSR.” A group of antisocial elements have sent information to the West regarding the creation of a so-called “Association for Olympic Guarantees in the USSR,” full of slanderous concoctions and provocative appeals.
I recall that the entire year of 1979 was devoted to this campaign, in endless public debates and declarations,225 which did not remain unnoticed by Moscow. It is quite amusing to read about this now in Andropov’s reports; as was his wont, he saw the hand of “the opponent’s” special services behind our busy activity, and would never have believed that alas, there was nobody involved but us—a handful of exiled dissidents (30 July 1979, No. 1455-A). Unfortunately, even among us there was no unity: some thought that the Olympic Games should be “used”, while others supported a boycott. I was among the latter, believing that a totalitarian state has sufficient control over the population, entry into the country and, moreover, the media to avoid being “used.”
And so it turned out: from the very start, the KGB was preparing for possible “use.”226 In the summer of 1979, a year before the games, the CC adopted a resolution, “On the Introduction of Temporary Limitations on Entry into Moscow and the Moscow Region in the Olympiad 80 Period and Inclusion of Citizens of Moscow and the Moscow Region in Construction Brigades, Sports and Pioneer Camps, and Other Leisure Facilities in the Summer of 1980” (24 July 1979, St 168/6).
In effect, Moscow became a closed city: there were to be no conferences, competitions, excursions, or business trips to the capital during the Olympic Games. All roads were blocked off; special detours were set up for transit transportation and transit passengers. Children were sent to summer camps in good time; even entry exams to higher educational institutes in the capital were deferred. The stadiums were to be filled only with reliable spectators, mostly soldiers from the Moscow garrison in plain clothes. An ordinary citizen could not get close to any Olympic objects; apart from the forces of the Moscow militia and state security agents, a further thirty-seven thousand persons from other parts of the country were sent to Moscow. Additionally, more than four thousand soldiers from the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (MVD USSR) were assigned to guard the airports and railway stations (20 May 1980, No. 1/3110):
The Olympic Village will be guarded by 4,100 persons. These include: 900 to guard the perimeter; 1,086 for hotel and economic services; 691 to ensure special control at checkpoints; … to ensure security and supervising public order at the 22 sports complexes, 21,758 persons; in 60 training facilities, 1,474 persons; in 9 hotels housing the foreigners accredited at the Olympic Games, 6,813 persons; in 120 places of residence for tourists, 3,482 persons; …
Even cleaning out the Olympic stables was to be done by state security personnel.227 At the same time, however, a much more serious “cleanup” was underway, as Andropov reported (12 May 1980, 902-A):
Six thousand foreigners deemed to pose a threat of mounting hostile actions during the Olympics have been refused entry into the USSR. Work on detecting foreigners of this category and refusing them entry into the USSR is continuing.
Alongside this, operative-chekist and prophylactic measures are being implemented for the purpose of reinforcing public order in Moscow and the Moscow Region, as well as stepping up the struggle against antisocial elements.
In order to prevent flagrant antisocial manifestations by mentally ill persons with aggressive tendencies, MVD USSR agencies and health authorities are implementing measures to isolate such persons for the duration of Olympiad 80.
In fact, there was no secrecy regarding this matter even at the time: arrests began in October 1979 and continued until summer, as was reported quite widely in the West. I wrote a good dozen articles on the subject myself, which were published in practically all Western countries (for example, “Cleansing for the Olympics,” The Observer, 18 November 1979). Moreover, I sent my letter addressed to all the sporting associations in England and to the most prominent athletes whose addresses I managed to obtain. Much was said on this question on television and numerous discussions that were subsequently broadcast on the radio.
I insist that none of them could have been unaware of what was going on. But they either remained silent, or replied to the effect that they could do nothing, as all decisions were made by the IOC. Some were even aggressive, defending sport from politics. Very few individual athletes responded to our appeals and refused to participate in the Soviet “witches gathering.” The remaining, overwhelming majority pretended ignorance. Only one of them told me frankly that the professional life of a sportsman is short, and the Olympic Games are too important for his career for him to jeopardize it by political gestures. Dozens of our friends went into prisons, camps, and psychiatric incarceration for these people to enjoy jumping and running in Moscow.
So the campaign against the Olympic Games began long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which only whipped up more agitation, and Carter’s decision regarding a boycott gave the sporting world an unexpected opportunity to be positioned as heroes, nonconformists, and staunch opponents of the dictates of politicians. Naturally, the leftist press was quick to seize this useful moment.
In England, the main heroes were two famous runners, Steve Ovett and Sebastian Coe, whose rivalry was keenly observed by the whole world. The self-satisfied faces of these “heroes” filled television screens as they manfully prepared to compete despite pressure from reactionary forces. For England at least, the Olympics in Moscow automatically became a great event if these two were taking part.
Of course I appealed to them both, but received no reply. Publicly they made proud declarations of their indifference to politics, as if this were something deserving of praise. I think neither of them would have turned down a chance to run at Auschwitz for the sake of their medals. Yet many years later I read with surprise that Sebastian Coe was running for Parliament, and as a Conservative candidate at that! Still, I suppose this was not really unexpected: the Conservatives were in power, and his success in the elections was guaranteed. If the communists had been in power, it is likely that he would have stood for election from their platform. So nowadays the apolitical Conservative Sebastian Coe, hero of the Moscow Olympic Games, sits in Westminster.
As for using the event, the scenario ran true to form: those who were its most enthusiastic advocates did nothing. The only ones to exhibit an unexpected initiative were the Italians: the representative of their radical party staged a demonstration in support of gay rights on Red Square. Another group of young Italians decided to have some fun and prepared a fake copy of Pravda, which they distributed in Moscow at the height of the Olympic Games. The fake newspaper was extremely well done; at first glance it was impossible to distinguish it from the central press organ of the CC CPSU. Only on the first page, directly under the title of the newspaper, there was a very realistic montage of Suslov’s head and the body of a criminal with a tattoo of Stalin on his chest.
This Italian Pravda carried a quite prophetic report about a military coup coinciding with the Olympic Games, according to which the power of the CPSU had been overthrown, the Russian Federation had seceded from the USSR, and “all the other Soviet republics [had] proclaimed their autonomy, after which each of them was able to pursue its own path of development at last.”
Nonetheless, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, announced by Carter and supported by a number of countries, had its positive points: the problem became an interstate issue, forcing the Soviet Union to mount a serious defense. Many associations, deprived of the support of their governments, had no option but to join the boycott at the last moment. As the CC reported in January 1980 (29 January 1980*, St 195/3):
US president Carter, acting on the pretext of the Soviet Union’s aid to Afghanistan, has issued a demand for the boycott of the summer Olympic Games in Moscow. The Congress of the USA has passed the relevant resolution on this matter. This hostile action by the US administration has found the support of nine governments (Great Britain, Canada, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the Netherlands). Carter’s direct pressure on the National Olympic Committee of the USA has forced that Committee to decide to request the IOC to relocate the 1980 summer Olympics elsewhere, to defer them, or to cancel them completely.
Carter’s administration is trying to encourage other countries to support the idea of a boycott. Carter has sent the relevant personal appeal to the heads of state of more than one hundred countries.
The only organization in the Olympic movement that can decide to cancel or relocate the Games is the International Olympic Committee (IOC). To date, not a single one of its eighty-nine members has expressed support for Carter’s proposal. Most of them, including the IOC president [Michael Morris, 3rd Baron] Killanin, see no grounds for the cancellation or relocation of the Games from Moscow.
Decisive condemnation of the current hostile campaign of the US administration has been expressed by the International Olympic Committee, the leaders of twenty-one international sports federations, and the national Olympic committees of most countries, including those whose governments publicly announced support for Carter’s proposal. The governments of the FRG, Japan, and several other countries are waiting on events. There is a suggestion that the whole question should be discussed within the framework of NATO and the EEC [European Economic Community].
After the February session of the IOC reaffirmed the invariability of its decision concerning the terms and place of conduct of the Games, the Politburo adopted a resolution, “On the Measures for Supporting Olympiad 80” (29 February 1980, Pb 186/2). The entire gigantic machine of Soviet propaganda and manipulation, pressure and coercion went into action (29 February 1980, Pb 186/2, p. 3):
In order to neutralize the hostile actions toward the Olympic movement by the US administration, work is to be carried out in support of the XXII Olympic Games with state and business circles, the foreign public and international organizations. …
Detailed instructions were received by Soviet ambassadors throughout the world, with precise formulations of who was to say what.
This was a fantastic machine, with nothing to equal it in all of human history. It is not even possible to explain its workings to someone who has never lived under communism. Is it possible to conceive how an entire country, and with it almost half the world, served aims established by a dozen elderly men who had not been elected by anyone?
A month later, the CC was informed that over 140 exhibitions on the 1980 Olympic Games had been displayed in sixty countries. Twenty documentary films were issued. Preparations were underway for an international photo competition devoted to the Moscow Games. More than 1,300 meetings were held with foreign journalists, and ninety press conferences (1 April 1980, St 204/14) were conducted in the USSR and abroad. A quick search located an American company interested in making a series of documentary films about the cultural program of the Moscow Olympics for public US television. They not only located this company (Foreign Transactions Corporation), they paid it for the rendering of “production and creative services” (3 April 1980, St-205/31). Rights to show the Games were presold immediately to the American TV company NBC, again for currency and equipment (all this, you will note, despite the official boycott of the Games by the government of the USA and strong public disapprobation for such actions). Soviet ambassadors were adjured as follows (15 April 1980, St 206/16):
We report for your information that the Soviet side renders aid in the form of providing discounted (to the amount of 50 and 100 percent) transportation of athletes from a number of countries to the Moscow Games and will cover their maintenance in the Olympic Village.
Only agree to come, and Aeroflot aircraft shall deliver you gratis to Moscow, where you will not have to spend so much as one cent (27 May 1980, St 212/83). Even the director general of UNESCO, Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, and “attendant persons” were brought to Moscow and maintained free of charge.228
Another solution, bearing in mind the extreme sensitivity of M’Bow regarding matters of protocol, may elicit a reaction unfavorable to us. M’Bow is sympathetic toward the Soviet Union and—despite the USA—supports the participation of UNESCO in the struggle for peace, détente and disarmament.
Then, suddenly, a new calamity: upset by overall condemnation, president of the IOC Lord Killanin, the mainstay of the Soviets in the entire campaign, decided to resign almost a month before the opening of the Moscow Games. This was to be avoided at all costs! The CC issued an immediate order (4 June 1980, St 214/1):
In view of Killanin’s decision to resign from the post of president of the IOC, he should receive urgent recommendations to refrain from any such announcements before the session of the IOC in Moscow, as Killanin’s plan to resign his presidency shall be seen by opponents of the Olympics as evidence of the disintegration and demoralization of the IOC.
In order to cheer up the disappointed lord, it was decided to award him the Order of Friendship of Peoples “for active work in developing the international Olympic movement and a great contribution to the preparation and conduct of the Olympic Games 1980 in Moscow” (15 July 1980, Pb 219/31). You think he refused? Not for a moment! Brezhnev personally pinned the well-deserved medal on his chest at the end of the Games. It’s not just the Senegalese who have an “extreme sensitivity to matters of protocol.”
Finally, at the last moment, literally a few weeks before the opening of the Games, a new opportunity presented itself (1 July 1980, St 217/8):
Pursuant to agreements with the Afghan government regarding the withdrawal of certain unnecessary units of Soviet military forces back to USSR territory, it is deemed feasible to use this measure to exercise additional influence on the national Olympic committees of a number of countries for the purpose of a wider representation at the Games in Moscow.
Yet again a new “plan of measures”—instructions to all Soviet ambassadors, all representatives and delegations, missives and telegrams indicating, See? We’re leaving, we’re leaving…. A unique machine, knowing no fatigue, no obstacles—and no defeats. The CC reported the following to fraternal communist and workers’ parties (19 August 1980*, St 224/7):
Generally speaking, the idea of boycotting the Moscow Olympics that the US administration and some of its allies tried to implement has failed for all intents and purposes. Sporting delegations from 81 countries numbering more than 8,300 individuals took part in the Olympic Games. The Games hosted 3,500 honored guests and officials, as well as 200,000 foreign tourists from 72 countries. The competitions were attended by some 5 million viewers. […] The Moscow Olympic Games drew the broad attention of the global community. 5,529 representatives of the media were accredited at the Games, including 3,500 from abroad. Television reports on the Games were beamed to all the world’s continents, viewed daily by more than 1.5 billion people.
It can be affirmed that it was possible on the whole to overcome the anti-Olympic and anti-Soviet Western propaganda and break through the “information blockade” surrounding the Games. … Many Western journalists did their best at first to seek out “negative materials,” but were soon forced to acknowledge the precise organization of events, the first-class state of the sporting facilities, the efficiency of Soviet information services, etc.
It is a fact that the vast majority of the participants and guests of the Olympics among those who came to the USSR with prejudiced conceptions of socialist reality subsequently gave short shrift to the slanderous concoctions of bourgeois propaganda.
So it can be said that the Kremlin celebrated victory. Those who had distinguished themselves particularly were rewarded with honors and medals (12 August 1980, St 223/17). Five thousand workers and officials, 300 military personnel, 1,500 MVD USSR personnel, and 850 from the KGB. And one lord—with the Order of Friendship of Peoples medal.
Now Afghanistan and its problems moved to the back burner. The main concern was to save détente and emerge from political isolation. It stands to reason that this had not been unexpected by the Soviet leaders: back in March 1979 they had been quite realistic in their assessment of the consequences of their intervention. By the end of January the Politburo adopted the resolution “On Further Measures to Ensure the State Interests of the USSR with Regard to Events in Afghanistan,” which, apart from measures aimed at stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan itself (including “measures of a specialized nature on disuniting Afghan émigré organizations and discrediting their leaders”—the source of future fratricidal slaughter after the withdrawal of Soviet forces), set out the general plan of a political campaign: “The need to ensure the broad political interests and security of the USSR,” wrote Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev (28 January 1980*, Pb 181/34), “requires maintaining the offensive nature of measures being implemented by us in connection with the Afghan events.”
The complex plan of measures they proposed covers practically all aspects of international politics:
- In relations with the USA, to continue countering the provocative steps of the Carter administration with a balanced and firm line in international affairs. …
- Strengthen influence on individual allies of the USA in NATO, primarily France and the FRG, making maximum use to our advantage of the differences between them and the USA in their chosen responses to the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
- Bearing in mind that the events in Afghanistan are exploited by the USA and China as a convenient excuse for further rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis, plan long-term measures to complicate the ties between Washington and Beijing within the context of the development of relations within the framework of the so-called tripartite alliance, USA-China-Japan. …
- Within the nonaligned movement, use the possibilities of Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as well as states of the progressive wing of DN [Independence Day]; inspire protests in support of the Afghan government. …
- The main efforts to counter the hostile activity of the USA and their allies should concentrate on the Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East. …
- Implement measures aimed at preserving the anti-imperialist, in the first place anti-American, aspects of Iran’s foreign policy. …
- In conducting foreign policy and propagandistic measures, make greater use of the thesis that the provision of military aid to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union should not be seen out of context of the longtime provocations of the USA aimed at achieving unilateral military advantages in strategic areas important to the USSR.
Practically the entire future development of Soviet foreign policy was determined by this document.
In fact, the “Cuban initiative” in the nonaligned movement (which was chaired by Cuba at that time) was “on the political settlement” of the problem of Afghanistan by means of bilateral talks with Pakistan and Iran (subsequently the Geneva talks). Propaganda directed at Iran was stepped up, including radio and television transmissions from Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan (8 July 1980, St 218/6). A campaign was launched “on stimulating protests by international society against the aggressive actions of the USA in the area of the Persian Gulf.” South Yemen was given the task of launching the campaign, but the “plan of measures” affected practically all the countries in the region, if not all of Asia and parts of Africa, but implemented through Soviet organizations such as the Soviet Committee of Solidarity of Asian and African Countries, the World Council of Churches, and their progressive allies (13 March 1980, Pb 187/55).
All progressive regimes, organizations, and forums, all the strongholds of socialism in the region of the Indian Ocean were pressed into service. By April, when the campaign was well underway, the Politburo adopted a resolution, “On Countering Plans for the Expanded Presence of the USA in the Near and Middle East and the Indian Ocean” (5 April 1980, Pb 191/8), which was sent to all Soviet ambassadors and contained a special task for the “friends of the people” (5 April 1980, Pb 191/8, p. 1):
Instruct the KGB of the USSR to employ special channels to facilitate the activation of protests against the American military presence and the threat of American intervention in developing countries, especially Arab states and in Iran
The Politburo adopted at least two resolutions regarding China, attempting to “counter American-Chinese military cooperation” and “expose the pro-imperialist course of Beijing” in the eyes of third world countries.
Despite such scope, all these were ancillary measures: the main campaign of an “offensive nature” was to be launched in Europe and the USA. This is why the first people to whom the Politburo turned after the invasion of Afghanistan were their partners in détente, the European social democrats, including Willy Brandt and the head of the Finnish social democrats (16 December 1980*, St 241/108), whom we know all too well—the former Finnish prime minister and minister of foreign affairs Kalevi Sorsa, the one who enjoyed “confidential cooperation” with Moscow on matters of détente and disarmament. By that time Brandt was already chairman of the Socialist International, and Sorsa one of its vice presidents, head of the special group coordinating the activity of the Socialist International on questions of détente and disarmament. The sense of these messages was, first and foremost, the affirmation that there is no causal link between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant international tension: the latter, maintained the Politburo, resulted from the aggressive policy of the West in general and the USA in particular. Here the mention of the “December session of the NATO Council” is raised for the first time as the main source of all the troubles, which later became the favorite argument of the forces of peace, progress and socialism in the West. As the Politburo wrote to Brandt (1 February 1980*, Pb 182/2):
In recent times, especially in connection with the December session of the NATO Council, events have occurred that have brought about a tangible sharpening of the international situation. As is well known, the Soviet Union has frequently warned that if NATO adopts its decision in December, it will destroy the foundation of negotiations, destroy their basis. Our agreement to negotiate in the face of the NATO decision would result in dealing with a reduction of just the Soviet defensive potential, while the USA forges ahead with the production of new missile and nuclear systems.
All this, writes the Politburo, “exposes the course of the current American administration, which was not devised overnight, but in connection with events in Afghanistan.” This course became obvious a long time ago and “merely acquired its more obvious expression in the ‘Carter doctrine’.”
It is clear that Carter and [Zbigniew] Brzezinski are aiming at intimidating the USSR, isolating our country, and creating difficulties whenever possible. This line is bound to fail, because it is impossible to intimidate the Soviet Union or shake its firm position.
Meetings with the working group of the Socialist International in Moscow discussed the question of where the course of president Carter is leading. Now this has been confirmed. The aim is simply the destruction of the gains of the past decade, gains achieved through the efforts of people of good will, including the social democrats.
This was first and foremost. Second, whatever the reasons for the increase in tension, the main task was to save détente.
In the present situation it is vital to affirm the policy of détente. It is important to note declarations that it is necessary to “keep a cool head and continue the process of negotiations,” that “nervousness is no substitute for a thought-out policy,” that “it is essential to avoid impulsive and hypertrophic reactions that do not correspond to the substance of events and can precipitate an even worse situation.”
As for the events in Afghanistan, which are, naturally, unrelated to the matter, they should be regarded without prejudice and nervousness and with the understanding that they were provoked by the undeclared war of the CIA and Beijing.
The message to the “confidential cooperator” K. Sorsa contained the same ideas, and often the same expressions, the only difference being that it smacked strongly of an instruction (1 February 1980*, Pb 182/2):
International social democracy could play a role here. In a few days’ time there will be a meeting of leaders of social democratic parties in Vienna, at which K. Sorsa shall be making an address. In view of the trust that has developed in recent years between us, would you consider it possible—naturally, at your own discretion—to raise some of the following ideas?
This is followed by a point-by-point list of what Sorsa should say to his colleagues:229
- Although it would not be right to speak of “the end of a decade of détente” (as some of its detractors do), there is no denying that the process has clogged.
- It is particularly worrying that there has been no forward movement in the field of military détente: the Vienna talks have stalled, Carter has deferred the ratification of SALT II, and the decision of the December session of the NATO Council makes it impossible for the USSR to continue talks on the limitation of medium-range weapons in Europe.
- Both superpowers—the USA and the USSR—have different explanations for the sharpening of the international situation, but it important to examine what they both offer. Carter, citing a nonexistent Soviet threat, is stubbornly steering the matter toward increasing US and NATO military strength. …
- No matter how differently the reasons for the sharpening of the international situation may be viewed in Europe, “there is a prevailing opinion regarding the need to safeguard détente.” […]
Naturally, this would require a more active policy both in matters of disarmament and in other areas of cooperation.
- International practice shows that the line of the Socialist International toward a more active participation in examining and deciding questions of disarmament was correct. This line… has demonstrated that social democracy also possesses greater possibilities for exercising a positive influence on the governing circles of those countries on which, first and foremost, success in moving along the path of military détente depends.
In conclusion, the Politburo wrote:
An analysis of the existing situation points to the following recommendations:
It would be feasible for the Socialist International to continue its line in matters of disarmament. It is particularly important to complete the development of all positions on the entire complex of problems of disarmament and its adoption by the Socialist International as its document ….230
Need it be said that “confidential cooperator” Comrade Sorsa fulfilled the instructions of his Moscow comrades conscientiously? His address in Vienna on 5 February 1980 contains practically all their recommendations, and even borrows some of their phraseology. This was the conclusion to his long address:231
Comrades! I think that in this meeting we have every reason to remind ourselves and the world that social democracy has always been and continues to be a peace movement. Broadly-based work for peace and disarmament is now needed even more than under favorable international conditions. Our movement is in a strategic position to influence developments both within our countries and societies as well as between states. In the present tension-charged situation, we should not do anything that would irreversibly hurt our interests in the long run. Above all, we must work for the public opinion that sees the possibilities and the necessity for peace and disarmament and is not moved by expedient political acts and demonstrations of public policy.
Who can say what the leaders of European social democracy thought upon hearing the impassioned appeal of their Finnish colleague, and whether they guessed whose wishes he was espousing with such fervor? By that time even the Italian communists had condemned the invasion of Afghanistan, and of the socialists, the only party not to do so was the Greek PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) party. Moreover, many of them at that time were in the governments of NATO countries. So there was no chance of avoiding a resolution in Vienna calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. One thing on which they were unanimous was the aim of saving détente, to which—for them—there really was no alternative. The Socialist International adopted Sorsa’s recommendations with practically no discussion.232
The member parties should create the necessary organizational and financial conditions for efficient and continuous work for disarmament.
Member parties should cooperate with appropriate organizations such as the trade unions and fraternal organizations, especially in the field of training and education as well as the mobilization of public opinion.
Member parties should be active in the work for disarmament also at the national level by cooperating in suitable forms with other non-governmental organizations in their own countries. … The UN week for disarmament should be made a broadly-based national event encompassing various political, civic and research organizations in all fields of life. Socialist and social democrats work actively for the success of this week.
Citizens! The Socialist International, a free grouping of the world’s socialist and social democratic parties, calls every person all over the world to work. … to make a contribution to efforts for disarmament, peace, détente and international cooperation.
The Soviet “struggle for peace” campaign that swept across Europe at the beginning of the 1980s would not have had even half of its success if it were not for the participation of social democrats, socialists and their subservient trade unions, and youth, women’s, and similar organizations that chose to cooperate with communist parties in this matter. The most astounding fact was not so much the campaign’s openly pro-Soviet orientation as its scope: when all was said and done, this was the measure of its success. If at the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980 their demonstrations gathered no more than ten or twenty thousand, by the end of 1980 the figures had risen to between eighty and one hundred thousand, and by the fall of 1981 the ground shook under their marches: three hundred and fifty thousand in Bonn, two hundred and fifty thousand in Brussels, up to two hundred and fifty thousand in London, around half a million in Rome, four hundred thousand in Amsterdam, some one hundred thousand in Copenhagen, thirty to forty thousand in Bern, and no fewer than ten thousand even in little Norway. Then came the culmination of the campaign, December 1983, with the deployment of new missiles in Europe: up to a million in West Germany, six hundred thousand in Rome, three or four hundred thousand in London, and up to half a million in Brussels and The Hague.233 The figures had a hypnotic effect on the crowds that seemed to convince them of their rectitude, making the crowds grow and grow. These figures gave pause even to the well versed; surely Moscow could not have so many agents and “fellow-travelers”! The figures were frightening: it seemed as though nothing could halt this epidemic of antinuclear hysteria. A little more and some government or other would be unable to hold out, surrender, agree to a compromise, split NATO, and grant the USSR an unlimited diktat in a nuclear-free, neutralized Europe. After that, a chasm on the edge of which there would be no foothold for a babbling socialist with his vain hopes for an intermediary between East and West, his Utopian dreams of “socialism with a human face” and convergence; after that it would be Moscow deciding which latter-day Alexander Kerensky in which European country was due for replacement by a staunch Leninist….
