XXV

TWEEZER

FORTITUDE required that the threat of a second landing should be kept alive for three weeks after the invasion had begun. As the illusory army group was composed solely of real formations, it was essential that none of its component parts should appear in France while the plan was still in operation. We have already seen how it had become necessary, for that reason, to omit VII Corps and the 79th US Infantry Division. We were now confronted with the possibility of losing the two corps comprised in the First Canadian Army, that is to say the 2nd Canadian Corps and the XII Corps, before the end of the month. 21 Army Group therefore thought it wise to withdraw them, too, without delay from the false Order of Battle. The proposed withdrawal of 2nd Canadian Corps came as no surprise for, as the reader will recall, we had counted, some time previously, on losing it as early as D plus 8 and it was to meet such an eventuality that the 2nd British Corps had been started on its journey to the South. Thus it was now available to fill, at least in part, the gap left by the two retiring corps. The plan which gave effect to this change was known as TWEEZER,¹ and was issued on 8th June, two days after the invasion had started. The 2nd British Corps, so the new story ran, had recently been detached from the Scottish force with a view to its ultimate employment in France. At first it had only been brought as far as Lincolnshire as it was thought that it might be required to revert at short notice to Fourth Army, which was still available for a Norwegian operation. After D Day it had appeared to the Supreme Commander that the Normandy assault was likely to proceed too slowly and would require a reinforcement of two further corps. He had therefore decided to allot the 2nd Canadian Corps and XII Corps to 21 Army Group as from 14th June and to move in the 2nd British Corps to take their place.

Adjustments were made in the deceptive wireless programme to indicate this regrouping. The First Canadian Army and its subordinate formations were to observe wireless silence from 14th June. On 16th June the wireless links of the 2nd British Corps were to close in Lincolnshire and simultaneously to open in the vicinity of Dover, that corps having already established wireless communication with FUSAG on 4th June.

It will be convenient at this point to complete the story of the 2nd British Corps’ move to the South. The reader may remember that we left it at Louth on 6th June with its two divisions at Skegness and Horncastle.

Agent 3 (3)’s encounter on the platform of Motherwell station on the eve of the invasion had already persuaded the Germans that the 2nd British Corps and the 58th British Infantry Division were on the move and heading for England.² A subsequent message from BRUTUS,³ who had included a visit to Doncaster at the end of his East Anglian tour, found its place in the Lagebericht for 11th June. ‘The same source, whose reports about the location of the English 2nd Army Corps’ Headquarters and the 58th English Infantry Division in Scotland have so far been confirmed, reports these on 7th June in the Doncaster area (30 kms. north-east of Sheffield).’⁴ By the middle of the month GARBO’s sub-agent 7 (2) was identifying troops in Kent with the 2nd Corps and 58th Division insignia, GARBO being prompted to add: ‘I attach the greatest importance to the reference by this agent to these insignia as it is an indication that all the troop concentrations seen by 3 (3) in Motherwell have been moved south.’⁵ Three days later the Lagebericht duly recorded: ‘From England there are further signs that the FUSAG formations are closing up towards the south-east coast. The hitherto unconfirmed transfer of the English 2nd Corps’ formations accepted in Central England to Kent fits in with this south-eastern concentration.’⁶ No mention had been made, on our side, of the 55th British Infantry Division since 3 (3) had found it at Dumfries, an observation which the Germans had ignored. When during the previous January PANDORA had disclosed to the German Minister in Dublin the fact that the 45th and 55th British Infantry Divisions, hitherto stationed respectively in Northern Ireland and in Sussex, had changed places, they had accepted the move of the 45th Division from Northern Ireland, but had apparently left the 55th where it was. A good source reports that the 45th English Infantry Division is stationed in South-Eastern Command and has relieved the 55th English Infantry Division employed on the coast. The 55th English Infantry Division is still on the south coast.’⁷ FREAK’s message about the troops in Northern Ireland sent in support of FORTITUDE NORTH would have disabused their minds on this point, but it had gone astray. Perhaps this explains why they could not believe that the 55th Division had turned up in Dumfries. At any rate, when on 20th June 7 (2) reported the division as being in his area,⁸ the Germans recorded the fact in the following terms: ‘The 55th English Infantry Division, hitherto accepted doubtfully north of Dungeness, has been confirmed by the same source. This formation is seemingly subordinate to the 2nd English Army Corps.’⁹ In other words it looks as if the 55th Division, both in reality and according to our cover story, went to Ireland for six months, but remained all the time, according to German opinion, ‘doubtfully north of Dungeness’.¹⁰ Be that as it may, the Germans now had the 2nd British Corps and its two divisions where we wanted them to be, namely, in Kent.

