APPENDIX I

Plan BODYGUARD

Overall Deception Policy for the War against Germany

COS (43) 779 (O) (Revise)

25th December, 1943

Intention of this Paper

1. The intention of this paper is to formulate an overall deception policy for the war against Germany in accordance with CCS 426/1 of 6th December, 1943, paragraph 9 (e).

Object

2. To induce the enemy to make faulty strategic dispositions in relation to operations by the United Nations against Germany agreed upon at EUREKA.1

Present Situation

3. The German General Staff will this winter be considering the strategic disposition of their forces to meet offensive operations by the United Nations in 1944. Though they will be forced to maintain the bulk of their forces on the Russian front, they already suspect that large-scale Anglo-American operations will be undertaken in Western Europe some time in 1944. It is, however, doubtful whether they have at present sufficient information regarding the timing and scope of this threat to justify any immediate changes in their strategic dispositions.

4. At a later stage, however, preparations for OVERLORD2 and to a lesser degree for ANVIL3 will be on such a scale and of such a type that the enemy cannot fail to appreciate our intention to carry out a cross-Channel operation and an amphibious operation in the Western Mediterranean.

Deception Problem

5. The problem to be solved is twofold:

(a) Overall Problem

We must persuade the enemy to dispose his forces in areas where they can cause the least interference with operations OVERLORD and ANVIL and with operations on the Russian Front.

(b) Tactical Problem

As soon as our preparations for OVERLORD and ANVIL clearly indicate to the enemy our intention to undertake a cross-Channel operation and an amphibious operation in the Western Mediterranean, Theatre Commanders concerned must implement their tactical cover plans to deceive the enemy as to the strength, objective and timing of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Choice of Areas in which to Contain Enemy Forces

6. In view of SEXTANT4 decisions our overall deception policy should be to contain enemy forces in areas where they will interfere as little as possible with operations on the Russian Front and with OVERLORD and ANVIL. Such areas are:

(a) Northern Italy and Southern Germany

It should be possible by means of real operations and feints to contain a number of first quality divisions in this area.

POINTBLANK5 operations from Italy should also help to contain enemy fighter forces.

(b) South-East Europe

The JIC appreciate* that the enemy will do his utmost to hold South-East Europe, though limited withdrawals from the islands and Southern Greece might be undertaken. Provided that we can persuade the enemy to believe that considerable forces and landing craft are being concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean it should be possible to contain enemy forces in the Balkans. Our chances of success would be increased if Turkey joined the Allies, but even if she refused we might still induce the enemy to fear the results of our continued infiltration. The deception plan would be assisted to a marked degree if the Russian General Staff staged an amphibious threat to the Bulgarian–Roumanian coasts across the Black Sea.

(c) Scandinavia

A threatened attack against Scandinavia should help to contain some first-quality divisions and limited naval and air forces. Such a deception plan would be assisted if the Germans were induced to believe that Sweden was prepared to co-operate with the Allies and if the Russians mounted a threat against enemy-occupied territory in the Arctic.

Allied Preparation for OVERLORD and ANVIL

7. (a) OVERLORD

It will be impossible wholly to conceal the gradual build-up of Allied forces and other preparations in the United Kingdom during the next few months. In addition the enemy will appreciate that considerable American forces in the United States are available for transfer to Europe.

In these circumstances our best chance of deceiving the enemy would be to indicate that Anglo-American strategy is dictated by caution and that we have no intention of undertaking the invasion of the Continent until we had assembled an overwhelming force and the necessary landing craft; these would not be available until the late summer. To support this story we must try to indicate that the assault and follow-up forces at present available in the United Kingdom are less than they in fact are, and that during the next few months we could re-enter the Continent against little or no opposition.

(b) ANVIL

Preparations and the build-up for ANVIL should not be so apparent in the early stages, therefore the tactical cover plan eventually put into operation by Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre, should suffice to cover this assault.

In the Mediterranean Theatre the enemy has in the past been induced to overestimate Allied forces by 20 to 30 per cent. It would be an advantage if such exaggeration could be maintained especially in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Russian Front

8. The Russian offensive will presumably be continued during the next few months but it would be of assistance to our plans if we could lead the enemy to believe that the Russian main summer offensive would not start before the end of June.

It would be plausible that this operation should thus precede OVERLORD and ANVIL thereby rendering the maximum assistance to these far more hazardous seaborne assaults.

Factors Against the Achievement of the Object

9. (a) Preparations for OVERLORD during the next few months and any announcements of the appointment of prominent commanders in the United Kingdom will indicate to the enemy that our main strategy is switching from the Mediterranean to North-Western Europe.

(b) Statements both in the press and on the radio and the platform may continue to emphasise the likelihood of operations in 1944 from the United Kingdom against North-Western Europe.

Factors For the Achievement of the Object

10. (a) Germany’s armed forces are dangerously stretched by current operations and provided we can induce her to retain surplus forces in Scandinavia, Italy and the Balkans, she will find it difficult simultaneously to provide adequate forces for Russia, France and the Low Countries.

(b) Germany’s defensive commitments are likely to be increased since:

(i) The political and economic situation in Germany and occupied countries is deteriorating and may necessitate the maintenance of strong garrison forces in these areas.

(iii) The attitude of neutrals and satellites may move further in favour of the Allies and compel Germany to dispose reserves to meet unfavourable developments.

(c) The assembly of the Rosyth force in North-East Scotland will reinforce the threat to Scandinavia.