Now that the decorative facades have fallen, exposing the vicious squalor of the essence of the Soviet regime, it is hard to believe that only some ten or twelve years ago millions of people in Europe saw no other way out than capitulation. It is hard to imagine that a commonplace Soviet “measure of an offensive nature,” which would not have fooled even a Soviet schoolchild, evoked mass hysteria among the adult population of a safe, free, well-protected Europe. And this population, forgetting Afghanistan and other communist crimes, demanded unilateral disarmament from its governments! And how they demanded: storming missile bases, surrounding them with human chains; in Holland even military servicemen declared their refusal to accept nuclear arms. No logic, no reasoned arguments had any effect.
“Protest and survive!”234
Protest—against what? Against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Against the already-deployed Soviet SS-20 medium-range missiles? No, against NATO’s intention to deploy its Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe.
“Our deterrent doesn’t deter anymore!”
What happened? Why? Had war broken out?
“There has never been such a great threat of the nuclear destruction of the world,” howled the pro-Soviet World Peace Council.
“We are entering the most dangerous decade in the history of mankind,” echoed “independent” Western pacifists.
Why? What was the reason for such a sudden danger? Was it because for the preceding decades there were games of détente with the Kremlin or, rather, a giveaway? It is frightening to think what the outcome could have been if the game had lasted another five years.
But neither the leaders of the movement nor their followers occupied themselves with such complex questions. Their arguments, if one can use that word for their hysterical ravings, were so contradictory at times that it was hard to see how they could all form part of a single movement. The only thing that united them was an irrational fear, a readiness to capitulate without being asked to do so. “Better red than dead”, the more so as most of them were already, if not red, then certainly a very bright pink.
I must confess that I cannot stand hysterics; they infuriate me and fill me with an almost irresistible desire to issue a few good slaps in the face (the best way to stop hysterics). Seeing a mass pro-Soviet hysteria was absolutely intolerable. I was overcome by sheer desperation: I had sacrificed half of my life trying to explain the essence of the Soviet system to people, and it had seemed that they did understand. But no, someone in Moscow pulled a string, did a bit of scaremongering, and it was back to the drawing board, as if there had never been a gulag, or our trials, or our books. Never mind us—the entire history of the twentieth century seemed to have disappeared into some dark hole, disappeared from the consciousness of millions of people, and we, like a theater audience, had to watch—not for the first time!—a repeat performance of a familiar tragedy. It was as if once more, as in 1917, there was an unbridled thirst for peace—at any price, and right this minute—that could sweep countries from the face of the earth to the joy of the Bolsheviks. Or as in 1938, when an identical seizure of pacifism opened the door to Europe for their brown-shirted brothers.
What could be done? Lacking the physical opportunity to slap all their faces, I selected the closest equivalent—I wrote a large, deliberately scathing article for the London Times (“Better Red than Dead Is Not Good Enough,” 4 December 1981) and then expanded and published it as a separate booklet (“The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union”235) in practically all Western countries:236
So now, despite all their errors, useless adventures and economic disasters, the Polish crisis and the stubborn resistance of Afghan peasants, Reagan’s plan for rearmament and UN resolutions, the Soviet leaders celebrated a significant victory: they found millions of useful idiots to implement their bankrupt policy. They were no longer in isolation, and the big question was whether they would allow the Americans to deploy their missiles in Europe. Undoubtedly the ranks of the peace movement contain an enormous number of sincerely concerned, frightened people whose intentions are for the best. I am absolutely sure that the overwhelming majority of them are sincere, honest people. But just as in the 1950s, there are also enough communists, fellow travelers, misled intellectuals, hypocrites seeking popularity, professional political speculators, frightened bourgeois and young people prepared to rebel for the sake of rebellion; of course, there are also indestructible Catholic priests with a dubious “mission” and many deeply religious people who are convinced that God has chosen them to be a force for peace on earth. But there is also no doubt that this disparate crowd is manipulated by a handful of scoundrels, receiving instructions directly from Moscow.”
It is easy to imagine the roar of fury that exploded, how the leftist intelligentsia hated me. Especially as at that time I had no direct evidence to back up my thesis; all I had were official Soviet publications, some materials from the World Peace Council, and a thorough knowledge of my beloved homeland. Like anyone who had grown up in the USSR I knew that the “struggle for peace” formed an integral part of the Soviet ideological battle with the outside world or, to be more precise, one of its mutations, because according to communist ideology, peace is possible only with the full victory of socialism worldwide. In communist Newspeak, these concepts became synonymous a long time ago, and the expression “struggle for peace” simply meant the struggle of the USSR for the expansion of its influence. This was true for Soviet citizens, all departments and organizations, many of which—committees for the protection of peace, “friendship” societies with all sorts of countries (and their counterparts in those countries), the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, the Committee of Soviet Women or the Foreign Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchate—were created for that purpose. Their task, like the task of any Soviet organization coming into contact with foreigners, was to hoodwink those foreigners, infiltrate international organizations and movements with similar profiles, find fellow travelers in them, promote “our” line in all matters—in general, to struggle for peace.
This was a gigantic machine that worked without stopping, simply mutating depending on the requirements of the moment. The usual wavering of Soviet foreign policy from the Cold War to détente and back needed only minimal adjustments to its functioning. So the need to overcome the shortfall in nuclear arms and counter the creation of NATO, and the general increase of fear in the West at the beginning of the 1950s called for an aggressive campaign for disarmament in general and nuclear arms in particular. Hence the explosion of peace-loving activity of the time, the famous Stockholm Appeal, Pablo Picasso’s La Colombe (The Dove), etc. However, the turn towards détente in the 1970s did not mean the cessation of this activity; the cultivated Western structures and personal contacts did not disappear but, on the contrary, became stronger. Now their orientation switched to the current problems of Soviet policy (23 March 1976, No. 235)—the campaign against the war in Vietnam, solidarity with the Chilean people or the people of Palestine, the struggle against apartheid, etc. The turn toward the Cold War of the 1980s just meant a change of emphasis in this incessant “war.” In fact, nothing changed: the same World Peace Council with its immortal chairman Romesh Chandra, with its headquarters in Finland and offices all over the world, had the same offstage director, head of the International Department of the CC Boris Ponomarev, and the same clients, mostly false “peace-loving” organizations created by local communist parties. Even the financing remained the same—mainly through the Soviet Peace Fund, into which every Soviet citizen was obligated to contribute part of his salary. The financing was not miserly: according to my very approximate calculations at the time, based solely on official Soviet sources, the Peace Fund collected around 400 million rubles, of which at least one-third (140 million, $35 million at the unofficial exchange rate at that time) was spent in the West to “render financial support to organizations, movements and individuals fighting for peace and disarmament, and to finance international congresses, symposiums, festivals and exhibitions, that grant these organizations and people the possibility of coordinating their activities on an international scale.”237
I repeat that all this was known even then, at the beginning of the 1980s and from perfectly accessible Soviet publications. Furthermore, from time to time the Western press would mention scandals connected with Soviet manipulation of the peace movement; for example, an activist in Denmark, Arne Petersen, was caught with Soviet money he’d received for publishing paid announcements and petitions of his movement; Soviet diplomats in Switzerland turned out to be party to organizing antinuclear demonstrations;238 and West German Greens, having quarreled with their communist allies, accused the latter of total manipulation of antinuclear rallies.239 The extremely high percentage of communists in antimilitary organizations in England,240 Holland, and Germany,241 to say nothing of Italy, was a convincing fact that spoke for itself.
However, at that time I did not have more direct evidence, and knew nothing about many aspects of these “measures of offensive nature.” I remember how I cudgeled my brains to determine when specifically the Politburo had made the decision to launch its campaign for disarmament. Before or after the invasion of Afghanistan? I was inclined to think that it was before, somewhere in mid-1979, around the same time as the decision concerning Afghanistan. It emerged that I was not quite right; history proved to be much more interesting. For one thing, this decision in itself had nothing to do with Afghanistan, and was made back in 1975, at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU, “as part of the general Program of further struggle for peace and international cooperation.” The achievements of détente had to be affirmed, as well as the Helsinki Accords which legalized the subsequent Soviet expansion in Europe, to camouflage the rapid build-up of arms and, most of all, to prevent retaliatory measures by Western governments. There were concerns about Soviet military supremacy even then. Andropov reported the following to the CC in December 1975 (14 December 1975*, 3088-A):
In recent times, the attention of the military and political circles in various NATO countries has been drawn to the problem of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, the development of which, according to prognoses, may cause a change in the structure of armed forces and result in a future serious influence on the development of the international situation. The main feature of such weapons, with their high autonomy and mobility, is their capability of hitting their target with practically one shot, irrespective of distance and in any weather conditions at any time of the day or night. Examples of these weapons are bombs with laser or television guidance, already deployed in the war in Southeast Asia; various types of missiles and shells guided by laser beam (the Hellfire antitank missiles being produced in the USA and the homing 155-millimeter artillery shells), or by the relief of a locality (the “Pershing-2” tactical missile with a targeting margin of error of 20–40 meters), unmanned aircraft, etc.
All this, continued Andropov, would introduce a raft of both stabilizing and destabilizing factors into the international situation. On the one hand:
The appearance of weapons such as these can lead to the abandonment of certain types of contemporary expensive aviation and armored vehicle technology, to an increase in the role of cheap tanks, armored vehicles, and unmanned aircraft in the future conduct of military actions with small, highly mobile units.
But on the other hand:
It is assumed in NATO military circles that the threat of a guaranteed defeat of targets with the new weaponry shall involve a number of measures for the dispersal of military industrial objects, arsenals, and large military bases. Stabilizing factors are seen in the high efficiency of the new weapons, which lessens the likelihood of the possible use of nuclear weapons and increases the ability of the defending side to oppose even the superior forces of the opponent.
… NATO military and political circles deem it feasible to arm one-shot system weapons with low-yield nuclear warheads. In their opinion, such weapons systems can destroy large targets with practically no damage to civil objects and no significant numbers of civilian victims. These features of the new weapons are used by NATO leaders as an argument for the need for simplified procedures in reaching a decision on the combat employment of tactical nuclear weapons.
The United States is attempting to exploit new possibilities linked with the appearance of tactical weapons to reinforce NATO and “raise the confidence of their West European allies in their ability to counter the forces of the Warsaw Pact.”
This was something that Moscow could not accept: the entire meaning of the “peaceful offensive” was to make Europe vulnerable, dependent on Soviet dictates, i.e., totally incapable of countering the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. It could be said that this was the aim of all their military maneuvers since Stalin’s time, but the appearance of nuclear arms at the end of the war had interfered badly with their plans. In view of the enormous numerical superiority of the socialist camp, Moscow would have been satisfied with full disarmament: communist hordes could have crushed Europe with their bare hands. But nuclear disarmament was the height of their dreams: the weapons at the disposal of democratic Europe had no chance of catching up with those of the totalitarian monster. In order to achieve this, the population of the whole continent would have to be militarized, all resources would have to be mobilized; i.e. Europe would have had to become a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union. For this reason, Truman and Clement Attlee depended on nuclear weapons from the moment NATO was created: they allowed Europe to enjoy democracy, develop economically, and remain independent. But there were certain minuses: nuclear weapons could not be used without destroying half of Europe in the process of repulsing a Soviet attack. All that could be relied on was the deterrent force of nuclear arms, i.e. to live under the perpetual threat of a nuclear catastrophe, and this served as the source of the shameless Soviet exploitation of fear. Whether the West would resort to using them at a critical moment was the main problem of European security, arising with every change in the political situation. This was the root of the infamy of détente with its temptation of peace and cooperation (in particular the infamy of its Western advocates, who knew perfectly well what they were playing with), its premise that when faced with an impossible choice between capitulation and nuclear suicide, that is, whether to become “red” or “dead,” people were inclined to the former, unwilling to even contemplate the horror of communist slavery. Moreover, it was considered improper to talk about such a horror in the midst of détente—it would be dismissed as “Cold War rhetoric”!
The appearance of strategic arms, the neutron bomb, and, later, the idea of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, better known as Star Wars) were the answer to this problem. It unleashed such a fury in Moscow because it neutralized the USSR, rendering its enormous numerical superiority (by the end of the 1970s about 3:1 by comparison with NATO in ground forces, tanks, and aviation242) completely useless, depriving the Soviets of their main ace—the ability to threaten. Should this come about, Europe would not have to make the torturous choice between slavery and death. Europe’s ability to ensure its full security unilaterally, without the participation of the USSR or any “collective agreements” (which could be interpreted later to the USSR’s own benefit), was a source of constant anxiety in the Kremlin. It would have put an end to all their dreams of getting their hands on Europe and its industrial potential without a single shot being fired.
For this is how they saw the future: they had no plans to occupy Europe or destroy it with nuclear arms. Especially as we saw in Andropov’s report, they did not fear for their security with the deployment of new weapons by NATO counties; the Kremlin knew perfectly well that their function was purely defensive. It stands to reason that the demonstrative emplacement of hundreds of SS-20 missiles at the end of the 1970s was a direct response to NATO’s new weapons, but only in the sense that it deprived the West of new defense advantages mentioned in Andropov’s report. It was as if Moscow was telling the West: Do not even dream of any “clean” nuclear defense, reducing civilian casualties to a minimum, because any use of your strategic arms will be met by our SS-20 missiles with nuclear warheads. There is only one explanation for these missiles—a desire to make Europe face, once again, the terrible choice between suicide and capitulation. There was no explanation for the unconcealed placement of these missiles, at the rate of about one every week by 1979, no attempt at camouflage. After all, if they wanted, the Soviets were perfectly capable of concealing from American satellites such things as the ongoing modernization of their missiles since at least 1974. In the Central Command of the Soviet army there was even a special department for that purpose—the Chief Directorate of Strategic Deception, which was very good at its work.
In fact, the notorious “Soviet paranoia” was well-enacted Soviet disinformation, seized upon willingly by the leaders of peace movements and similar “Sovietologists.” After all, in view of the enormous system of Soviet intelligence and the mightiest army in the world, what did they have to fear? But being experienced players, Soviet leadership calculated soberly that a sharp change toward hostility after decades of demoralization, the sudden Western awareness of the colossal military advantages of the East that gave NATO no chance of defense, would make Europe’s choice to “redden” inevitable. This is just what I wrote in my booklet:243
From that moment you will gradually start to lose your freedom, finding yourselves subjected to constant and unstoppable Soviet blackmail.
You may like or dislike your trade unions, but would you want them to be afraid of a Soviet invasion every time there was the possibility of a big strike (as happened in Poland over 16 months)? You can like or dislike your press, but would you want it to be controlled by stringent censorship in order to avoid an angry reaction of a powerful neighbor (as occurs in Finland)? You can like or dislike the parliamentary system, but you are at least free to cast your vote for whoever you want without having to consider the desires of a foreign state. Nobody threatens to move in and enforce an alien government on your country (as happened in Afghanistan). The nature of the Soviet system is such that it will calm down only when you become identical to it.
So the disarmament campaign was already planned in 1975, but was not considered urgent; it was something for the future. The placement of the medium-range SS-20 missiles was planned for the end of the 1970s, and the American missiles were not expected any sooner. As Andropov stated at the end of his report (14 December 1975*, 3088-A):
At present, work on creating strategic missiles at the stage of installation of tested samples, study the accrued experience of their practical deployment, and also the development of new experimental systems. At an unofficial meeting of representatives of NATO military and industrial circles in March 1975 in the FRG, a conclusion was reached regarding the reality of a wide distribution and possible application of strategic weapons by the beginning of the 1980s.
The beginning of the 1980s was earmarked for the launch of the “struggle for peace” in all its glory. Preparations for it were not hurried, but substantial. In the summer of 1975 the World Peace Council issued its appeal for disarmament, coinciding with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Stockholm Appeal.244 It was only in May 1976 that the CC resolution “On the Procedure in the USSR for a Campaign Calling for a Halt of the Arms Race, for Disarmament” was finally adopted, and the plan for the main events was approved. The CC wrote the following (21 May 1976, St 9/4):
The conduct of a global campaign for cessation of the arms race and for disarmament is an important sociopolitical undertaking, making it possible to acquaint foreign society with the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth, the creation of a broad social foundation of support for Soviet initiatives in the field of halting the arms race and [promoting] disarmament, and isolating the bellicose forces of imperialism and Maoism, which are striving to undermine the process of decreasing international tension.
The main event was the mass collection of signatures under the appeal of the World Peace Council issued a year earlier, allegedly to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the famous Stockholm Appeal.
The collection of signatures under the WPC Appeal is being conducted among citizens of the USSR with a minimum age of 16 on a strictly voluntary basis. Foreign citizens located on the territory of the USSR may sign the appeal at their own discretion. …245
This was accompanied by evenings, meetings, exhibitions, festivals, the publication of special Soviet posters, brochures, stained glass, and even a special postage stamp—all “for halting the arms race and [promoting] disarmament.” It was only at the end of the programs that there was a modest addition:
TASS, APN, Gosteleradio [the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting], and the editorial boards of central newspapers and journals shall all give broad, regular coverage of the campaign in the USSR and abroad. In work aimed at foreign countries, special attention must be paid to propaganda showing the essence of Soviet positions on questions of disarmament, coverage of the mass nature of the campaign being conducted throughout the country.246
A special announcement was sent to every communist and workers’ party in the world. The leaders of socialist countries were informed additionally in confidence of the following (8 July 1976, St 11/5, p. 3):
The mass nature of the campaign in support of the WPC Appeal in socialist countries will serve as an added stimulus to activate participation in the campaign by the public in capitalist and developing countries.
One can just feel how slowly and ponderously, like millstones, the wheels of this gigantic machine of “fraternal” countries, their associates and branches, friends and fellow travelers began to grind on all continents, with the possible exception of Antarctica. Their work was adjusted, financial aid was increased to various foreign structures—such as in Scandinavia (8 June 1976, St 11/7)—positions in international organizations were reinforced, coordinated meetings and briefings were held. The scope of the planned campaign and its putative terms can be assessed if only from the fact that the USSR and its clients achieved in 1978 a special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, the final document of which proclaimed:247
Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind with the existence of nuclear arms and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,
Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,”
Let us not forget: all this is in 1978, at the height of détente, when there did not seem to be any direct threat of a nuclear war. But there was rapid Soviet expansion in the third world, there were heavily-armed communist hordes in the center of Europe, the only defense against which remained nuclear arms, and it was unclear whether it would be used as a last resort. What was the threat to the world perceived by the UN, what worried the General Assembly so? Why, the very existence of this last resort against communism. Why did the UN recommend nuclear disarmament, which would result in the global triumph of “a new international economic order”—to wit, socialism?
It must be emphasized, moreover, that this special session marks not the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.
And in fact, the Politburo-approved program of action made the UN and all its endless structures an appendage to the “struggle for peace,” although all this was done with Western money.
The 1980s were declared the “Decade of Disarmament,” and entire states and regions were openly called upon to declare themselves to be “nuclear free.”
At the same time, the CC ordered “steps toward raising the role of the Soviet Union in UNESCO, an increase in the numbers and activities of Soviet employees in the secretariat of that organization” and reported on the success already achieved in the development of UNESCO’s USSR-initiated Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War. These achievements were really noteworthy: the special resolution of the CC “On Further Increase of the Activity of the USSR in UNESCO Matters” summarizes the result of this work over twenty-five years (28 August 1979, St 173/6):
Due to the principled line of the USSR and fraternal socialist countries, UNESCO has taken a firm course for its active participation in current international problems, first of all in the struggle for peace, détente, and disarmament, and against colonialism and racism. …
Despite the opposition of Western countries, UNESCO conducted and received broad international approval of events dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the birth of K. Marx, the 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin, the 50th and 60th anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, etc.
Important political decisions adopted at the 220th session of the General Conference (October–November 1978), create favorable conditions for a more active orientation of UNESCO toward more active support of the attempts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for an enhancement of the international situation, countering the schemes of militarist forces and opponents of détente, including the Maoists.
The Soviet Union’s participation in UNESCO activities has not just a foreign policy and ideological effect, but also gives a considerable boost to the national economy. Through UNESCO, Soviet scientists receive access to information valuable to our science, national economy, and defense.
However, the possibilities for strengthening our positions in UNESCO and increasing our receipt of scientific and economic information are not being exploited to their full potential. This applies to both the scientific and technological programs of UNESCO and receipt of the relevant information, and the propaganda channels as well as the Organization’s publishing activity (its publications are distributed in 140 countries).
All this, you will note, was being conducted with Western money, and the generous annual budget of UNESCO in 1979 amounted to $151.6 million! Years passed before the USA and England terminated their participation in financing UNESCO, seeing finally that this organization had become a mere instrument of Soviet policy and a hotbed of espionage. But this situation was common to most international organizations, including the UN itself. Just listing them all would fill several pages, and all of them were full of Soviets with their clients and fellow travelers, employing their “possibilities”: channels, finances, and prestige. Together with the “peace movement” of all leftist forces, they became a formidable weapon for influencing public opinion, allowing the use of any subject, any excuse for broadening their campaign and creating its infrastructures. For example, 1979 was proclaimed as the International Year of the Child by UNESCO, which seemingly had no relation to the Soviet campaign for the nuclear disarmament of the West. But this would fool only an ignorant Western citizen (14 August 1979, St 171/5, p. 8):248
Pursuant to the Resolution of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR N139-44 dated 5 February 1979, the Committee of Soviet Women, the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], and the Central Committee of the Lenin Communist Youth League [Komsomol] are authorized to conduct a World Conference: “For a Peaceful and Secure Future for all Children” in Moscow in September 1979 with the participation of up to 700 foreign delegates.
Without taking a closer look, this appears to be quite innocuous. Children, as they say, are the flowers of life. Who does not want a peaceful and happy future for children? One can only thank the Soviet Union for all the trouble and expenses required by such an honorable cause. And the expenses were quite impressive: 1.5 million rubles and 80,000 hard foreign currency rubles. All for the sake of children?
The organization of the global conference in Moscow opens up new possibilities for explaining the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and its efforts in the struggle for disarmament and international détente, for propaganda concerning the advantages of socialism in creating conditions for a happy childhood. The conference shall lend a new impulse to the development of cooperation among the extensive forces of the global society in the struggle for children’s rights.249
The main right of children turned out to be “to live in peace.”
The Afghan adventure actually hindered rather than helped the Soviet campaign for unilateral Western disarmament by mixing their cards and upsetting all their plans. In any event, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan the global political atmosphere was much more favorable for their plans. The moot point is whether the West would have managed to stand fast if the situation had lasted a few more years. The first real test of their strength was the campaign opposing Carter’s idea of arming NATO with neutron weapons—one of the technical innovations calculated to reinforce European defense against the superior forces of the Warsaw Pact (especially in tanks), as mentioned in Andropov’s report. And although these weapons were clearly defensive and no threat to peace in Europe, and the campaign of opposition was just as clearly pro-Soviet, it was extremely successful. All it took was a few protests in Holland, Denmark, and Norway between 1977 and 1978 to scare Carter and force him to reconsider his attitude toward neutron weapons. Without doubt, this was a defeat for NATO and a victory for Moscow, moreover an easy and confidence-inspiring one, as shown in the proud report of the International Department of the CC (26 September 1978, St 126/8):250
The significant stepping up of the activity of the World Peace Council (WPC), particularly in the field of struggle for the cessation of the arms race and against neutron weapons has enabled the recent increase in the level of mobilizing the masses and broadening the sociopolitical base of antimilitarist manifestations, primarily in capitalist countries including the USA and West European states.
The “struggle for peace” continued to grow and spread throughout the late 1970s, according to plan and totally independent of world conjuncture. Even the signing of the 1979 agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons (SALT II) by Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna (29 May 1979, St 160/5) and the top-level meeting did not slow it down. On the contrary, the Soviet Union continued to force the issue, including by the continuous issue of “peace initiatives” and proposals unilaterally advantageous to the USSR and unacceptable to the West (non-use of nuclear weapons, means for reinforcing “trust” by a unilateral withdrawal of a small number of Soviet forces in Germany, etc. (16 March 1979, Pb 147/8). Thus the artificial (and not unsuccessful) impression was created of the tireless work of Soviet leaders devoted to peace and, to a lesser degree, the indifference of NATO and the US government, forced to reject these “initiatives.” By the end of 1979 the Soviet Union was winning the campaign rganizationally, psychologically, and strategically and, it can be assumed, would have won completely in a few more years were it not for Afghanistan.
Probably the most important aspect of this adventure was not even the concrete Soviet aggression (this had happened in the past) but its surprising untimeliness, which brought about a change in the general world situation, and the entire political context. It would be hard to imagine a more colorful illustration of what “peaceful coexistence” with the Soviet regime could lead to, especially for a small neutral country. This illustration was all the more impressive at the height of the Soviet campaign for disarmament, for a peaceful coexistence based upon trust. There could be no better advertisement for NATO—even Switzerland began to doubt the usefulness of its traditional neutrality. At the very least, none of this could promote the “growth of the sociopolitical base” of the Soviet peace movement. On the contrary, this moment widened the split between the Western left and right wings regarding questions of defense, with the latter achieving a clear and well-founded position. This played a considerable role in the West’s move to the right in the 1980s, bringing Ronald Reagan to power, then Helmut Kohl in the FRG. Polarization also increased in European socialist and social democratic parties, in which the more moderate pro-Atlantic wing in the leadership either broke away (such as the British Labour Party), or restrained their parties from a more radical position (Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the FRG and Prime Minister Bettino Craxi in Italy).
