GARBO had always insisted that, for the credit of the organisation, at least one of the agents should gain advance information of the invasion. We could not expect to be allowed to tell the enemy that the invading armies were on their way more than an hour or so before the landing took place, and it was arguable that a last-minute message of this kind might excite suspicion. In spite of this, however, the agent and his case officer held to their opinion. Agent Four, the Gibraltarian waiter in the NAAFI of the Chiselhurst caves was chosen for the task. The chain of events which will now be unfolded was designed with two objects in view. First to manœuvre Four into a position which would enable him to provide GARBO with news of the invasion when the Allied armies were still at sea. Second, to build up GARBO’s connections with the ministries in London, as these were destined, ultimately, to provide the enemy with the key to Allied intentions. In order to trace the development of the plot, we must go back to FABIUS.
On 27th April GARBO received a message from Four to say that he was leaving the Chiselhurst caves for an unknown destination. He had already a few days before been requested to sign a ‘security certificate’ requiring NAAFI volunteers employed in the assembly areas to agree to meet no one outside the sealed area and to accept military censorship of mail. On 29th April he rang up GARBO and asked him to meet him at Winchester station on the following day. At this meeting Four explained that he had been posted to Hiltingbury Camp, situated in a wood a mile south-west of Otterbourne in Hampshire. This camp was, in fact, occupied by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, one of the real assault formations, and it would be from here that the Division would move to its port of embarkation at the beginning of June. The objection which we had previously had to sending observers into the Southampton area, where too many vital secrets would meet the eye, did not apply in this case, because he was in a sealed camp, and so his inability to communicate with GARBO could readily be explained. Indeed the problem now would be to find a way of putting him in touch with his chief when the time came for him to deliver his final message. At the end of March, when the repercussions of FABIUS upon the cover plan were being discussed, it had been agreed that it would be unreasonable to withhold all knowledge of the exercise from the agents. The policy was therefore established that a number of the agents should observe the preparations for the great rehearsal, but that there should be a realistic variety in the opinions which they expressed as to the purport of the activities observed. Some should be misled into believing that the great day had come; others should see the position in its true light. As the camps in the assembly areas were most rigorously guarded, it was clear that Four would not be able to make his report about the invasion without running the gauntlet in such a way as to jeopardise his future position in the network. After so hazardous an undertaking he would almost certainly have to go into retirement. Thus his ultimate reputation as an agent did not greatly matter. He could therefore act as the foil to other agents whose credit we wished to enhance.
At his meeting with GARBO on 30th April, Four accordingly told his master, referring of course to the embarkation for FABIUS, that ‘all the 3rd Infantry Division are concentrated here ready to embark. There are other camps full of troops ready for attack. Have identified the 47th London Division1 in a camp to the south of mine … it is extremely difficult to leave the camp. They are preparing cold rations for two days, also vomit bags, lifebelts2 for troops’ sea voyage.’3 GARBO added that Four was convinced that the invasion was imminent. On the other hand, on 2nd May, GARBO stated that J (5) at the Ministry for War had notified him that there was no possibility of immediate invasion, which drew from GARBO the comment: ‘I am disconcerted by what Four said and cannot under any circumstances advise or give information.’4 The Germans took the side of Four. ‘I do not consider that you should attribute too much importance to the opinion of J (5) in the present situation, since it is very probable that the Ministerial personnel has received very severe orders with regard to the confidential handling of all military matters at the present moment. It is also possible that subordinates of Ministries are being falsely misled intentionally.’5 The following day Four announced that the 3rd Canadian Division had just left in the Southampton direction with embarkation orders;6 and on 5th May: ‘Four communicates that orders have been given to clean and prepare the camp to receive troops once more. Agent supposes these will be second-line units. This proves J (5)’s lie because she suggested, naïvely, today that troops in the Southern area were on manœuvres, information which has been disproved, as in this case troops would have returned. My opinion is that, assuming they have not landed on the Channel coast, the troops which embark must at this moment be moving towards their far-off objective or to join the fleet, reported by Three in the Clyde.’7 That was to give a little passing assistance to FORTITUDE NORTH.