Overall Deception Policy

11. The following Overall Deception Policy is based upon the considerations outlined above.

12. Allied Intentions. We should induce the enemy to believe that the following is the Allied plan for 1944.

(a) POINTBLANK operations were seriously affecting the enemy’s war potential and, if continued and increased, might well bring about his total collapse. Consequently, reinforcement of the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean by long-range American bombers was to have first priority.

(b) The Allies must be prepared to take advantage of any serious German weakening or withdrawal in Western Europe and preparations to this end must be put in hand forthwith.

(c) To concert in spring an attack on Northern Norway with Russia with the immediate object of opening up a supply route to Sweden. Thereafter to enlist the active co-operation of Sweden for the establishment of air bases in Southern Sweden to cover an amphibious assault on Denmark from the United Kingdom in the summer.

(d) Since no large-scale cross-Channel operation would be possible till late summer, the main Allied effort in the spring of 1944 should be against the Balkans, by means of—

(i) An Anglo-American assault against the Dalmatian coast.

(ii) A British assault against Greece.

(iii) A Russian amphibious operation against the Bulgarian–Roumanian coast.

(iv) In addition, Turkey will be invited to join the Allies to provide operational facilities including aerodromes to cover operations against the Ægean Islands as a prerequisite to the invasion of Greece. her refusal would not materially modify the Allied intentions.

(v) Pressure against the satellites to induce them to abandon Germany.

(e) Anglo-American operations in Italy would be continued, and in order to hasten their progress, amphibious operations against the north-west and north-east coast of Italy would be carried out. Provided these were successful, 15 Army Group would later advance eastwards through Istria in support of the operations mentioned in (d) above.

NOTE. The operations in (c) (d) and (e) above would enable us to employ our amphibious forces and retain the initiative until preparations for the final assault in the later summer were completed.

(f) Though Russian operations would presumably be continued this winter it would not be possible for them to launch their summer offensive before the end of June.

(g) In view of the formidable character of German coastal defences and the present enemy strength in France and the Low Countries, a minimum of twelve Anglo-American Divisions afloat in the initial assault and a total force of about fifty divisions would be required for a cross-Channel assault. This operation would not be launched until the late summer (i.e. after the opening of the Russian summer offensive).

Allied Strength and Dispositions

13. We should induce the enemy to believe the following information regarding Allied strength and dispositions.

(a) United Kingdom

(i) Shortage of man-power has obliged the British Army in the United Kingdom to resort to cannibalisation, while several of their formations are on a lower establishment, or still lack their administrative and supply units. The number of Anglo-American Divisions in the United Kingdom available for offensive operations is less than is, in fact, the case. Some United States Divisions arriving in the United Kingdom have not yet completed their training.

(ii) Personnel of certain Anglo-American Divisions in the Mediterranean with long service overseas are being relieved by fresh divisions from the United Kingdom and United States. The former will, on relief, return to the United Kingdom where they will re-form and be utilised for training inexperienced formations.

(iii) Invasion craft remains the principal bottleneck and the full number required for the initial assault cannot be made available from home production and the United States before summer.

(b) Mediterranean

(i) Anglo-American forces in the Mediterranean, especially in Eastern Mediterranean, are greater than is, in fact, the case.

(ii) French forces are taking over responsibility for the defence of North Africa, thus leaving Anglo-American forces free for offensive operations elsewhere in the spring of 1944.

(iii) Certain British Divisions and landing craft are being transferred from India to the Middle East.

(iv) Fresh divisions from the United Kingdom and United States are expected to arrive in the Mediterranean.

Tactical Cover Plan

14. (a) United Kingdom

When the enemy realises that cross-Channel operations are imminent, the story indicating that no cross-Channel attack will occur until late summer, will tend to lose plausibility. At this juncture the tactical cover plan prepared by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, will come into force with a view to deceiving the enemy as to the timing, direction and weight of OVERLORD.

(b) Mediterranean

In due course the enemy will probably appreciate, especially from air reconnaissance, that an amphibious operation is being mounted in North African ports and Western Mediterranean Islands. At this stage, a tactical cover plan prepared by Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre, will come into force with a view to deceiving the enemy as regard the timing, direction and weight of ANVIL.

Timing

15. The selection of the D Day of all cover and deception plans mentioned above is a question to be decided by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. In this connection, it is recommended that the dates chosen should, in each case, be later than OVERLORD or ANVIL D Days, with a view to delaying the despatch of enemy reinforcements for as long as possible.

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre, should in consultation with the Controlling Officer decide the tempo of the OVERLORD and ANVIL tactical cover plans.

Means of Implementation

16. (a) Physical Means

Implementation by means of movements of forces, camouflage devices, W/T deception and other activities will be carried out in accordance with detailed plans prepared by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre.

(b) Diplomatic Means

Genuine diplomatic approaches will be required to lead the enemy to believe that we intend persuading Sweden to join the Allies and assist us in operations in Scandinavia.

Even if Turkey refused to join the Allies in the near future, the enemy should be led to believe that our continued infiltration may give the Allies important opportunities in connection with a Balkan campaign.

(c) Special Means

Implementation by means of leakage and rumours in support of plans prepared by Theatre Commanders will be co-ordinated by the London Controlling Section.

(d) Political Warfare

The Political Warfare plan while not departing from its main purpose should conform to the above general policy.

(e) Security

Plan BODYGUARD cannot succeed unless the strictest security precautions are taken to conceal the true nature of OVERLORD and ANVIL preparations.