On the other hand, the Soviet leaders had to force their campaign, alter their plans and terms, and overload their resources in trying to overcome the resultant political isolation. Even a decrease in “cultural exchange” due to boycotts and protests against their policy undermined their possibilities seriously, especially in the USA. The very necessity of overcoming such isolation raised doubts about all their campaigns. Not by chance, even I had the impression that such a turbulent “struggle for peace” was much more closely tied to events in Afghanistan than it was in reality.
In view of this, the success of their campaign is all the more astounding. The April 1980 resolution of the CC “On Additional Measures for Activating Public Manifestations against the NATO Decision to Manufacture and Deploy New American Missiles in Western Europe” (15 April 1980, St 206/15) affirms the new plan of action in the resultant atmosphere. All mass media received the following instruction:
Reinforce argumentative criticism of the US-influenced decisions of the Brussels session of the NATO Council as one of the main causes of the sharpening of the international situation, explain the significance of the proposals of the Soviet Union regarding medium-range weapons in Europe and general military détente on the continent for a radical decrease in tension concerning relations between states.251
Soviet public organizations should make full use of planned contacts and exchanges with West European countries, and also the additional proposals of Soviet embassies in these countries for the purpose of ensuring that the campaign against the NATO military continues to grow and reach maximum intensity by the time of the spring session of the main agencies of that bloc (May–June of this year).252
Sure enough, by June, demonstrations were springing up in Europe.253 The task was made easier by the fact that many protests and events had been planned and prepared in advance, so all they needed was to be reinforced and broadened, to receive more financing and not have to start from scratch. For instance, the International Association of Parliamentarians for Peace in Helsinki in May 1980 (23 May 1980, St 212/57), the international conference for a ban on nuclear arms in Japan in August (28 July 1980, St 221/35), and the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace in September in Sofia, of which I wrote in 1982, had all been planned about a year ahead.254 The latter, as I guessed correctly in my brochure, was really the central event in 1980, calling for255 “… activation of protests against the adventurist policy of imperialist circles in the USA, NATO, and the Beijing hegemonists, for the preservation and continuation of the process of international détente in the 1980s.”
Initially, this “parliament” was planned as a more modest, commonplace measure of the WPC, and had the original title World Congress of the Supporters of Peace. But the activation of the “struggle” required additional financing, so preparatory work was stepped up (especially regarding the inclusion of noncommunist organizations), help was received in accordance with Sorsa’s recommendations from socialists and social democrats, and the enterprise mutated into a “parliament of peoples.” Its role was manifold: in the first place it was to lend its authority to Moscow’s decisions (just the way dubious banks launder dirty money), as shown by the Soviet Peace Committee’s report to the CC:256
The political preparation for this central enterprise of the public movement for peace, called upon to determine the main directions of the efforts of peace-loving people for the next couple of years, is conducted in cooperation with international and national organizations of various political orientations. It is expected that the work of the World Parliament shall include 1,500–2,000 delegates and guests from more than a hundred countries, from the UN, UNESCO, UNCTAD, and other international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.257
However, the reality exceeded all expectations: the event was attended by 2,260 lovers of peace from 137 countries representing 330 political parties, 100 international and more than 3,000 national nongovernmental organizations, 200 members of various parliaments, around 200 trade union leaders, 129 leading social democrats (33 of whom were members of the executive bodies of their parties), 150 writers and poets, representatives of 33 liberation movements, 83 communist and workers’ parties, women’s, youth, and religious organizations, 18 representatives of various committees and specialized services of the UN, etc.258 Naturally this “parliament” unanimously adopted the Soviet program of actions, the appeal and other documents.
Secondly, this gathering was convenient for deciding numerous organizational questions regarding future actions and reinforcement of ties with various Western organizations of the required tendency, i.e., for the further development of infrastructure. To this end, for example, some of the delegates (some six hundred persons!) were taken from Sofia to Moscow on their way home, where a further week was devoted to the development of “bilateral relations” and “acquaintance with Soviet reality” at the same time (15 September 1980, St 228/44).
After all, fulfillment of the decisions of the Parliament of Peoples had to be ensured—to guarantee that its participants, upon returning home, incorporated the relevant resolutions into their organizations, adopted the program of actions, and implemented it unfailingly. The special resolution of the Secretariat of the CC “On Measures for the Further Activation of Manifestations by Peace-Loving Peoples in Light of the Results of the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace” (18 November 1980, St 237/101) set out the basic directions of this work and the main measures. All Soviet agencies and public organizations, for instance, were instructed to
… coordinate their actions with the relevant organizations in fraternal socialist countries and progressive organizations in the nonsocialist parts of the world and achieve an active antiwar direction for forthcoming large international enterprises:
Meetings of the participants of the Brussels public movement on questions of security, cooperation, and disarmament (Brussels, November 1980), the Congress of the International Union of Students (Berlin, November 1980), the World Forum of Youth and Students for Peace, détente and disarmament (Helsinki, January 1981), the sessions of the General Council of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity of Asian and African Countries (Aden, March 1981), the Congress of the International Democratic Federation of Women (Prague, October 1981).
Special attention must be paid to the forthcoming extended meeting of the leadership of the World Forum on contacts with peace-loving forces in Vienna in January 1981, striving for reinforcement and development of the established cooperation between various political parties and mass organizations based on an antiwar platform, and steering the matter, among other things, toward reaching a decision to conduct an authoritative global conference on disarmament and détente in a capitalist country. …
[…]
… this work should be carried out in close contact with the relevant organizations in socialist countries and international democratic organizations;
[…]
The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions is to take steps toward the convening of an international conference on the socioeconomic problems of détente in 1981 in accordance with the decision of the Twentieth Congress of the International Federation of Trade Unions, and to cooperate in the implementation of the proposals of the British National Union of Mineworkers regarding the conduct of a global miners’ conference against the arms race.
The Central Committee of the Komsomol and the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR shall participate in the activity of workers’ agencies launched in October 1980 at the Budapest meeting of the All-European structure of cooperation of youth and students for the purposes of reinforcing the antiwar direction within the framework of its enterprises.
The gigantic flywheels of this diabolical machine spun faster, nuts and bolts did their job, piston rods and cranks hurried into motion, and off it went to crush countries and continents in a cloud of dust. Congresses and forums, marches and protests, “nuclear-free zones,” and missives from scientists—all was accomplished practically to the letter. And in front lay a whole ten years, previously designated by the UN as “the decade of disarmament.” It seemed as though nothing could stop this epidemic of peace loving, until the whole world turned red. As the wise rabbi said in a Soviet joke of the 1950s, “There will be no war, but there will be such a struggle for peace that not a stone will be left standing.”
Even now, with hundreds of documents before me attesting to Soviet manipulation of Western peace movements, when there would seem to be answers to all questions in these piles, I still cannot find an answer to the question that occupied me more than anything else: what really made these “peaceniks”—stupidity or infamy? If it was a bit of both, then in what proportion? I recall being asked at a press conference at the time, What should one do in order to avoid becoming a “useful idiot”? My answer was, Do not be a fool in the first place. If this circumstance cannot be changed for purely biological reasons, then one should follow this simple rule: never be useful to the USSR or its policies. If even this is too hard to grasp, it is probably better to abstain from public activity altogether. And certainly avoid participation in any enterprises with the Soviets and their clear friends.
A simple rule, one that should be understandable even to a fool. But no, our peacemakers painted themselves into a corner by proclaiming themselves ready to cooperate with all “antiwar” forces: how can we, they reasoned, demand disarmament from the USSR if we are not prepared to disarm ourselves? We should set an example of “dialogue” to the rest of the world. And so they did. So what was this, naivety or pretense, stupidity or convenient self-justification? I do not know. I remember only what burning indignation my brochure evoked among the leading peacemakers: is it impossible to have dealings with Soviet or local communists, and remain “independent” at the same time?
“There is not a shred of evidence that the peace movement received Soviet funding,” wrote one of them in a tone of injured innocence,259 as if the crux of the matter were money and it was impossible to be a Soviet flunky gratis. Some even refused demonstratively to take part in any events of the World Council of Churches, being fully aware of the odious nature of that Soviet structure. Look at us: we’re independent!
But even this was foreseen by the sages in the CC. The subject arose at a special coordination meeting of the secretaries of the central committees of all fraternal socialist countries in Budapest on 14–16 July 1980, convened on the initiative of Erich Honecker, at which, among other questions of international politics, the issue of “matters of coordination of international mass public peace movements” (9 June 1980*, St 214/74) was discussed. Before the meeting began, the German insisted that
the achievement of our common aims apart from diplomacy requires the support of a broad mass movement. However, the breadth and efficacy of this movement depends greatly on how we shall be able to achieve the action of the broadest possible action by supporters of peace—far beyond the framework of the movement directed by the World Peace Council—aimed at the solution of the core task, which is the continuation of détente and liquidation of the threat of nuclear war. … We deem it feasible to come to an agreement between our parties on the key issues of the strategy and tactics of a global movement in support of peace and to agree on the most important international actions.260
We are naturally proceeding on the assumption that the World Peace Council must retain its important role and continue to augment it. Yet it is an acknowledged fact that the World Peace Council falls far short of reaching all the political forces prepared to struggle for peace, détente, and disarmament. Numerous reformist trade union organizations, religious groups of Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist confessions, many national action committees representing millions of people, refuse to join the World Peace Council or to cooperate with it. … It is a fact that numerous important actions (the Dutch movement “No to the neutron bomb!”, the Brussels demonstration against NATO missiles, the international peace rally) took place without the involvement of the World Peace Council and even despite the initial resistance of individual representatives of its leadership.261
Of course, write the East Germans, such enterprises as the World Parliament of Peoples in Sofia are very significant, but:
The preparatory committee… consists mainly of representatives of the World Peace Council. The fact that the Dutch movement “No to the neutron bomb!”, the British Labour Party Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Belgian Action Committee for Peace and Cooperation and also the Danish Committee for Cooperation are still not involved in the preparations is clearly due to the known position of these organizations that decline direct cooperation with the World Peace Council, and the International Parliament for Safety and Peace is still openly declared to be a creation of the World Peace Council.262
Understandably, the East Germans’ proposal for more flexible tactics and greater coordination with the social democrats and socialists received full support in Budapest. So it was possible to bring many more “moderates” to Sofia than expected, and individual work with them began to bear fruit, as the CC’s International Department reported in August 1980 (11 August 1980, 25-S-1395):263
The prominent Belgian public figure, former minister, and member of the socialist party [Albert] De Smaele, who played an active role in the Brussels movement for European security, informed Soviet representatives of his intention to put forward the idea regarding reinforcement of the security of the non-nuclear states of Europe. He stressed that the main motive for proposing this initiative is the deep concern of the European public in the face of the increase in nuclear missiles foisted by the militarist circles of the USA and NATO on Europe.
Amusing, isn’t it? Neither the triple supremacy of the troops of the Warsaw Pact or the already-deployed Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at his country perturbed this former Minister of Economic Affairs. Furthermore, he hurried to advise Moscow of his intended initiative before declaring it publicly. And what was the substance of the “initiative”? How would it “reinforce the security of the non-nuclear states of Europe”?
De Smaele’s proposal was that the public of European countries without nuclear arms should attempt to achieve the status of non-nuclear states for their countries. His primary motivation is that countries that already have nuclear arms on their territories should reject their increase and the deployment of new types of missiles, to be followed by efforts toward the reduction and subsequent withdrawal of existing nuclear arms.
The Belgians intend to discuss this initiative with representatives of the public of other socialist countries, and also the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe in the near future.
Naturally, the initiative of Belgian “public circles” delighted Moscow:
Such a public discussion would reinforce the stepping up of the struggle against the deployment of new types of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe.
Admittedly, there was a small hitch:
The present formulation of this proposal for guarantees of the security of nonnuclear states diverges from the positions agreed upon between socialist countries.
Simply speaking, it was unacceptable to the Warsaw Pact countries, but was perfectly acceptable in relation to Western Europe. It was therefore deemed feasible to
… use the discussion of the De Smaele idea for advancing our known proposals to the political circles of the West. …
There was more to come. Exhilarated by the mighty support of the Soviet Union, the former minister plunged into frenzied activity as a result of which his initiative became wholly “aimed at increasing public resistance of the nonnuclear states to the increase in nuclear missiles being foisted on them by the militarist circles of the USA and NATO” (17 November 1980, 237/76) and received the “full support of the leadership of both socialist parties and Catholic circles of Belgium as well as Holland and other neighboring countries.” In this form it became a pan-European movement, seized upon and reinforced by the Soviet machine.
Following instructions to lend the campaign total support, the Central Committees of fraternal communist parties used it to
… advance the proposals of L.I. Brezhnev in Western political circles to examine the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe together with the organic ties with the issue of American forward-deployed nuclear arms at the commenced Soviet-American talks on the nuclear question….
and the contents of:
… the presentation by comrade A.A. Gromyko at the XXXV session of the General Assembly of the UN proposing guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against countries not possessing such weapons, nor having foreign nuclear weapons [on their territory].
Tell me no more tales about “independent” movements for a nuclear-free Europe, nuclear-free zones, cities, municipalities, or villages. It is amazing that Western peacemakers refused stubbornly to see how they were being used by the Soviet machine for its purposes—refused mainly to see that no treaties, agreements, or especially cooperation with this machine on equal terms were possible. So how can one tell whether this was due to assumed naivety or natural stupidity?
Take, for example, “nuclear-free zones” and municipalities—yet another “independent movement” launched by the Soviets through the system of “twinned cities.” This was approved by the CC CPSU on 15 January 1980264 in a special resolution. The system of “twinned cities” had existed since the times of the Second World War and was used by the Soviet regime for “propaganda concerning Soviet reality, the achievements of communist construction, the peaceful foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state.” Over the years this degenerated into an empty formality: delegations were exchanged from time to time, as well as exhibitions, collective artistic amateur talent events and the conduct of friendship “days” and “weeks.” The deterioration of relations had its effect on all these links. As the chairman of the Presidium of the Association of Soviet Friendship and Cultural Societies for ties with foreign countries stated in a report to the CC (12 March 1980, No. 418):265
The governing circles of a number of Western countries oppose friendly relations between cities. The British government is keeping strict control over these ties, up to the point of proscribing them; contacts have broken off between Soviet and Egyptian cities; Zionist circles in the USA are opposed to the establishment of such ties. Over the past two months there have been attempts by reactionary, anti-Soviet forces to bring discord into the friendly ties between Soviet and foreign cities. For instance, letters have been received from the municipalities of certain cities in the USA, Norway, and England indicating their decision to sever or suspend ties with Soviet cities due to “the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet army forces.” The municipalities of some Italian cities, including those headed by communists, have granted Sakharov “freedom of the city” status and sent protests concerning the “exile” of this “champion of human rights” to Gorky. It should be noted that great efforts to establish ties with cities in Japan, the USA, and Italy are being made by the Chinese for use in their hegemonic aims.
The CC had no intention of surrendering such “channels of external influence on various social strata in foreign cities” to the enemy (14 July 1980, St 219/96).
A plan of special measures was developed to boost this activity, financing was increased, party control was improved as well as the selection of cadres, supply of propaganda materials, coordination with fraternal socialist countries, and a “conference of mayors of European capitals devoted to cooperation and disarmament” was envisaged. The number of such cities was rapidly augmented. In other words, the machine roared into action.
Responding to the call of Soviet cities, a number of their foreign partners issued protests regarding the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Europe.
In November 1980, the first city to declare itself “nuclear-free” was Manchester (twinned with Leningrad), followed by Sheffield (twinned with Donetsk). It is not surprising that by mid-1980, in Great Britain alone, 180 municipalities had declared themselves to be “nuclear-free zones,” as well as 17 in Norway, almost 400 cities in Spain and Portugal, and the entire Quebec province of Canada, while entry into Japanese and New Zealand ports was severely restricted for navy vessels with nuclear arms on board. The first international conference of “nuclear-free” municipalities took place in Manchester in 1984, and one year later there was another in the Spanish city of Cordoba, twinned with Bukhara.266
Can it be that all these mayors and municipal advisers did not understand, after decades of very limited contact, that life in their “twins” differed vastly from life in the West; that those twins, for instance, were totally controlled, and their “appeals” were in no way spontaneous? Finally, did they not find it strange that despite all fraternal appeals, not a single Soviet city became “nuclear-free”? Even one stay in Donesk or Bukhara would have been sufficient for someone of the meanest intelligence to shed such illusions forever.
Meanwhile, just the material aid to these movements was quite significant. Admittedly, it was rarely in monetary form—the episode in Denmark was rather an exception to the rule. The reason was that the GRU (military intelligence) and the KGB played only an auxiliary role in the “struggle for peace”; the main director was the International Department of the CC, which had no need to send banknotes directly to Western peace organizations—this was done through local communist parties along well-established channels (8 January 1969*, Pb 111/162). This procedure not only had purely technical advantages that lessened the chances of failure, but was also dictated by an organizational need: it affirmed the influence of communist parties in peace movements. It also enabled the peacemakers’ leaders to “sincerely” reject accusations regarding their financial dependence on Moscow. Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that they did not know what part of their organizations’ expenses were covered from the party strongboxes of their communist allies. It was equally easy to guess the source of contributions to these strongboxes.
Material aid was also rendered by means of free transportation by Aeroflot (and airlines of fraternal countries) of hundreds of delegates to international forums (especially from third world countries), payment of their maintenance (especially if the forums took place in socialist countries), or, for instance, the provision of simultaneous translators. These forms of aid were rendered regularly, at times even if Soviet organizations or the organizations of their allies were not the actual hosts of a given enterprise in the West, and certainly if the Soviets were among the organizers. At the very least, this ensured the required majority of votes to avoid undesirable decisions. Consider, for instance, this report from the first female cosmonaut, Valentina Nikolayeva-Tereshkova, chair of the Committee of Soviet Women, to the CC in July 1980 (2 July 1980, No. 76):267
A forum of nongovernmental organizations will be held in Copenhagen on 14–24 July, which shall be conducted simultaneously with the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women. It is assumed that some ten thousand people will participate in the forum. Preparations for the forum show that reactionary forces are attempting to exploit it for their own purposes. …
It can be expected that such problems as Afghanistan, Cambodia, refugees, human rights and so on will be raised with hostile aims.
[…]
At the request of the WIDF [Women’s International Democratic Federation], the Committee of Soviet Women shall pay for the return travel to Copenhagen for forty representatives from a number of Asian and African countries (Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, South Africa, Ethiopia, and others) in Soviet rubles, as well as the travel for progressive US forces. However, the living expenses of these delegations in Copenhagen will require additional funding in foreign currency.
The ceremonial opening of the conference by the Queen of Denmark was rudely disrupted: there were even fights before the police intervened.268 Need it be added that undesirable subjects were effectively blocked, despite this not being a Soviet event? It is not hard to imagine what would have happened if it were. For example, the event that was to be one of the most important at the World Forum of Youth and Students for Peace, Détente and Disarmament on 19–23 January 1981 in Helsinki was organized on the initiative of the Komsomol. Preparations for it went perfectly, as noted by the head of the Komsomol, Boris Pastukhov, in a report to the CC (18 December 1980, No. 01/1281):269
The entire preparatory process was encouraged by the activation of joint protests for peace by young people and students at the national and international levels. Preparatory work in Finland is conducted by the National Committee of Finnish Youth Organizations (SNT) with the support of President of the Republic of Finland [Urho] Kekkonen.
The enterprise was really unusual: up to six hundred delegates from more than a hundred countries were expected, including representatives of international associations of young social democrats, liberals, centrists, demo-Christians, and other political tendencies, along with representatives of the UN, UNESCO, UNCTAD, and so on.
At the same time, in view of the broad spectrum of political forces in the preparations for the forum, there were attempts by certain organizations, mainly conservative ones, to force discussions of “violations” of human rights in socialist countries, about the situation in Afghanistan, Poland, etc., and to include participants in a number of reactionary youth organizations in the forum. These attempts met with no support from the overwhelming majority of participating delegations.
But such things were no joke, and it was best to take early steps to ensure “the positive political balance of forces to the advantage of progressive youth organizations from liberated countries.” Unfortunately, “allowing for the difficult financial situation” of many of them, additional financial outlays were required for Aeroflot to bring 110 delegates to Moscow and back and for up to 150 delegates to be taken by train from Moscow to Helsinki and back, “up to 18 thousand convertible rubles to cover the travel of groups of delegates from places not served by Aeroflot and to send a group of up to 15 Soviet simultaneous translators for work at the forum.” The results were not long in coming as Pastukhov reported one month later (6 February 1981, 01/118):270
The vast majority of speakers, including representatives of social democratic, centrist, and liberal organizations, supported the continuation of the policy of détente and the further development of the process of limitation of strategic weapons, and spoke positively of the contribution of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the cause of ensuring peace and security. They censured NATO plans for the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of a number of West European countries and criticized the concept of a “limited” nuclear war. Numerous delegates stressed the threat to peace from the hegemonic policy pursued by Beijing leaders. …
The behavior of right-wing youth movements at the forum exposed their intention to undermine the cooperation of various political forces that has developed over the past decade, primarily to alienate the social democrats and socialists from joint actions with the VFDM and IUS [International Union of Students]. …
The Soviet delegation, leaning on the VFDM and MSS, took steps to isolate the right-wingers and to consolidate the forum on an antimilitaristic basis. This work was complicated by the komsomols of the “Eurocommunist” tendency (Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Spain), who spoke out against Soviet military aid to Afghanistan. A positive role in discussions was played by member organizations of the VFDM and MSS from Asian, African, and Latin American countries.
It is true to say that this forum reflected the entire political spectrum of that time, but not in the proportions existing in the world. Therefore all the efforts of right-wing forces, moreover lacking even a tenth of Soviet experience in such matters, were in vain:
The final document, approved unanimously by the participants of the forum, reflected the most important foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist counties. Among other things, the final document contains a demand for the soonest possible ratification of the SALT II treaty and continuation of the process of limitation of strategic arms, condemns the concept of a “limited” nuclear war, stresses the need to prevent the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear weapons on the European continent, and declares support for the conducting of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe.
One can only guess how much all this struggle for peace cost Moscow, including the direct and indirect financing of Western peacemakers. For 1981 alone, more than two thousand persons were to have free transportation by Aeroflot.271 Apart from these, there were whole crowds of those who came “for rest and medical treatment,” and for “acquainting themselves with Soviet reality”—mainly at holiday resorts. There was also the constant aid to friendship societies and solidarity committees. … Other groups solicited invitations that looked more like a desire to have a good time on a “freebie” (8 April 1980, St 205/10):
The Soviet Peace Committee, the Central Committee of the Komsomol, and the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR have received a request from the French peace movement to receive a group of 50 activists of the youth committee of the movement for the purpose of conducting a seminar in the USSR on questions of the struggle for peace, détente, and disarmament. The youth committee of the French movement includes representatives of various progressive French youth organizations, such as the Young Communists Movement of France272 young people from the General Confederation of Labor [CGT], Working Christian Youth, and others. The visit to the USSR by representatives of the youth committee of the movement shall contribute to intensifying the committee’s activity, augmenting its authority, and allow us to broaden our cooperation with various forces in France that advocate peace, détente, and disarmament.
Expenses required for travel—12,000 convertible rubles—and for maintenance—30,000 rubles—were covered by the Soviet Peace Fund. These sums were quite considerable at the time. The average monthly wage in the country was 150 rubles, 5 rubles per day. Every Soviet citizen was obligated to work one day every year to the benefit of this fund, whether he wanted to or not. It is noteworthy that this fact was not concealed from anyone; on the contrary, it received broad coverage in the press and was reported in numerous Soviet peace publications,273 and therefore Western peacemakers could not be unaware that their “struggle” was being financed by the forced labor of the Soviet population. But did that worry them?
People in general, and the intelligentsia in particular, are extremely arrogant, egotistic animals, considering themselves smarter than anyone else in the world, and certainly smarter than their governments. I can think of no occasion on which the intelligentsia admitted that it had been wrong, especially when it came to disputes with the lawful authority. The reason for this is probably the intelligentsia’s belief that its real abilities remain unwanted. Terrible. After all, they are the elite, and that means that they should rule the world or, at least, rule people’s minds. But life, that unfair judge, has condemned them to more humble pursuits: teaching children the alphabet, curing our aches and pains, studying bacteria through a microscope, being bored in provincial courtrooms, or giving communion to parishioners and listening to their endless complaints about the injustice of life. And all around, out in the big world, completely different people make important decisions that determine the fate of mankind. Moreover, those people are not brighter, better educated, or morally worthy. How can one accept that? So a member of the intelligentsia cannot simply force himself to do his job without contrivances and pretensions. He cannot just teach children to read and write—no, he has to “raise future generations”; he cannot just prescribe pills for a patient and ease his suffering—no, he needs to concern himself with the health of all mankind. A priest, meanwhile, is convinced that God Himself has put him in the pulpit for the salvation of one and all.