Then came the anti-climax of 7th May. ‘Four has displayed the ability of a simpleton. I am very disgusted with him, though I have not let him know this. He has, today, communicated that the troops he was awaiting, which he thought would be second-line troops, have arrived, but they are the same as had previously left, which is to say the 3rd Canadian Division. The troops at the other camps have likewise returned. Though too late, he tells me that they have been in one of the many rehearsals which Churchill announced would be carried out before the Second Front was opened. My last comments about J (5) should be disregarded. I see that her information was true and that the fault has been partly mine through being impressed by the agent. I see that I could get more accurate information through my Ministerial friends. Four, in excuse, says that his beliefs were confirmed by concrete military events, which I am unable to deny. In future he will make no further comments to influence me or my chiefs. I am afraid he is a little discouraged by his great stupidity.’8 With engaging solicitude, Madrid replied: ‘I do not consider that we should reproach Four at all since the troops and the majority of the officers left the camps convinced that it was to be the invasion and only a few high officers knew the real objectives. If Four is disillusioned through his mistake, which he could not avoid you should give him encouragement, as, if not, it might happen that when the real invasion is about to take place he will not notify this owing to over-precaution.’9 Nevertheless the Germans were left with the realisation that where Allied intentions were concerned as opposed to mere observation, the people at the Ministries were likely to be better informed and that they were not ‘being falsely misled intentionally’.
In reply to our request for permission to send an advance report of the landing in France the Supreme Commander gave instructions that a message might be sent three and a half hours before the first touchdown, that is to say at 0300 hours BST.10 Unfortunately, under the transmission timetable which had come into operation at the beginning of May, Madrid closed down at 23.30 hours at night and did not listen again until 0700 hours. It was therefore necessary to find some means of bringing the Germans onto the air four hours sooner than the timetable demanded. Obviously one could not use the invasion itself as an excuse for keeping them on the alert. Some other inducement, therefore, had to be found. What better than a sudden revival of interest in FORTITUDE NORTH? Only on 22nd May Madrid had stated: ‘I am particularly interested to know urgently whether the 52nd Division is still in the camps in the Glasgow area after finishing the manœuvres11 on the 11th in accordance with the message of Three. I should be grateful to have your reply as soon as possible. Please take every measure to ensure that you are notified of every movement of that division by the quickest possible means. I should be grateful if you would tell me how much time will be lost from the moment the division starts its embarkation operations until the news reaches you for the transmission to us by message.12 In answer to this, GARBO on 26th May told Madrid that 3 (3), the only remaining agent in Scotland, had been called by telegram to London. 3 (3) had reported on his arrival that the invasion fleet was still in the Clyde and the 52nd Division in the Kilmarnock area. ‘Since it was impossible for him to keep a check on the fleet and the 52nd Division at the same time, as they were no longer both in the same place, he was told that he should not lose contact with the fleet, as troops could not embark without ships, thus, while controlling one you control the other.’13
With these instructions 3 (3) had returned to Glasgow. On 3rd June GARBO informed the Germans that he had received a telegram from 3 (3) saying that he would be arriving in London at eleven o’clock on the same evening. ‘Something must have happened which cannot be explained in the code which had been agreed between us for announcing the sailing of the Clyde fleet. Therefore you should be listening tomorrow morning at 0300 hours.’14 3 (3)’s explanation, of which the Germans were informed on the next day, showed that the sub-agent had lost his head. In order to understand what follows, we must, for a moment, anticipate our narrative of events in Scotland. At the beginning of June certain changes were made in the constitution of Fourth Army. As part of this reorganisation, the 55th British Infantry Division had been transferred, on the 2nd of that month, from Northern Ireland to Dumfries, while the 2nd British Corps and the 58th British Infantry Division had received orders to move south. Having heard of the arrival of a large contingent of troops from Ireland, 3 (3) ‘disregarded my instructions that he should not leave the Clyde. He discovered an entire division had, in fact, arrived and was encamped in the Dumfries-Lockerbie area…. He believes it is the 55th English Division. Returning to Glasgow, on arrival at Motherwell, he discovered that vehicles and men in full equipment in large numbers were assembling there … belonging to the stag’s antlers division and the one with the sign of the fish in red on blue and white waves…. Becoming panicky and realising that his arrival in Glasgow would be delayed in view of the congestion, he decided to telegraph me and take the 1.22 train from Motherwell which was about to leave for London and, so, be able to notify me quicker. I am very disgusted as what he should have done was to have returned to keep a watch on the fleet. Therefore I am giving him strict instructions to return immediately to Glasgow giving him an password in order to telephone me to let me know whether the troops are embarking.’15 Meanwhile the Germans should continue to listen by night so as to avoid any risk of delay when 3 (3)’s message came through.
