* Misprint for Donny.

1. General Morgan and his staff were generally known by the abbreviated title COSSAC.

2. COS (43) 215 (O), dated 26th April, 1943 – War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee – Directive to General Morgan.

3. Known as HARLEQUIN.

4. Held by the London Controlling Section, Ministry of Defence.

5. Operation OVERLORD, COSSAC 23 (48), dated 15th July, 1943, para. 47. OVERLORD was the code name for the cross-Channel invasion.

6. The Fremde Heere West map of the United Kingdom, published on 31st December, 1943, gives the Sixth Army at Luton. At Edinburgh an army is shown, but without number.

7. Chief of Operations (B) Section to Chief of United States Operations Branch COSSAC. COSSAC/OO/6/5/Ops, dated 5th October, 1943.

8. After the invasion had been launched, a later edition of Das Britische Kriegsheer came into our possession. A comparison of this with the previous edition of 1942 showed that the Germans had discovered very little in the intervening period. This was probably due to an improvement in signals security in the British Army, and in particular to the adoption by all British forces in the United Kingdom in July 1942 of the ‘link’ procedure, which made it more difficult for intercept to establish chains of command as well as to identify the individual formations and units contained in each group. This procedure was invented by the Germans and had been adopted by British troops in the Middle East some time previously. Had we possessed a more up-to-date edition of Das Britische Kriegsheer in the summer of 1943, we might not have thought quite so highly of the German intercept service.

9. The London Controlling Officer was the adviser to the British Chiefs of Staff on deception in all theatres.

10. COS (43) 208 (O), dated 22nd April, 1943.

1. After General Eisenhower’s return to England in January 1944, the scale of the attack was enlarged to comprise five divisions in the assault and three in the follow-up. This was made possible by postponing the attack against the south coast of France which, until then, was to have been made concurrently with OVERLORD.

2. This remained the broad policy of the campaign until the first week of August 1944, when ‘the chances of delivering a knock-out blow were so favourable’ that the capture of the Brittany ports was subordinated to the encirclement and destruction of the German Seventh Army and Panzer Group West. (Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6th June, 1944, to 8th May, 1945. First paragraph of chapter headed ‘Battle of the Falaise-Argentan Pocket’.)

3. Extract from Principal Staff Officers’ (43) 12th Meeting, COSSAC, dated 19th August, 1943.

4. COSSAC/2356/Ops, dated 5th October, 1943. Chief of Ops (B) Sub-Section to the Controlling Officer.

5. COSSAC (43) 28 Operation OVERLORD, dated 15th July, 1943, Part I, Selection of Lodgement Area, para. 37.

6. OVERLORD, Part II, Outline Plan for Opening Phase, para. 7.

7. COSSAC 43 (39). Second draft for Head Planners dated 16th September, 1943, para. 3, repeated in all subsequent drafts. The cover plan now under consideration was at first given the code name TORRENT. This was changed to Appendix Y in October 1943.

8. Appendix Y to COSSAC (43) 28, dated 20th November, 1943, para. 5.

9. It was proposed also to muster the necessary wireless resources to represent another assault force for the purpose of covering the departure of the 3rd British Infantry Division from Scotland.

10. Appendix Y, para. 11.

11. There was also a somewhat elaborate proposal that the Germans should be persuaded to believe that the real concentration in the South had been made for deceptive reasons.

12. Appendix Y, para. 10.

13. I bid. y para. 34.

14. Ibid, para. 42.

15. Ibid., para. 12.

16. Ibid.y para. 55.

17. A security measure introduced ‘so that the final and inevitable silence will lose significance’.

1. CCS 426/1, dated 6th December, 1943, para. 9 (E).

2. It received the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the 23rd January, 1944.

3. COS (43) 779 (O) (Revise), dated 25th December, 1943. See Appendix I.

4. When the plan was written it was supposed that a real landing, Operation ANVIL, would be made on the south coast of France at the same time as OVERLORD. This accounts for the omission of any reference to deceptive operations in that region.

5. On the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in the North-Western European Theatre, COSSAC became merged in the new organisation which was designated Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

6. BODYGUARD, para. 7 (a).

7. The concealment of the return of these divisions was the subject of a special plan known as FOYNES. This is examined elsewhere.

8. The assault was to be made by fifty divisions with twelve divisions afloat.

10. BODYGUARD, para. 5 (b).

10. The earlier drafts appeared under the code name MESPOT. The name was changed to FORTITUDE on 18th February, 1944.

11. NEPTUNE was the code name used in any OVERLORD document which mentioned the target date or the target area.

12. SHAEF (44) 13, dated 23rd February, 1944, Plan FORTITUDE, para. 5. The reader may think that the distinction between objects (a) and (d) is a very fine one. The plan is reproduced at Appendix II.

13. FORTITUDE, para. 16.

14. Ibid., para. 6.

15. FORTITUDE alias MESPOT. (Third draft), dated 17th January, 1944, para. 11.

16. BODYGUARD, para. 15.

17. Ibid., para. 14 (a).

18. FORTITUDE alias MESPOT. (Third draft), dated 17th January, 1944, para. 22.

19. Ibid., para. 11.

20. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Division, SHAER

21. SHAEF 519/1/Q, dated 21st January, 1944, from AC of S, G-4 Division to AC of S, G-3 Division.

22. Chief of Movement and Transportation, SHAER

23. The original text says: ‘after D Day’, but this is clearly a misprint for ‘before’. There would have been little hope of concealing the real target area after D Day.

24. SHAEF/4060/Mov/18th February, 1944. Chief of Movement and Transportation, SHAEF, to BGS Plans and Ops Section, G-3 Division, SHAEF.

25. FORTITUDE alias MESPOT. (Fourth draft), 30th January, 1944, para. 23.

26. Ibid.y para. 12.

27. 21 Army Group/25/COS, dated 25th January, 1944. Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, to DACOS, G-3 Division, SHAEF.

28. FORTITUDE alias MESPOT. (First draft), dated 3rd January, 1944, para. 30.

29. 21 Army Group/25/COS, dated 25th January, 1944. Chief of Staff, 21 Army Group, to DACOS, G-3 Division, SHAEF.

30. FORTITUDE, para. 28.

31. FORTITUDE alias MESPOT. (Third draft), dated 17th January, 1944, para. 13.

32. This opinion had been expressed as early as September of the previous year, see COSSAC (43) 39 (2nd draft for PSO’s), dated 29th September, 1943, Appendix C, Command and Control.

33. SHAEF 24 (41), dated 26th February, 1944. Plan FORTITUDE Directive to Joint Commanders. See Appendix III.

34. Control of the Army’s share in the Norwegian operations was delegated shortly afterwards to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Scottish Command.

1. The name given to all forms of controlled leakage.

2. Ops (B) at that time consisted of one General Staff Officer, first grade, who had to rely, for the most part, on the assistance of officers borrowed from the other sections of the Operations Branch and lent, on a part-time basis, by the Intelligence and Administrative Branches. The Naval and Air Staffs also nominated officers to advise on matters relating to their respective Services.

3. It must be understood that where controlled enemy agents were concerned there was always a technical and administrative as well as an operational control. It is the latter only that we are here concerned with. The technical control of the Mediterranean agents remained at all times with SIME (Security Intelligence Middle East), as in the United Kingdom it did with MI5.

4. LCS (43) Org./2, dated 21st July, 1943.

5. COSSAC/2361/Ops, dated 26th July, 1943, GSOI Ops (B) to COSSAC.

6. At this time, owing to the expansion of the Staff, Ops (B) Section became Ops (B) Sub-Section.

7. Although these arrangements may have been contemplated at that time both by 21 Army Group and First United States Army Group, at neither Headquarters was the Deception Staff in fact to form part of the Operations Division, as will be seen hereafter. At the American Army Group Headquarters the Deception Staff did not yet exist.

8. SHAEF 18209/Ops, dated 27th January, 1944, Cover and Deception Organisation. AC of S, to DCOS, G-3 Division, SHAEF.

9. This sub-section of MI5 controlled the German agents that we were employing to pass information to the enemy. They constituted by far the most important LCS channel.

10. Memorandum by London Controlling Officer, dated 3rd January, 1944.

11. Summary of the conclusions reached at a meeting between MI5 and LCS on 15th January, 1944.

12. SHAEF 18209/Ops, dated 27th January, 1944, Cover and Deception Organisation. AC of S, to DCOS, G-3 Division, SHAEF.

13. CO/363/4 Preparation and Implementation of Deception Plans covering OVERLORD and ANVIL, dated 15th January, 1944.

14. The only reason for giving details of organisation is to show how many people it took to do the work and what each person did. The succession of Ops (B) establishments which were approved from time to time do not provide a true guide. Sometimes hey were not filled, sometimes they were filled by officers who worked in some other branch of the Staff, and sometimes officers held on some other establishment were lent to the Sub-Section. In these circumstances the writer feels that it is best to ignore them and simply to say how many were in fact employed in the Sub-Section at different times, giving their ranks and the nature of their tasks.

15. The conventional division of a deception staff into ‘Operations’ and ‘Intelligence’, though useful as a method of diverting curiosity from highly secret practices, was by no means – at least in the case of the SHAEF Deception Staff – an accurate description of their functions. In the accepted sense of the terms the functions of both were operational, one controlling deception by physical devices and the other deception by Special Means. If, in theory, it was the function of the Intelligence element to supply the operational element with intelligence, this was not the practice partly no doubt because during the most critical periods they were not even located in the same building; also because the very small size of the ‘I’ Staff would in any case have prevented it. In fact they both gleaned what intelligence they required as best they could. It may be mentioned in passing that the information most often required was about our own side and not about the enemy, a kind of inverted intelligence, for we were, after all, posing as a part of the enemy’s Intelligence Service. That meant that our links with the Intelligence Division were slender as compared with those that we built up with Staff Duties, Training, Movements and Transportation and other branches of the operational and administrative staffs. For the sake of clarity, the two sides of the Ops (B) Sub-Section will therefore be referred to throughout this report as the ‘Physical Deception Staff’ and the ‘Special Means Staff’.

16. One of these captains was transferred to the Special Means Staff in August 1944.

17. 21 Army Group 00/217/Ops (D), dated 22nd February, 1944.

18. This arrangement was instituted by General Paget in November 1943. 21 Army Group/1835/1/G (SD), dated 27th November, 1943.

19. For further particulars of No. 5 Wireless Group and its subsequent activities see ‘History of G (R) 21 Army Group and HQ. “R” Force, April, 1945’, ‘Notes on Wireless Deception for Operation OVERLORD 32/Security/15 (Signals 9), August 1944’ and ‘“R” Force Wireless Activity 1st November, 1944 to February, 1945’.

20. An account of the organisation and activities of Twelfth Reserve Unit and of its predecessor ‘Fourth Army’ will be found in the SHAEF Deception Library Files relating to FORTITUDE NORTH and in the Library File entitled ‘Organisation of Twelfth Reserve Unit’.

21. A full account of the ‘CLH’ units will be found in ‘CLH/A/160–172/44, dated 7th July, 1944, Naval Report Operation NEPTUNE, Radio Deception’.

22. This argument did not apply to No. 5 Wireless Group where traffic was recorded, since each recording could be perfected at leisure. 21 Army Group did in fact make some use of controlled leakage in deceptive operations after it had gone overseas. ‘The encoding and phrasing of messages and conversations was often intentionally insecure in order to reveal the germ of the special idea it was desired to convey.’ ‘“R” Force Wireless Activity, 1st November, 1944, to 12th February, 1945’. Operation TROLLEYCAR TWO, Annexure 27 to Appendix ‘E’)

23. They were known by the code name ‘BIG BOB’. For further details see ‘Operation QUICKSILVER THREE – “BIG BOB”, May to September 1944’, dated 3rd November, 1944, and issued by the Director of Special Weapons and Vehicles, the War Office.

24. Much of what follows is based upon the official history of B1A, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 by J. C. Masterman, printed by MI5 in September 1945.