The intelligentsia is the most dissatisfied layer of any society, and that is why it is the source of endless heresies: socialisms, communisms, feminisms, ecologisms, and similar Utopian ideas about universal happiness, which can be achieved only under their leadership (something that is not usually acknowledged openly). This is the source of their most common feature—lying. A member of the intelligentsia will never admit that the basic motive of his boisterous social activity is a desire for power. Certainly not! He will reject this until he is blue in the face, invariably advancing the most honorable, most altruistic reasons. He will bluster and wind himself up to the extent of believing in his own unselfishness.
Yet what he is really excels at is the art of interpretation—that is, the ability to shuffle and combine certain facts while omitting and “overlooking” others, or, on the contrary, rejecting them as false and even describing them indignantly as arrant lies. He is the unparalleled master of context; by changing it, unnoticed by anyone, he can come up with any highly unexpected conclusion by mixing totally unsuitable facts, like a magician pulling a rabbit out of a hat. No matter how hard you argue with him, no matter how closely you drive him to the wall, he will always slip away, like a cake of soap in a bath. His main evidence—the real, practical result of his ideas—is usually relegated to the future, and he is totally uninterested because he will bear no responsibility for it. It will be up to other people to pay the price, maybe in another epoch, and he will remain blameless; his ideas are honorable and wonderful, and it is not his fault that nature turned out to be flawed, useless for his brilliant ideas. Like the legendary Frankenstein, he feels no guilt for the acts of the monster he created, for he is less concerned with the end result than the process that allowed him to feel himself to be God, for a short time at least.
Such were our peace activists, mostly primary school teachers, nurses, parish priests, and similar semi-intelligentsia, all those Alexander Solzhenitsyn acutely labeled smatterers, possessing a smattering of knowledge. The same can be said of their leaders, for many of whom the process of “leadership” was more important than the essence of the cause. So how can one determine whether they were fools or villains? Did they understand that they were playing to Moscow’s advantage or not? No, they were simply not interested; they did not want to know. Even their notorious fear of a nuclear disaster was originally contrived, self-induced rather than spontaneous. What can one say? Of course, saving mankind is a much more rewarding occupation than spending years teaching children multiplication tables. It adds a certain panache to one’s movements and notes of honorable indignation to one’s voice. A mob acquires the power to decide global problems, and the leaders acquire power over the mob. And who cares what will happen in the distant future? They will not be responsible in that future; even if nothing turns out the way it was supposed to, who shall call upon them to answer for it? Their intentions were noble, but our world is imperfect.
Such were, to use the term loosely, the “nuclear debates” of the 1980s in the West: logic, arguments, and facts played no part in them. Can it be that nobody really understood that it is impossible to “try” unilateral disarmament? Can it be that somebody did not know that this would be irreversible? Western governments tried in vain to explain the complexity of the situation, they showered the public with figures regarding missiles, warheads, tanks, and aircraft to no effect—their figures were not believed, because nobody wanted to believe them, and the general theme of the debates merely confused the man in the street even more, as though all these missiles and tanks had already opened fire on Europe.
The mobs may have been hysterical, but their leaders were not. They were the embodiment of incredible arrogance and ignorance combined, and the greater the ignorance, the greater the arrogance. For instance, most of them lacked the required education to understand the extremely complex technical aspects of nuclear missiles, strategy, or geopolitics. Nevertheless, they confidently rejected the data and expositions of acknowledged experts, labelling them “propaganda.” In return, they created their own “experts” who said what they wanted to hear. An enormous number of dubious institutes, research groups, and committees were created, many of which included, naturally enough, pro-Soviet “experts” or simply Soviet representatives. For some reason, it was they who were to be believed.
Let us say that the overwhelming majority of the leaders of antiwar movements at that time had no idea of the nature of the Soviet regime, the reality of Soviet life, history, or even communist ideology, although questioning this would have been legitimate. At least half (and in fact almost 100 percent) of their claims depended on the USSR, its intentions, and its behavior. But the majority declared this to be “irrelevant,” openly trusting the official declarations of the USSR or such “experts” as Georgy Arbatov. As far as they were concerned, the opinion of Vadim Zagladin from the International Department of the CC was sufficiently objective for them to cite him as a source of information about the USSR in the Western press and as an authority for rejecting my “prejudiced” opinion.274 Our views, just like any negative information concerning the USSR, were dismissed as “propaganda” and “Cold War stereotypes.”
Generally, absurd as it may seem, “the other side”—the Soviet Union and its satellites, its arms and intentions—did not worry anyone at all in these “debates.” The threat of nuclear war and the need to prevent it were declared to be somehow outside the context of real life, as if they had emanated from nowhere—from God or sheer chance. For instance, from a mad general (invariably an American one). In the USA, where the “struggle for peace” was led by the leftist establishment (which had secured its positions in the campaign against the war in Vietnam and reached the peak of its power in the period of détente), mass brainwashing became particularly audacious, open, and gigantic in scope. It was a deliberate campaign to instigate mass hysteria, concentrated exclusively on one side of the question—the horror of nuclear war. Liberal foundations (such as the Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, MacArthur and George Gund) assigned literally billions of dollars so that, in the words of the president of the Rockefeller Foundation, “the prevention of nuclear war in the 1980s would be what the movement for human rights was in the 1960s.”275
At that time Hollywood and television produced dozens if not hundreds of documentary and feature films about the consequences of a nuclear explosion, of the end of civilization. Suddenly, all American intellectuals became “concerned”: concerned scientists, concerned teachers, and concerned doctors.
The groundwork was done by doctors, with their widely advertised letter of appeal to their Soviet colleagues under the eloquent heading “Danger—nuclear war.”276 I do not know whether they had thought up this profound headline themselves or whether they were prompted by some Pugwash committee with a suggestion from the sage CC. But I will never believe that they did not realize they were appealing not to their colleagues in the USSR, but to the Soviet government, providing it with a marvelous propaganda opportunity. Health Minister Boris Petrovsky reported the following to the CC (4 April 1980, No. 1099):277
Pursuant to the decision of the CC CPSU dated 20 March 1980, the Ministry of Health of the USSR submits a draft reply by leading Soviet medical scientists to American physicians, composed with allowance for suggestions made by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the KGB of the USSR. At the same time we report that there has been a meeting with one of the organizers of the American movement “Physicians for Social Responsibility” [Bernard] Lown, who reported that American scientists intend to organize a broad international movement in the medical community against nuclear war and, among other things, plan to hold a conference in the USA at the end of 1980, with the participation of Soviet and Japanese physicians. The final decision on the venue of the conference remains to be decided.
The CC was only too pleased to enter this game; it was not every day that such an opportunity cropped up to promote their positions through independent American scientific institutions, especially through physicians, with their considerable influence on health-obsessed Americans. It replied (15 April 1980 (St 206/19), p. 18.):
Regarding the signatures of Soviet physicians under the answering letter, it appears feasible to collect a significant number of signatures, limited to those of comrades who represent the larger scientific organizations.
It stands to reason that these included the inevitable Yuri Ovchinnikov, and academician Nikolay Blokhin (as he was director of the oncological center), but there was still the need for a cardiologist: after all, the initiator of the whole enterprise, Bernard Lown, was an American cardiologist. This saw the arrival on the scene of academician Yevgeny Chazov, chairman of the All-Russian Scientific Society of Cardiologists. As Chazov reported to the CC a few months later (17 December 1980, No. 3457):278
Pursuant to the decision of the Secretariat of the CC CPSU, a Soviet delegation headed by academician Y.I. Chazov went to Geneva in December of this year, comprised of academics from the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences [Leonid Andreyevich] Ilyin and [Mikhail] Kuzin. The delegation took part in a meeting with American scientists representing the “International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War” movement. The American delegation was headed by Professor Bernard Lown, a prominent cardiologist of the Harvard school (Boston), and president of the American movement “Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.” The delegation also included Dr. Eric Chivian, a psychiatrist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge) and the society’s secretary, Jim Muller.
The meeting was of a consultative nature and was devoted to discussing the possibility of creating an international movement, “Physicians for Nuclear Disarmament.” A memorandum outlining the principles of such a movement was composed at the meeting, which is basically acceptable to us, as it arises from the concept of prohibiting nuclear war.
Agreement was reached on the conduct of a Soviet-American conference of physicians and doctors advocating the prevention of nuclear war on 19–26 March 1981. On this occasion, the American side will be the organizers, and will invite ten prominent Soviet men of medicine as well as three experts specializing in the field of nuclear weapons and problems of disarmament.
It is envisaged that at the end of the conference appeals will be issued to all doctors of the world, to governments and peoples in various countries, as well as to the heads of state of the Soviet Union and the USA, which will stress the grievous consequences to all the peoples of the world from the occurrence of a nuclear war, and a call to the limitation and prohibition of nuclear arms.
We request that the composition of our draft documents be referred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Ministry of Health of the USSR, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. It is envisaged that the delegations shall implement a timely exchange of the indicated documents and conduct a preliminary discussion regarding them so that there will be agreed texts at the conference itself.
What a find! Practically all the appeals of the “concerned” physicians would be composed by Soviet generals and diplomats—after all, the American side is too independent to seek the advice of the Pentagon or the State Department, let alone accept the instructions of its government. Soviet “experts on nuclear weapons and disarmament” will certainly explain everything as it needs to be explained at the conference. The average American, if the doctor has prescribed that smoking, cholesterol, and nuclear war are bad for one’s health, shall demand immediate nuclear disarmament from its congressmen and senators. Is it surprising that the “struggle for peace” in America, a country inclined to hysteria, should assume an even more hysterical nature than in Europe? The most popular campaign there was the one that seized upon Brezhnev’s peace initiatives in 1979: “Nuclear freeze,” “No to the first nuclear strike,” and so forth, and the most active—crowds of frenzied people storming military bases or munitions factories. One such group even tried to physically fulfil the biblical precept of turning swords into plowshares: its members stormed the workshop where missiles were assembled and threw their bodies against them until they drew blood.279 This is where the psychiatrists from the University of Massachusetts and cardiologists should have directed their efforts. But no, this had nothing to do with them, at that time they were receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo together with their colleague Yevgeny Chazov, although in all fairness it should have probably gone to the sagacious CC.
It was not just doctors; practically the entire educated class of America mobilized. How could it lag behind its enterprising colleagues? Even bishops made an effort and issued “A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace,” in which, speaking on behalf of the Lord God, they declared nuclear weapons to be “absolutely amoral,” leaving everyone to guess how amoral tanks and cannons had been in, say, the Second World War. Learned men from other professions joined in. However, they had a problem: the exile of honorary member of the American National Academy of Sciences Andrei Sakharov from Moscow to Gorky practically led to a boycott of the Soviet side by American scientists. Still, that was not an insurmountable problem: the noble cause of saving mankind justifies anything, even betrayal. The president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, A.P. Alexandrov, stated the following in a report to the CC (16 December 1980*, St 241/9):
As we have already reported, at a meeting between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of the USA in Moscow in June of this year, the Americans put forward a proposal for organizing bilateral exchanges of opinions on questions of reinforcing peace, international security, and disarmament. The NAS secretary for international affairs, [Thomas] Malone, assumes that such exchanges shall be one of the ways to restore bilateral meetings of scientists, suspended at the start of this year by the American side. In May 1980, the National Academy of Sciences of the USA set up a 16-member committee within the framework of the academy, headed by the president of the California Institute of Technology, Marvin L. Goldberger, to address issues of international security and control over armaments. The committee intends to establish and maintain contacts with Soviet scientists, and also academic circles in West European countries and Japan. The committee members consider that matters of international security should not be examined solely in the field of government channels, but also along the line of contacts between scientists searching for approaches to resolving problems in the sphere of security and submitting the relevant recommendations to their government without undue publicity.
The CC was only too pleased to approve this initiative, as declaring “the right to live in peace” to be a basic human right was the main slogan of their “struggle for peace.” Getting rid of the boycotts and embargoes caused by their repressive policies was one of the main tasks of the campaign for the resumption of détente. So whence this agitation among academics? Is it not clear that if your lawfully elected government requires your input on questions of state security, it will ask you? But no, the intelligentsia is always smarter than the government, nothing should occur without it. But what of colleague Sakharov?
The president of the NAS of the USA, Frank Press, told journalists, “Despite our continuing deep concern for Sakharov, there are some issues of such deep importance to the future of mankind that we have felt it necessary to continue talking about them with our Soviet counterparts. In this regard, arms control and international security are certainly of high priority. Our members feel very strongly about this issue.”280 This was said at the very time when it was being reported in the Western press that Sakharov was on the brink of death as a result of his hunger strike. Will you say again that American men of science did not know what they were doing?
Whatever anyone says, I cannot bring myself to believe in the naivety of these people. Possibly the only exception was the leader of the small but influential elite organization, the END (European Nuclear Disarmament), the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson. Even with all his fuddled leftist intelligentsia views, he did not deny that, say, the process of disarmament requires changes in the policies of both sides, and a popular disarmament movement is meaningful only if there is an analogous (i.e., independent of its government) movement on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, he was sincerely dismayed by the Soviet manipulation of Western movements, something he wrote about quite frankly, calling his less discerning colleagues in the movement “lunatics.”281 Yet even he was unable to comprehend completely that dealings with the Soviet machine should be avoided at all costs.
“We are willing to engage in discussion with official organizations over there, provided that the discussion is on honest and equal terms, and not on terms which co-opt us into some pro-Soviet theater of propaganda,” he wrote rather naively, although several paragraphs earlier he seemed to discern the total impossibility of fair and equal relations with Moscow. “To the Russians, we are background music only, and music not even loud enough to swing a German election.”
He seemed to be a sincere person, but befuddled in his thinking. Moreover, he had his own domestic “expert on Soviet life” in the person of our good old friend Zhores Medvedev, that very same Dr. Medvedev whose ideas, as we recall, coincided amazingly with those of Yuri Andropov. Naturally, Zhores Alexandrovich was one of the coauthors of the END appeal for “a nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal” in 1980 which, allegedly on behalf of “Soviet dissidents,” was signed in Moscow by his twin brother Roy Alexandrovich.282 Probably it was these two who explained to Professor Thompson that there are different kinds of dissidents: a) bad ones, and b) good ones. The bad ones do not believe in socialism and serve the forces of reaction, while the good ones believe in socialism and can certainly support the appeal. For several years, Professor Thompson searched vainly for “good dissidents.” Alas! Whoever he found turned out to be “bad.” The Czech Charter 77 and the Polish Workers’ Defense Committee rejected any ideas of unilateral Western disarmament as pro-Soviet. The cunning Jacek Kuron, himself a first-class manipulator, managed to get a letter out of prison in 1984 to the END conference, where he suggested a joint struggle for the repeal of martial law in Poland and the full demilitarization of Central Europe. A year later, an extremely polite Vaclav Havel attempted an intelligent explanation to Western peacemakers that their Utopianism would not find understanding among a willy-nilly skeptical East European public. It was all in vain. Finally, though small, rather purely symbolic groups of activists for peace began to appear in the GDR and even the USSR. But—what bad luck!—as soon as they appeared, their members would be expelled to the West, or imprisoned. So E.P. Thompson did not manage to find any good dissidents in the East, right up to the collapse of communism.
Astounding, is it not? Here was a man who was no fool, who was honest, who was yet unable to grasp the simple truth (as Jacek Kuron wrote to him) that the whole of the threat to peace in Europe emanates from the Soviet bloc, that it is necessary to fight not for peace, but against the Soviet regime. Lost in socialist delusions, he, like thousands of West European socialists, was unable to comprehend that the very idea of peace and disarmament, torn out of the context of the general political context of Europe, was already a pro-Soviet one. And if there was a need for a mass movement in the East, it had already come into being in the human rights movement, without which there could be no hope for peace or any other independent public movement. Is this so difficult? Is this not what we all wrote about, Andrei Amalrik and Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov? Is this not what the Helsinki Groups spoke of again and again, stressing the link between the first and third baskets of the accords—between security in Europe and human rights? Is this not what I wrote about in my brochure in 1982? “Two sides of the Soviet regime—internal oppression and external aggression—are inextricably linked.”
Paradoxically enough, this was the weak link in their campaign, which became a question of party politics; the question of Western disarmament could be resolved by the standard democratic mechanism of elections. Moscow and its allies were able to achieve success only with the aid of manipulations, machinations, hysterical propaganda, and blackmail. But it took just bringing the question to the judgment of the electorate, and their entire crafty campaign was doomed. Hysterical mobs and falsified “public opinion polls” regularly indicating a growing support for the idea of unilateral disarmament vanished. The British Labour Party, which had made nuclear disarmament its main platform in the 1983 election, suffered a crushing defeat for this very reason. In the FRG, despite all the efforts of Chancellor Schmidt to restrain the radicals in his party, in the minds of the electorate it was firmly associated with the anti-nuclear campaign and, like its British colleagues, lost the 1983 election. Only in Holland and Belgium, where the proportional election system condemned any government to exist as an unwieldy and unstable coalition dependent on the dictate of even the tiniest political groups, was the deployment of new missiles deferred for several years. In the rest of Europe the deployment began as scheduled, which undermined the campaign of the peacemakers even further, because despite their prophesies, this did not precipitate a nuclear war. This was definitely the tipping point—after 1983 the campaign dwindled markedly, and it petered out by the middle of the 1980s.
That was the end of this shameful page in the social life of the West. As we have said, the threat of a new world war and a nuclear holocaust disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet regime. Nowadays nuclear bombs, missiles, and warheads are stockpiled in arsenals, causing nobody any concern, in Russia and the USA and even Kazakhstan and Ukraine. This would seem to be just the time for concerned intelligentsia to demand their destruction, especially as it would be quite easy now. There they are, these “absolutely amoral” objects—so start demonstrating. But there are no indignant peacemakers on the streets of European capitals, no raging protests surrounding military bases such as the infamous women’s “peace camps” at Greenham Common in the UK. Where are they? Where have they gone?
Look, there they are, they haven’t disappeared anywhere. Nowadays those same eternally concerned preach lies about an inevitable ecological catastrophe, about the greenhouse effect, with the same aplomb and passion in their voices with which they once frightened the nervous bourgeoisie regarding the horrors of nuclear war.
Yet even before the 1983 elections and the deployment of new missiles, the biggest setback to the peacemakers’ campaign was the events in Poland. Their effect was immediate and visible: as was noted by E.P. Thompson,283 for example, crowds of demonstrators snowballed in October and November 1981, comprising over two million people throughout Europe.
So why, in the spring or fall of 1982, were there no demonstrations by three to four million people? The answer: the introduction of martial law in Poland and the persecution of Solidarity.
It is hard to say which aspect of the Polish crisis had the greatest effect on the peacemakers: the threat of a Soviet invasion, which hung over Poland for almost a year and a half, the crushing of a peaceful popular movement by the army, or that movement itself, which extended to practically the entire working population of the country. My own opinion is that this latter fact was not unimportant to our peacemakers, most of whom belonged to various Western left-wing parties and organizations. Perhaps for the first time, many of them paused to think about real life in the socialist paradise, and there was no way they could—at least externally, for the sake of appearances—not sympathize with the trade union movement. The need to make a political assessment of this event inevitably brought about dissent in their ranks: on one hand, the communists (such as the Italians) seemed to support Solidarity; on the other hand, the socialists (such as the Greek PASOK) supported the Jaruzelski regime and martial law.
It is true that it would have been difficult to imagine a more deadly situation for communist demagogues than a unanimous mutiny by workers against a proletarian state. Even Soviet propaganda did not dare to label Solidarity a reactionary organization, but preferred to speak of “individual anti-socialist elements” inside it. The Polish crisis could not have come at a worse time for them: right at the height of the “struggle for peace,” when they had just managed to climb out of political isolation after the invasion of Afghanistan. The oldsters in the Kremlin simply did not have enough strength to cope with all the crises and campaigns that coincided in one year.
Poland had always been a weak link in their socialist chain. The main tasks had not been accomplished even while Stalin was still alive: the Catholic Church remained unbroken, there were still individual peasant owners, and alongside that there was the rebellious spirit of the Poles, thanks to which Poland survived three partitions, the Second World War, Nazi occupation, and Soviet “liberation.” Rebellion is a truly Polish trait; it surfaced every three to five years, beginning with 1968, then again in 1970 and 1976—and every time, although at times with the shedding of blood, they managed to wrest certain concessions from the authorities. Moscow pretended not to notice—the main concern was to avoid a serious uprising. So Poland was, according to a joke of that time, the merriest barrack in the socialist camp. Almost a third of all workers were employed in the private sector—small trade and the service sector. This alone allowed a greater degree of personal freedom than any other state reforms (something anyone who has not lived under real socialism may find hard to appreciate). And there were just as many reforms in Poland as there were rebellions. By 1980 all versions of models of socialism had been tried, and not a single one of them worked.
The final crisis arose from the most prosaic reason, but one very characteristic of socialism: mired in external debts, the government was forced to raise food prices, including meat products, knowing full well that a similar attempt had resulted in the rebellion of 1976. But what could the government do? The country was bankrupt, incapable of paying even the interest to Western banks….
On the other hand, former rebellions were not complete losses for the Poles: they accrued experience, and dissident structures were growing under the relative softness of the regime. After the events of 1976, the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) came into being—a kind of coordinating center for dissident activity, ensuring contact between the workers’ movement and the intelligentsia as well as an independent system of communication among various groups and parts of the country. The KOR played a key role in the events of 1980: it assisted in the synthesis of spontaneous, scattered strikes into a general strike that mobilized the whole country.
The workers had also learned from the past, and instead of the customary rebellion, demonstrations, bloody clashes with the police, now resorted to an original form of protest—they occupied their plants, mines, docks, and factories. This innovation caught the authorities in Warsaw and Moscow quite unprepared—only this can explain the unusual acquiescence of the Polish authorities, which practically sanctioned the creation of the independent Solidarity trade union, besides making a number of other concessions to the workers. Faced with the impossibility of employing their usual weapon—police force—they were prepared to agree to anything for the sake of calming the country (with the view of taking everything back quietly later).
But the Soviet authorities were also learning something. The crisis in Poland did not really come as such a great surprise to them. On the contrary, they had been preparing for it since at least April 1979,284 being fully aware that raising food prices was inevitable. The situation was discussed frequently at meetings between Brezhnev and Edward Gierek, first secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), through July 1980—that is, after the rise in prices and the beginning of strikes, when Brezhnev was particularly concerned that the economic crisis would spill over into a purely political movement. His advice to Gierek was to do the following:285
- Suppress decisively all attempts to use nationalism for the imposition of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet attitudes, to distort the history of Soviet-Polish relations and the nature of the cooperation between the USSR and the Polish People’s Republic;
- Launch irreconcilable counterpropaganda against attempts to blur the class content of socialist patriotism under the slogan “all the Poles in the world are brothers,” and also idealize Poland’s prerevolutionary past;
- In political struggle with anti-socialist elements, do not be on the defensive, but conduct a vigorous advance against them.
What did come as a surprise to the Kremlin was the weakness of their clients, Polish communists, who were clearly incapable of coping with the crisis. Even years later, Moscow could not understand the nationwide nature of the opposing movement. It seems as though they really believed that the case concerned only certain “elements” that the Polish comrades treated far too liberally.
A hastily appointed Politburo committee on Poland (25 August 1980, Pb 210/11) began the immediate development of instructions to the Polish leadership on measures to “reinforce the role of the party in society,” as though the matter concerned a region of the USSR in which naughty schoolchildren had gone too far. The Gdansk agreements were given an uncompromising assessment by the Politburo, which they sent to the Polish leadership on 3 September 1980 (3 September 1980*, St 213/38):
The agreement of the government of the PPR, approved by the plenum of the CC PZRP [Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party], is a great political and economic price for the achieved “settlement.” Of course, we understand under what conditions you had to make this difficult decision. Essentially, the agreement means the legalization of the anti-socialist opposition. An organization arises that aspires to extend its political influence over the whole country. The difficulty of fighting it lies mainly in that the opponents position themselves as defenders of the working class, the workers.
The agreement does not remove the root causes of the critical events; moreover, resolution of the current problems of the Polish economy and Polish society becomes complicated.
Insofar as the opposition intends to continue the struggle for the achievement of its aims, and the healthy forces of the party and society cannot accept the backsliding of the Polish people, the agreed-upon compromise shall, most likely, be of a temporary nature. It must be borne in mind that the opposition expects outside aid, and not without reason.
Under the pressure of anti-socialist forces that have managed to delude a significant part of the working class, PPR had to retreat into defense. Now the problem is to prepare a counterattack and win back lost positions in the working class, the people.
In this counterattack, displaying flexibility, it would be advisable to use all the resources of the ruling party, its firm and healthy core, state power, mass public organizations with the necessary reliance on the front ranks of the working class, and, if necessary, calculated administrative means.