We now return to agent Four, immured in Hiltingbury Camp. Since the end of FABIUS, GARBO had only met him once, namely on 22nd May, when he had been in London on twenty-four hours’ leave.16 This silence was not again broken until about midnight on 5th/6th June. Four’s story may be told in GARBO’s own words. ‘Still no news from 3 (3) but, meanwhile, Four has hastened to London, having broken camp together with two American deserters who had arrived in the camp last Sunday. Discovering the plans of these two men, he decided to join them in view of the important news which he would otherwise have been unable to communicate in view of the complete sealing of the camps for the last week. En route, he tried to communicate by telephone, using the password prepared in case of emergency, but found that only official calls were being accepted. He therefore continued his journey clandestinely to London in order to report to me personally. He arrived after a difficult journey created by the steps he took to slip through the local vigilance. He states that he wrote me three days ago, announcing anew the distribution of cold rations and vomit bags, &c., to the 3rd Canadian Division. This letter has not yet reached me due to the delay in the mails. Today he says that, after the 3rd Canadian Division had left, Americans came in, rumours having reached him that the 3rd Canadian Division had embarked. The American troops which are now in the camp belong to the First US Army. The two Americans who escaped with him through fear of embarking belonged to the 926 Signals Corps. The situation of this agent is very compromising for the service because his absence must have been noted owing to the many hours which have elapsed since he left the camp. In order to protect the service I have taken a decision which I think you will approve, which is to put him into hiding, taking advantage of the fact that Seven is here, who says that he can arrange this with absolute safety and without danger of compromise. Therefore, tomorrow, they will both leave for the South of Wales.’17 According to the imaginary procedure, this message would have been enciphered by Three and the widow, and taken round by the latter to the operator, 4 (1), in time for him to transmit at 0300 hours.
Thus we may picture GARBO leaving for his office on the morning of 6th June, congratulating himself on having been able to give his masters advance information of the great landing in France.
We must now return for a short interval to the world of flesh and blood. On the evening of 5th June a small party consisting of GARBO, his case officer and wireless operator, the head of B1A Section and the Special Means Officer at SHAEF, repaired to a villa in the north of London, where GARBO’s wireless transmitter was installed. The only messages received from Madrid that evening were concerned with technical matters affecting call signs18 and the domestic affairs of agent Five in Canada.19 Communication continued until shortly before midnight. The Germans showed no sign of uneasiness. By three o’clock in the morning the message containing the story of Four’s escape was encoded, and the operator called Madrid. Madrid failed to reply. The call was repeated at intervals, but without result. At first this failure to attract the attention of the Germans caused some consternation. The invasion fleet was already approaching the French coast, and in a short time the landings would take place. It seemed as if we were to forego the benefits which would accrue from an advance report. On reflection, however, it seemed possible to turn the situation to our advantage, for since we now knew that the Germans would not receive the message until after the landing had occurred, we could strengthen the wording and still claim that GARBO had received it several hours before the troops landed. In fact the message did not go off until eight o’clock in the morning, by which time the imaginary GARBO was on his way to work at the Ministry of Information oblivious of Madrid’s negligence.