25. Reichssicherheits-Haupt-Amt.

26. Recent evidence reveals that one or two of these uncontrolled agents had a few meagre sources of genuine intelligence in the United Kingdom. Although final judgment must be reserved, there is nothing at present to show that the Germans acquired any useful information in this way, or that the security ring round the British Isles was effectively penetrated at any time. It seems likely that the agents in question regarded these genuine contacts as an insurance-something which could be quoted if at any time their masters challenged the more extensive but more or less imaginary sources of intelligence which they had superimposed on these slender foundations.

27. The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, page 16.

28. Ibid.y page xiii.

2. The Germans took GARBO’s reports about the Chislehurst caves seriously, even if their interest was sometimes tinged with incredulity. When the invasion came, a suitable occasion for exploiting the story did not present itself and the Germans were ultimately informed, in August 1944, that the caves had been used for storing arms for the Maquis.

3 In the summary of Agent Seven’s sub-network which follows no account is taken of 7 (1), a soldier in the 9th British Armoured Division, who had no connection with the others in the group. An ‘unconscious’ agent, this man’s position was very similar to that of the young officer in the 49th Division. It had been supposed in the autumn of 1943 that the 9th Armoured Division would play a prominent part in the deceptive operations of the coming year. As with the 49th Division this proved to be an incorrect forecast. Thus 7(1) does not appear in die ensuing narrative.

4. Facetiously, the Germans bestowed on 7 (5), the sub-agent whom GARBO sent to observe troop movements in Devonshire, the code name DRAKE.

1. This forgery entitled ‘Avis à la Population’ was printed with a proper regard for correct detail and was sent to the Germans.

2. TATE 1815 MET 20th January, 1944.

3. BRUTUS 1435 GMT 23rd January, 1944.

4. One of the lesser double-cross agents.

5. This theme was generally referred to as POINTBLANK, the name of the real programme for bombing the interior of Germany.

6. 1st United States Infantry Division, 9th United States Infantry Division, 2nd United States Armoured Division, 82nd United States Airborne Division, 50th British Infantry Division, 51st Highland Division, 7th British Armoured Division and 1st British Airborne Division.

7. This ban was observed by the British formations until the invasion, but ceased to be observed by the American formations in February 1944.

8. BRUTUS Message received 1201 GMT 11th January, 1944.

9. MULLET and PUPPET Letter despatched 29th December, 1943.

1. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops, dated 10th March, 1944.

2. ‘Naval Report Operation NEPTUNE, Radio Deception’, Appendix ‘B’, dated 19th July, 1944, para. 4 (ii).

3. Plan FOYNES.

4. The following account is somewhat oversimplified, but does not involve any material distortion of fact.

5. Operation VERITAS.

1. FREAK 1413 GMT, 22nd March, 1944.

2. GARBO 1920 and 1924 GMT, 28th March 1944.

3. This division had previously been located in Sussex and had recently changed places with the 45th British Infantry Division. These movements were reported by PANDORA on 20th January to the German Minister in Dublin.

4. FREAK 1355 and 1403 GMT, 30th March, 1944.

5. FREAK Message received 1204, 1212 and 1234 GMT, 12th April, 1944

6. GELATINE Letter No. 5 in secret ink to Lisbon, dated 12th March, 1944.

7. BRUTUS 1733 GMT, 31st March, 1944.

8. BRUTUS 1203, 1210, 1216, 1221, 1227 and 1236 GMT, 15th April, and 0907 and 0916 GMT, 16th April, 1944.

9. This imaginary insignia consisted of the medieval four placed upon the normal Army colours of red, black and red. Whether the enemy ever appreciated the significance of the hieroglyphic is not known. Like many others that we invented it appeared in due course among the instructional coloured plates of British formation insignia which were issued to the German troops.

10 This, of course, was the sign of the disbanded 2nd Corps which had fought at Dunkirk and was therefore well known to the Germans.

11. The Norwegian Brigade had in fact just moved from Brahan to Callander.

12. COBWEB 1220 GMT, 20th April, 1944.

13. BRUTUS 0923 and 0937 GMT, 16th April, 1944.

14. GARBO 2018, 2036, 2044, 2055, 2102, 2118, 2124 and 2140 GMT, 14th May, 1944, and 1902, 1914 and 1922 GMT, 15th May, 1944.

15. GARBO 1920 GMT, 27th April, 1944.

16. TEAPOT Message No. 9 sent 1630 BST, 9th April, 1944.

17. MULLET and PUPPET Letter No. 54 in secret ink to Lisbon, dated 2nd February, 1944, to arrive 25th February.

18. MULLET and PUPPET Letter No. 64 in secret ink to Lisbon, dated 11th March, 1944, to arrive 2nd April.

19. Ibid.

20. MULLET and PUPPET Letter No. 66, dated 15th March, 1944, to arrive 5th April.

21. MULLET and PUPPET Letter No. 74, dated 14th April, 1944.

22. MULLET and PUPPET Letter No. 76, dated 25th April, 1944.

23. BRUTUS 2010 GMT, 4th May, 1944.

24. COS (44) 126 (O), 30th April, 1944.

25. TATE 1834 MET, 25th March, 1944.

26. BRONX Letter dated 17th March, 1944, to arrive 31st March.

1. In this context ‘false’ preparations are intended to denote those preparations, real enough in the physical sense, which were undertaken solely for deceptive reasons, and which were not required for OVERLORD.

2. 120/General/1744. Q (M) 6/29/17, dated 21st October, 1943. Director of Movements, the War Office to G-3, COSSAC.

3. SHAEF/ 1820/4/Ops, dated 9th February, 1944. SHAEF to the War Office (M02).

4. S/00/355/6/G (O), dated 28th January, 1944. MGGS, GHQ, Home Forces, to BGS, South-Eastern Command.

5. SE/00/3/BGS, dated 9th February, 1944. GOC in C, South-Eastern Command to GHQ, Home Forces.

6. As an example of the scale of effort involved, a statement by the MGA, South-Eastern Command, during a meeting held at the War Office on 3rd February, 1944, may be quoted: ‘Accommodation could be provided to the full capacity of our ports,’ he said, provided that (a) £80,000 worth of construction was carried out, (b) Wrotham Camp and Gravesend Barracks were made available for the Gravesend sector. Wrotham Camp and Gravesend Barracks, which were occupied respectively by 148 Training Brigade and 96 PTC, would have had to be evacuated.

7. Minutes of a meeting held at HQ, 21 Army Group, 1200 hours, 23rd February, Part 1 (c), issued under cover of 21 AGP/00/261/17G (R), dated 24th February, 1944.

8. 21 AGP/00/261/17/G (R) (1), dated 24th February, 1944. 21 Army Group to SHAEF G-3 Division.

9. SHAEF/ 18209/Ops, dated 4th March, 1944. Chief of Staff SHAEF to Headquarters 21 Army Group.

10. SHAEF/18216/Ops, dated 16th March, 1944. DAC of S, to AC of S, G-3, Division, SHAEF.

11. SHAEF/182161 Ops dated 15th March, 1944. SHAEF to 21 Army Group.

12. S/00/355/1/G (O), dated 26th March, 1944. GHQ, Home Forces, to South-Eastern, Southern, Eastern Commands and London District.

1. 21 Army Group Signal Instruction No. 1, dated 1st September, 1943, Appendix ‘W’.

4. GARBO Letter No. 252, dated 20th October, 1943, taken by the courier to Lisbon on 17th December.

5. According to the report on Army Wireless Deception for OVERLORD issued in July 1944 (32/Security/15/(Signals 9)), this fixed network continued to operate with minor modifications until the date of the invasion, although it bore no kind of relation to the FORTITUDE SOUTH Order of Battle as finally constituted.

6. SHAEF/18201/6/Ops, dated 3rd February, 1944.

7. It was no longer possible to make use of this division as its place in the invasion build up had been advanced and it was due to go overseas within a fortnight of the first landing.

8. Later renamed Twelfth Army Group.

9. Information supplied verbally by GSOI G (R) 21 Army Group.

10. The effect of this decision may be studied on the map MC attached to the Special Means plan of 6th May at Appendix V.

11. NJC/00/261/33. Operation OVERLORD Cover and Diversionary Plans by C in C Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, C in C 21 Army Group and C in C Allied Expeditionary Air Force, dated 18th May, 1944. See Appendix IV.

12. The American links were supplied by 3103 Signals Service Battalion. Owing to the formidable size of the American force which had to be represented it was only possible to supply links down to the divisional level. The Canadian network, being real, required no artificial augmentation.

1. Letter No. 16, dated 18th February, 1944, despatched to Lisbon on 19th February with eight other letters in a tin of curry powder.

2. Under the original arrangement agent 7 (5) was to have been placed in Southampton and agent 7 (6) in Exeter. On reflection we decided that it would be dangerous to put anyone in Southampton because he might see too much. That area could if necessary be covered by periodical visits. Under the revised arrangement 7 (6) was to remain in South Wales, his place in Exeter being taken by 7 (5).

3. GARBO Letter from Lisbon, dated 3rd April, 1944, received 22nd April.

4. GARBO 1806 and 1855 GMT, 7th March, 1944.

5. GARBO 1906 GMT, 13th April, 1944.

6. TATE 0634 MET, 25th May, 1944. TATE’s transmissions from Wye provided a novel feature inasmuch as he did not go there at all. An aerial was erected in Kent and transmissions were made by remote control and the use of a GPO line.

7. TATE 0639 MET, 28th May, 1944.

8. TATE 2015 MET, 1st June, 1944.

9. TATE Message received 2120 MET, 31st May, 1944.

10. When TREASURE came to England, she brought her pet dog with her. Unfortunately the cog had died in quarantine and TREASURE held the British Security Service responsible for its death. In order to make the authorities atone for their alleged negligence, she threatened to disclose to the enemy, by means of a secret code word, that she was working under Allied control, a threat which she never carried out.

11. FREAK 1125 GMT, 26th April, 1944.

12. BRUTUS 1634 GMT, 26th April, 1944.

13. GARBO 1910 GMT, 25th April, 1944. In reality, this division was to move to Chisledon in Wiltshire. FORTITUDE SOUTH extended its journey to Tenterden in Kent.

14. SHAEF/24132/4/SM/Ops, dated 6th May, 1944. See Appendix V.

1. This division was equal to little more than an armoured brigade in strength.

2. Until May 1944, this formation had been designated 273rd Panzer Division.

3. The location of this division would have allowed it to support the First or Nineteenth Army at short notice.

4. Approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, 10th May, 1944.

5. SHAEF/ 18237/Ops (B). Approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Western European Theatre, 4th June, 1944, but in operation from 23rd May.

6. Letter No. 14 from Lisbon, dated 7th March, 1945, received 12th March.

7. When IRONSIDE failed to materialise, BRONX, in a letter despatched on 7th June, which may be presumed to have arrived about three weeks later, justified herself in the following way: ‘Distraught by the news and convinced of the genuineness of the information given by Captain X. Dined with him last night but he did not respond to my teasing on the subject of his indiscretion, merely reminding me that I had promised never to speak of it again. Can only suppose that there has been a change of plan or else that this attack, also, will take place.’

8. On the instructions of the War Department in Washington a press stop was placed upon the movements of this General, who was then in America. His real name was Friedendal, but TATE having described him wrongly in his first message felt obliged to persist in his error until the end of the war.

1. Letters dated 27th March and 5th April, 1944.

3. i.e. the OKW and Abteilung III.

4. A message sent by FREAK on 15th May, recording the move of the 15th British Infantry Division from Yorkshire to Sussex, is recorded in Lagebericht West No. 1271 of 20th May, 1944.

5. Further news of ARTIST was awaited in vain. After the war TRICYCLE met Frau Vermehren, who told him that she and ARTIST were both confined in Oranienburg Prison and that he had disappeared when she was still there. She presumed that he had died in the camp. According to her he was being interrogated on financial matters. An SOE prisoner who escaped from Oranienburg confirmed that ARTIST was there and was still alive a short time before the war ended. All subsequent attempts to find him have failed.