The party must give a principled political assessment of the August events and facilitate its own program of actions, including questions of improving workers’ living conditions.
Moscow considered it particularly important to strengthen party control over information in the mass media, primarily regarding radio and television, which had been penetrated by the Church for the first time in accordance with the Gdansk agreements. They wrote:
Under such conditions, the limits of what is permissible must be clearly defined, stating openly that the law on the press excludes any speechifying against socialism. … The mass media should show that the events in Poland were not precipitated by any deficiencies of the socialist system, but by errors and miscalculations as well as certain objective natural factors (natural disasters, etc.).
Gierek was sent into retirement and replaced as General Secretary of the PPR by Stanislaw Kania, but that did not improve matters. The Politburo decided to invite the Poles to Moscow for talks in October (29 October 1980*, Pb):
BREZHNEV. Tomorrow we have the arrival of the first secretary of the CC PPR, Comrade Kania, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PPR, comrade [Jozef] Pinkowski. The committee of comrades—[Mikhail] Suslov, Gromyko, Andropov, [Dmitry] Ustinov, [Konstantin] Chernenko, [Mikhail] Zimyanin, and Rusakov—has prepared materials for talks with the Polish leaders. I have studied these materials in detail. I think that the comrades have covered all the main questions. If anyone has anything to add, please let us discuss it now.
USTINOV. I have also read the materials carefully. I believe they are very substantial and cover the necessary points. It is important that all the questions are posed very acutely, just as they should be put to the Polish leaders.
BREZHNEV. There is really a counterrevolution in full swing in Poland, but the Polish press and Polish comrades say nothing about this, nothing is said about the enemies of the people. Yet these are enemies of the people, direct accomplices of the counterrevolution and the counterrevolutionaries themselves are acting against the people. How can this be?
(Omission in the text, ANDROPOV?) … Now they are criticizing Gierek, the CC, the party, and at the other end anti-socialist elements, which are running amok unimpeded.
Comrade Jaruzelski is a very reliable man, but is starting to speak without any particular zeal. He even says that the army will not go against the workers. I think we should say all this to the Poles in a very harsh manner.
BREZHNEV. When Jaruzelski was talking to Kania about who should play the role of first, he flatly refused to be the first secretary and suggested that Kania should be the first. That also tells us something.
GROMYKO. I believe that the prepared materials set out the basic questions quite correctly. As for the introduction of martial law in Poland, that must be borne in mind as a measure for rescuing revolutionary achievements. Of course, it may not be necessary to introduce it immediately, especially straight after Comrades Kania and Pinkowski return from Moscow; some time should pass, but they must have it pointed out to them and given support. We cannot lose Poland. In the fight against Hitler the Soviet Union lost 600 thousand of its soldiers and officers to liberate Poland, and we cannot allow a counterrevolution. […]
SUSLOV. I think the materials are well prepared and balanced. The current leaders of the PPR are insufficiently strong, but they are honest, the best in the leadership core. […] They must launch a counterattack instead of retreating into a defensive position. This position is mentioned in the materials we are studying today.
BREZHNEV. They need self-defense units.
[ANDROPOV, SUSLOV, and USTINOV say that this measure is a necessity. Defense units should be formed and should be stationed in barracks and, possibly, be armed in a timely manner.]
SUSLOV. We once wrote to [previous first secretary of PZPR Wladyslaw] Gomulka that he should not use weapons against workers, but nobody paid any attention, and the Polish leadership resorted to arms.
[Boris] PONOMAREV. The documents prepared for talks with the Polish leaders are consecutive and realistic. The materials make our concern quite plain. We must stress this concern to the Polish leaders.
GROMYKO. Maybe we should give copies of these documents to the Polish leaders?
ANDROPOV. If we do that, it is possible that they shall end up in the hands of the Americans.
BREZHNEV. That could really happen.
RUSAKOV. Let them pay attention to Leonid Ilyich and take notes.
[Viktor] GRISHIN. Leonid Ilyich, you should start the talks by voicing our concern. Let them answer later. The documents are well prepared.
[Nikolai] TIKHONOV. Of course, Leonid Ilyich, you should open your address on this material and expound all it contains. We have invited them to express our concern regarding the situation that has developed in Poland. The materials set everything out very clearly. In Poland today, there are obvious actions by counterrevolutionary elements. Let them tell us what is going on, explain how things have come to such a pass. Communists are leaving the party in fear of anti-socialist elements. That is how bad the situation has become. […]
[Andrei] KIRILENKO. It is three months since the strikes started, and they are not becoming fewer. We have done a great deal for Poland, we gave them everything and advised them in order to resolve arising issues. So far they have not drawn the military into the struggle against anti-socialist elements, and do not even expose them, as present comrades have pointed out. Now they are having problems with young people. The Komsomol has practically ceased to exist. There are no youth units. Maybe military personnel should don civil clothing and go out into the working masses.
Resolution: Approve the materials for the friendly working visit of Polish leaders to the USSR.
Maybe all that sounds comical, but constant pressure from Moscow on the Polish leadership had its significance. No matter how the influence of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) had weakened, its apparatus was enormous, and the structures of a totalitarian state put powerful means in its hands to control and suppress. In fact, the Kremlin strategists were right: the totalitarian system is calculated to be at constant war with the people, and all depends on its skillful use. The watching eye of Moscow forced the Polish leadership to act more energetically, putting aside doubts and wavering. The watching eye was ever keener: Brezhnev spoke by phone to Kania practically every week, and other Politburo members monitored their equivalent Polish colleagues, top-level Soviet delegations traveled to Poland periodically for on-the-spot investigations. Moscow virtually took over the leadership of the entire situation, down to the smallest details: just as in Afghanistan, special advisers and groups of experts on all matters were sent to Poland, without whose consent (or at least the consent of the ambassador, Averky Aristov) nothing was done. Even the economic program of PZPR, adopted at the congress, had first been studied and developed in Moscow (19 January 1981, St 246/79). Everything was exploited, right down to the smallest disagreements in the Solidarity leadership, their smallest miscalculations. The KGB presence in Poland increased.286
Finally, a formidable psychological pressure on the population was the deliberately circulated threat of a Soviet invasion of Poland, although no real preparations had been carried out for that purpose. For example, military maneuvers were staged on Polish territory, deliberately inflated, as a demonstration of readiness to “render international aid.” However, from the very beginning of the crisis, this was no more than a bluff: “decisive actions” were demanded of the Poles, repressive measures were enacted and martial law was declared, but the option of an invasion was never even considered.
One way or another, by the beginning of 1981 the situation had stabilized. This was possible because the leadership of Solidarity had not expected such success, being more prepared for repressions, and was not quite sure how to handle it. As one of the top-level visitors reported (22 January 1981):
The country is in a state of permanent discussion both in party organizations and at enterprises. This discussion also appears in the media, with frequent debates about the Polish model of a socialist society, about liberalization, revision of Marxism-Leninism, political pluralism, and so forth.
But this situation did not satisfy Moscow either—there was no breaking point, the crisis remained, and its negative results were beginning to be felt in the West and even in the USSR (2 April 1981*, Pb):
BREZHNEV. We are all extremely concerned regarding future events in Poland. The worst of it is that our friends listen, agree with our recommendations, and then do practically nothing. Meanwhile the counterrevolution is advancing on all fronts.
Politburo members have been informed of the content of all previous discussions with Polish leaders. I shall advise you of my latest telephone conversation with Kania on March 30.
Kania reported on the recent plenum of the CC of the Polish United Workers Party and complained that they were severely criticized during the plenum. So I said to him, “Rightly so. You not only deserved criticism, they should have taken a stick to you. Then maybe you would understand.” These were my very words.
Comrade Kania admitted that they are acting too leniently and should have taken a harder line.
I answered: “How many times did we try to convince you that decisive measures must be taken, that you cannot go on yielding to Solidarity? But you keep talking about a peaceful way, not understanding or unwilling to understand that the ‘peaceful way’ you are following may cost you in blood. So it is vital to draw the correct conclusions from the criticism at the plenum.”
Our friends managed to avert the general strike. But at what cost? The cost of yet another capitulation. Kania himself admitted in a discussion with the ambassador that the new compromise is a great mistake. …
It seems that among other things it may be worth fulfilling our friends’ request and allow comrades Andropov and Ustinov to go to Brest for a meeting with Kania and Jaruzelski. This will be a chance to get a detailed picture of the situation in the country, assess the intentions of our friends and set out our position to them once more.
We have the fallback measure of a new top-level meeting of the seven on the Polish question.
We have a committee on Poland. Maybe the comrades from the committee monitoring events in that country would care to say a few words?
ANDROPOV. I consider that the proposals put forward by Leonid Ilyich regarding future steps concerning Poland and the assessment of the situation there are perfectly accurate. We are saying that it is time for us to exert some more influence, apply more pressure to our friends’ leadership. I believe the proposal for a trip to Brest by comrade Ustinov and me to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski is right. […]
[USTINOV supports the proposals in practically the same words.]
GROMYKO. Allow me to inform you briefly of what we are hearing through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is a great deal of incoming information on Poland. But it must be said that the situation in Poland is being watched closely in the USA, the FRG, and other countries, and the real state of affairs is greatly distorted. It stands to reason that the coverage of information concerning the situation in Poland by the USA and the FRG is tendentious. It shows the “justice” of demands by Solidarity and anti-socialist forces in Poland and the inability of the Polish leadership to settle an internal matter. There is also much said about the Soviet Union, as though warning us that the Soviet Union should not intervene in Polish affairs with our armed forces. Clearly this is mere bourgeois propaganda that has always assumed hostile positions toward the Soviet Union and now serves up this information in a tendentious manner, as I have already said.
I wish to add that the condition of both Kania and Jaruzelski is not good. There are even hints that Jaruzelski is deeply depressed and does not know what to do next. This is very bad. The fact that the leadership of the Polish Republic backed down in negotiations with Solidarity is also very bad. Even Polish leaders themselves say that the latest agreement with Solidarity is a mistake.
As for the attitude to Rural Solidarity, it can be said that it is already legalized. … How can the situation in Poland be assessed after the plenum of the CC? I think we would not be mistaken in saying that there has been no improvement. On the contrary, there has been further deterioration, because the leadership is retreating. But as Leonid Ilyich has said, Kania has asked that Comrades Andropov and Ustinov come to Brest for an exchange of views with Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski. I think we should do this, especially as this will be an opportunity to say all we want to the comrades at a face-to-face meeting. In my opinion this meeting will be a kind of interim step and it must be used to the full. If they agree, as they say they will, to a partial introduction of emergency measures, they must be asked if they will be certain that the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and state security agencies will back them. I think it would be advisable to conduct a deep analysis by our military people of what the situation is within the Polish armed forces, if the army is the main power, and if it is reliable.
The Politburo of the CPSU must have a clear picture of the distribution of forces in Poland. We must know this. The Polish command asserts that the army will do its duty. Is this really so? In any case, we have to urge our Polish comrades to take harsher, I would say extreme measures to restore order and that further backtracking is totally unacceptable, they must not retreat any more.
USTINOV. With regard to the military, the situation is as follows. The military leadership meets today at 2000 hours with Comrades [Viktor] Kulikov and [Vladimir] Kryuchkov and other comrades. The Polish army, according to Comrade Jaruzelski, is ready to do its duty. But to speak frankly, we must bear in mind that neither Kania nor Jaruzelski will go as far as confrontation, bearing in mind the conflict in Bydgoszcz.287 The results of that conflict showed that it only took touching two members of Solidarity to bring the whole country to its feet—in other words, Solidarity was able to mobilize its forces in rapid order. Of course, there is still some hope if the army, the security agencies, and the militia form a united front, but it will still only get worse. I think it will be impossible to avoid bloodshed, it will happen. And if that is feared, then there is no option but to surrender position after position. And that could lead to a loss of all the achievements of socialism.
I also wonder whether we should implement some measures of an economic nature. What do the Polish comrades think? We help them, we tear things away from ourselves and our friends in order to give to Poland, but the Polish people do not know that. No Poles know that it receives all its oil, cotton and so on from us. If all the aid the Poles receive from the Soviet Union were to be counted up and considered seriously, if this were revealed on the radio and television, I believe the Polish people would understand who supplies their basic economic aid. But not one single Polish leader has appeared before the workers and revealed this.
As for the Polish leaders, I think it is difficult to decide which of them is better. At one time we considered Comrade Jaruzelski to be a firm leader, but he turned out to be a weakling.
[…]
BREZHNEV. We should tell them what proclaiming martial law means, explain it properly.
ANDROPOV. Yes we should explain that martial law means the establishment of a curfew, limiting movement along city streets, and reinforcing the guarding of governmental and party premises, enterprises, and suchlike. Jaruzelski has crumbled completely under pressure from Solidarity, and Kania has started drinking more and more lately. It’s a sad situation. I believe that we have enough reasons to advance in talks with Kania and Jaruzelski. They should probably hear them.
At the same time, I would like to say that the events in Poland are having an effect on the western areas of our country. Among others, in Belorussia many villages get good reception of Polish radio and television broadcasts. Moreover, there have been spontaneous demonstrations in other areas such as Georgia, groups of loudmouths gather on the streets in groups, as happened in Tbilisi, shouting anti-Soviet slogans and so forth. We need to implement strict internal measures here too.
And it is true that from the very beginning of the crisis, very radical measures were taken in Moscow to prevent the spread of the Polish disease. Tourist exchange with Poland was reduced almost by half (28 November 1980, St 239/36); measures were implemented for additional censorship of the Polish press delivered to the USSR for retail sale (22 December 1980, St 242/61) or by subscription, and propaganda was stepped up.288 Attempts were made to undermine the authority of Solidarity abroad, especially among friendly organizations and parties. Ponomarev reported (13 January 1981, 18-S-62):289
A Solidarity delegation (eighteen persons headed by L. Walesa) shall be in Italy on 14–18 January at the invitation of local trade unions. The delegation will also include representatives of the anti-socialist-inclined political opposition. According to available information, bourgeois parties and the mass media intend to provide broad coverage to the presence of this delegation in Italy in order to discredit the socialist system in the Polish People’s Republic in support of a line aimed at destabilizing and finally liquidating the socialist achievements in Poland. To this end, reception of the members of the delegation is planned to take place at sufficiently high trade union and political levels. Apart from a meeting with the Pope in the Vatican, L. Walesa and his delegation will be received by the leadership of the United Federation of Trade Unions and will organize meetings with workers’ collectives. Despite the original intention of the leadership of the Italian Communist Party to refuse a meeting with L. Walesa, the leadership is still hesitating and does not exclude the possibility of certain contacts with him.
We deem it feasible to approach the leadership of the Italian Communist Party, which has strong positions in the Italian trade union movement and exercises significant influence on the political circles of the country.
We could also instruct the Soviet ambassador in Italy to meet with [Enrico] Berlinguer or his deputy to point out the need to take all possible steps to ensure that L. Walesa’s trip to Italy does not result in support for the political anti-socialist opposition.
East European leaders (especially Honecker) had expressed great concern regarding the possible spread of the infection while visiting Moscow for the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU (12 March 1981, Pb).
Unfortunately, the leaders of Solidarity themselves did not comprehend the importance of exporting their experience into other “barracks.” It was only much later, at the first Solidarity congress in September 1981, that the famous “Appeal to the Workers of Eastern Europe” was adopted, and even then, it is said, it was quite by chance, on the initiative of rank-and-file members. Yet it was this that drew attention as the most mature political act. As can be imagined, the Kremlin was absolutely infuriated (10 September 1981*, Pb):
BREZHNEV. Yesterday I saw the “Appeal to the Peoples [sic] of Eastern Europe,” which was adopted by the congress of Polish Solidarity. It is a dangerous and provocative document. The words are few, but they all hit the same target. Its authors wish to provoke unrest in socialist countries and stir up groups of all kinds of renegades. I do not think criticism in the press is sufficient response to this brazen challenge. What if this demagogy is refuted by the collectives of our large enterprises, such as the Kirov Plant, Magnitka, KamAZ, and others? Their letters addressed to Solidarity would be hard to hush up. Particularly if we give them prominent coverage in our mass media.
If the comrades agree, let us charge the committee on Poland with determining suitable enterprises and assist them in preparing a qualified rebuff to Solidarity. …
ZIMYANIN. I would inform the Politburo of the publications that are planned in connection with the Solidarity congress. It can be said that the congress demonstrates the increasing deterioration of the situation in Poland. It is already known that they have appealed to the parliaments and people of several countries, including socialist ones, with their “renewal” program. For that reason, relevant responses are being prepared along the line of our press and TASS. These materials shall expose the activities of the Solidarity trade union. I support Leonid Ilyich’s proposal regarding the possibility that these materials shall expose the activities of the Solidarity trade union. I agree with Leonid Ilyich that we should give a voice to some of the collectives of our leading enterprises. We shall also try to prepare these [documents].
TIKHONOV. We have to react somehow, and react specifically to the acts of these hooligan elements in Poland, against whom the government is taking no steps. Apart from the fact that statues to our soldiers are being defaced, the leaders of our party and government are being lampooned, insulting the Soviet Union in as many ways as possible and more of the same. In other words, they are laughing at us. I do not think we can remain silent any longer, and we must lodge a protest to the Polish government along state or other lines. In my opinion, it is impossible not to react.
GROMYKO. This needs careful thought. We are talking about a friendly country.
GORBACHEV. I think that Leonid Ilyich’s proposal regarding a reaction by collectives of our large enterprises in the press and exposure of the actions of Solidarity is quite correct.
GRISHIN. Such declarations should be organized and published in Pravda and other papers. We shall call upon such collectives as ZiL, the Hammer and Sickle [Serp I molot], and other large industrial plants.
So the plan went out to all the plants and factories in the country: workers’ meetings, angry tirades, and resolutions of condemnation. But no matter what the intentions were of the sage leaders, the information blockade of events in Poland was thereby lifted, people started to talk and think, and who knows what conclusions they might have reached had this process started sooner? Unfortunately, the Solidarity leaders were too cautious, wary of provoking such a powerful neighbor, although it would seem clear that Big Brother would do whatever he wanted even without any additional provocation.
Let us return to the secret meeting of comrades Andropov and Ustinov with comrades Kania and Jaruzelski in Brest. It was really this meeting that was to resolve the matter of future martial law. Upon their return, the comrades reported the results to the Politburo (9 April 1981*, Pb):
ANDROPOV. Comrade D.F. Ustinov and I traveled to a meeting with our Polish comrades in Brest, and met in a railway carriage just outside the city. The meeting began at 9 p.m. and ended at 3 a.m. so that the Polish comrades would remain undetected and nobody would know they had been away.
Our task was to listen to the Polish comrades attentively and give our relevant thoughts, as agreed at the Politburo meeting.
Our general impression from this meeting is that our comrades were very tense, highly nervous, and it was clear that they were under great stress. Comrade Kania admitted candidly that they are finding it very hard to manage affairs and that they are under constant pressure from Solidarity and anti-socialist forces. However, they claimed that after the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU, the situation in Poland is stabilizing. Kania said that they had carried out membership and election meetings in most grassroots party organizations, and it is worth noting that not one single member of Solidarity was among the delegates, that is, our candidates were elected for the congress. Then Kania was forced to admit that subsequent events, including the warning strike and events in Bydgoszcz, showed that “the counterrevolution is stronger than we are”. They were particularly fearful of the warning strike and even more of a general strike and were doing all they could to avert a general strike. …
These are the problems we face, said Comrade Kania. The first priority is restoration of the trust of the people in the party, straightening out the economy, and ending strikes and idle time at industrial enterprises. Of course, the Polish comrades have no experience in combating these negative manifestations, so they do not know what to do and lurch from side to side. With regard to the entry of armed forces, they stated directly that this was totally impossible, as is the declaration of martial law. They say that they would be misunderstood, and they would be powerless to do anything. The comrades stressed that they would use their own resources to restore order. They mean the Ninth Congress, preparations for which are underway, will not allow Solidarity to include its candidates as delegates. Good workers are elected by party organizations to attend the congress as delegates. …
As for martial law, it could have been declared a long time ago. What would this mean? It would help them to smash the advance of counterrevolutionary elements and all kinds of rabble-rousers and to put an end to strikes and anarchy in the economy once and for all. Our comrades have drawn up draft documents concerning the declaration of martial law, and these documents should be signed. The Polish comrades responded, “How can we sign these documents if they must first go through the Sejm?” and so on. We said, “There is no need for anything to go through the Sejm, this would be the document according to which you will act when you declare martial law, and now it is necessary for you—Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski—to sign them personally so that we shall know that you are in agreement with it and will know what to do during martial law. If martial law has to be declared, there will be no time to waste in devising measures for implementing martial law, they must be prepared in advance. That is what we are talking about.”
After our clarification, Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski said that they will study and sign the document on 11 April.
We then asked about the content of Jaruzelski’s address to the Sejm. Jaruzelski spoke at length and not very coherently. He said that he would indicate a two-month prohibition of strikes. We asked what he meant by two months, and what was supposed to happen after that? “Two months will fly past, and the strikes will resume. You promise your workers a lot, then fail to deliver, giving more reasons for distrust of the party.”
The question of implementing widespread political measures is particularly important at present. For instance, regarding the issue that you have shortages of bread and other foodstuffs. Why is this happening? Because strike after strike has disorganized the national economy and this is the reason for shortages. Every strike costs the country millions upon millions of zlotys, but the average worker does not know this and blames everything on the government, the CC of the party, and the Politburo, while the instigators, the organizers of the strikes, stand aside and appear to be the protectors of workers’ interests. But, we say, if you look at the matter in its entirety, then the main guilty party for all the economic ills is Solidarity and the strike organizers. That is the crux of the problem. Why not bring that to the attention of the workers?
There is much talk of creating a national front for the salvation of Poland. Discussion of this is being conducted in several districts. It is envisaged that such a front would include veterans of the revolutionary movement, military leaders such as Rola-Zymierski, and others. This could be written in. Or, for instance, there is now talk in the FRG about the return of Silesia and Gdansk, territories joined to Poland, to the FRG. Why not play up this question? I believe that the people would close ranks on such issues. The people must be stirred up.
We said that we have no objections to the formation of a national front for the salvation of Poland. But this front should not be a substitute for the party and the government. …
The Polish comrades mentioned the possibility of bringing three workers into the Politburo. They cited Lenin, who suggested bringing workers into the Politburo. We replied that we have never had workers in the Politburo. But if you really have such a need, then there could be an introduction of not necessarily three, but maybe one worker into the Politburo. An additional number of workers could be brought into the CC in order to facilitate the rallying and unity of the party. For instance, you have mentioned recruiting workers into popular control. Not a bad measure.
[…]
We said directly to Kania, “You keep retreating every day, but action is needed, military measures and emergency measures must be affirmed.” …
As for the support of the Politburo. On whom can the Politburo depend for support? The army numbers 400 thousand men, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of the USSR has—100 thousand and 300 thousand reservists, making that 800 thousand in all. Kania said that tension has eased and they managed to prevent a general strike. But it is hard to say how long this calmer situation will last.
What are they doing after our meeting? It must be admitted that they are doing something. Kania is on his way to Gdansk. Jaruzelski is revising his address to the Sejm. However, Kania and Jaruzelski hold very different views on specific questions. Comrade Jaruzelski repeated his request to be relieved of the post of Prime Minister. We made it clear to him that he must remain at that post and perform his duties honorably. We stressed that the opposition is gathering forces to seize power.
On the other hand, other Politburo members—Comrades [Stefan] Olszowski and [Tadeusz] Grabski—have a somewhat different, more hard-line position than the leadership. We need to work with them. Among other things, they propose to create a clandestine Politburo and carry on work. They say that they got this idea from Comrade Zhivkov. I do not know how true that is, but they claim comrade Zhivkov gave them this advice. We should also realize that if the leaders of fraternal parties are making such recommendations to our Polish friends, we shall have nothing to gain, but can only lose.
SUSLOV. Maybe we should prepare information for fraternal parties.
GROMYKO. Under no circumstances should it become known that this meeting took place.
ANDROPOV. Speaking about the meeting is absolutely impossible.
USTINOV. Yu.V. Andropov has given a comprehensive report, so I would just like to mention something briefly. First, the first thing we noticed was the depressed state of our partners. But I feel that despite everything, we need these two—retain Kania and Jaruzelski and reinforce relations between them. The situation is that they have disagreements in the Politburo. In the first place, they are shaken by strikes; they are very frightened of them. We asked why they had changed their decision regarding Bydgoszcz. Initially they had not wanted to give up in the Bydgoszcz conflict, and then they retreated. They assured us that they’d had the threat of a general strike hanging over their heads. We then asked why they pay workers during strikes. They said that this was demanded by Solidarity. That means you are on Solidarity’s leash, we said. They have reached no decision regarding rural Solidarity, but have in fact acknowledged the existence of this organization. …
In order to dispel their fears regarding the declaration of a state of emergency or martial law, we cited the example that in many countries, the moment there is an uprising or disorders of some kind, a state of emergency or martial law is proclaimed. Take Yugoslavia, when there were demonstrations in Kosovo; a state of emergency was declared, and nobody objected. We cannot understand why the Poles are so afraid of it.