Certain other minor changes in the FUSAG Order of Battle which occurred during the first half of June must be recorded here. Shortly before the invasion, as has already been stated, VIII Corps and the 79th US Infantry Division had been withdrawn from First Canadian Army and had been replaced by XII Corps and the 35th US Infantry Division,¹¹ both these formations being transferred from Third Army. A gap had thus been left in the latter army. We now had to ask ourselves the question, should we continue to use misplaced real divisions or should we fall back on wholly imaginary ones? For reasons which will be examined later, the latter course was decided upon. Accordingly XXXVII Corps and the 59th US Infantry Division were brought into being¹² and introduced to the Germans in the following way: at the end of May the 28th US Infantry Division had moved from its imaginary location in Kent to carry out fictitious training with the sham naval assault force ‘F’ at Felixstowe. ‘According to a reliable message the American 28th Infantry Division, hitherto accepted in the Dover area, has been transferred to the Harwich area.’¹³ Its training having been completed by 7th June, the division was made to return in due course to its previous location. According to credible reports the 28th American Infantry Division has been moved back to Kent from the Ipswich area, where it is said to have been carrying out landing exercises.’¹⁴ The proposal was to make the new division, the 59th, which was supposed to be assault trained, take the place of the 28th and continue its amphibious training with Force ‘F’. In the message reporting the departure of the 28th US Division from Harwich GARBO therefore announced the arrival of the new one, so that the Lagebericht quoted above continues: ‘In the place of the 28th American Infantry Division there is said to be a new infantry division in the Ipswich area, which is said to have arrived recently in England.’¹⁵

Shortly afterwards the XXXVII Corps was discovered to have taken XII Corps’ place in Third Army. ‘According to an unconfirmed agent’s report the American XXXVII Army Corps is in the area around and south-west of Harwich and has under command the American 7th Armoured Division (Chelmsford area) and the American 59th Infantry Division (Harwich area).’¹⁶ The 7th Armoured Division, a misplaced real formation and part of the original FUSAG, had only just arrived from America, yet the OKH Intelligence Summary saw fit to add: ‘The 7th Armoured Division may be the armoured division of unknown number which on previous evidence was hitherto believed to be in the South-West of England,’¹⁶ and of the newly created and wholly fictitious 59th Infantry Division: ‘The 59th Infantry Division is probably the American infantry division of unknown number which hitherto, for want of further information, was believed to be in Scotland, but which had not been confirmed there for a long time.’¹⁶

Other additions to the Order of Battle included the imaginary 2nd Airborne Division which was brought into existence at Skegness in Lincolnshire as the result of a 21 Army Group instruction of 11th June, and which opened a wireless link with the 2nd British Corps in Kent on 17th June. This division had already been reported by BRUTUS as being in the Grantham area on 7th June, and in the Lagebericht for the 11th we read: ‘According to an Abwehr source which has reported accurately for a long time, the 2nd English Airborne Division, hitherto thought to be in the Western Mediterranean, location unknown, is now in the Grantham area (30 kms. east of Nottingham).’¹⁷ Finally on 6th June arrangements were made for the inclusion of the Nineteenth Tactical Air Force in the FUSAG Order of Battle. This was to correct a mistake which had resulted from an oversight in the signals arrangements. The Nineteenth Tactical Air Force in reality provided the air support for the Third US Army. When the latter was moved fictitiously to Chelmsford at the end of April from its real location at Knutsford in Cheshire, the wireless links of the Air Force with which it was associated continued to operate in their true location in Cheshire. This was not noticed until the beginning of June, when steps were immediately taken to remedy the situation. In fact the Nineteenth Tactical Air Force moved during June to Biggin Hill in Kent, an admirable location for the support of FORTITUDE SOUTH.

At the middle of June, therefore, the FUSAG grouping of forces was theoretically as follows:

Imaginary formations are printed in heavy type

It was not necessary, of course, for the controlled agents to tell the enemy that the 2nd Canadian Corps and XII Corps had been transferred to 21 Army Group until these formations really went to France. Consequently, since wireless deception was telling them nothing, the Germans were for the time being merely left with the impression that FUSAG had been reinforced by the 2nd British Corps.

TWEEZER provided that the whole of the FUSAG wireless network should go off the air on 26th June and, in a final attempt to hold such formations of the German Fifteenth Army as still remained in the North-West of France, the impression of imminent embarkation was to be given. Thereafter the forces engaged in deception would disperse. The 2nd British Corps and the 58th British Infantry Division with their supporting wireless would return to Scotland. The party representing the 55th British Infantry Division would rejoin its main body on the latter’s arrival from Ireland. The other formations engaged in FORTITUDE SOUTH would duly appear in Normandy, while No. 5 Wireless Group and 3103 Signals Service Battalion would become available for service overseas.