6. As a security precaution an officer with no knowledge of the OVERLORD plan had already examined all the previous traffic, and although he had deduced from it a slight bias in favour of the Pas de Calais and a desire to suggest that the operation was by no means imminent, he found no clear indication of our intentions.

7. This view was soon to be supported by the Germans’ own broadcast statements: ‘Both at home and abroad landings at many points are predicted, some of which may seem almost unopposed until the High Command has identified the main thrust.’ PWE Central Directive Part II, Guidance for Output for week beginning 1st June, 1944, para. 2.

8. Before 20th May, the 21st Panzer Division had moved from Rennes to an area immediately south of Caen, while the Panzer Lehr Division had been newly identified to the south of Chartres. Before 27th May, the 91st Infantry Division had moved from Redon near the mouth of the Loire to the Cherbourg Peninsula.

9. TRICYCLE Letter in secret ink, dated 20th May, 1944.

10. FREAK 1233 and 1248 GMT, 30th June, 1944.

11. FREAK Message received 1130 GMT, 4th July, 1944.

1. For further particulars see (1) ‘Reports on the Wireless Deception and Security Measures taken by the three Services in connection with Operation NEPTUNE, July 1944’ Naval Report (Appendix D) and Army Report (page 6, Effect of Exercise FABIUS). (2) History of G (R) 21 Army Group and HQ, R Force, April 1945. Part III, para. 3, Exercises.

2. This number was made up as follows:

Great Yarmouth	49
Lowestoft	20
River Deben	59
River Orwell	63
Dover	46
Folkestone	18

3. Particulars given here are derived from Plan FORTITUDE, The Air Contribution, reference FEWB/JNA, Offices of the War Cabinet, dated 24th May, 1945.

4. BRUTUS 2010 GMT, 29th May, 1944, GARBO 1951 and 1956 GMT, 2nd June, 1944, and TATE 2nd June, 1944. As examples of the mishandling of controlled agents these three messages deserve study. Had the agents merely observed the aircraft in flight, no risk would have been run. But all three disclosed the fictitious object of the exercise. That this very singular item of operational intelligence should simultaneously have reached the ears of a Polish Staff Officer, a Welshman resident in Dover and a German prisoner-of-war working on a farm in Kent, all of them enemy agents, was indeed straining German credulity. Had the Germans analysed and compared the traffic of their agents at the time that it was received, their suspicions could hardly have failed to be aroused.

5. History of G (R) 21 Army Group and HQ, R Force, April 1943, page 11, Operation QUAKER.

1. GARBO 2050 and 2102 GMT, 10th May, 1944.

2. FREAK 1338 GMT, 21st April, 1944.

3. As there were many Poles working in the neighbourhood of Lille, this incidentally provided an unobtrusive pointer to the false objective.

4. BRUTUS 1935 GMT, 18th May, 1944.

5. BRUTUS 1833 GMT, 25th May, 1944.

6. BRUTUS Message received 2001 GMT, 29th May, 1944.

7. BRUTUS 2037 GMT, 10th June, 1944.

8. BRUTUS 2015 GMT, 11th June, 1944.

10. The fact that VIII Corps and the 79th US Infantry Division, which had just been falsely represented both by the controlled agents and by wireless as being in Kent and Sussex, were likely to come into contact with the enemy within a few days, led us to fear that American prisoners-of-war might reveal the fact that these formations had in reality come straight from Cheshire to their ports of embarkation. As an insurance against this danger, GARBO sent the following message on 5th June (2127, 2132 and 2140 GMT): ‘I dined last night with 4 (3) – the majority of the American troops who have arrived in England have disembarked in the north-western ports of the Island. Formations and units first go to staging areas of Western Command. The majority in the area of Cheshire. They stay there until they have been brought up to strength and receive their equipment leaving for the concentration areas in the East and South of England. Therefore nearly all the camps in the North-West of England are those which receive American troops, manned by personnel of that nationality.’ Thus any soldier who denied knowledge of the fictitious locations might be assumed to belong to a rear party which had been transferred directly from the staging camp to the port of embarkation.

11. FREAK Message received 1133 GMT, 18th May, 1944.

12. GARBO Message received 1955 GMT, 17th May, 1944.

13. BRUTUS Message received 0905 GMT, 4th June, 1944.

14. GARBO 1906 GMT, 27th May, 1944.

15. In the matter of grouping, the only important disclosure affecting 21 Army Group was of the fact that First US Army was under General Montgomery’s command (TREASURE 2010 GMT, 8th May, 1944). The reason for telling the Germans this was in order to induce them to accept the view that we were in the habit of mixing nationalities and so make them more ready to believe, when they saw TREASURE’s statement was corroborated on the field of battle, that First Canadian Army was under FUSAG and VIII Corps under First Canadian Army. In fact the enemy had already learnt through its intercept service that First US Army was under 21 Army Group.

1. GARBO 2058 GMT, 19th May, 1944.

2. GARBO 2014 GMT, 17th May, 1944.

3. GARBO 1915 and 1925 GMT, 2nd June, 1944.

4. GARBO 1804 GMT, 28th April, 1944.

5. GARBO Letter in microphotograph from Lisbon, dated 3rd April, received 22nd April, 1944.

6. GARBO 2115 GMT, 2nd May, 1944.

7. GARBO 2038 and 2044 GMT, 22nd May, 1944.

8. GARBO Message received 0110 GMT, 23rd May, 1944.

9. GARBO 1907 GMT, 24th May, 1944.

10. GARBO 2039 GMT, 29th May, 1944.

11. GARBO 2055, 2200, 2205 and 2212 GMT, 29th May, 1944.

1. The 47th and 61st British Infantry Divisions were, in fact, employed to provide ‘hotel staffs’ in the assembly areas. It could therefore be presumed that any district in which either of these formations was seen denoted a place of embarkation. This pointer was used subsequently to indicate preparations for embarkation in the East and South-East.

2. ‘Vomit bags and lifebelts’ became GARBO’s ‘leit motif’ for imminent invasion. It may interest the reader to know that this message was scrutinised by Hitler himself.

3. GARBO 1906, 1912, 1918 and 2130 GMT, 30th April, 1944.

4. GARBO 2115 GMT, 2nd May, 1944.

5. GARBO Message received 1905 GMT, 3rd May, 1944.

6. GARBO 2045 GMT, 4th May, 1944.

7. GARBO 1949 and 1954 GMT, 5th May, 1944.

8. GARBO 2035, 2046 and 2052 GMT, 7th May, 1944.

9. GARBO Message received 1959 GMT, 8th May, 1944.

10. In the ensuing narrative British summer time is referred to throughout.

11. These were the landing exercises in Loch Fyne to which reference has already been made.

12. We knew through Most Secret Sources that the question contained in the last sentence had emanated from Berlin. Madrid, anxious to supply Berlin with a prompt answer, had not waited for GARBO’s reply but had stated that such information might be expected to reach Madrid within forty-eight hours. This expression of opinion having been duly noted by GARBO’s case officer in London, GARBO on the following day informed Madrid that he could supply the required information in twelve hours. Madrid said no more.

13. GARBO 1952, 2022 and 2030 GMT, 26th May, 1944.

14. GARBO 2040 GMT, 3rd June, 1944.

15. GARBO 1956, 2002 and 2016 GMT, 4th June, 1944.

16. GARBO 2049 GMT, 23rd May, 1944.

17. GARBO 0608, 0615, 0645 and 0651 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

18. GARBO 1929 hours GMT (2129 hours BST), 5th June, 1944.

19. GARBO 2004 hours GMT (2204 hours BST), 5th June, 1944.

20. It is only fair to add that the passages in the D Day speeches, which GARBO now found so embarrassing, had been included with the approval and indeed at the suggestion of SHAEE In answer to a request for guidance, the Political Warfare Division had been specifically informed that public speakers might refer to OVERLORD as preliminary operations for the liberation of Europe. They should say that, although the assault has not yet been made in any of their countries, their hour of liberation is at hand’ (SHAEF/18202/6/Ops, dated 1st May, 1944). How this error of judgment occurred is of little consequence today. But it is important to notice that the reply given to the Political Warfare Division transgressed a principle of deception by allowing the cover story to emanate from a source which the enemy could not fail to recognise as officially inspired, an error which was not redeemed by the fact that in this particular case the Germans were so obtuse as to take the speeches, for a time at least, at their face value and argue that they provided evidence of ‘further undertakings’ having been planned. (Appendix to OKH Lagebericht West No. 1288, dated 6th June, 1944.) Some three weeks later it became necessary to close the English Channel to fishing boats. The Deception Staff recommended that the ban should include the entire European coast from the Spanish frontier to the North Cape. After some deliberation, the prohibition was confined to the coastlines of Holland, Belgium and France, but in order, presumably, to show that an attack on Norway was still to be reckoned with, SHAEF broadcast its instructions on 29th June in the following terms: ‘The Supreme Commander requires that no fishing shall be carried on in the coastal waters between the French port of Bayonne, near the Spanish frontier, to the West Frisian Islands until the 6th July at 9 p.m. But the Supreme Commander warns fishermen in other coastal areas that fishing may become extremely dangerous at any time, and that it will not be possible to issue special warnings immediately in advance of future operations.’ A copy of that message is to be found in the files of the OKW (OKW/WFS Papers, File No. 605, teleprinter message dated 29th June, 1944). The second sentence has been sidelined and the word ‘deception’ (Taeuschung!) has been added.

21. GARBO 2055, 2107, 2122, 2135, 2140, 2237, 2247, 2255 and 2300 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

22. GARBO 2158 GMT, 7th June, 1944.

23. GARBO 2152 GMT, 7th June, 1944.

24. GARBO 2040 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

25. GARBO 2305 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

26. GARBO 2310 and 2322 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

27. German code name for agent 4(1).

28. GARBO 2355 GMT, 6th June, and 0601 GMT, 7th June, 1944.

29. GARBO Message received 2010, 2016, 2022, 2100 and 2108 GMT, 7th June, 1944.

30. GARBO 2038, 2044 and 2050 GMT, 12th June, 1944.

31. BRUTUS 1816 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

32. TATE 1826 MET, 7th June, 1944.

33. SHEPHERD Letter to Lisbon, dated 7th June, 1944.

1. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops, dated 18th April, 1944. Notes for meeting regarding programme for forces engaged in Plan FORTITUDE (Scandinavia) for period Y minus 15 to Y plus 28.

2. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops, dated 4th May, 1944.

3. Scottish Command expressed some concern over the speed at which this move was carried out. It was suggested that the employment of operators in Lincolnshire who had been transmitting only twenty-four hours earlier in Scotland was unrealistic. It was also contended that if it had been necessary to route the 55th Infantry Division through Scotland instead of sending it direct from Northern Ireland to Skegness, it would have been more reasonable if it had maintained wireless silence while it was in Dumfriesshire. (SCCR MS 4/43878/2/Ops, dated 6th June, 1944 – Scottish Command to SHAEF.)

4. It moved to Buckinghamshire in August, where it was observed by EIRUTUS (1707 GMT, 21st August, and 1750 GMT, 24th August, 1944) and in the following month was transferred to Belgium.

5. See Chapter 27: The New Plan.

6. A force of three divisions comprising the 55th US Infantry Division, the real 48th British Infantry Division at Lincoln and a new imaginary division were to be held in readiness to occupy Southern Norway immediately there was any indication of a German withdrawal. (SHAEF/18252/Ops (B), dated 27th July, 1944.)

7. GARBO Message received 2045 GMT, 15th May, 1944.

8. GARBO 1950 GMT, 20th May, 1944.

9. BRUTUS 1707 GMT, 17th May, and 2113 GMT, 11th June, 1944.

10. BRUTUS 1629 and 1634 GMT, 14th June, 1944.

11. GARBO 1948, 1958, 2006 and 2014 GMT, 22nd June, 1944.

12. GARBO Letter No. 22, dated 20th July, 1944.

13. Teleprinter message WX39193, dated 30th September, 1944. AGWAR from Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF and other addressees. This instruction also brought BODYGUARD as a whole to an end: ‘In view of present rapidly changing situation, it has been decided to cancel Plan BODYGUARD, and you should therefore prepare a short-term deception plan to cover your respective operational requirements, these plans to be co-ordinated through London Controlling Section. The Russians have agreed to cancellation of Plan BODYGUARD.’