GARBO’s deception at the Ministry of Information was to be achieved by inverting fictitious PWE directives which warned the press not to speculate about future landings. On the day before the invasion took place the Special Means Staff had an opportunity of seeing the drafts of a number of the speeches that were to be made on the afternoon of the following day when the attack had been launched. Several of these speeches made veiled allusions to the possibility of further landings. This placed GARBO in a difficult position since the PWE directives about which he was telling the enemy forbade all reference to future assaults and diversions. In composing these imaginary directives we had worked on the assumption that no public mention would be made of a second landing. That seemed a reasonable assumption to make, for clearly no one would have been allowed to throw out hints about the real invasion before it occurred, and what held good for the first landing would presumably hold good for the second.20
Let us see how GARBO sought to find a way out of this new difficulty: ‘After the crisis last night with agent Four I was summoned early this morning to the Ministry of Information. I arrived to find the department already in a complete state of chaos, everyone speculating as to the importance of the attack which had started this morning against France. All the sections were handed copies of a directive, distributed by PWE to the Ministry. I find it very significant and more still if compared with the speeches of the Allied Chiefs. I transmit an exact copy of this directive.
“‘Special Directive on the Offensive against Northern France.
“‘Political Warfare Executive. Central Directive.
‘“1. The offensive launched today by General Eisenhower forms another important step in the Allied concentric attack on the fortress of Europe.
‘“2. It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should be kept in the dark as to our future intentions.
‘“3. Care should be taken to avoid any reference to further assaults and diversions.
‘“4. Speculation regarding alternative assault areas must be avoided.
‘“5. The importance of the present assault and its decisive influence on the course of the war should be clearly stated.”
‘Together with the directive J (3) handed me copies of the speeches which had, at that moment, not been broadcast. After reading these documents I asked him for a further interview and told him that, as a basis for propaganda, I considered that the directive was in complete contradiction with the speeches as it was inevitable that these speeches would be quoted and used as the basis of propaganda by the world press. I pointed out that these speeches gave a latitude which is denied by the directive. For instance, in Eisenhower’s speech, which says: “A premature uprising of all Frenchmen may prevent you from being a maximum help to your country in the critical hour. Be patient. Prepare!” … And still more important, the following: “This landing is but the opening phase of the campaign in Western Europe. Great battles lie ahead.” The Belgian Prime Minister said: “Preliminary operations for the liberation of Europe have begun. The first assault is the certain signal for your deliverance.” And also “The moment of supreme combat has not yet come.” … J (3) told me, in confidence, that I had spotted the one inevitable weakness in the policy which had been directed. He explained that, in the first place, it was essential that Eisenhower should keep the people from rising too early in areas which were yet to be involved in operations but, at the same time, it was equally necessary to try to hide all this information from the enemy. He said he did not think the enemy would be able to draw any definite conclusions from these speeches but he thought that they, nevertheless, constituted such a contradiction to the directives as to create a difficult situation internally. He went on to say that the Director-General had himself raised my point. Nevertheless, he felt that, if the work were done intelligently, he believed it possible to focus public attention on the present attack and thus detract from any other suggestion of future plans, this being precisely the work with which he was entrusted.’21
On the following day GARBO told the enemy that, under pressure from the Ministry of Information, the PWE Directive had been amended so as to allow ‘certain limited speculation in general terms as to future operations’.22 Thus, the real speeches and the imaginary directive were brought into line, and it was to be hoped that the Germans would regard the veiled hints of ‘more to come’ as minor indiscretions, which had caused a momentary stir in the Ministries of Whitehall, rather than as evidence of organised deception. The amendment permitting limited speculation was, incidentally, a useful hedge against possible indiscretions in the press.