Yuri Vladimirovich spoke very well about declaring a state of emergency. We said that the plan drawn up by our comrades should be signed.
Then I told them straight out what we agreed on in the Politburo, what will happen in Poland if things begin to boil over, and in what kind of an economic situation the country will find itself. “After all, at the moment Poland receives all its oil at almost half price from the Soviet Union. It also receives cotton, iron ore, and many other goods. What will happen if these supplies cease? Why is this fact not known, not clarified to the workers? After all, this is a powerful weapon. This must be pointed out to the workers and to Solidarity. At this time, Solidarity has dug in at the largest industrial plants. These plants must be taken back from Solidarity. You have excellent plants and factories in which the workers support the leadership. For example, the plant manufacturing television sets. You can and must support branch trade unions, work actively with them.” Afterwards Jaruzelski told me privately once more that he cannot work, he does not have enough strength, and pleaded to be relieved of his post.
The question of just how real was the threat of a Soviet invasion was the key issue of the Polish crisis. The behavior of the leaders of Solidarity, the reaction of Poles to the declaration of a state of emergency, and the stance of the West all hinged on it. It also remained the subject of heated debates after the collapse of the regime, in the period of “round tables” between Solidarity leaders and the party’s top figures in the spring of 1989, which determined the current situation in Poland. Even now, when some of the minutes cited above have been published in Poland, public opinion inclines toward seeing Jaruzelski as a hero of some sort, who saved the country from the horrors of a Soviet occupation and the attendant shedding of blood, national humiliation, and even a loss of statehood. Even after it became clear that Moscow had no intention of invading, the Poles still seem to believe that Jaruzelski knew nothing of this and, therefore, was a hero who saved Poland. Need it be said that this is a typical self-serving lie that suited the majority—both former communist activists and numerous Poles who, one way or another, saw the state of emergency as the lesser evil? Even the former leaders of Solidarity used it as justification for their reaching an accommodation with the party leaders at the round table. As a result, the savior of the homeland and father of the people General Wojciech Jaruzelski lives peacefully in Warsaw.
I do not know whether all the CC documents were published in Poland, but the ones in front of me leave no doubt: Moscow had prepared no invasion of Poland, and Jaruzelski knew this perfectly well. Furthermore, having no great trust in the Polish army, by the end of the 1980s he had made numerous requests for the entry of Soviet forces and received a decisive refusal from the Kremlin. He proclaimed an emergency situation only when he realized that no military aid from Moscow was forthcoming.
A detailed analysis of the situation in Poland and Soviet strategy relating to it was made by the Politburo of the CC CPSU in April 1981, soon after the secret meeting in Brest. They wrote (23 April 1981*, Pb 7/VII):
The internal crisis in Poland has assumed a protracted, chronic nature. The Polish United Workers’ Party has lost a significant amount of control over the processes occurring in the country. At the same time, Solidarity has become an organized political force, capable of paralyzing the activity of party and state agencies and actually seizing power. If the opposition is refraining from this, it is mainly because of fears that Soviet forces will enter the country and because they hope to achieve their aims without loss of blood by means of a creeping counterrevolution.
However, it is perfectly clear that the calm after the Sejm session will be short-lived. The opposition has accepted it for tactical reasons while continuing to gather strength to strike new blows at the party. […] Solidarity as a whole and certain sections of it in particular are preparing to blackmail the authorities again by issuing new demands of a predominantly political nature. The signs of emerging differences in the layers of this professional association provide insufficient grounds to expect any substantial change in its overall orientation. Even if there were to be a schism between Walesa and extremists from the CBS-CDF, Walesa and the Catholic clergy backing him have no intention of relaxing their pressure on the party. There is also the possibility that the extremists may seize control of Solidarity with all the inevitable consequences.
A new tactical consideration has emerged lately, which unites practically all the variegated opposition. Realizing that the geopolitical situation of Poland precludes its participation in the Warsaw Pact and the principle of the leading role of the communist party, these forces have obviously decided to attempt to destroy the Polish United Workers’ Party from within, bring about its rebirth, and then seize power “on legitimate grounds.”
[…] In view of the above, we need to weigh our attitude to the policy of the Polish leadership again and reach a clearer idea of which forces can be relied on to preserve the achievements of socialism in Poland.
As the document goes on to say, on one hand, there was the “right wing,” composed mainly of “revisionist-minded” activists, closer to social democratic ideas and actually linking with Solidarity. On the other hand, on the “left wing” were comrades “closest to our positions,” made up mainly of old party members.
Unfortunately, representatives of this inclination are far from being in the majority. They create the impression that they see the way out of the crisis in the form of a frontal attack on Solidarity, without taking the current juxtaposition of forces into account. Moreover, they see no chance for an improvement in the situation without the entry of Soviet forces into the country. Objectively, this results in their growing isolation in the party and in the country.
The Politburo saw a way out of the crisis in supporting Kania and Jaruzelski, who occupied a “centrist position.” Even though they displayed “insufficient firmness and experience in the struggle against counterrevolutionary forces and make unjustified concessions in confrontation with them,” that was the best option available.
Both of them, especially Jaruzelski, have authority in the country. At present there are practically no other activists to exercise party and state leadership.
Therefore the Politburo came to a decision to:
… continue political support of Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski, who, despite obvious wavering, are coming to the defense of socialism. At the same time, it is necessary to strive to make them take more consecutive and decisive actions in the interests of resolving the crisis on the basis of preserving Poland as a socialist country that is friendly to the Soviet Union.
Apart from this and other recommendations regarding reinforcement of the unity of the Polish United Workers’ Party, ties with the working class, economic measures, and suchlike, the Politburo advises to:
… make more active use of the putative differences between Solidarity leaders, expose the anti-socialist, antinational activity of the CDS-CDF and their leaders, and strive toward the isolation of these counterrevolutionaries. Take decisive steps against efforts to raise a wave of anti-Sovietism among the population.
Encourage the Polish leadership to show constant care regarding the condition of the army and MVD USSR agencies, their moral and political stability, and their readiness to do their duty in defense of socialism. […] Make maximum use of the factor reining in the counterrevolution of the fear of internal reactionaries and international imperialism regarding the possibility that the Soviet Union may bring its forces into Poland. In external policy declarations, stress L.I. Brezhnev’s statement at the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU concerning our firm intention not to abandon Poland in its time of trouble and to allow nobody to injure it.
So it is obvious that the Soviet threat was nothing more than a bluff, raised to the level of government policy. What was really planned was an emergency situation on which the bets were placed (as well as on a possible schism in the Solidarity leadership). Furthermore, this was a decision that was never rescinded; only minor adjustments were made from time to time. By September 1981 it was obvious that Kania was unable to handle his task despite Brezhnev’s threats to have him dismissed (18 June 1981, Pb). It got to the point that Honecker suggested holding a meeting of fraternal parties in Moscow, inviting Kania, and urging him to resign in favor of Olszowski (17 September 1981, Pb). But even here the Politburo decided not to change its line: it appointed Jaruzelski. The latter understood full well why he had been made First Secretary as well as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. This was something of which Brezhnev reminded him in a phone call on the day of his “election” (19 October 1981*, Pb 1942):
BREZHNEV. Hello, Wojciech.
JARUZELSKI. Hello, deeply respected, dear Leonid Ilyich.
BREZHNEV. My dear Wojciech, we have already sent you a congratulatory message, but I would like to congratulate you personally on your election to the post of First Secretary of the CC of the Polish United Workers’ Party.
You did right to agree to this decision. There is nobody in the party with authority equaling yours—the votes at the plenum make that plain. We realize that you are facing a very difficult task. But we are certain that you will cope with it and do everything possible to overcome the rampant disease affecting your country.
I think the main thing now is for you to find reliable assistants from among devoted and committed communists, bring them together, stir the entire party into action, and inspire them with a combative spirit. That is the key to success.
It is vital to implement your intentions regarding decisive action against the counterrevolutionaries without wasting time. We hope that everyone—both in Poland and abroad—will feel that things are going to be much different now. That the situation is on the mend.
I wish you good health and success!
JARUZELSKI. Thank you very much, my dear Leonid Ilyich, for your greetings and first of all for your confidence in me. I tell you frankly that I agreed to take up this post after a lengthy inner struggle and only because I knew that you would support me and support this decision. If that were not the case, I would never have agreed. This is a very heavy, difficult task in the current situation in the country, of which I am now Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. But I realized that this is all right and necessary if you think so personally.
BREZHNEV. Wojciech, we have thought so for a long time. We have spoken about this with friends on numerous occasions.
JARUZELSKI. That is why I agreed. As a communist and a soldier, Leonid Ilyich, I shall do my best to make things improve, to reach a turning point in the country and the party. I understand and agree with you that this is a decisive moment—the selection of leadership in the party, and the government. That is why I have deferred the decision on cadres to the next plenum, which we shall conduct in a few days, in order to think carefully, to consult, so that this will be a complex decision, and not just individual measures concerning cadres.
BREZHNEV. Cadres are very important, both in the center and locally.
JARUZELSKI. This question will also have to be decided locally. Of course, this must be done in parallel with reinforcement of the party in the spirit of active struggle. In suitable circumstances, resolute measures should be employed to do battle where there is certainty of success.
I am off now to a meeting of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces in the Ministry of Defense. I shall outline the tasks facing us. We shall include the army in all spheres of the life of the country.
After yesterday’s plenum, I had a meeting with the first secretaries of local committees and said that they should not be concerned that we shall include the armed forces in carrying out certain procedures, we shall increase meetings between officers in meetings with the working class in order to have direct influence on workers and alienate them from the influence of Solidarity. Naturally we are not changing our general direction in the sense that struggling for the healthy forces of the people who have misguidedly joined Solidarity, we shall attract them to our side and at the same time strike the opponent in a way that will bring results.
I shall be meeting your ambassador today. I will try to discuss certain matters with him in more detail and ask for your advice on questions that he will report to you.
In informing you of all the decisions that we make, we shall report at the same time on what grounds these decisions were reached.
Our greatest difficulty at the moment is the market. This is the cause of numerous strikes and protests, including those organized by Solidarity, but some are purely spontaneous. This complicates the implementation of some inevitable measures and complicates our work, as the mood of the population is not the best. But we shall do everything possible to improve the situation.
This is what I wanted to report to you immediately, to keep you informed. Thank you again for your kind words.
BREZHNEV. Once more, Wojciech, I wish you good health and success.
JARUZELSKI. Thank you. Goodbye.
Can you say that these are the words of a man who does not understand what is happening? Everyone understood everything perfectly. The Politburo awaited the results tensely. A mere ten days had passed since Jaruzelski’s appointment, but the men in the Kremlin began to worry that there were no noticeable changes (29 October 1981*, Pb).
GROMYKO. With regard to Poland, I have just spoken with Ambassador Aristov. He said that the one-hour strike was very impressive. Solidarity is virtually in charge at many enterprises. Even those who want to work cannot do so, as Solidarity extremists block those who want to work, issuing threats of all kinds to them.
As for the plenum, comrade Aristov reports that it went by normally and an additional two secretaries were elected. At the Sejm, which resumes work on October 30, they shall pose the question of limiting strikes. How this law will work out is too early to say, but at least efforts are being made to limit strikes by legislation. Comrade Jaruzelski’s address at the plenum was not bad at all.
BREZHNEV. I do not believe that Comrade Jaruzelski did anything constructive. I think that he is not sufficiently brave. … In one conversation Schmidt let slip that the situation developing in Poland is very dangerous and may affect my visit to the FRG, which may not take place.
ANDROPOV. The Polish leaders are talking of military aid from fraternal countries. But we must stick firmly to our line: our troops shall not enter Poland.
USTINOV. In any case, we must say that our armed forces cannot go into Poland. They, the Poles, are not prepared to accept our forces. At the moment, there is a demobilization of servicemen who have completed their terms. Moreover, the demobilized are allowed to return to their homes to collect civilian clothing and then return for service at work for another two months. This is when they are worked on by Solidarity. As we know, Jaruzelski organized operative groups of around 3 persons. But these groups have done nothing so far. This probably calls for a meeting with the Polish leadership, including Jaruzelski personally. The question is, whom shall we be meeting?
RUSAKOV. The Sejm starts work tomorrow, and will tackle the question of granting the government something like emergency powers to decide certain matters. Jaruzelski would really like to come to Moscow.
Jaruzelski did not get his trip to Moscow, but Brezhnev sent him a “verbal missive” through the ambassador, which stated among other things that (21 November 1981, Pb 37/21):
In many discussions with our side, we have stressed the same thought repeatedly: we are not opposed to agreements. But they must not contain concessions to opponents of socialism. The main thing is that the business should not focus on mere agreements: alongside measures to win broad popular masses and various political forces over to your side, resolute measures must be implemented against open enemies of the people’s system. You have agreed with this view and said that you intend to fight for the workers and strike the class opponent at the same time. … Now it appears that the emphasis is placed only on the first part of that dual formula. We know that there are leaders who are placing their hopes on Kania’s bankrupt course. It would be dangerous to listen to their persuasions. It is clear now that without a decisive struggle with the class enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in Poland. In essence, the question is not whether there will or will not be a confrontation, but who will start it, by which means it shall be waged, and who will seize the initiative.
As we see, not a word about Soviet troops.
Finally, on 10 December—three days before the proclamation of martial law in Poland—the Politburo still did not know for certain what Jaruzelski would do (10 December 1981*, Pb). This is perhaps the most interesting and convincing document:
RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday there was a meeting of the secretaries of the Voevodship committees. Comrade Aristov has reported that the secretaries are at a loss to understand Comrade Jaruzelski’s address, which gave no clear, precise line. Nobody knows what will happen in the next few days. There was talk of “Operation X.” At first it was said that this would take place on the night from the eleventh to the twelfth, then from the twelfth to the thirteenth. The latest indication is that it will be around the twentieth. The plan is that the chairman of the Council of State [of the Republic of Poland], Jablonski, shall declare martial law on radio and television. At the same time, Jaruzelski stated that the law on the declaration of martial law can be implemented only after it has been discussed in the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is scheduled for 15 December. This complicates everything. The agenda of the Sejm session has been publicized. It contains no mention of martial law. But in any case, Solidarity is perfectly aware that the government intends to declare martial law, and is taking all necessary steps to prepare for it.
Jaruzelski says himself that he intends to make an address to the Polish people. But he will not talk about the party; he will appeal to the nation’s patriotic feelings. Jaruzelski speaks about the need to declare a military dictatorship, as happened under Jozef Pilsudski, indicating that the Polish people will understand this better than anything else.
Jaruzelski also cites Comrade Kulikov, who, he claims, said that the USSR and allied states will render military aid to Poland. As far as I know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly; he simply repeated the words once said by L.I. Brezhnev, that we would not desert Poland in its time of need.
As for what is occurring in the Voevodships, it must be said that the power of party organizations there is nonexistent. Administrative power is still present, but only to a certain degree. In fact, all power is in the hands of Solidarity. It looks as though Jaruzelski is simply giving us the runaround, as his words do not reflect any proper analysis. Unless they organize themselves quickly, and do not repel the pressure from Solidarity, there will be no success in improving the situation in Poland.
ANDROPOV. From discussions with Jaruzelski, it is clear that they still have no firm decision to introduce martial law, and despite the unanimous approval of the CC of the Polish United Workers’ Party and the Politburo of the CC of the party regarding the proclamation of martial law, we have seen no concrete measures implemented by the leadership to date. Solidarity extremists have the party leadership by the throat. In recent days, the Church has also made its position clear. It has virtually joined the side of Solidarity.
It stands to reason that in such circumstances the Polish comrades need to prepare quickly for Operation X and set it in motion. At the same time, Jaruzelski says that they shall implement Operation X only if forced to do so by the actions of Solidarity. This is a very alarming symptom. Especially in view of the fact that the last meeting of the CC of the party and the decision it adopted regarding the introduction of martial law shows that the Politburo is much more decisive. All the members of the Politburo spoke out in favor of more resolute action. This decision pinned Jaruzelski to the wall, and he is now forced to find a way to wriggle out of the situation. I spoke with [Miroslaw] Milewski yesterday and asked him what measures are intended, and for when. He said that he knows nothing about a specific date for launching Operation X. This would appear to indicate that Jaruzelski is either hiding the plan for specific actions from his comrades or is simply trying to evade taking this action.
I would like to note now that Jaruzelski is giving us quite demanding economic requests as a condition for conducting Operation X and, I would say, poses the matter of military aid, albeit indirectly.
If we look at the list of goods the Polish comrades want us to provide, let us say that it gives rise to serious qualms about how necessary the provision of these goods really is. For example, what can the provision of fertilizers and certain other goods have to do with Operation X? In connection with this I would say that our position, as formulated at the last meeting of the Politburo, and on numerous earlier occasions expressed by Leonid Ilyich, is correct and there is no need to deviate from it. In other words, we stand on the position of international aid, we are concerned by the situation in Poland, but the implementation of Operation X is a matter for the Polish comrades to decide, and whatever their decision is, so be it. We shall not insist on it, or try to talk them out of it.
As for economic aid, we shall find it difficult to provide the requested amount. It looks as though something should be provided. But I repeat that the supply of goods in the form of economic aid is a brazen one, and this is all being done so that if we fail to supply something, we shall be blamed. If Comrade Kulikov really did speak of bringing in troops, I think he made a great error. This is a risk we cannot take. We do not intend to send troops to Poland. This is the right decision, and we must stick to it to the end. I do not know how events will develop in Poland, but even if it falls under the power of Solidarity, that will be one matter. But if capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet Union, and they already have relevant agreements on economic and political sanctions, it will be very hard for us. We have to take care of the needs of our country, to strengthen the Soviet Union. This is our primary line. …
As for communications from the Soviet Union to the GDR through Poland, we need to do something to guard them.
GROMYKO. We are now discussing the situation in Poland very harshly. I doubt that we have done so before. This is because we have no idea what turns the situation in Poland might take. The Polish leadership realizes that power is sliding out of its hands. Kania and Jaruzelski were expecting support from neutrals. Now there are really no neutrals left. The position has emerged quite clearly: Solidarity has declared itself as a definite counterrevolutionary organization, aiming for power and stating openly its intention to seize that power. The Polish leadership must decide whether to surrender its positions if it fails to implement resolute measures, or take such measures, proclaim martial law, isolate the Solidarity extremists from Solidarity, and restore order. There is no other way.
What is our attitude to events in Poland? I quite agree with the opinions expressed by the comrades present. We might tell the Poles that we look upon events in their country with understanding. This is a standard formulation, and we have no grounds to change it. At the same time, we should try to douse the aspirations of Jaruzelski and other leaders regarding sending in armed forces. There can be no such thing. I think we can instruct our ambassador to visit Jaruzelski and inform him accordingly.
Despite the sufficiently unanimous decision of the Politburo of the CC of the Polish United Workers’ Party regarding the proclamation of martial law, Jaruzelski is wavering again. At first he seemed to take heart, and now he has weakened. Everything he once said remains in force. If they continue to waver in the fight against the counterrevolution, there will be nothing left of socialist Poland. The introduction of martial law would show the firm intentions of the Polish leadership to the opposition. If the measures they intend to implement are carried out, I think we can expect positive results. … I believe that at this time we should abstain from any harsh instructions that would force them to take certain actions. I think that we shall take up the right position in this case: restoring order in Poland is the task of the Polish United Workers’ Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We told our Polish friends, and will continue to do so, that firm positions must be maintained and that they should not feel disheartened.
Of course, if the Poles strike a blow at Solidarity, the West will probably refuse them credits and will provide no aid. This is what they have in mind, and this is something we should be aware of also. So Leonid Ilyich is quite right to suggest that we should charge a group of comrades with considering this question, allowing for our ability to provide Poland with a certain measure of economic aid.
USTINOV. The situation in Poland is definitely very bad. The situation becomes more complex with every passing day. The leadership, including the Politburo, lacks resolution and unity. All this affects the overall situation. At the last Politburo meeting there was a unanimous decision regarding the proclamation of martial law. Now everything is up to Jaruzelski, and how he will go about implementing it. Frankly speaking, nobody can say anything about Jaruzelski’s actions. We do not know anything either. I spoke with Siwizky and he said directly that none of them know what the general is thinking. So the man actually performing the obligations of the Polish Ministry of Defense does not know what will happen next, what actions shall be undertaken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the minister.
As for what Kulikov allegedly said regarding bringing troops into Poland, I can affirm with certainty that Kulikov said no such thing. He simply repeated what we and Leonid Ilyich said, that we shall not desert Poland. He knows perfectly well that the Poles themselves have asked that troops be not brought in.
With regard to our garrisons in Poland, we are reinforcing them. I am inclined to think that the Poles will not initiate confrontation, unless Solidarity takes them by the throat, in which case they will proceed.
[…]
SUSLOV. It is clear from what has been said here that we share the same opinion regarding events in Poland. Over this entire period we have been restrained and coolheaded. This was mentioned at the plenum by Leonid Ilyich. We said this openly to the people, and our people have supported the policy of the Communist Party.
[…] This made it clear to all peace-loving countries that the Soviet Union advocates a policy of peace firmly and consistently. That is the reason we cannot change our position concerning Poland, one we adopted from the very start of events in Poland. Let the Polish comrades determine what actions they should take. We should not push them toward more decisive measures. But we should continue to assure the Poles that we regard their actions with understanding.
It seems to me that Jaruzelski is being rather cunning. He wants to protect himself by the requests he is making to the Soviet Union. Naturally, we cannot physically fulfil these requests, and Jaruzelski can say later that he asked the Soviet Union for aid, but did not receive it.
At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the entry of military forces. If forces are brought in, that will precipitate a catastrophe. I think we are all agreed that there can be no question of bringing in troops.
On the matter of rendering aid to Poland, we have provided it to the tune of over a billion rubles. Quite recently we decided to send Poland 30 thousand metric tons of meat, of which 16 thousand metric tons have already been delivered. I do not know whether we shall be able to supply the total thirty thousand metric tons, but in any case we should probably add a certain number of metric tons of meat in the form of aid. …
GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is heading for further deterioration. The line of our party regarding the events in Poland is quite correct. … There is no question of sending in troops. Economic problems should be considered, and see what can be given to the Poles.
SUSLOV. We should expose the schemes of Solidarity and other counterrevolutionary forces in the press.
CHERNENKO. I agree with everything said by the present comrades. It is a fact that the line of our party and the Politburo of the CC regarding the Polish events, formulated in the addresses of L.I. Brezhnev and the decisions of the Politburo, is perfectly correct, and should not be changed.
I think we should decide today to:
- Take note of the information provided by Comrade [Nikolai] Baibakov.
- In our relations with the Polish Republic continue to pursue the general political line of the CPSU, also the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU dated 8 December 1981 and the exchange of views at the meeting of the Politburo of the CC on 10 December 1981.
- Instruct comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, [Vladimir] Dolgikh, [Ivan] Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying the question of economic aid for Poland, allowing for the views expressed at the meeting of the Politburo of the CC.
BREZHNEV. What is the opinion of the comrades?
ALL. Comrade Chernenko has formulated all the proposals correctly, they should be adopted. …
The resolution is adopted.
No doubt about it, the Soviet leaders were first-class players. Even I breathed a sigh of relief when I heard about martial law in Poland: Soviet intervention had seemed extremely likely at the time, the bloody consequences of which were hard to imagine. The well-equipped and trained half-million-strong Polish army, unlike its Czech colleagues twelve years earlier, would hardly have remained neutral. The reaction of the population needed no guessing. The point at issue was a war in central Europe with a population of thirty-five million that was famous for its stubbornness, decades of partisan activity, and hundreds of thousands of victims. In fact, a European version of Afghanistan. Is it possible that they do not understand this in the Kremlin? I wondered gloomily. Will they really unleash this madness?
Yet they ventured into Afghanistan, they crushed Hungary. As for “surrendering Poland,” that was surely something they could not countenance. Moreover, the matter was not limited to mere threats or Brezhnev’s words that they would not “desert Poland in its time of need”—no fewer than forty-four Soviet divisions were brought up to the Polish border. How must it have been for the Poles to live with this constant threat hanging over their heads? It is not surprising that the introduction of martial law offered them some relief—the lesser evil—and they tended to justify their army and Jaruzelski (now being hailed as the savior of the country). The enormous pressure of those days was probably best expressed in the Polish anecdote about a man drowning in the Vistula River and shouting at the top of his voice, “Help! Help!”
The crowd on the bridge above his head shouts in reply, “Quiet! Quiet! Do you want the Soviets to hear you and come to render ‘international aid’?”
Only this purely neurotic reaction can explain the amazing success of the martial law, the introduction of which passed almost without bloodshed. What can one say? The ability to make a situation they created seem like the lesser evil was something the Soviet regime had developed into a fine art. They were always the lesser evil—lesser than the typhoid and starvation of a civil war, lesser than Hitler, lesser than a nuclear war and even being invaded. And if there was nothing worse to be found, they made up “hawks” and “conservatives” in the Politburo who allegedly posed a threat to the “doves” and “reformers.” Other scares were devised under Gorbachev: the neo-Nazi Pamyat society, Zhirinovsky. … This stratagem was repeated dozens of times and, amazingly enough, it always worked.