14. The 113th Independent Infantry Brigade and the Norwegian Brigade dropped out in July, 1944, when Fourth Army went South.

15. BEETLE Message No. 251, sent 5th March, 1945.

1. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1185, dated 24th February, 1944. A complete series of daily OKH Legeberichte for the whole of 1944 and the early part of 1945 was discovered by the United States Seventh Army in a cave in Thuringia during the last days of the war. It provides by far the most valuable evidence of the progress of FORTITUDE, stating in nearly all cases the source of intelligence upon which each entry is based.

2. OKW/WFSt papers, file 603. Note by OKW/WFSt, dated 17th March, 1944, initialled by Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont and Krummacher.

3. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1210, dated 20th March, 1944.

4. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1151, dated 21st January, 1944.

5. AOM No. 2717, dated 16th February, 1944, reflected in Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1178 of 17th February, 1944.

6. ‘The transfer, which has recently again been recognised, of landing craft from the Mediterranean to England, though small in extent (20-22 LCT), does, however, fit in with our existing view regarding the formation of a Schwerpunkt in England.’ (Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1170, dated 9th February, 1944.) This was probably based on observation at Gibraltar.

7. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1197, dated 7th March, 1944.

8. In a letter dated 16th February, GARBO, in giving an account of his visit to the South-West of England, was allowed by an oversight to say: ‘In Portland harbour I saw some American soldiers with the number one in red on khaki ground in the neighbourhood of the town. I learned that the insignia belongs to the 1st American Division.’ It so happened that the Commander of ‘A’ Force, a closely interested party, was in London at the time. He took the view that the wording of the message suggested troops on leave rather than the return of a whole formation. The accuracy of this diagnosis may be gauged by the following quotations: ‘The reported appearance of traces of the 1st American Infantry Division, hitherto assumed to be in the Western Mediterranean, still lacks confirmation’ (Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1189 of 28th February, 1944), and ‘a well regarded source reports the appearance of weak forces of the 1st American Infantry Division in Great Britain. This division was hitherto assumed to be in the Western Mediterranean. It maybe that these are remnants since the 1st Infantry Division was in Great Britain before being sent to the Mediterranean. Since there is no further reliable evidence for the transfer of this division from the Mediterranean to Great Britain, we must, for the present, accept it in an unknown location.’ (Ueberblick USA No. 22 for 2nd March, 1944.)

9. FREAK 1213 GMT, 24th April, 1944.

10. GARBO 1755 and 1803 GMT, 1st May, 1944.

11. TREASURE 1053 GMT, 17th May, 1944.

12. 7th British Armoured Division, 1st British Airborne Division and 82nd US Airborne Division.

13. The order to the British formations provided that they might operate divisional wireless nets but they were forbidden to establish rear links to corps. High-powered 22 sets were not to be used. No officers with RT peculiarities were to speak on RT and WT operators were to be changed.

14. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1145, dated 15th January, 1944.

15. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1160, dated 30th January, 1944.

16. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1149, dated 19th January, 1944.

17. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1189, dated 28th February, 1944.

18. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1199, dated 9th March, 1944.

19. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1194, dated 4th March, 1944.

20. In spite of the world ‘still’, it will be noted that the number of divisions has increased since 3rd March when an estimate of four to six divisions was given.

21. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1224, dated 3rd April, 1944.

22. BRUTUS 2043 GMT, 13th April, 1105, 1117, 1124, 1814 and 1820 GMT, 14th April, 1203, 1210, 1216, 1221, 1227 and 1236 GMT, 15th April, 0907, 0916, 0923, 0937, 0944, 0949, 0935 and 0959, 16th April, 2944.

23. Lagebericht West No. 1244, dated 23rd April, 1944.

24. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1244, dated 23rd April, 1944.

25. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1244, dated 23rd April, 1944.

26. Lagebericht West No. 1245, dated 24th April, 1944.

27. The 55th Division was identified by COBWEB on 5th March and again on 20th April, 1944.

28. Map published by Fremde Heere West on 15th May, 1944.

29. OKW/WFSt Papers, File 603. Note initialled by Keitel and Warlimont and shown to Hitler by jodl.

30. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1279, dated 28th May, 1944, Short Appreciation for the West.

31. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1197, dated 7th March, 1944.

32. Statement made under interrogation.

1. Fuehrer’s Order No. 51, dated 3rd November, 1943.

2. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1149, dated 19th January, 1944.

3. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1173, dated 12th February, 1944.

4. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1224, dated 3rd April, 1944.

5. The following assessment of German views is derived from examination of the Fremde Heere West maps and of the Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches, also compiled by Fremde Heere West, both of which were published monthly.

6. It was shown in this location in Das Britische Kriegsheer issued 10th April, 1942.

7. Among other things the Germans still believed in the existence of the ‘County Divisions’ which had of course long since been disbanded.

8. A note on the map of 31st December states that many of the unlocated divisions were probably in the South or South-West.

9. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1197, dated 7th March, 1944.

10. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1224, dated 3rd April, 1944.

11. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1241, dated 20th April, 1944.

12. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1158, dated 28th January, 1944.

13. ‘Furthermore, the appearance of higher American Command Staffs seems to be of significance (according to a sure source possibly American First Army Group and American First Army).’ (Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1145, dated 15th January, 1944.) ‘The First US Army has been confirmed in Southern England from a sure source.’ (Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1152, dated 22nd January, 1944.)

14. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1147, dated 17th January, 1944.

15. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1210, dated 20th March, 1944.

16. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1212, dated 22nd March, 1944.

17. Identified with South-Eastern Command.

18. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1241, dated 20th April, 1944.

19. Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches No. 28, dated 29th April, 1944.

1. Many true reports of troop locations in the British Isles had been given by the controlled agents during the previous twelve months, mainly with the object of building up their reputations. All the correct information appearing on the Fremde Heere West map, dated 31st December, 1943, had been supplied by them.

2. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1199, dated 9th March, 1944.

3. Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches No. 28, dated 29th April, 1944.

4. BRUTUS 1634 GMT, 26th April, 1944.

5. Lagebericht West No. 1255, dated 4th May, 1944.

6. FREAK 1125 GMT, 26th April, 1944.

7. Lagebericht West Mo. 1255, dated 4th May, 1944.

8. GARBO 1955 GMT, 2nd May, 1944.

9. Lagebericht West No. 1256, dated 5th May, 1944.

10 10. GARBO 1840 GMT, 1st May, 1944.

11. Lagebericht West No. 1256, dated 5th May, 1944.

12. BRUTUS 1206 GMT, 29th April, 1944.

13. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1256, dated 5th May, 1944.

14. GARBO 1840 GMT, 1st May, 1944.

15. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1623, dated 12th May, 1944.

16. BRUTUS 1730 and 1735 GMT, 9th May, 1944.

17. Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches No. 29, dated 15th May, 1944.

18. Ibid.

19. The Ninth Army is not mentioned at all though it is shown on the Fremde Heere West map of 15th May located near Didcot.

20. In arriving at this total they made no distinction between higher and lower establishment divisions.

21. BRUTUS 1836 GMT, 25th May, and 1605 GMT, 26th May, 1944.

22. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1280, dated 29th May, 1944.

23. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1256, dated 5th May, 1944.

24. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1288, dated 6th June, 1944.

25. BRUTUS 1605 GMT, 31st May, 1944.

26. GARBO 2050 GMT, 10th May, 1944.

27. GARBO 2055, 2101 and 2108 GMT, 12th June, 1944.

28. This division was first reported to the Germans by BRUTUS on 24th June, 1944.

29. 28th, 35th, 79th, 80th and 83rd US Infantry Divisions, 4th, 5th and 6th US Armoured Divisions, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division.

30. 43rd, 53rd and 59th British Infantry Divisions and 11th British Armoured Division.

31. 45th, 47th, 55th, 61st and 76th British Infantry Divisions and 9th British Armoured Division.

32. Essex County Division, 14th British Armoured Division, 6th and 7th Canadian Infantry Divisions, one British and one Canadian division of unknown number.

33. (1) ‘The 4th American Infantry Division as well as possibly the III American Army Corps have been identified in Great Britain by a sure source. They are under command of the American First Army.’ (Lagebericht West No. 1235, dated 14th April, 1944). III Corps was not in the United Kingdom.

(2) According to a sure source the 10th Light American Division as well as the 30th Infantry Division may be under the command of XIX American Army Corps.’ (Lagebericht West No. 1259, dated 8th May, 1944). There was no 10th Light American Division in the United Kingdom.

Otherwise the information given on both these occasions was correct.

34. (1) ‘The English 6th Airborne Division has been confirmed in Great Britain through a captured document. Reports from the Abwehr and from a sure source agree that the division is no longer in the area south of Hull (Northern Command) but in the neighbourhood of Salisbury (Southern Command).’ (Lagebericht West No. 1215, dated 25th March, 1944.) This information had already been given by BRUTUS on 21st February and again on 8th March.

(2) According to a useful piece of information, the 28th Infantry Division hitherto in the Swansea area has been moved to the Folkestone area. The move from the original area around Swansea could be confirmed by a sure source.’ (Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches No. 29 for 15th May, 1944). This was confirmation of GARBO’s message of 1st May.

(3) According to trustworthy Abwehr messages which have been confirmed by “Y”, the 50th English Infantry Division (Mot.) hitherto accepted in the Scottish Command, has been identified in the area north of Southampton (Southern Command).’ (Lagebericht West No. 1273, dated 22nd May, 1944.) This had been reported by TREASURE on 17th May.

35. Unless we count the move of the 28th US Infantry Division. This, however, is a very doubtful claim as apart from the fact that the move had already been reported by the Abwehr, the division really did move at that time from Tenby to Chisledon in Wiltshire, and in these circumstances one cannot be certain that a breach of signals security on the part of the real division might not have caused the leakage.

36. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1144, dated 14th January, 1944.

37. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1199, dated 9th March, 1944.

38. Report dated 25th January, 1944. OKW/WFSt Papers, File No. 605. 1939 is clearly a misprint for 1940.

39. There is nothing to show that such isolated attempts to draw the attention of the enemy to the Pas de Calais as Plan PREMIUM and SNIPER’s ‘airfield construction’ plan, which were made before the new policy took effect, produced any useful result.

40. OKW War Diary.

41. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1154, dated 24th January, 1944.

42. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1192, dated 2nd March, 1944.

43. Ueberblick des Britischen Reiches No. 29, dated 15th May, 1944.

44. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1283, dated 1st June, 1944.

45. OKW/WFSt Papers, File 605, Invasion West.

46. Head of the OKW Intelligence branch, and described in greater detail in chapter 23 seq.

47. Further evidence that COPPERHEAD had not reached the desired quarter was provided by the interrogation of Colonel Meyer-Detring, formerly la, at Field-Marshal Rundstedt’s headquarters. At the end of the interview, the Colonel took up a copy of the Sunday Express and, drawing the attention of his interrogator to an article by Lieutenant James recounting his wartime exploit at Gibraltar, commented on the ingenuity of the idea, clearly indicating by his remarks that this was the first that he had heard of it.

1. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1265, dated 14th May, 1944.

2. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1287, dated 5th June, 1944.

3. The italics are the writer’s.

4. Obtained from Most Secret Sources (BJ 508, dated 28th May, 1944). Before the invasion Most Secret Sources told us very little of what the enemy believed our dispositions and intentions to be. The reason for this is now clear. Until FORTITUDE SOUTH had been in operation for about a month, they had no definite opinions about the invasion for us to discover. This conversation provided one of the rare instances where we obtained, before D Day, a really valuable insight into the enemy’s thoughts. It gave us the first definite assurance that the Germans greatly over-estimated our strength and thus emboldened us to confirm the error in GARBO’s culminating message of 8th-9th June (of which more will be said later), greatly to the advantage of FORTITUDE SOUTH. It is hardly necessary to add that Hitler’s prognostications as to objectives and sequence of attacks were most encouraging to us, though the reference to Normandy gave ground for some uneasiness.