Before the invasion was many days old, indications were not lacking of the enemy’s belief in our intention to effect a second landing north of the Seine. On 3rd June the Allied Intelligence Staff had forecast that by the 13th three armoured and three infantry divisions would have left the Fifteenth army’s area for the bridgehead. As it was, only one, the 2nd Armoured Division, had crossed the Seine. On 12th June Sertorius, the German commentator, announced: ‘Of the German reserves, only a fraction have taken an active part in the battle, while the remainder are still being held in their reserve positions. Consequently there can so far be no talk of a major German counter-offensive against the Allied armies on the Cotentin and Calvados shores. This temporary holding back and sparing of German forces arises from the consideration that the Anglo-US attack on the Normandy sector is only the first part of the invasion action, and that equally strong, if not stronger, actions will certainly follow on other sectors of Europe’s Western flank. The place and time of these coming actions cannot exactly be foreseen, but obviously a new major landing will not be started before the situation on the Normandy shore has been so far stabilised that further assistance from the bulk of the enemy’s air and sea forces can be dispensed with.’ Most significantly of all, Most Secret Sources had revealed the order for the transfer of the 85th German Infantry Division to the bridgehead and the subsequent rescinding of that order.

At the middle of the month it was possible to take either a short-term or a long-term view. If we completed the operation with a show of embarkation at the end of June we should probably be more certain of pinning down German forces in the immediate future, but by doing so we should be spoiling our chance of keeping the threat alive in July. Once we had persuaded the enemy that the expedition was about to sail, subsequent inaction would cause them to wonder why we did not come and thus begin to sow seeds of doubt.

While it was agreed by this time that a new story designed to continue FORTITUDE SOUTH into July would probably be needed, 21 Army Group still thought that some advantage could be gained by bringing the original plan near to ‘culmination’. Providing that matters were not pressed too far it was felt that this could be done without damage to any future story. Thus, on 2nd June, Force ‘F’, having been joined by its headquarters ship, HMS Lothian, moved to its battle station at Sheerness, decoy lighting was increased at the hards and finally, as already stated, wireless silence was imposed on 26th June, this being intended to suggest the movement of the forces to their ports of embarkation.

The Special Means Staff at SHAEF was invited by 21 Army Group to support the move to embarkation. Knowing that measures were already being considered which would require the controlled agents to tell a story altogether at variance with any suggestion of imminent attack, the Special Means Staff found itself in a somewhat difficult position. A solution was attempted in the ‘Southern Railway Plan’, also known as Plan MERCURY. If we could suggest a movement of the FUSAG formations from their existing locations to the ports without actually specifying any dates, we should still have a line of retreat when invasion of the Pas de Calais at the end of June did not materialise. It was therefore decided to let one of our agents come into possession of a Southern Railway movement table based on an undisclosed D Day. This could hardly excite the suspicion of the Germans, for to omit dates from such a document would be a normal security precaution. With the assistance of the Traffic Manager of the Southern Railway, tables were accordingly prepared showing the movement of all the FUSAG formations from their concentration areas to the ports of Tilbury, Gravesend, Dover, Folkestone and Newhaven. As GARBO and BRUTUS were both fully occupied at that time, it was decided to employ TATE for this particular task. TATE had removed to Kent at the end of May and was working on the farm of his employer’s friend. On 8th and 9th June he sent the following message: ‘The Special Trains Section of the Southern Railway has opened an advance control office at Ashford Junction. This section is a part of the London East Division of the Southern Railway … and all important troop movements are dealt with by it. A friendly clerk in the Ashford office billeted here tells me that the advance control office has been opened to cope with increased troop movements in that area.’¹⁸ The idea now was to throw a fly over the Germans by letting out a few details of this movement plan in the hope that their interest would be aroused and that they would ask for more particulars so that eventually we could give them the complete story. On 14th June TATE therefore followed his first message with this: ‘Railway clerk friend has been very busy working out adjustments to timetables. Was able to see at his place a railway notice called “Special Working Arrangements in Connection with Movements of Troops”. Unfortunately no dates given. Dates also unknown to friend. On the cover were several instructions. The first page dealt with twenty-three trains to Tilbury from Tenterden on a date described as “J minus 11”…. Thirteen of them were for tracked vehicles and the rest were passenger trains, each with about 500 seats for men and thirty or so for officers. There were about six pages in all but had not much time get much detail of the others. They covered a period from J minus five or six. The places of departure include Heathfield, Ashford, Elham.¹⁹ The destinations were mainly Gravesend, Tilbury and Dover. Every timetable carried a list of trains to carry tracked vehicles…. One included eight trains of ten “warflats”, which I was told were for tanks and other big vehicles. There were only twelve trains in this timetable. There were frequent references to connections with the LMSR line. On the last page of the timetable there was a list of hospital trains destined for Birmingham but no times for the movement were shown.’²⁰ The Germans did not rise. On 21st June TATE was told: ‘Do everything possible to investigate troop formations which pass through your place or are in the district. If there are no troops there try to get information about concentration areas and reserve areas either from your own travels or from a third party. Especially now such messages are of colossal importance.’²¹ But nothing was asked about the friendly clerk in the advance control office at Ashford Junction.²²