It must be said that the Solidarity leaders were unprepared for martial law. The threat of repression had hung over them for too long and they were accustomed to it, and stopped preparing. With few exceptions, all their structures were seized practically in the first few days, and most of the leaders were arrested. This is understandable from a psychological point of view; what you wait for usually catches you unawares. It is amusing to recall now that during the night of introduction of martial law, I had been speaking on the phone with Polish dissident Adam Michnik. I said jokingly that judging by photos, he had gained a lot of weight and it was time to go on a diet—at which point the connection broke. I had no idea that at that moment all the telephones in Poland had been silenced, and poor Adam was fated to lose a great deal of weight during the next six months.
There is no avoiding making mention of eternal Polish carelessness: nobody had bothered to set up parallel “shadow” structures during the one and a half years of the crisis. Solidarity, with its millions of supporters and activists, simply ceased to exist overnight.
All in all, the Soviet calculations proved justified. Having done what they intended, they informed fraternal parties, acting like impartial observers (13 December 1981*, Pb 40/26):
As friends are aware, the Polish leadership declared martial law in the country, announced the creation of a Military Council of National Salvation and isolated the more extreme elements in Solidarity, the Confederation for an Independent Poland and other anti-socialist groups.
W. Jaruzelski’s address to the people leaves a good impression; in our opinion it places the right accents on the basic questions. Among other things it is especially important that the leading role of the Polish United Workers’ Party and the fidelity of Poland to its alliance obligations to the Warsaw Pact are confirmed.
The success of the operation was made possible by the Polish comrades’ maintaining strict secrecy. It was known only to a very limited circle in Jaruzelski’s entourage. Due to this the opponent was caught unprepared, and the operation is proceeding satisfactorily at this time.
On the eve of implementing the plan, Jaruzelski advised Moscow. He was told that the Soviet leadership views this decision by the Polish comrades with understanding. At the same time, we are proceeding on the assumption that our Polish friends will decide these matters with internal forces.
Our preliminary assessment is that the actions of Polish friends are an active step in rebuffing the counterrevolution and thereby echo the general line of fraternal countries.
These conditions raise the question of rendering political and moral support to Polish comrades, as well as economic aid. The Soviet leadership will continue to remain in contact with fraternal countries regarding the Polish question.
This was an inarguable success of the Soviet regime, but not a victory. It was too soon to celebrate: a Poland driven into the underground continued to resist; Western reaction, although less than it would have been in the case of an invasion, still undermined the Soviets’ positions. The main point was probably that martial law did not facilitate resolution of the reasons for the crisis in Poland—on the contrary, the crisis worsened and became even more hopeless. “Rescued Poland” became an unbearable burden for the Soviet regime. It is curious that at about this time the Politburo began to realize the hopelessness of its position (14 January 1982*, Pb):
BREZHNEV. … There has been martial law in Poland for a month. The first results are obvious. As Jaruzelski says, the backbone of the counterrevolution has been broken. However, more serious problems lie ahead.
Having restored relative order in the country, the Polish comrades must now address problems that may be called strategic—what to do with the trade unions, how to get the economy back on its feet, how to achieve a reversal in the consciousness of the masses, etc.
The most important question is the situation in the Polish United Workers’ Party. Friends are seeking the best approach to resolve it. It appears that Jaruzelski has no intention of dissolving or renaming the party, but intends to make use of the martial law situation to conduct a substantial purge. Maybe that will yield results.
It appears that the general has developed as a political figure and usually makes the right decisions. At times he seems too cautious, and acts with a wary eye on the West and the Church. But in the present circumstances, a frontal attack may ruin everything. In matters of principle, firm, harsh measures should go hand in hand with flexibility and circumspection. It is good that Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian experience of fighting the counterrevolution.
We all understand that the main condition for the full stabilization of the situation in Poland must be the revival of the economy. After 1968, the return to normality in Czechoslovakia occurred so quickly because this sector was practically untouched by the counterrevolution. This situation is the reverse.
Consequently, we are facing a difficult question—we are already at the limit of our possibilities with rendering aid to the Poles, but they keep sending new requests. We may have to do something, but we cannot give them large advances.
We have to answer Jaruzelski’s letter, telling him in a comradely spirit what we can and cannot do. Under all circumstances we have to make our supplies in the first quarter according to schedule, in the hardest winter months for the Poles. …
Incidentally, the Poles’ situation regarding food is not all that desperate. There is enough bread in the country; the peasants need to be approached in order to gain their interest, to establish, as we used to say, a link between the city and the village.
The Polish leadership also continues to rely on help from the West. In principle we cannot oppose this, although it is doubtful that the West will support a military power willingly. They will probably continue to try for concessions, and this is where we shall have to be particularly vigilant.
Jaruzelski also poses another question: Should aid be accepted from the Chinese? Why not? That will mean that China diverges from the USA with their economic sanctions.
In conclusion it can be said that the Polish question will remain at the center of international politics for a long time. Therefore our commission on Poland should keep on working as actively as before.
TIKHONOV. On the issue of building an underground railway, the Council of Ministers has already drawn up the relevant proposals and they have been submitted to the Politburo.
CHERNENKO. The proposal concerning our participation in building the underground railway in Warsaw is to be voted on in the Politburo. …
BREZHNEV. … As you see in his letter, Comrade Jaruzelski expresses deep gratitude for the fraternal aid rendered by the Soviet Union to the Polish People’s Republic. At the same time he requests the Soviet side to confirm the scope of supplies for 1982, as contained in the draft protocol for the coordination of plans of both countries for 1981 through 1985 concerning oil, gasoline, and petrochemicals. The scope of oil supplies in 1982 remains at the level of 13 million metric tons, and petrochemicals at 2.94 million metric tons, to ensure maximum supplies of fuel in the first quarter of 1982.
Comrade Jaruzelski also reports that he has appealed to the general secretaries of the CC of the Hungarian Communist Party, the GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, asking them to render Poland essential economic aid, including providing the domestic market with basic agricultural and industrial goods.
We have returned to the question of additional aid measures for Poland on numerous occasions. I have brought up this matter now for a simple exchange of opinions. It is obvious that this time again we will be unable to supply Poland with everything, but something must be found and something must be given. For this reason, on one hand, I ask the relevant comrades to speed up consideration of these questions and submit the corresponding materials to the Politburo. On the other hand, attempts must be made to resolve certain positions positively.
[…]
BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, I would like to raise two questions. The first concerns additional supplies of oil. I have taken a careful look at our resources, and there is no way to provide these additional supplies of fuel to Poland. I consider that we already provide Poland with an adequate amount of petrochemicals and they should manage with what they get.
The second question concerns the supply of grain for bread production. They have sufficient supplies of grain. They had a fairly good harvest this year, but the preparations for bread production are considerably lower than last year despite the good harvest.
ANDROPOV. They are requesting a certain amount of grain in order to return it in the second quarter.
SUSLOV. In other words, they are not making an additional request for grain, but one with return.
[…]
KIRILENKO. Of course it is hard for them to get any amount of grain from other countries, although they have bought some from Canada.
BREZHNEV. If there are no objections, we could adopt the following resolution:
Charge the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Gosplan of the USSR and the Ministry of Foreign Trade with examining the requests in Comrade Jaruzelski’s letter, bearing in mind the exchange of opinions at the past meeting of the Politburo. And submit the relevant proposals to the CC CPSU.
The proposal is approved.
It can be said that the Polish crisis was the first considerable demonstration of the general economic collapse of socialism, a harbinger of its future. After all, the question was not the appearance of Solidarity but the inability of the system to supply the country with necessary goods, and as the Politburo became increasingly aware, the entire socialist camp could not ensure the provision of even a temporary sufficiency of goods to Poland. The Polish crisis aggravated these problems, turning them into political issues: the question of whether Poland should or should not be a Soviet satrap came down to the point, strictly speaking, of whether the USSR could supply Poland with the required amount of oil, meat, grain, cotton, etc.
At first, this situation annoyed the Soviet leaders intensely, creating friction between those who were answerable for the economy and those who were answerable for politics, security, and ideology. Naturally, the reason did not lie in differing convictions, or in that one group was more dogmatic than another, but in that one group would speak of political expediency while others spoke of economic possibility (26 March 1981*, Pb):
ARKHIPOV. Regarding the situation in the national economy, Comrade Jaruzelski has reported that the 1981 plan is 20 percent below the preceding one for 1980. There are particular difficulties with coal. As you know, they export coal as a source of hard currency. Instead of the 180 million metric tons envisaged by the plan, they shall extract only 170 million metric tons under optimum conditions. The production of meat is falling by 25 percent, sugar by one and a half. Instead of 1.5 million metric tons they shall gather 950 million metric tons at the most.
Poland is now facing the rationing of bread and flour.
As for the financial situation, the Polish debt, mainly to capitalist countries, stands at $23 billion, of which $9 billion was received under guarantee from the relevant states. The remaining credit was taken by the Poles from private banks. There are four hundred such banks. Now our Polish friends face the fact of the purchase of $9.5 billion worth of various goods from abroad. All this will be at the cost of loans. Exports will comprise only $8.5 billion. Western countries are dragging out decisions on whether to grant Poland credit. They now need to pay $1.5 billion, mainly interest on loans. They ask us for $700 million. Of course, we cannot raise such a sum. We are currently supplying Poland with oil, gas, iron ore, etc.
In the course of the discussion, the Polish friends asked whether they should declare a moratorium on loans or join the International Monetary Fund and ask for additional loans from Western countries. Of course, in both cases this would be a concession to Western countries. It would have no economic effect. The Poles have no common opinion on these matters. They ask us for additional cotton and synthetic fibers. We have decided on a certain increase in cotton and synthetic fiber supply.
GROMYKO. The Polish comrades have stressed the acute nature of the question of the import of goods, as they cannot pay for them. It is characteristic that they show no serious appreciation of the supply of raw materials from the Soviet Union. It is as if they consider this a trifling matter. But in reality, all their cotton and iron ore come from us, as does oil.
ARKHIPOV. We supply Poland with 13 million metric tons of oil at 90 rubles per metric ton. If you take into account that the world price for oil is 170 rubles, we are short by 80 rubles for every metric ton. We could sell all that oil for hard currency, and the profits would be colossal.
In the meantime, things on the oil front were getting worse, and oil was the USSR’s main source of hard currency, just as coal was for the Poles. In order to rescue Poland, supplies to the other East European brothers had to be reduced, a measure they did not take well (29 October 1981*, Pb):
RUSAKOV. In the course of negotiations, the leaders of fraternal countries touched upon economic matters. The main issue is the reduction of energy carriers, primarily oil. Comrades [Janos] Kadar, [Gustav] Husak and Zhivkov did say that even though this will be hard for them, they treated our proposal with understanding, saying that they would seek ways out of the situation and accept our measures. For greater clarity I asked the comrades if I could advise the Politburo that they agree with the proposal I have put before them. They replied that yes, I could go ahead.
The conversation with Comrade Honecker was a different matter entirely. He said immediately that such a reduction in oil supply was unacceptable, that this would cause serious losses to the national economy and to the GDR as a whole, that it would be a serious blow to the economy of the GDR and they would have no way of making ends meet. He stated that the GDR may refuse, and asked for a written response to the two letters sent to Comrade Brezhnev. The matter became extremely complicated and remained undecided. Comrade Honecker pointed out once more that the GDR supplies us with bismuth and uranium, supports the Group of [Soviet] Forces, and that they are experiencing difficulties because Poland is not supplying the coal which should be delivered along our line. As a result of all this, as Comrade Honecker expressed it, the standard of living of the German people will be lowered, and the authorities will not know how to explain it. The leadership will be forced to review all its plans.
BREZHNEV. … As you know, we have decided to reduce oil supplies to our friends. They did not take this easily, especially Comrade Honecker, who, as you see, expects answers to the letters sent to us. The others do not expect an answer, but probably feel that we have changed our decision somehow.
Maybe at the next meeting with our friends on this matter, we should say that we are doing all we can to fulfil and even exceed the plan of oil supplies, and hope that we can accomplish this. In that case, we could make some changes to the planned supplies of energy carriers, but on no account create the impression that we are now retreating from our decision. …
With regard to oil supplies, I am particularly concerned about the GDR. I must say that socialist countries have taken our proposals hard. …
I simply do not know what our decision should be.
[ANDROPOV, SUSLOV, and KIRILENKO all say that they have to agree with what BREZHNEV just said.]
ARKHIPOV. We will also have difficulties with fuel. The miners will fall short of coal extraction by 30 million metric tons. How can that be compensated for? The oil industry will not exceed the plan, so we will have to cover this shortfall of 30 million metric tons somehow. Moreover, we are short 1.5 million metric tons of sugar, it will also have to be purchased, and 800 metric tons of vegetable oil, without which it is impossible to get by.
As for a reply to Comrade Honecker, I think comrade Rusakov’s proposal is the right one. We have to affirm that we cannot change the decision of which comrade Honecker has already been apprised.
As for the supply of uranium mentioned by Comrade Honecker, the uranium we receive from the GDR is not an answer to a problem, it comprises only 20 percent of the amount we use. Comrade Honecker does not take into account the fact that we are building nuclear power plants for the GDR, and that this is no small undertaking.
RUSAKOV. I would like to add that the Poles ask us to maintain the same supplies of oil and gas that they have this year.
ARKHIPOV. We are holding talks with the Poles and believe that our economic relations with them should be conducted on the principle of the balancing of plans. Of course, this will result in a significant reduction in oil supplies, insofar as they are not supplying us with coal and other products. Still, if all goes well, we are including the supply of oil at the current level in our calculations.
BAIBAKOV. All the socialist countries are trying to probe us now, taking their cue from the GDR, waiting to see how we will deal with the GDR. If Honecker manages to breach the wall, they will try to do the same. In any case, nobody has sent written replies yet. Over the past few days I have talked with the chairmen of all the State Planning bodies of socialist countries. They all want to retain the overall amount of oil supplies, with division into years. Some propose that oil could be replaced with other energy carriers.
It was not just oil, which was the mainstay of the empire; there were other problems as well. The most basic: meat. The problem with meat was what had started all the unrest in Poland, and it would seem that a year later an effort could have been made to swamp Poland with it. But no, there was nowhere to get meat, and that was that. A huge totalitarian empire, in which the word of the leaders is law, struggles but fails to provide thirty thousand metric tons of meat.
BREZHNEV. Have we sent the meat regarding which we adopted a resolution, and have we informed Jaruzelski about it?
RUSAKOV. Jaruzelski was informed, and he was the one who named the figure of thirty thousand metric tons.
ARKHIPOV. We shall send Poland meat from our state reserves.
BREZHNEV. Have there been any contributions of meat from the republics into the union reserve after my telegram?
ARKHIPOV. So far there has been nothing, Leonid Ilyich. Admittedly, not enough time has passed. I have talked to all the republics and can report that measures are being implemented everywhere to ensure fulfilment of the plan of supplies of meat to the state. Among others, such plans have come into force in Estonia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. The Ukrainians have not yet sent instructions to their regions.
CHERNENKO. But we sent our telegram to all the regions of Ukraine.
ARKHIPOV. We shall receive data by Monday, then we shall report how matters stand.
GORBACHEV. Leonid Ilyich, your telegram played a great role. First, all the republics and regions are giving serious consideration to measures that would ensure fulfilment of the plan. At least, according to data at our disposal as a result of phone calls to regional, district, and township committees, and the CCs of the communist parties of union republics, so the question is being discussed at the bureau level. We shall give an estimate on meat deliveries for 1 January.
BREZHNEV. I keep thinking that even though we gave the Poles 30 thousand metric tons of our meat, it is not really likely to help them. In any case, it is still unclear what will happen to Poland. …
The Politburo discussed these thirty thousand metric tons of meat over several more months: one day it might appear, the next day not. Telegrams flew hither and thither, runners rushed all over the place, telephone wires ran hot with furious bosses’ curses, but there was still no meat. Anyway, what are thirty thousand metric tons of meat compared to world revolution? Even at Western market prices they were unlikely to fetch more than $30 million. All of Poland should not be lost over such a trifling matter. But on 10 December, three days before the proclamation of martial law, Gosplan chairman Baibakov returned from Warsaw and reported the following (10 December 1981*, Pb):
As is known, we are assisting Poland with a delivery of thirty thousand metric tons of meat pursuant to the decision of the Politburo in response to a request from our Polish comrades. Of these thirty thousand, sixteen thousand metric tons are on their way abroad. It must be noted that the product—in this instance meat—is being sent in dirty railway wagons that have not been cleaned after transporting ore, and is of a disgusting appearance. When this meat is unloaded at Polish stations, there is real sabotage. The Soviet Union and the Soviet people are referred to by the Poles in unspeakable curses; they refuse to clean the wagons, etc. There is no limit to the insults directed at us.
Jaruzelski’s new requests on the eve of martial law were, as Andropov put it, “brazen.” But wasn’t Poland worth it? Moscow would gladly have parted with even more, but it had nothing to offer.
BAIBAKOV. … It must be said that the list of goods they include as our aid to their country comprises 350 items to the sum of 1.4 billion rubles. It also includes 2 million metric tons of grain, 25 thousand metric tons of meat, 625 thousand metric tons of iron ore, and numerous other goods. Allowing for what we were going to give to Poland in 1982, the total amount of aid to Poland shall comprise around 4.4 billion rubles with inclusion of the requests submitted by the Polish comrades.
The time is at hand for Poland to repay loans issued by Western countries. For this, Poland needs at least 2.8 billion convertible rubles. When I heard the Polish comrades ask for it and to what it amounts, I raised the issue that we should conduct our mutual economic relations on a balanced basis. I also pointed out that Polish industry is not fulfilling the plan to a significant degree. The coal-mining industry, which is the main source of hard currency, is in total disarray, no appropriate measures are being implemented, and the strikes continue. Now, even though there are no strikes, the mining of coal is still at a very low level.
Or, for example, peasant produce; they have grain, meat products, vegetables, and so on. However, they give nothing to the state; they are waiting to see what happens. Trade at private markets is fairly brisk at highly inflated prices.
I told the Polish comrades to their faces that they need to take more resolute steps in these circumstances. Maybe something like a surplus appropriation system should be introduced.
When it comes to grain, Poland harvested 2 million metric tons this year. The people are not starving. City dwellers go to markets and villages to buy the products they need. These products are all available.
… Realizing the state of the payments balance, the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on repayment to Western countries. If they do this, all Polish ships in the waters or docks in any country and all their assets in countries to which Poland is in debt will be seized. For this reason, the Poles have ordered captains of ships to leave port and remain in neutral waters. …
RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has given a very precise picture of the state of the Polish economy. What should we do? I think that we should supply Poland with the goods envisaged by the economic agreement, and this must not exceed the amount of goods that we supplied in the first quarter of last year.
BREZHNEV. Are we able to do this now?
BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, this can be done only by drawing on state reserves or by reducing supplies to the domestic market.
So how much did the “Polish crisis” cost the USSR? Of course, it is impossible to calculate all the expenditures, but economic aid alone, including loans for the purchase of goods and settlement of foreign debts, delayed payments, and gratis aid, comprised $2.934 billion in 1980–1981. And no subsequent year cost much less.
Nothing had changed in Poland four years later: the Politburo kept racking its brains about how to restore the leading role of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and how to quash the counterrevolution once and for all. Top-level Soviet delegations flew to Warsaw and gave valuable advice on “increasing work among the masses”; Jaruzelski appeared in Moscow from time to time—requesting additional aid. By 1984 even the most thick-skinned member of the Politburo realized that the situation was hopeless. As one of them said (25 April 1984, Pb):
It must be taken into account that Poland, calling itself a socialist country, was never socialist in the full sense of the word.
It is unlikely that any of the Soviet leaders could say for certain what “in the full sense of the word” means, or which fraternal country would qualify as such. Any of them could recite parrot-fashion what it means theoretically, but the practical side of the question upset all the schemes. One can only guess at which moment in history various leaders should have realized that the “model” they’d created was dysfunctional. Presumably Lenin understood this by 1921, when it became clear that there would be no worldwide socialist revolution. Stalin certainly would have reached this conviction in 1941, seeing the crash of his empire under the blows of the German army. Khrushchev probably never gave such questions much thought until he was deposed, but the enforced inactivity of his final years opened his eyes. But for Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Chernenko, Ustinov, Suslov and others, the Polish crisis was for them what 1941 was for Stalin.
It is true to say that the beginning of the 1980s exposed the putrefaction of the system. Afghanistan on one hand and Poland on the other, the increasing hostility of the West, the unsuccessful disarmament campaign, and in the center growing economic deterioration, mass disaffection, technical backwardness, and the all-pervasive corruption of the ruling apparatus. In total, this signaled the crisis of the system. After Poland, the Soviet leadership took a look at its own country through different spectacles (24 October 1980, St 233/8):
As instructed, the departments of the CC CPSU have analyzed the information coming into the Central Committee concerning the mistakes and conflicts between workers and administrations in individual enterprises, which have caused some downing of tools and other negative manifestations.
We deem it essential to report that the number of such negative occurrences in recent times has increased, which is a matter of serious concern. Analysis shows that most of them are due directly to breaches of the procedure of the established review of norms and wages, incorrect accrual and late payment of wages, especially of bonuses, poor working conditions, and careless treatment of workers’ complaints.
The symptom was malignant, even though strikes did not turn into mass occurrences. As a rule, the issues in question were local conflicts, affecting one shop floor or a shift, caused by brazen breaches of labor legislation by the administration. In 1979 there were around three hundred such occurrences. But the situation in Poland had a definite influence on the mood of workers.
It must be noted that in recent weeks there has been a growing number of refusals to work. In a number of places, refusals to perform work duties were not limited to the collective of one shift but spread to the next ones, involving a significant number of workers.
Predictably, the trade unions were reprimanded and ordered to take better care of their members. But how could this help if the trade unions, the administrations, and local party authorities had long fused into one apparatus whose primary responsibility was to ensure fulfilment of the plan? Moreover, the strikes were just the culmination of a growing dissatisfaction that had nothing to do with any specific labor dispute. First and foremost, there was the shortage of even the most basic products. It was all very well for the Poles to revolt over meat shortages; Soviet workers did not even dream of meat, they hardly had enough bread.
“Letters from citizens from various places have been received; they write, often in very harsh terms, about periodic irregularities in supplies of bread, the decrease in the assortment of available breadstuffs, and their low quality,” reported Chernenko (17 February 1981, St 250/9). How could workers not strike if “their attitude results from irregularities with bread supplies, in some places no bread is to be had for up to four days? Children rarely see white bread or rolls. There is no flour available for sale.”
Naturally, he pointed an accusing finger at inefficient local managers, and also peasants who were allegedly buying up grain to feed their personal livestock. But even Chernenko began to comprehend that there was something wrong with the system itself, if only because of the widespread nature of the phenomenon. In any case, managers had been replaced, bread was sold here and there with coupons and according to lists (in order to prevent it being bought to feed livestock), but there were still shortages of bread. How could this be?
Chernenko quoted from another letter (17 February 1981 (St 250/9), pp. 5–6):
The newspapers publish reports about the successful fulfilment of socialist obligations of the tenth five-year plan regarding the sale of grain to the state by republics and regions, but in our working town it has been impossible to buy a loaf of bread for the second day in a row. By 2–3 p.m. the shelves in the shops are empty. This has caused the circulation of negative rumors.
It is really somewhat mystifying: the plans were met and exceeded, tens of millions of metric tons of grain were purchased from Canada and the USA, but there was still no bread. The cause could not be ascribed to mere negligence, the more so that the situation with bread was just one of many examples:290
It is worth noting that alongside reports concerning interruptions in bread deliveries and certain other consumer goods, complaints are being received from certain republics and regions about shortages of salt and table vinegar.
The story with salt is even more intriguing than the disappearance of bread. There are whole lakes of salt in Russia, and it does not need to be grown or harvested; it is gathered by excavators and loaded directly into wagons. What could be simpler? The mystery of the vanished salt occupied the CC as a separate issue, but this riddle was never fully solved. The letters department of the CC reported as follows (17 February 1981, St 250/10):
Among letters addressed to the Central Committee by workers from certain parts of the country on the question of providing the population with foodstuffs, there are complaints with increasing frequency about difficulties with acquiring table salt, its limited range and low quality. … [One letter] states: “In recent times, trade in our town has been in a ‘feverish’ condition. This affects everyday consumer goods. A short while ago, table salt disappeared from sale. This causes all kinds of nervous reactions.”
“Our region produces salt,” writes [another comrade]. “What can explain the fact that there are constant interruptions in the sale of this commodity? It has reached the point that children from the orphanage go around from door to door, asking for a pinch of salt. Inevitably, this has an effect on our productivity at work and our attitudes.”