5. This appreciation, which is contained in a teleprinter message despatched 2150 hours on 5th June, 1944, states: ‘C in C West estimates situation as follows: The systematic pursuit and appreciable increase of enemy air attacks indicate that preparations for an assault are well advanced. As previously supposed, the place chosen for the attack will probably lie between the Scheldt and Normandy, while an extension of the northern front to Brittany, including Brest, is not to be ruled out. Where, within this entire sector the enemy will attempt a landing is still problematic. The concentration of enemy air attacks on the coastal defences between Dunkirk and Dieppe and on the Seine–Oise bridges, n conjunction with the paralysing of the south flank, with its supply routes, between Rouen and Paris (inclusive), may indicate the Schwerpunkt of a projected landing on a large scale. The elimination of the Seine crossings would, however, have the same effect on troop movements in the event of an enemy attack on a sector to the west of the Seine bay, Normandy or Brittany. That the invasion is actually imminent does not seem to be indicated as yet.’

6. C in C West’s Appreciation for 15th-21st May, 1944.

7. The account which follows is derived principally from the OKW War Diary.

8. Presumably a misprint for Klesheim near Salzburg, frequently occupied by Hitler during the war.

9. The German First Army occupied South-West France and the Nineteenth the South of France and the Mediterranean coast.

10. This was the movement which led 21 Army Group to suggest drawing attention to the cover objective by Special Means on the eve of the invasion.

1. This man was employed as a clerk in the IC section at OB West from June 1942 until November 1944. He was described as ‘an intelligent man whose knowledge about matters of strategy is necessarily limited to the talk current among the enlisted staff personnel, although he appears to have enjoyed the confidence of several staff officers’.

2. Twelfth Army Group. PW Intelligence Bulletin No. 1/51, dated 24th March, 1945.

3. This of course refers to the central group of armies which they were still unwilling to abandon altogether.

4. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1288, dated 6th June, 1944. This appreciation also refers for the first time to a theory which was held by the Germans for several weeks after the invasion that we had retained the bulk of the Allied Air Forces in the United Kingdom. This suited us well enough as it provided additional air support for the second landing. ‘As part of this undertaking we may expect the employment of large parts of the Anglo-Saxon Air Forces which have been held back.’

5. BRUTUS 1805, 1807 and 1810 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

6. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1290, dated 8th June, 1944.

7. This rather strange passage is explained in the OKH Situation Report for 8th June, 1944. ‘In this connection it is noteworthy that two English divisions are getting ready for embarkation in the Firth of Clyde area (West Scotland). These are the 52nd and 58th English Infantry Divisions which a short time ago were standing by on the east coast of Scotland. It follows that these divisions will not be included in any operation against the Norwegian area. It can thus be seen that the enemy will have recourse to forces in the Scottish area to extend his operations in France.’ In planning FORTITUDE NORTH we had originally chosen embarkation ports on the east coast of Scotland, reviving the plan which had been adopted for TINDALL during the previous autumn. At the instance of the Administrative Staff at COSSAC these arrangements were changed on the ground that the capacity of the eastern Scottish ports was inadequate. The expedition was consequently made to embark in the Clyde. This was the result!

8. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1292, dated 10th June, 1944.

9. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1228, dated 6th June, 1944.

10. OKH Situation Report, a.m. 9th June, 1944. Enemy Situation West and North.

11. Signal from C in C West to OKH, dated 6th June, 1944.

12. From what happened now it would seem that the 116th Panzer Division was under OKW control at this time although the War Diary states that it was placed under Army Group B at the beginning of May.

13. According to a recent statement by General Blumentritt, the moves of two other divisions, the 85th Infantry Division and the 16th GAF Division, from locations north of the Seine to Normandy were cancelled at this time on OKW instructions. The recall of the 85th Infantry Division was known to us at the time from Most Secret Sources.

14. Interrogations of senior German commanders and staff officers for the purposes of this report were carried out by Mr F. C. B. F. Hesketh (Holcombe Court, Holcombe Rogus, Wellington, Somerset), who can amplify, if required, the record of interviews given in these pages.

15. Admiral Buerckner, his former chief at the Abwehr, described him as ‘bone lazy’ (stink faul).

16. Information supplied by Jodl.

17. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1291, dated 9th June, 1944.

18. OSTRO, a German of Czech origin named Paul Fidrmuc, was a businessman in Lisbon who sem regular reports to the Abwehr in Germany for which he was very highly paid. These he collected from imaginary networks of agents in France, Britain, the United States and the Middle East.

19. JOSEPHINE and HECTOR, the two most prolific German spies operating in Sweden, were ‘run’ by a certain Dr Kraemer, a German journalist residing in Stockholm. Both agents were, of course, ‘uncontrolled’; indeed, it is not clear that they really existed at all. It seems that Dr Kraemer’s motives were pecuniary and he used these channels alternately to convey spurious intelligence in exchange for money payments. Most important operational messages went to JOSEPHINE, who in consequence enjoyed the higher reputation.

20. By arrangement JOSEPHINE was always referred to as ‘sehr zuverlaessiger V-Mann’.

21. Harrison was a fictitious air marshal to whom JOSEPHINE attributed much of his most sensational intelligence. It is possible that he was thinking of Air Marshal Harris, but mistook the name.

22. GARBO 1928 GMT, 8th June, 1944.

23. As vehicles of neatly all the formations going to Normandy, including the assault divisions, were embarked at Tilbury and the London Docks, it was possible to report their insignia in those districts without any departure from truth. This tended to increase the apparent size of the Eastern concentration.

24. Permission to refer to the dummy landing craft was given on 8th June. In order to provoke an air reconnaissance, GARBO told the Germans that 7 (7) had received this information through a new and untried source. He therefore requested them to check these statements by aerial observation in order that he might assess the value of the agent. No such flight was undertaken, but on 17th June GARBO was informed: ‘With reference to the report of the friend of 7 (7) about barges, you may consider this as confirmed.’ The Abwehr were evidently not anxious to advertise their inability to have their demands met by the German Air Force. It may be noted here that where it is necessary for controlled agents to refer to dummy equipment of any kind, it is usual for them to attribute the observation to a third party. This is an obvious precaution against the danger of the enemy discovering that the display in question is a false one.

25. GARBO 0144, 0149, 0155, 0204 and 0209 GMT, 9th June, 1944.

26. Misprint for Donny.

27. The frontispiece [page xxiii] contains a facsimile reproduction of this message.

28. Berlin to Madrid, 11th June, 1944.

29. A – GARBO; B – JOSEPHINE; C – Belgian sabotage organisation.

30. Both Jodl’s and Krummacher’s signatures on GARBO’s message are followed by the date 10th June. All were agreed that this merely implied that the signatures had been put on after midnight on the night of the 9-10th. This would be natural as the message only came into the office at 2220 hours.

31. This view of the matter is supported by a remark made by Von Rundstedt to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, and quoted by the latter in his book The Other Side of the Hill (Cassell, 1948), at page 251: ‘The scale of the invading forces was not a surprise – in fact, we had imagined that they would be larger, because we had received exaggerated reports of the number of American divisions present in England. But that over-estimate had an indirect effect of important consequence, by making us the more inclined to expect a second landing, in the Calais area.’

1. BRUTUS 1705 GMT, 11th August, 1944.

1. 21 AGP/00/261/33/IG (R), dated 8th June, 1944.

2. The Germans slightly garbled 3 (3)’s story which was transmitted to them at 1956 hours GMT on 4th June. 3 (3), having heard of the arrival of a large contingent of troops from Ireland, disregarded GARBO’s instructions that he should not leave the Clyde and went to investigate in the Dumfries–Lockerbie area, where he found the 55th British Infantry Division. Returning to Glasgow he found troops of the 2nd British Corps and the 58th British Infantry Division at Motherwell also on the move. The Germans reported the 2nd British Corps and the 58th British Infantry Division as having gone to Dumfries and said nothing about the 55th Division at all.

3. BRUTUS 1625 GMT, 7th June, 1944.

4. Lagebericht West No. 1293 of 11th June, 1944.

5. GARBO 2201 GMT, 16th June, 1944.

6. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1301, dated 19th June, 1944.

7. Lagebericht West No. 1179, dated 18th February, 1944.

8. GARBO 2110 and 2120 GMT, 20th June, 1944.

9. Lagebericht West, dated 24th June, 1944.

10. At this moment the true position was that an advance party of the 55th Division, specially constituted for wireless deception, had now arrived in Sussex, having travelled via Dumfries and Lincolnshire, while the main body was about to join it from Northern Ireland.

11. Following an observation of GARBO’s agent 7 (4) transmitted at 2146 hours GMT on 16th June, 1944, the Lagebericht West No. 1300 of 18th June, 1944, records: ‘According to a credible report the 35th American Infantry Division has been moved from the area south-west of Ipswich to the area north of Brighton.’

12. The numbers of fictitious Allied formations were supplied by the London Controlling Section who allotted blocks to each theatre of war upon which the latter could draw at will. The London Controlling Section in turn received British numbers from the War Office and American from the War Department in Washington. So far as the North-West European theatre was concerned, fictitious British insignia were designed by the Special Means Staff of Ops (B) Sub-Section and American were supplied by the War Department through the London Controlling Section.

13. Lagebericht West No. 1292, dated 10th June, 1944, based on BRUTUS 2005 GMT, 6th June, 1944.

14. Lagebericht West No. 1301, dated 19th June, 1944, based on GARBO 1910 and 2110 GMT, 17th June, 1944.

15. Lagebericht West No. 1301, dated 19th June, 1944.

16. Lagebericht West dated 25th June, 1944, based on BRUTUS 1846 and 1852 GMT, 24th June, 1944.

17. Lagebericht West No. 1293 of 11th June, 1944.

18. TATE 1802 MET, 8th June, 1944, and 0602 MET, 9th June, 1944.

19. These, of course, were the places where our imaginary formations were located.

20. TATE 1802, 0606 and 1814 MET, 14th June, 1944.

21. TATE Message received 0614 MET, 21st June, 1944.

22. Had this plan been put through GARBO or BRUTUS the results would almost certainly have been different. We did not know that at this time and indeed for several months to come TATE’s messages were having no apparent influence on the Germans. The enthusiasm of TATE’s control in Hamburg led us to suppose that he was thought well of and we had not the advantage of an MSS check because the retransmission of messages from Hamburg was done by land-line and nor by wireless.

1. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1290, dated 8th June, 1944.

2. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1291, dated 9th June, 1944.

3. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 15th June, 1944. The 49th British Infantry Division had been reported on several occasions by the controlled agents as being in the Eastern counties. The 9th British Armoured Division having just been disbanded, the designation had been allotted to 21 Army Group for cover operations in France.

4. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 28th June, 1944. Like the 9th British Armoured Division the 76th British Infantry Division, hitherto stationed at Norwich, had just been disbanded, and was now being used for deception by 21 Army Group.

5. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 15th June, 1944.

6. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 17th June, 1944.

7. Appendix to Lagebericht West, No. 1301, dated 19th June, 1944.

8. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1293, dated 11th June, 1944.

9. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 15th June, 1944.

10. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 22nd June, 1944.

11. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 22nd June, 1944.

12. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 28th June, 1944.

13. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 22nd June, 1944.

14. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 22nd June, 1944.

15. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 22nd June, 1944. This was imagination. The Lagebericht contains many contributions from the Luftwaffe Command IC which have no foundation in fact.

16. The original FORTITUDE SOUTH plan had stated simply that the assault would be made in the Pas de Calais. Its successor, FORTITUDE SOUTH II, which is described in a later chapter, defined the objective in greater detail. The assault was to be made by three infantry and three airborne divisions on the beaches exclusive River Somme to inclusive Boulogne. For the reason given above, however, these particulars were never communicated to the enemy by Special Means.

17. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1293, dated 11th June, 1944.

18. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1295, dated 13th June, 1944.

19. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1298, dated 16th June, 1944. References to a message purporting to have been written two days before the invasion, which prophesied the Normandy landing and a subsequent assault further to the east, appear in several of the OKH Intelligence Summaries during the few days succeeding 6th June. In the Appendix of Lagebericht West No. 1289 of 7th June, we find the following entry: ‘As regards the group of forces in the East of England (American First Army Group), there exists an Abwehr message from before the beginning of the invasion (4th June, arrived 7th June) containing relevant information about the start of the invasion, and stating that a further and larger operation is planned against Belgium.’ It will be noted that although the message is reported to date from 4th June, it did not arrive until the 7th. It does not appear in Krummacher’s personal file (OKW Papers, File 605) until 1500 hours on 10th June, when it was initialled by him and by Jodl, but did not go to the Fuehrer. It cannot therefore be considered as a proximate cause for the revocation of the order to move the armoured divisions from the Pas de Calais to Normandy. The quotation from the Intelligence Summary of 16th June given above appears to be a blend of this somewhat doubtful message of 4th June, which gave Belgium as the objective of the second assault, and the subsequent uncontrolled message of 13th June, which specified the Seine-Somme sector.

20. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 24th June, 1944.

21. Although there is some confusion in the use of the term ‘central Channel area’ or ‘central Channel zone’, it seems usually to refer to the Seine–Somme sector and is assumed to do so in the present context.

22. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 26th June, 1944.

23. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 24th June, 1944.

24. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 28th June, 1944.

25. There had been six arrivals and three departures.

Arrivals (placed in order of arrival)—

16th GAF Division and 346th Limited Employment Division from Fifteenth Army area; 276th Field Division from Hendaye (S.W. France), 272nd and 277th Field Divisions from Sete-Narbonne (Mediterranean coast); 2nd Parachute Division to Brest area, place of origin not known. Departures—

245th Limited Employment Division to Dieppe; 709th Limited Employment Division captured at Cherbourg; 716th Limited Employment Division to Perpignan (Mediterranean coast) replacing 272nd Field Division.

26. This increase was due to the arrival of six divisions: 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division from south of the Loire, 2nd Panzer Division from Amiens, 2nd SS Panzer Division from Toulouse, 1st SS Panzer Division from Ghent, 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions from Germany.

27. It is not clear what became of this division.

28.	Formation	New Location	Date of Arrival
	6th Parachute Division	Abbeville	Before 18th June
	363rd Field Division	Bruges–Ghent area	Before 18th June
	89th Field Division	Havre–Rouen area	Before 25th June
	70th Field Division	Ghent–Antwerp area	Before 8th July
	271st Field Division	Beauvais (from Montpelier in the South of France)	Before 8th July

During the month succeeding the invasion, seven field and three armoured divisions were sent to France as reinforcements – of these, five field and one armoured division went to Fifteenth Army, one field and two armoured to Seventh Army and one field to the South of France.

29. This passage is extracted from the exposition by General Jodl of matters referred to in German Despatch No. 776. The exposition is quoted by Admiral Abe, the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin, in his despatches to Tokyo. The italics are the writer’s.

1. The main features of this story were proposed by 21 Army Group at a meeting held by Supreme Headquarters at Main 21 Army Group Headquarters on 26th June. The story agreed at that meeting, however, made FUSAG the headquarters of the American forces in Normandy and proposed creating a new army group headquarters to continue the FORTITUDE story. A subsequent proposal by 21 Army Group (21 AGP/00/272/2/G (R), dated 2nd July, 1944) recommended the redesignation of the real FUSAG so as to leave the imaginary FUSAG in command of the deception forces in South-East England with its name unchanged. This amendment was adopted.

2. This, of course, was a real army, destined ultimately to go overseas.

4. In July this formation was in fact reunited as a Training Division at Wye in Kent.

5. As its predecessor in title, the 80th British Reserve Division, had been located at St Annes, in Lancashire, it would in due course be represented as moving from that place to its new location in Kent.

6. In July this miscellaneous collection of signals units was given an establishment and designated the Twelfth Reserve Unit.

7. Commander of Ninth US Army.

8. SHAEF Outgoing Message ‘BIGOT’ to AGWAR for Marshall from Eisenhower No. S-55125, dated 6th July, 1944.

9. SHAEF/18250/Ops (B), dated 19th July, 1944. See Appendix VI. The Special Means plan of 20th July is given at Appendix VII.

10. 7 (6)’s report in support of IRONSIDE I is here referred to.

11. GARBO 2106, 2112, 2122 GMT, 15th June, 1944.

12. Appendix to Lagebericht West, dated 17th June, 1944.

13. BRUTUS 2010 GMT, 17th June, 1944.

14. GARBO 1950 and 2110 GMT, 20th June, 1944.

15. GARBO 2036 and 2045 GMT, 2nd July, 1944, reflected in Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1316, dated 4th July, 1944. According to a report as yet unconfirmed, an American army headquarters (Ninth?) is in Liverpool. If this is correct, then it may be an army which is destined to take over command of formations arriving later from the USA.’

16. BRUTUS 2019, 2036 and 2041 GMT, 10th July, 1944.

17. BRUTUS 1015 GMT, 18th June, 1944, reflected in Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1301, dated 19th June, 1944. ‘Attention is deserved by a report from a particularly trustworthy source according to which FUSAG will be supported in action by strong portions of the heavy bomber force, which points to its employment against strong fortifications and so fits in with our existing appreciation (Middle Channel coast).’

1. GARBO Message received 2120 to 2154 GMT, 15th December, 1943.

2. GARBO 1847 to 1905 GMT, 22nd February, 1944, and 1807 GMT, 23rd February, 1944.

3. GARBO Message received 1950 GMT, 16th June, 1944. GARBO expressed annoyance. ‘It has upset me very much to have to learn the news of this arm having been used from our very enemies when I had hoped to have heard about it in advance from you in order to be able to leave the city.’ (2054 and 2102 GMT, 16th June.) Madrid answered with apparent sincerity: ‘Today Headquarters has notified us that it has been impossible for them to warn us in advance as to the date on which the new arm would be employed since they themselves were not informed on account of an order from the High Command that the secret should only be disclosed to those people who had to be told in order to put it into operation.’ (GARBO Message received 2121 GMT, 17th June, 1944.)

4. GARBO 2115 GMT, 30th June, 1944.

5. GARBO Message received 2200 GMT, 30th June, 1944.

6. GARBO 2044 GMT, 5th July, 1944.

7. GARBO 2012 GMT, 6th July, 1944.

8. GARBO Message received 1939 GMT, 7th July, 1944.

9. GARBO Message received 2015 and 2036 GMT, 7th July, 1944.

10. These false Spanish credentials had been supplied to him by the Germans some time previously for use in an emergency.

11. GARBO 1920 GMT, 7th July, 1944.

12. TATE 0603 MET, 23rd June, 1944.

13. GARBO 2044 GMT, 28th June, 1944.

14. GARBO 2055 and 2106 GMT, 30th June, 1944.

15. GARBO 2055 GMT, 5th July, 1944.

16. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1320, dated 8th July, 1944.

17. BRUTUS 1908 GMT, 6th July, 1944.

18. BRUTUS 1615 GMT, 11th July, 1944.

19. A gross overestimate and almost certainly a misprint.

20. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1316, dated 4th July, 1944.

21. In most other contexts Dunkirk–Calais is referred to as the ‘Eastern Channel Area’.

22. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1318, dated 6th July, 1944.

23. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1320, dated 8th July, 1944.

24. Appendix to Lagebcricht West No. 1322, dated 10th July, 1944.

25. OSTRO Message, dated 6th July, 1944.

26. OSTRO Message, dated 19th July, 1944.

1. GARBO 2005 and 2015 GMT, 12th July 1944.

2. GARBO Letter No. 21, dated 14th July, 1944.

3. BRUTUS Message received 1705 GMT, 12th July, 1944.

4. GARBO Message received 2049 and 2106 GMT, 23rd July, 1944.

5. TATE Message received 1833 MET, 31st July, 1944.

6. 83rd US Infantry Division (XII Corps) sailed 20th June; 2nd Canadian Infantry Division (2nd Canadian Corps) sailed 3rd July; 35th US Infantry Division (XII Corps) sailed 6th July; 4th US Armoured Division (XX Corps) sailed 8th July. The only other corps was the XXXVII, but as both it and its subordinate formations were imaginary they could not of course have been identified by the enemy even if they had been ordered to France, which was not the case.

7. BRUTUS 1725, 1731 and 1737 GMT, 19th July, 1944, 2019, 2024 and 2144 GMT, 20th July, and 1709 GMT, 21st July.

8. Lagebericht West No. 1339, dated 27th July, 1944.

9. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1339, dated 27th July, 1944.

10. Unless we count the Pariser Zeitung, but this seems doubtful. BRUTUS’s transmissions were made on the evenings of the 19th to the 21st inclusive. The newspaper article appeared on the morning of the 21st.

11. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1341, dated 29th July, 1944.

12. ‘The programme of FORTITUDE air operations … has not to date progressed to an extent sufficient to create any significant pattern in the mind of enemy Intelligence.’ (SHAEF/18250/Ops (B), dated 8th August, 1944. General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff, to C-in-C Allied Expeditionary Air Force.)

13. BRUTUS Message No. 921, 26th July, 1944.

14. SHAEF/Fwd/12466, dated 26th July, 1944. General Eisenhower to General Marshall.

15. OKH Situation Report, dated 4th August, 1944.

16. Lagebericht West No. 1351, dated 8th August, 1944.

17. The letter was subsequently returned to him as it was thought that it might be found useful on another occasion.

18. GARBO Message received 2049 and 2106 GMT, 23rd July, 1944.

19. GARBO Message received 2050 GMT, 29th July, 1944.

20. GARBO 1906 and 1922 GMT, 31st July, 1944.

21. GARBO Letter No. 25, dated 12th August, 1944.

22. ‘Norwich/Ipswich: There has been a reduction in armoured divisions in this area (despatched to France) and an increase in American infantry divisions.’ OKH Report dated 10th August, 1944, based on GARBO’s message of 7th August, 1944, sent at 2126 GMT.

1. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1347, dated 4th August, 1944.

2. GARBO Message received 2056 GMT, 29th July, 1944.

3. BRUTUS 2033 GMT, 1st August, and 1741 GMT, 2nd August, 1944.

4. OKH Situation Report, dated 4th August, 1944.

5. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1354, dated 11th August, 1944.

6. GARBO 1907 and 1925 GMT, 12th August, 1944.

7. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1358, dated 15th August, 1944.

8. Extract from the Daily Telegraph of 16th August, 1944.

9. BRUTUS Message received 1708 GMT, 26th July, 1944.

10. BRUTUS 2019 GMT, 18th August, 1944.

11. GARBO Message received 2112 GMT, 26th August, 1944.

12. BRUTUS Message received 1738 GMT, 13th September, 1944.

13. BRUTUS 1820 GMT, 29th September, 1944. By this time BRUTUS had given up his appointment at FUSAG and had returned to the Polish Headquarters in London.

14. GARBO 1933 and 1950 GMT, 1st October, 1944.

15. GARBO Message received 1819 GMT, 6th October, 1944.

16. This statement requires one qualification. The Ninth Army was in fact at all times at Bristol. A deceptive wireless link operated between FUSAG at Wentworth and Ninth Army at Bristol from 26th July until 17th August. The controlled agents had not yet said where the Army was. The reader will remember the Germans’ doubts as to whether it was the Ninth or the Fourteenth Army which would replace the Third Army in East Anglia. The map of 29th August shows both the Ninth and the Fourteenth Armies as being in the Eastern counties. During August, however, both BRUTUS and GARBO gave its true location and accordingly we find in the German appreciation for 31st August the following entry: ‘The American Ninth Army, which hitherto was thought to be in the South-East of England in the immediate neighbourhood of FUSAG, is now, according to credible information, in the Bristol area.’ (Lagebericht West No. 1374, dated 31st August, 1944, based on BRUTUS 1810 GMT, 10th August, 1944, and GARBO 2055 GMT, 16th August, 1944.)