It was not possible, as it had been with the other speeches, to obtain in advance a draft of the Prime Minister’s statement in the House of Commons. He went further than the other speakers and said: ‘I have also to announce to the House that during the night and the early hours of this morning the first of a series of landings in force upon the European Continent has taken place.’ This GARBO explained by saying: ‘In spite of recommendations made to Churchill that his speech should contain every possible reserve, he based it on the consideration that he was obliged, on account of his political position, to avoid distorting the facts and would not permit that his speeches should be discredited by coming events.’23
On his return from the office, GARBO found the long-expected message from 3 (3) in Glasgow awaiting him. The fleet had not left the Clyde, nor had the troops embarked, but a state of alarm still existed.24 After informing Madrid that he had as yet received no military reports from his sub-agents and that he had in consequence called them urgently to London, he continued: ‘For the present I can only state a definite argument, based on the studies and appreciations which my work in the Ministry has facilitated and it is that the enemy are hiding their intentions behind this first action.’25 His account of the day’s events closed on a self-congratulatory note: ‘Fortunately the first action was robbed of the surprise which they wished to create through the information from Four as, from the hour at which the assault is said to have started, I am able to prove, with satisfaction, that my message arrived in time to prevent the action coming as a surprise to our High Command. There is no doubt that Four has accomplished through his action a service which, though it will make it impossible to use his collaboration in the future, has justified a sacrifice by his last report. Four left this morning accompanied by Seven who will arrange for him to be hidden in a safe place. For myself, and counting on your approval, I intend to take care of this friend and give him every consideration in order to make him aware of our recognition.’26 No sooner had this report been despatched than news reached him through the widow that Madrid had not been listening at 0300 hours that morning. ‘On handing over today’s messages, Almura27 told the widow that he was not able to send the urgent messages until 0800 hours since you had not been listening. This makes me question your seriousness and your sense of responsibility. I therefore demand a clarification immediately as to what has occurred. If what I suspect is the case and Almura has failed in his duties, then I am absolutely decided in this event to abandon the radio service until I can find some other solution. I am very disgusted in this struggle for life or death, I cannot accept excuses or negligence. I cannot swallow the idea of endangering the service without any benefit. Were it not for my ideals and faith I would abandon this work as having proved myself a failure. I write these messages to send this very night though my tiredness and exhaustion, due to the excessive work I have had, has completely broken me.’28 The German reply, which came back the same day, provides an interesting psychological study. ‘I have read your last two messages of yesterday and I perfectly well understand your state of morale and feel moved to answer you the following. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find out who is to blame if a culprit really exists with regard to the delay in the transmission of the message of Four. After finishing on Monday at 2350 hours, having received your message, Centro was listening according to plan every hour up to 0300 hours and again from 0700 hours on Tuesday, getting the message of Four at 0800 hours. It is possible that, in spite of the staff having been listening properly, due to bad conditions having set in, there would have been no other calls from Almura during the night. Let us know at what time Almura tried to call us without success. But, even supposing the worst and Almura did not call, you must remember that Almura, according to what you have told us, is not aware of the true significance of your mission and it is possible that he, after his days work and having been transmitting that night for nearly three hours, should have felt tired and, considering that he had fulfilled his duties, he could not imagine that the message was one of such importance that it could not be delayed for a few hours. I wish to stress in the clearest terms that your work over the last few weeks has made it possible for our Command to be completely forewarned and prepared and the message of Four would have influenced but little had it arrived three or four hours earlier. Thus I reiterate to you, as responsible chief of the service, and to all your collaborators, our total recognition of your perfect and cherished work and I beg of you to continue with us in the supreme and decisive hours of the struggle for the future of Europe.’29 On 12th June GARBO replied: ‘Almura communicated that on the night of the crisis he called at 0300 hours for half an hour and that he repeated his calls at 0700 hours without any result. With regard to the belief that Almura would not imagine the extreme urgency of the message handed to him, this I can dispel as whether or not he knew its contents is nothing to do with the fact that he had his instructions given to him by the widow, which were to tell him that it was of extreme urgency that that message should be sent that night. I cannot, therefore, accept negligence, even if he were tired from his long hours of transmission. I am also exhausted but I know how to fulfil my duties. Furthermore, the payment he receives is the highest of the network and it would, therefore, be unwise for him to accept the possibility that the atmospheric conditions were bad but, on future occasions, I intend to take my security measures in urgent cases as in the one mentioned and will endeavour to see that the widow remains present at any important transmissions.’30 Here the Germans thought it wise to let the matter drop.
The invasion took all the other agents by surprise. BRUTUS stated frankly: ‘Unfortunately, by remaining without contact with 21 Army Group and through awaiting a state of alert at FUSAG, I was not able to give you details of the first landings.’31 Similarly TATE confessed the date of the invasion had caught him unawares as in his district everything was apparently unchanged. No departures of troops had been observed; on the contrary more were coming daily.33 Others reacted as best fitted their respective circumstances. One obscure double-cross agent, who does not otherwise figure in the invasion story, remarked fatalistically: ‘It has arrived and I have not been able to let you know in time.’33