Curiously enough, the CC did not learn about these shortages from its own apparatus or control agencies or even the omniscient KGB, but from complaints made by ordinary citizens. The infuriated CC conducted investigations, guilty officials were brought to book on “strict party responsibility” or even imprisoned, but the situation did not improve. Local managers became more vigilant in ensuring that no further complaints reached Moscow, and particularly persistent complainants were put away in psychiatric institutions, imprisoned, or hounded to death. As for the party’s economic apparatus, it merely reported on the fulfilment of plans with excess at all levels, and no matter how hard the CC fought against these write-ups, it could not eradicate them. A special article was introduced into the Criminal Code, envisaging a punishment of up to three years’ imprisonment, all in vain. Finally the leaders had no idea of what the country was producing, in what quantity, or of what quality….
By the beginning of the 1980s, corruption within the apparatus had reached epic proportions, even though since Khrushchev’s times economic crimes had carried the heaviest penalties, up to execution by firing squad. The most fantastic matters were exposed only occasionally: entire sectors of the economy were riddled with corruption, and the scope of theft involved hundreds of millions of rubles (4 January 1980, St 191/12). On the other hand, this led to the appearance of an entire shadow industry: a system of clandestine enterprises and manufacturers totally unconnected with the state economy. Indestructible private initiative turned out to be much more efficient than the unwieldy state machine (4 October 1980, St 231/9). But this surfaced very rarely: as a rule, local party authorities were hand in glove with the wheeler-dealers, and even the KGB proved unable to fathom things out to the end. Entire regions, and at times republics, were ruled by these new mafia-like personal principalities (the best-known example being the notorious “Uzbek case”, which saw even Brezhnev’s son-in-law jailed). But very often the threads led to Moscow, into Brezhnev’s entourage, so these cases were closed. As time went by, the leaders found it harder and harder to fight corruption: after all, their sole weapon of power—the party-administrative apparatus—was simultaneously the main source of corruption. It was a vicious circle. Subsequently this process contributed to the disintegration of the USSR much more than ethnic conflicts: the fragmentation of the USSR was caused primarily by the fragmentation of the party-administrative apparatus, while local “nationalism” was exploited only by local authorities. This explains why in 1992 all the breakaway “independent” republics ended up under the rule of the local party nomenklatura.
Nationalism per se, “ethnic conflicts”—all this was a commonplace matter; these things could not be rooted out in the Soviet empire either by propaganda about “friendship of the peoples” or by repressions. By the 1980s, with a weakening of the CC’s control over local apparatuses, the situation began to become more acute. Andropov reported on this in December 1980 (30 December 1980*, St 243/8):
Materials received by the KGB of the USSR indicate that in recent times there have been increasing negative nationalist processes and crimes committed on this basis among certain categories of the indigenous population of the Karachay-Cherkessia Autonomous Region. The nature of these processes, alongside other factors, is influencing hostile elements among the older generation that participated in armed struggle against the Soviet system. Idealizing the past moribund traditions and customs of their people, they use all means to incite feelings of “grievance” toward Soviet power in their milieu for alleged “persecution of Karachays,” speculating on the fact of their banishment to Central Asian republics in the years of the Great Patriotic War.
The situation is further influenced negatively by existing firm familial ties and religious anachronisms. Self-proclaimed mullahs (of whom more than 100 have been detected) attempt to affirm Islamic positions. …
The existence of such moods among young people often grow into open hatred of Russians, which leads to incidents of brazen hooliganism, rapes, and group brawls that could turn into mass disorder at any time. In 1979 alone, law and order agencies in the region recorded 33 cases of rapes of Russian women and those of other nonlocal nationalities; over 9 months of this year there were 22 analogous crimes and 36 cases of assault. Such occurrences are frequently accompanied by cynical shouts such as: “… This will happen to all Russians!”, “Kill the Russians!”, “Get out of our country!” and suchlike.
The situation in the region is also negatively influenced by shared economic interests and parochialism. There are many known instances of certain Karachay managers going to any lengths to get rid of workers of other nationalities and replacing them with their own relatives or close cronies. This results in the frequent misuse of official positions and similar negative social manifestations, which paints a picture of lawlessness.
Naturally, the CC ordered “improvement of the organizational party and educational work among the population.” What else was there to do?
It was a really amazing system: it was easier for it to occupy a neighboring country, suppress a full-fledged national rebellion in another, or, on the contrary, incite a revolution on the other side of the globe than to supply its own people with salt. In accordance with the CC’s secret instructions, millions of Western simpletons turned against their governments, but it proved unable to control its own administrative apparatus. As for managing the economy of their own country, this was something it never learned over seventy years. All the CC was capable of doing was ordering, issuing instructions to “increase,” “raise,” “broaden,” and vote “yes” unanimously. It could also raise prices (11 June 1979*, St 162/67), and if these “feasible measures” failed to yield the required results, it could seek out scapegoats and subject them to “strict punishment.”
The Secretariat of the CC of the CPSU advises that it has been decided to raise retail prices as of 1 July 1979 for the following (on average):
Articles made of gold—by 50 percent;
Articles made of silver—by 95 percent;
Articles made from natural fur—by 50 percent;
Carpets and carpet articles—by 50 percent;
Light passenger automobiles—by 18 percent;
Imported furniture—by 30 percent.Councils of Ministers of union republics, the Ministry of Trade of the USSR, and ministries and agencies owning public catering establishments are simultaneously ordered to increase markups in restaurants, cafés, and similar establishments by an average of 100 percent in the evenings, and to raise the prices for beer sold in restaurants, cafés, and other public catering establishments by an average of 45 percent.
The CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR have been forced to adopt these measures due to difficulties balancing the growth of the financial incomes of the population with the volume of production of consumer goods and services, and the need to regulate the trade in scarce commodities as well as to increase the struggle against speculation and bribery.
Despite previous rises in prices for gold and silver articles, carpets, fur articles, automobiles, and imported furniture, demand for them exceeds supply. Trade in these commodities involves lengthy queueing and frequent breaches of trade regulations. Subpurchasers and black marketeers use this situation for personal gain and corrupt salespeople with bribes. In their letters to the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR the working people criticize such occurrences, and call for the restoration of order. The most effective means of solving this problem is increasing productivity and regulating the sale of scarce goods. Significant efforts are being made to this end. For example, the manufacture of carpets has risen from 30 to 67 million square meters, that is by 2,2 times, since 1970. The sale of automobiles to the population for that period increased by 9.5 times. However, the production of a number of commodities still fails to meet demand, and with regard to others, market funds cannot be increased in the necessary amount due to insufficient currency means (imported goods) or natural resources (natural furs, articles made from precious metals).
Therefore raising prices is a regrettable but necessary measure to regulate trade. In order to minimize the impact on the vital interests of workers, prices are only being raised on articles that do not constitute primary needs. Furthermore, the old prices for gold dentistry disks remain unchanged, and in view of the higher prices, compensation is increased for wedding rings for couples being married for the first time (up to 70 rubles per person). With the rise in prices for articles made of natural fur, retail prices for children’s items and items made from rabbit fur or sheepskin remain unaltered (with the exception of fur coats).
[…]
The announcement of the changes in prices shall be made by the State Committee on Prices of the USSR in the press on 1 July 1979. Party committees should provide timely information to party activists and establish control over the implementation of means for the review of prices and organize the necessary clarifying work to the population. Should various conjectures and rumors arise regarding mass rises in retail prices, as has occurred in the past, refute them decisively. Activists must be oriented firmly and the population must be made aware that there will be no rise in prices other than those listed in the report of the State Committee on Prices.
In view of the forthcoming rise in retail prices, the CC CPSU considers it necessary to stress the extreme importance of the maximum expansion of the production of consumer goods, ensuring the precise fulfilment of confirmed plans for their manufacture and improved quality, the timely commissioning of new capacities, broadening the sphere of consumer services and improvements in the organization of trade.
I don’t know about “maximum expansion,” but every party activist took the prior warning to heart and stampeded to buy up gold, fur articles, carpets and other scarce goods. They made the most of their “affordable demands” as quickly as possible. How else could it have turned out?
Later, after the official announcement, a fully predictable speculation began in gold disks for dentures and the alteration of children’s fur coats into adult attire. The CC’s care about old people, children, and young folks is even rather touching, but did it not realize what boundless possibilities its care was providing for the abuse of office and ideal conditions for the black market?
This is just one relatively small example of how a party-ruled state is incompatible with economics.
So much has been written about the Soviet economy that there is no need to dwell on it here, especially as I have devoted numerous pages to this subject in a previous book.291 The essence of the matter is sufficiently simple: either the party manages economic processes, or the market does. There is no possible third way, for these two versions are incompatible: either the welfare of the people depends upon persistence in work and demand for production, and career success—based on their own abilities (where there is no place for the party), or it depends on loyalty to the party and connections with the management (in which case there is no room for economic development). Yet even now, when this simple truth has been proved beyond all doubt by the collapse of the Soviet economy, there are still people who refuse to face that fact. For example, there is talk about some “Chinese model.” There is no such thing as a “Chinese model”; there is a period of disintegration of party power in China. Just look at how many party functionaries are executed in China every year for corruption. How else could it be? The more influence market forces have on people’s lives, the less power is exercised by the party. Corruption is the only way the party can participate in the economy, the market manifestation of its power. But this signals the beginning of the disintegration of the party, and of the entire system alongside it. Therefore, even knowing practically nothing about China, I can make a confident prediction that the communist system will disappear there just as it disappeared in the USSR and its satellites. And soon enough at that.
The Western leftist intellectual “elite” did not want to accept that the crisis of the Soviet system in the 1980s was first of all a crisis of socialism. On the contrary, this intelligentsia even took heart, and prosocialist forces went on the attack after the Soviet collapse; you see, the “bad” Soviet model only impeded them, throwing the shadow of totalitarian crimes over them, but now the time was ripe for the “good” model. But there are no “models” of socialism, there are only various scenarios for the failure of the economy. A country can be brought to ruin either quickly and radically, or slowly and irreversibly (with all versions of “models” between these extremes). The very expression “socialist economy” is a contradiction in terms. The basic idea of socialism is the idea of “fair distribution” of a product and not its creation, due to which any model works toward attrition: it distributes while there is something to distribute. When all the wealth accrued over centuries has been distributed and those capable of generating wealth have been destroyed one way or another, the result is the attrition of natural resources and increase in the national debt up to the point of bankruptcy.
The Soviet model of socialism was radical: the principle of distribution was taken to its logical limit, where the state carried out the central planning of both demand and supply. It lasted so long simply because Russia is a fabulously rich country. Even now, after seventy-five years of the most rapacious robbery of its resources, it is still immensely wealthy with oil, gas, coal, ores, gold, diamonds, timber, and God knows what else. The laziest ruler could rule over it without a care in the world and with no crises. It required an “idea” to bring about an economic collapse. Socialism was just such a profound idea; it did not so much drain as bankrupt the country, causing an incredible delay in development. The “fairer” the distribution of profits and the less competition, the less intense production became and the less need there was for modernization. The economy arising on this principle was extremely extensive: it grew solely in breadth, consuming disproportionately huge resources. Consequently it proved incapable of intensifying its exploitation of these resources. Thus by the 1960s there was an insufficiency of manpower, by the 1970s of arable land, and by the 1980s of fuel, energy and oil, although all these existed in nature. But the system proved unable to exploit its own natural resources effectively.
This plus fantastic military expenses (according to current data, more than half the economy was engaged in work for military needs), the growing cost of the empire, and foreign policy adventures show that the collapse of the Soviet system was only a question of time. Knowing how all accountability in the USSR was built on write-ups, it is ridiculous to cite official Soviet statistics. Nevertheless, by the 1980s even these indicators began to show alarming signals. No matter how the administrative apparatus quibbled, the fact was that the growth of the economy and the productivity of labor had fallen to zero at a time when investments were beginning to make losses: by 1978 one ruble of investment yielded a return of a mere eighty-three kopecks.292
By comparison, the 1980s were years of tempestuous economic growth in the West due to the so-called “conservative revolution.” For the first time in postwar history there were leaders of a definite antisocialist tendency (Reagan, Thatcher), and they made the dismantling of socialism the foundation of their program. The lowering of taxes and expenditure in the state sector, privatization of enterprises and entire branches of industry formerly nationalized by socialists, the dismantling of social security systems and strict monetarism—all these factors together brought about an intensification of production and economic growth. Moreover, after these reforms, other countries had to follow whether they liked it or not. Otherwise they would lag behind. In those years, let us note, not only the USSR and its clients faced insolvency—all the socialist countries in Europe and the third world went bankrupt. Even countries with socialist governments had to abandon their traditional policies and follow in the footsteps of the hated Thatcher.
It is a curious phenomenon that despite the rabid, almost pathological hatred of the intelligentsia, the overwhelming majority of the people in the USA and the UK voted stubbornly for Reagan and Thatcher, even though the reforms they initiated proceeded far from smoothly. People realized that these reforms were in their interest, as they freed them from the power of the “distributive elite,” from state leveling. Socialism as an idea was finished; it did not even attract the unemployed.
This meant that the intelligentsia began to lose their influence. The changes in attitudes and discretization of the intellectual “elite” was caused, in no small way, by the explosion of new communications technology, especially the appearance of cable and satellite television and private television and radio stations. If the leftist “elite” could still control three or four television channels (mainly state-run ones), the appearance of hundreds of commercial channels ruled out ideological control over information. And in what else lay the power of the intelligentsia, apart from its ability to manipulate public opinion?
Paradoxical as it might sound, it is impossible to dispute the fact that the “conservative revolution” actually expanded democracy, allowing the lower strata of society a wider freedom of choice, and with it power. Naturally, there were some minuses to this state of affairs, some costs. For example, a direct result of the commercialization of life was a fall in culture, even its bankruptcy. This is undoubtedly regrettable, but the fault was evident: the “carriers” of culture were too deceitful and egotistic. Yet because of the drop in culture its eternal parasite, leftist utopianism, that ersatz religion of the intelligentsia, also lost power. It has not yet died completely; it is in its death throes, taking on increasingly absurd forms such as trendy ecological concern and feminism. It will still inflict harm on many people, but it will have no place in the next century, just as there is no place left for socialism in the current one. It seems to be the end of that period in our history when the “elite” lorded over everything, because the same thing has occurred in the sphere of ideas, culture, and information as happened in the economy: the dictatorship of the producer became the dictatorship of the consumer.
These changes were like a death knell to the Soviet leaders. Their clients were bankrupt, their ideological allies were losing influence, and global development, making a mockery of Marxism, brought about a crisis of socialism instead of a crisis of capitalism. Even technological progress changed from an ally into an opponent of their system: they had enough trouble jamming Western radio stations, yet now there was the threat of the direct satellite transmission of television. The mushrooming spread of video recorders created a new form of ideological sabotage—pirated cassettes of Western films (19 April 1982, 782-A). For the rest of the world, the appearance of personal computers was a step forward, but for the Soviet regime it was a new headache; halting the flood of information from the outside world and restraining the circulation of samizdat became even harder. But progress was unstoppable. I recall a turbulent discussion in the Soviet press in 1985 and 1986: Does a Soviet citizen need a personal computer? The ideologists were against, the military was for. Contemporary military technology is based entirely on digital control, the military pointed out, but if a Western conscript is computer-savvy since childhood, a Soviet one is not. The military won.
The threat of the military falling behind, which arose in the 1980s due to Reagan’s rearmament program, was the main argument in favor of the need for reform. Nothing would have forced the Soviet leaders to venture on reforms apart from the threat of losing their superpower status, and with it their influence in the world. This threat arose mainly because of the very nature of socialism: its economic base is incompatible with its global ambitions. The USSR had entered the “arms race” with an economy that was already creaking at the seams, and now they burst completely. Only when there was nothing left, when ruin was inevitable, did they take the desperate step toward “reform.” As I wrote in my 1982 brochure:293
Once you get on the back of a tiger, it is almost impossible to get off again. The effort at an internal liberalization may prove fatal. The amount of hatred that has built up in the country over 65 years of the socialist experiment is immense, the results of any reform are so unpredictable and the more so the destruction of the power of that clique and their unbelievable privileges (or even their physical annihilation) are so probable in a weakening of the central authority, that it is hard to imagine the leaders toying with liberal ideas. Only the threat of an unavoidable and imminent demise could force the Soviet rulers to implement serious internal reforms.
This fact is indisputable; it has been acknowledged openly by former Soviet leaders, workers in the apparatuses of the Central Committee, the KGB, leading economists and generals.294 But it will never be acknowledged by the Western establishment, because admitting that the hated and accursed “arms race” brought about the full destruction of the threat of a world war, a global confrontation, and the very partition of the world into conflicting camps would be equal to their suicide.
The situation was paradoxical: if information from West to East used to be blocked by any means, now information going in the opposite direction was blocked just as thoroughly. Russian books, articles, information in the press confirming the above were not published in the West. Even the declaration of the last Soviet Minister of Foreign affairs in communist times, Bessmertnykh, made at Princeton University in the USA claiming that President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative hastened the end of the USSR,295 was barely reported by the American press (a single article in the Washington Post296 that was largely ignored by all other newspapers). Yet how much noise, what screams broke out in that same American press when that program was announced! The scientific establishment blocked any development of this program, and those few nonconformist scientists who agreed to participate in it were ostracized by their colleagues. But in this instance, total silence. The “free” press remained mute and the scientific world pretended that nothing had happened. The establishment remained the establishment, the nonconformists remained nonconformists and “renegades.” It would seem that if there were to be any sense in the Nobel Peace Prize, it should be awarded now to those who devised the SDI, who were not afraid to take part in it. But no, the Nobel Peace Prize would go to “concerned” physicians, whose only merit was that they frightened the populace with the horrors of nuclear war under the guidance of the sage CC.
However, the SDI is the most vivid and best-known example of Reagan’s policy in the first half of the 1980s. A book published recently in the USA by Peter Schweitzer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union.297 gives us a first look at the strategic plans of his administration in those years and shows that the arms race, Star Wars, etc. was only part of a general strategy directed quite consciously at bankrupting the Soviet regime. This included the campaign against Western financing of the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe, the tightening up of control over the leakage of scientific and technical information to the East (CoCom) and financial measures against the Soviet Union receiving Western loans. The same aims were served by a massive program of aid to Afghan mujahideen, underground Solidarity, the Nicaraguan Contras, and similar anticommunist movements all over the world: apart from purely moral or political considerations, the “Reagan doctrine” (as it was known at the time) saw its own task as making the cost of the empire intolerable for the USSR.
Even the arms race launched by Reagan’s administration concentrated deliberately on weapons calling for an ever-higher technological level—that is, the field in which Soviet lagging was particularly hopeless. The SDI was only the culmination of this process, its most outstanding feature, one might say—its symbol. Nobody could even say for certain whether this program could be implemented or not from a purely technical viewpoint, but both sides—the USA and the USSR—focused on it, understanding perfectly that if the USA commenced on it, the USSR would have to join in this race, which was completely beyond its capability.
Finally, the most important aspect of this undeclared economic war—from my point of view at least—was manipulation of the oil market performed by the USA through Saudi Arabia. Oil and natural gas were the economic bases of the Soviet empire, its main source of hard currency. Problems with their extraction began by the end of the 1970s, and in the 1980s the drop in their yield had become marked.298 The reasons for this were purely internal: insufficient investment in infrastructure and equipment alongside increasingly rapid rates of extraction caused a drop in the yield from oil fields, especially in the Tyumen region. However, the catastrophe came in 1985–1986, when the sharp decline in oil extraction in the USSR coincided with an equally drastic fall in oil prices on the international market. As a result, the Soviet Union lost more than a third of its hard currency income in one year—a shock that a healthy economy in a prosperous Western country would not have survived.
As the aforementioned book indicates, the drop in oil prices was not by mere chance;299 it was the result of the lengthy and purposeful efforts of the Reagan administration. Back in 1983 the US Department of the Treasury submitted a report to the president recommending efforts toward achieving falling global oil prices:300
A drop in international oil prices to $20 a barrel would lower U.S. energy costs by $71.5 billion per year. That would be a transfer of income to American consumers amounting to 1 percent of existing gross national product….
A lower oil price would occur with either a drop in demand (not very likely) or a dramatic increase in production. Concerning the latter, the report noted that if Saudi Arabia and other countries ‘with available oil reserves should step up their production and increase world output by… about 2.7 to 5.4 million barrels a day and cause the world price to fall by about 40%, the overall effect on the United States would be very beneficial.’
For Moscow, this would be a disaster:
The report noted Moscow’s heavy reliance on energy exports for hard currency. By Treasury Department calculations, every one-dollar rise in the price of oil meant approximately $500 million to $1 billion in extra hard currency for the Kremlin. But the reverse was also true: dropping prices meant plunging incomes. And Moscow, unlike other producers, could not raise production to increase earnings.
Over all subsequent years the Reagan administration’s task was to convince the Saudis to do just that: increase production in order to bring oil prices down to the desired level. Intensive lobbying of the Saudi royal family included such measures as reinforcing their defenses by selling them the latest military hardware (frequently against the wishes of Congress), American guarantees of security, and economic privileges. It must be said that the Saudis did not try too hard to resist: increasing oil production was in their interests. It brought money into their coffers, helped friends and ruined enemies—Iran, Libya and the USSR.301
August 1985, a stake was driven silently through the heart of the Soviet economy. …
In the first few weeks of the Saudi push, daily production jumped from less than 2 million barrels to almost 6 million….
For the United States, the coming drop in oil prices was a boon—the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars being given to American consumers. For the Kremlin, any drop in oil prices was damaging to the economy. But in 1985 it was cataclysmic. Soviet hard currency reserves were strapped. Gold sales had been doubled in 1985 to keep the hard currency coming at the necessary level. Energy, being the bread and butter of the Soviet hard currency–earning machine (almost 80 percent), mattered more than any other commodity to the health of the economy. …
Shortly after Saudi oil production rose, the international price of oil sank like a stone in a pond. In November 1985, crude oil sold at over $30 a barrel: barely five months later it stood at $12. For Moscow, over $10 billion in valuable hard currency evaporated overnight, almost half its earnings.
This blow, from which the Soviet economy never recovered fully, came at the most unpleasant moment: income from oil was earmarked to cover the first phase of Gorbachev’s reforms, the so-called “acceleration”—intensifying the economy by the purchase and commissioning of new equipment from abroad. Only such a massive modernization program could help the Soviet leaders to retain the status of a superpower, cope with the arms race and the increasing cost of the empire, and prevent the “Polish disease” on the domestic front. The economic collapse turned them immediately into “reformers,” “liberals,” and “democrats.” They needed an NEP, just like Lenin in 1921: an alliance with the West, just like Stalin in 1941; and détente, just like Brezhnev in the 1970s. Simply speaking, they badly needed a respite in the Cold War, without which they would not get Western loans and technology. In order to achieve this, help was needed from old allies: the leftist establishment of the USA and European Mensheviks—so that once more, for the umpteenth time, they could make the West believe in the sudden metamorphosis of the Soviet regime.
But its Western friends were also keen for “reforms” of the regime, for a new liberal image of the USSR. However much they now talked of “bad” and “good” models, the collapse of socialism in the West was a catastrophe for them, too, exposing their traitorous role in the half-century-old battle of humanity against the threat of totalitarian enslavement. Just as the defeat of Nazi Germany exposed the “peacemakers” and collaborationists of that time, the collapse of the USSR destroyed all the cunning self-justifications of its apologists and fellow-travelers, all the theories of the “moderates” and the “prudent”:
It goes without saying that those Western circles that would have been required to answer these unpleasant questions were not overjoyed by this possibility. For them, and the Soviet leaders, there was only one way out: prevent the total collapse of the communist regime. There is no other explanation of the absurdity of the next five years, when communism was suffering obvious agonies while the whole world tried to prolong its existence. This seeming absurdity was fueled by the exaggerated “Gorbymania” in the press, the mass euphoria regarding glasnost and perestroika, multimillion-dollar loans—all this was not stupidity or naivety, but a well-planned campaign. The result was almost unbelievable: a criminal regime, feared by the whole planet for more than half a century, drowning in the blood of entire peoples, disappeared without a trace, and those who had served it—both in the East and in the West—remained in power.
The regime was certainly doomed; it would not have lasted out the century, first of all because its basic idea was absurd, unnatural, a creation of the intelligentsia. It fell because of those who dared to challenge it, who refused to accept its dictates, be they in the mountains of Afghanistan or in the White House, on the Gdansk docks or in the Vatican, in the jungles of Africa or Soviet prisons. And in the final account because of ordinary people who rejected the power of the rotten elites of the East and West.
While these elites continue to cling to power, this simple truth will not be acknowledged universally. General Jaruzelski shall remain the acclaimed savior of his homeland, Soviet-nurtured terrorists shall receive Nobel Peace Prizes, and war criminals who soaked Afghanistan in blood shall command the Russian army. More than anything, this will be sustained by the Gorbachev myth—the myth about “courageous reformers” in the Kremlin who saved the world from themselves. Something akin to the tale about the good king Louis XVI, who rescued France from the monarchy.