17. SHAEF/18250/Ops (B), dated 4th August, 1944, Chief Ops (B) Sub-Section to Chief Ops Section.

18. Two Panzer, nine field and eleven limited employment divisions.

19. 49th, 85th and 331st Field Divisions, 6th Parachute Division and 344th Limited Employment Division.

20. SHAEF G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 21 for week ending 12th August, 1944.

21. IP (1) Daily Digest of World Wireless Propaganda, 7th–8th August, 1944.

22. TATE 1840 MET, 3rd August, 1944, 1602 MET, 8th August, 1944, and 0620 MET, 9th August, 1944.

23. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1347, dated 4th August, 1944.

24. Now Field-Marshal Sir H. Maitland Wilson.

25. FX.68506, dated 5th July, 1944, from AFHQ to SHAEF.

26. S.55127 SHAEF to AFHQ, dated 6th July, 1944.

1. SHAEF/24183/3/SM/Ops, dated 18th August, 1944. ‘Special Means Interim Plan for the Movement of Fourteenth Army from East Anglia to the South Coast.’ When this plan was being written it was hard to know exactly when the remaining German forces would be withdrawn from the Pas de Calais. As one did not wish to run any risk of relieving the pressure too soon, the plan provided that the move of the Fourteenth Army could, temporarily, be interpreted as the ‘culmination’ of FORTITUDE II. Advantage was never taken of this provision since, by the time that the plan came into operation, practically all the enemy’s troops had left. See Appendix VIII.

2. GARBO Letter No. 26, dated 24th August, 1944.

3. S.55194, dated 8th July, 1944. SHAEF Personal from Eisenhower to AGWAR to General Marshall.

4. OKH Situation Report, dated 10th August, 1944.

5. BRUTUS Message received 1713 GMT, 15th August, 1944.

6. GARBO Message received 2111 and 2119 GMT, 16th August, 1944.

7. Questionnaire given to TRICYCLE in Lisbon at the beginning of April 1944.

8. BRUTUS 1407 and 1412 GMT, 18th June, 1944.

9. BRUTUS 1252 GMT, 13th August, 1944.

10. BRUTUS 1714 and 1718 GMT, 21st August, 1944.

11. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1369, dated 26th August, 1944.

12. Three sections were left behind for a short time to represent the FUSAG Headquarters’ links.

13. BRUTUS 1443 GMT, 20th August, 1944.

14. Special Means Interim Plan for the Movement of Fourteenth Army from East Anglia to the South Coast, dated 18th August, 1944.

15. Lagebericht West No. 1374, dated 31st August, 1944, a reflection of BRUTUS 1443 GMT, 20th August, GARBO 1950 GMT, 23rd August, and 2032 and 2040 GMT, 26th August, TATE 0603, 1818 and 0605 MET, 27th August, and GARBO 2034 and 2106 GMT, 28th August, 1944.

16. Lagebericht West No. 1386, dated 12th September, 1944, a reflection of BRUTUS 2016, 2024, 2028 and 2032 GMT, 6th September, and 1715 and 1721 GMT, 7th September, 1944, and GARBO 2035, 2044 and 2052 GMT, 6th September, 1944.

17. OKH Situation Report West, dated 10th September, 1944.

18. On 26th August, BRUTUS was asked: ‘Of which brigades is the 5th British Armoured Division composed? Why is it at Newmarket if the corresponding corps is at Folkestone?’ (Message received 1408 GMT). On 30th August, BRUTUS replied: ‘With regard to the 5th British Armoured Division, it is stationed in the area of Newmarket as this area is suitable for tank training units. It is considered normal to detach an armoured division from its corps in order to obtain good training conditions…. Composition: 37th Armoured Brigade and 43rd Infantry Brigade. According to one of my comrades the 37th Brigade took part in exercises with 7th Corps in Kent a few days ago.’ (1711 and 1717 GMT.) At the same time GARBO’s sub-agent 7 (4) observed large armoured vehicles with the sign of the blue lobster, i.e. that of the 5th Armoured Division, south of Ashford. (2025 GMT, 26th August, 1944.)

19. SHAEF/24183/3/SM/Ops, dated 11th September, 1944. Special Means Plan for Move of part of Fourth Army from Kent to Essex. See Appendix X.

20. GARBO 2032, 2048 and 2101 GMT, 9th September, 1944.

21. TATE 0604 MET, 10th September, 1944.

22. GARBO 1910 and 1916 GMT, 14th September, 1944.

23. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1391, dated 17th September, 1944.

24. SHAEF/19011/Ops (B) (Fwd). GCT/370.28-202/Ops (B), dated 8th September, 1944. Current Cover and Deception Policy. See Appendix IX.

25. GARBO 2046 to 2150 GMT, 31st August, 1944.

26. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1376, dated 2nd September, 1944.

27. Appendix A to 21 AGP/00/272/2/G (R), dated 12th September, 1944.

28. Fwd 15007, dated 16th September, 1944. SHAEF Fwd to 21 Army Group.

29. G (O)/1523, dated 17th September, 1944. Fourth Army Directive No. 5.

1. German Security HO Mil. (RSHA Mil.) B/L 11102/8 of 8th August, 1944, quoted in Luftwaffe Fuehrungsstab IC Fremde Luftwaffen West No. 109/45 g. Kdos (A), dated 6th January, 1945. Assessment of Reports from Confidential Agents.

2. German Security HO Mil. B/L 13869 of 29th August, 1944, quoted in above-mentioned document.

3. German Security HO (RSHA)/10031 of 1st September, 1944, quoted in Luftwaffe Fuehrungsstab IC Fremde Luftwaffen West No. 109/45 g. Kdos (A), dated 6th January, 1945. Assessment of Reports from Confidential Agents.

4. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1383, dated 9th September, 1944.

5. GARBO 2032, 2048 and 2101 GMT, 9th September, 1944.

6. BRUTUS 1725 GMT, 21st August, 1944.

7. He had added the real and newly arrived 17th American Airborne Division to the 9th and 21st American and 2nd British Airborne Divisions in a message sent on 1st September, 1944.

8. BRUTUS 1714 and 1724 GMT, 10th September, 1944.

9. BRUTUS 1835, 1840 and 1846 GMT, 14th September, 1944.

10. BRUTUS 2122 and 2144 GMT, 20th September, 1944.

11. Quoted in Enclosure 3 to Luftwaffe Fuehrungsstab IC No. 109/45 g. Kdos, dated 6th January, 1945.

12. Appendix to Lagebcricht West No. 1391, dated 17th September, 1944.

13. This delay resulted in a certain amount of enquiry and recrimination. It is not clear whether it was caused by a failure of communications or whether Dr Kraemer was merely playing the well-known trick of backing the winner after the race was over.

14. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1392, dated 18th September, 1944.

15. ‘Sure source’ (sichere quelle) meant wireless intercept.

16. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1393, dated 19th September, 1944.

17. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1397, dated 23rd September, 1944.

18. GARBO Message received 1910 GMT, 29th September, 1944.

19. TATE Message received 1911 and 1917 MET, 30th September, 1944 Another typical question for the farm-hand.

20. BRUTUS Message received 2144 GMT, 3rd October, 1944.

1. At this time we meant to send BRUTUS to France so as to have one really good agent on each side of the Channel. On 11th June, he asked the Germans to hide a transmitting set for him in France, which, he explained, he would be able to pick up when he went abroad. ‘I can suppose that FUSAG may leave at any moment and I can lose radio contact with you. (2130 GMT). After three weeks the Germans answered: ‘We thank you for the suggestion about installing concealed apparatus in France. Help us to realise this project by giving us as soon as possible date and place of future landing.’ (Message received 1607 GMT, 2nd July, 1944). This placed us in a dilemma. If we suggested somewhere in the neighbourhood of the cover objective we would not get the wireless set. If, on the other hand, we told them to leave it where we knew we were going, it would spoil the cover story. As it seemed clearly more important to substantiate FORTITUDE, BRUTUS replied on 6th July: ‘With regard to radio transmitters: I suppose that Arras, Lille and Ghent would be good places because it seems certain that FUSAG will attack east of the region at present occupied by 21 Army Group’ (2025 GMT). Nothing happened until 6th October, when all idea of sending BRUTUS abroad had long since been abandoned and he had given up his appointment at FUSAG. ‘The apparatus with 50,000 francs is buried between Claye and Meaux, on the north side of the National Highway No. 3, between Paris and Meaux, on the edge of the ditch, one metre below the grass. From the kilometre sign: Meaux 12 Km. 4, Claye 2 Km. 3, respectively, you must walk straight ahead five metres in the ditch’ (Message received 1808 GMT, 6th October, and 1804 GMT, 9th October, 1944). When this message was received, the American SCI Unit in Paris was anxious to provide one of the newly captured controlled agents, who happened to be in the vicinity of Meaux, with a transmitting set, but could not touch it until authorised to do so by the Germans. Eventually, when they became resigned to the fact that BRUTUS was not going abroad, they did what we hoped they would and told the new agent where it was. It was then possible to dig it up and put it into use.

2. Amendment No. 13 to WE VIII/457/5 w.e.f., 9th June, 1944.

3. An advance party had already gone overseas in August.

4. The officers of this section were mainly occupied in controlling agents in the 21 Army Group communication zone.

5. SHAEF/24300/SM/Ops (B), dated 25th September, 1944.

6. DAC of S G-3 to Chief of Ops, 12th February, 1945.

7. Chief of Ops to DAC of S G-3, 24th February, 1945.

8. At this time the Special Plans Section ceased to be under command of ETOUSA and was assigned to Twelfth Army Group.

9. SHAEF/19008/Ops (B) (Fwd), dated 28th August, 1944. Subject: Cover and Deception. Signed W. B. Smith, Lieut.-General US Army, Chief of Staff. The first paragraph shows that at this date we still believed that strategic deception had a future.

10. GBI/CI/370-2(SHAEF/CI/400x), dated 31st August, 1944. Subject: Cover and Deception. Signed W. B. Smith, Lieut.-General US Army, Chief of Staff. This instruction implicitly reversed the decision made only ten days before by the 212 Committee, that it should itself ‘direct the deception policy governing the traffic of controlled agents and authorise the use of controlled agents for particular operations.’ During the ensuing months, however, as the reader will presently see, the operational control of double-cross agents in France was in a large measure delegated to the army groups.

11. Minutes of the 212 Committee of 13th November, 1944, para. 4.

12. GBI/CI/211.1(Agents)/SHAEF/CI/57x, dated 5th December, 1944. Subject: Approval of Special Agents’ Traffic in the North-West European Theatre.

1. GARBO 1943 and 1950 GMT, 14th September, 1944.

2. This requirement could only be satisfied by an interchange of divisions between XXXIII and XXXVII Corps. This left XXXIII Corps with the 11th, 17th and 48th Infantry Divisions.

3. Through an oversight this message was omitted from the summary of GARBO’s traffic. The date and time of its transmission is not, therefore, recorded.

4. Lagebericht West No. 1411, dated 7th October, 1944.

5. BRUTUS 1807 GMT, 9th October, 1944.

6. An American headquarters controlling and administering US troops stationed in the United Kingdom.

7. Lagebericht West No. 1460, dated 25th November, 1944.

8. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1460, dated 25th November, 1944.

9. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1460, dated 25th November, 1944.

10. GARBO Message received 1914 GMT, 31st January, 1945.

11. GARBO 2028 GMT, 12th March, 1945.

12. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1431, dated 27th October, 1944.

13. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1464, dated 29th November, 1944.

14. Lagebericht West No. 1425, dated 21st October, 1944, based on BRUTUS 1815 GMT, 17th October, 1944.

15. Lagebericht West No. 1434, dated 30th October, 1944, based on BRUTUS 1803 and 1808 GMT, 24th October, 1944.

16. BRUTUS 1743 and 1750 GMT, 29th November, 1944.

1. GARBO 1915 and 1924 GMT, 2nd December, 1944. Southern Command had in fact been instructed to prepare a plan for the reoccupation of the Channel Islands.

2. SHAEF/24309/SM/Ops (B), dated 6th November, 1944. See Appendix XI.

3. On 18th January, the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine analysed all the reports which had been received since the time of the invasion forecasting assaults on Norway, Denmark and the German Bight. These reports were graded X for true, XX for possible and XXX for false. The conclusions drawn here as to German contemporary beliefs regarding an assault across the North Sea are based principally on this document. It may be of passing interest to note that 66 messages were received from 47 sources. Of these messages OSTRO sent 8, JOSEPHINE 7 and BRUTUS 2. Of the remainder, 4 sources supplied two messages each and the remaining 40 only one apiece. Unfortunately we have no evidence to show what sustained these fears of an amphibious attack after January 1945.

4 4 20th September report from V-man DORETTE that invasion of Denmark was likely and 22nd September report from KdM Hamburg that a landing in North Germany and Denmark would take place in connection with the Western offensive.

5. Towards the end of October, OSTRO and JOSEPHINE, in messages which bear a curious similarity, put forward the story of an impending attack on Northern Norway to forestall the advance of the Russians, which gained credence for a short time.

6. As was our custom, we started the operation by confirming the formations in their previous locations. On this occasion that task was performed by BRUTUS and so we read in the German Intelligence Summary of 19th November: ‘According to a report from a good source the 7th English Army Corps as well as the 58th and 80th English Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armoured Division have been confirmed in their old areas in Great Britain.’ (Lagebericht West No. 1454, dated 19th November, 1944.)

7. BRUTUS 1739, 1810 and 1828 GMT, 17th November, 1944.

8. BRUTUS 2157 GMT, 19th November, 1944.

9. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1460, dated 25th November, 1944, based on BRUTUS 1749, 1757 and 1801 GMT, 13th November, 1944, GARBO 1935 and 1945 GMT, 19th November, 1944, TATE 0750 and 1910 MET, 20th November, 1944, and GARBO 1858 and 1928 GMT, 23rd November, 1944.

10. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1474, dated 9th December, 1944.

11. Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1479, dated 14th December, 1944, based on GARBO 1915, 1924 and 1944 GMT, 2nd December, 1944, BRUTUS 1759 GMT, 4th December, 1944, GARBO 2000 GMT, 6th December, 1944, and GARBO 2018 GMT, 8th December, 1944.

12. GARBO Message received 1804 GMT, 14th December, 1944.

1. Lagebericht West No. 1452, dated 17th November, 1944.

2. BRUTUS 1754 GMT, 7th December, and 1746 GMT, 8th December, 1944.

3. SHAEF/24309/SM/Ops (B), dated 19th January, 1945. See Appendix XII.

4. GARBO 1855, 1902, 1909, 1916 and 1924 GMT, 2nd February, 1945.

5. ‘In order to get a clear idea of the English and US divisions stationed actually in Great Britain, please instruct your agents to investigate carefully about this question, transmitting to us all details which you and the agents may obtain. At the same time try and find out for which reasons the English and US divisions which still remain in Great Britain are not moved to the front in France and Belgium.’ GARBO Message received 1918 GMT, 12th January, 1945.

6. GARBO 1814 and 1818 GMT, 18th April, and 1804 and 1809 GMT, 27th April, 1945.

7. GARBO Message received 1850 and 1902 GMT, 31st January, 1945.

8. TATE Message received 1845 MET, 31st January, 1945.

9. GARBO Message received 2027, GMT, 19th February, 1945.

10. GARBO 1901 GMT, 2nd March, 1945.

11. BRONX Letter No. 14 from Lisbon, dated 7th March and received 12th March, 1945.

1. GELATINE Letter No. 35, dated 7th April, 1945.

2. BRONX Letter No. 17, dated 3rd May, 1945.

3. The German Intelligence Summary (No. 1372) of 29th August, 1944, located the 17th US Infantry Division in the vicinity of Cambridge. This was almost certainly the result of a message sent by TATE at 1804 MET on 28th July, 1944. A report sent by TATE on 5th October (0755 MET), at the request of Sixth Army Group, that a corps consisting of one armoured division and two infantry divisions was on its way from New York to Marseilles finds its counterpart in Appendix to Lagebericht West No. 1411, dated 7th October, and Lagebericht West No. 1430, dated 26th October, 1944.

4. BRUTUS Message received 1703 GMT, 31 August, 1944.

5. BRUTUS 1720 GMT, 11th September, 1944.

6. BRUTUS Message received 1713 GMT, 12th September, 1944.

7. BRUTUS 1832 GMT, 29th September, 1944.

8. GARBO Letter No. 30, dated 3rd October, 1944.

9. GARBO Letter from Lisbon, dated 12th December, 1944, and received 1st January, 1945.

10. GARBO Letter from Lisbon, dated 20th March, 1945, and received 1st April, 1945.

11. GARBO Letter from Lisbon, dated 31st August, 1944, and received 9th September, 1944.

12. GARBO Letter No. 39, dated 8th April, 1945.

13. GARBO Message received 2025 and 2032 GMT, 1st May, 1945.

14. GARBO 1826 GMT, 3rd May, 1945.

15. GARBO Message received 1812, 1833 and 1841 GMT, 6th May, 1945.

16. GARBO Message received 1932 GMT, 8th May, 1945.

17. GARBO 1910, 1919 and 1925 GMT, 8th May, 1945.

1. On 31st May, 1944, OSTRO gave a correct forecast of the invasion. There is no evidence to show that his message was based on anything more solid than his own imagination. In the autumn of 1944 an enquiry was initiated at the headquarters of the Fremde Luftwaffen West into the traffic of JOSEPHINE, HECTOR and OSTRO, which led to the surprising conclusion that all three agents were controlled by the Allies. This conclusion was based partly on the fact that they had failed to answer satisfactorily a number of catch questions which had been put to them, partly on certain similarities which were observed in their traffic, due, no doubt, to the fact that both Kraemer and Fidrmuc had been relying upon the same German intelligence summaries, but more particularly, in the case of JOSEPHINE, upon an ingenious analysis of FORTITUDE SOUTH which revealed all its weaknesses and roundly declared that the story had been false from start to finish. Fortunately the traffic of our own controlled agents was not submitted for examination, and since the part which they were playing in strategic deception had now practically ceased, they escaped castigation. The prime mover in this investigation appears to have been a junior officer named Count Posadowski. It is not without interest to observe that one of the first of his reports in which he cast doubt upon the credibility of these agents bears the marginal comment: ‘This note was handed over personally by Lieutenant Count Posadowski to Lieutenant-Colonel von Dewitz, who was so annoyed that he read barely half of it. Thenceforward the former very intimate relations were broken off. There was no factual discussion of the matter.’ Such is the fate of those who venture to suggest that geese are not swans after all. The Fremde Luftwaffen West evaluation of JOSEPHINE’s reports on FUSAG is given at Appendix XIV.

2. During FORTITUDE a map was kept on which were marked imaginary installations which had been reported to the Germans, so that the controlled agents, when visiting the places where they were supposed to be situated, would not forget to observe them.

3. These remarks do not apply to the allusion to FABIUS which Mr Churchill made in his speech of 29th March, 1944, for here there was a sufficient element of truth to remove it from the category to which reference is now being made.

4. The writer always contended that moorings, suitably placed and brought to the notice of the enemy by the controlled agents, would have been as effective and far less costly than a large fleet of dummy craft.

5. See COSSAC recommendation at page 29, para. 2.

6. For example, on 7th June, 1944, in order to help the American troops who had met opposition on the beaches, 21 Army Group asked the Special Means Staff at SHAEF to tell the enemy that the Guards Armoured Division was to sail on D + 3. It was not really due to leave until some days later, but it was hoped that this false report might draw German forces in front of the British and Canadians and so relieve the position on the American beaches. At 0006 hours on 8th June, GARBO reported that the Guards Armoured Division was about to leave and in the same message told the enemy that the 3rd British Infantry Division had already taken part in the assault. The latter statement was true, and by including it we hoped to make them believe the other part of the message which was not. Madrid regarded this item of intelligence as being of such importance as to justify sending it direct to Paris, and on 9th June an urgent message from Paris to KO Spain stated that the information concerning the part played by the 3rd British Infantry Division in the assault was correct and added that the report of the impending departure of the Guards Armoured Division had been described by Von Rundstedt as especially important and that the latter had asked for further reports of a similar nature (History of the GARBO Case, chapter 24B, FORTITUDE (Phase II), pages 194, 199 and 200).

1. Cairo Conference.

2. Cross-Channel invasion.

3. Proposed attack against French Mediterranean coast.

4. Teheran Conference.

5. Long-range bombing attacks.

* JIC (43) 385 (O).

* These were short-term diversionary operations ‘forming an integral part of operation NEPTUNE’, and therefore omitted.

* Amended on 5th June, XII being substituted for VIII Corps and XXXVII for XII Corps (21 AGP/00/272/2, dated 5th June, 1944).

* This system of writing ‘Special Means’ plans was devised in the summer of 1943 when it became the task of the Deception Staff at COSSAC to supply the TWIST Committee with the essential features of the COCKADE plans and with the dates on which individual releases could be made. It was found a convenient method of presenting the story to the controlled agents and was adopted in subsequent plans. Column (b) gives the facts on which the story was to be based; Column (c) gives the dates on which the events referred to in Column (b) would occur; Column (d) gives the story, based on the facts contained in Column (b), which was to be told by the controlled agents; Column (e) gives the date on which the story was to reach the enemy. So far as possible the serials were arranged chronologically in the order in which each item was to be disclosed to the Germans.

Appendix D, the ‘phased programme for identification and grouping of military forces – 1st May to NEPTUNE D Day’, was designed to guide the controlled agents when reporting the moves to concentration, real and false, which occurred during that period. Similar programmes were prepared for subsequent troop movements.

FORTITUDE SOUTH I employed real formations only, the basis of the deception being to give them false concentration areas. The true locations before concentration, given at map MA, are therefore the same for OVERLORD and FORTITUDE. Map MB gives the real OVERLORD concentration, while map MC gives the false FORTITUDE concentration.

Appendices, A, B, C, E, G, H and K are omitted as most of the information which they contain is to be found in other parts of this report. Appendices F and J were never issued.

The Special Means plan of 6th May, 1944, was written before the change of policy caused by the arrest of ARTIST took effect.

† Will be issued later.

* As shown at page 222.

† As shown at page 244.

† The body of the Special Means plan for FORTITUDE SOUTH II is omitted since it consists of little more than a recapitulation of the outline plan contained in Appendix VI, arranged in chronological serials to suit the needs of the controlled agents. Appendices B, C, D and F are also omitted. Appendices G and H were never issued.

† Will be issued later.

‡ Forecast.

* As this and all subsequent troop movements in the United Kingdom depended almost entirely on reports from the controlled agents, no further outline ‘operational’ plans, if we exclude the Cover and Deception Policy Directive of 8th September, 1944 (Appendix IX), were issued. From now onwards all fictitious troop movements, disbandments and regroupings were the subject of Special Means plans only.

1. Reference is made in this plan to a newly created 17th British Corps. This Corps was brought into being to command the 55th and 61st British Infantry Divisions when 2nd British Corps went abroad. Very soon afterwards it was decided to let the Germans know that 55th and 61st Divisions were under the control of GHQ, Home Forces, which was in fact the case, thus 17th Corps became superfluous. As its existence was never reported to the Germans, it is not referred to at all in the text of the report.

2. The ‘story’ at paragraph 7, refers to the possibility of British forces in the United Kingdom being sent to the Far East. This was to explain why these fresh divisions did not appear in France. In the event we did not make use of this part of the story.

* Original phrase in English. The meaning of this expression is somewhat obscure.