If the conflicts inherent in BODYGUARD and FORTITUDE had given rise to problems in the field of physical deception, they bore even more hardly on Special Means. In the case of visual misdirection and wireless deception, a sudden alteration in the story could be attributed to human or mechanical error, to faulty air reconnaissance or to imperfect reception on the part of the intercept stations. Admittedly this would not tend to engender confidence in the channels, but it would not necessarily cause the later story to be disbelieved, nor would it offer prima facie evidence of an intent to deceive. The double-cross agents, on the other hand, did not enjoy this protection, and if the facts proved their stories to be wrong, it was often difficult for them to retreat. This was especially true when they spoke of Allied intentions as opposed to mere observation. The plan of 23rd February threatened to involve them in contradictions on two fundamental points. ‘Invasion in July’ meant committing them to a wrong target date, and ‘invasion of the Pas de Calais’ to a wrong initial objective. We already know how the story of invasion in July had been allowed to lapse. The Pas de Calais remained. During March and April the double-cross agents took various steps to direct the threat towards North-Eastern France and the Low Countries, but in a comparatively veiled manner and avoiding the suggestion that this was the only Allied objective. To this end Plan PREMIUM was formulated. Another example of an attempt to focus the attention of the enemy upon the cover target will be found in the ‘airfield construction’ plan, whose execution was entrusted to SNIPER, the Air Force sergeant employed at the Belgian Headquarters in London. SNIPER told the Germans1 that he had been selected with others to attend a course of ‘airfield construction’ near St Albans. It appeared that the English and American units engaged in this work would, when they went abroad, have to depend to some extent on locally recruited labour and that national organisers, such as himself, would be attached to the various units. He gave a detailed account of these airfield construction companies, from which it could be inferred that in the initial stages of the assault the fighter aircraft would operate from airfields in this country. Thus, the two points were established: that an assault would be made on a part of the French coast that was within easy fighter range and that before long airfields would be required in Belgium.
The Joint Commanders’ Plan, as has already been stated, began with an introduction which recited the SHAEF story, and then, in the body of the plan, under the title QUICKSILVER I, gave a modified version of its own. The latter, therefore, now became the operative one. The SHAEF story had, so to speak, been ‘kept off the title’. According to QUICKSILVER I, the story before D Day was simply that the Supreme Commander had under command two army groups, 21 Army Group and First United States Army Group, the latter being located in South-East England. After D Day the story was to be that as soon as 21 Army Group had enticed the enemy reserves in the Pas de Calais towards Normandy, the Supreme Commander intended to attack the Pas de Calais with the American Army Group. This put the controlled agents on a much more satisfactory footing. Until the day of the invasion they would merely be required to build up the imaginary army group. After the assault had been made, they would be able to point to the fact that only 21 Army Group had been employed and draw the obvious inference that FUSAG was intended for an independent operation across the Dover Straits.
No one was quicker to appreciate the full implications of the new situation than GARBO’s case officer. A memorandum dated 4th May, which outlines in detail the part to be played by the GARBO network during the coming weeks, concludes with the proposal that forty-eight hours after the invasion had begun, GARBO should state that since last communicating he had given careful consideration to all the developments of the last two months and that, after consulting with his agents, he had arrived at the conclusion that the present large-scale attack was only one prong of the Second Front to be carried out from this island. The strategic importance of the attack was that of drawing reserves to the assault area in order that the second assault force should be able to make a comparatively unopposed advance along their direct route to Berlin. ‘GARBO will then proceed to compare the logic of this analysis with the build-up of reserve forces, as will have become apparent from his agents’ reports to that date, laying particular stress on those divisions still in the FORTITUDE area…. He will end his message requesting that this report should be passed to Berlin together with his strong recommendation that they should guard against falling into this British trap by moving into the threatened area reserves which must be held available to hold and counter the second blow when delivered.’
Yet one cause for anxiety remained. It had been at 21 Army Group’s request that SHAEF had included in the plan of 23rd February the proviso that when the real preparations indicated unequivocally that the assault was imminent, the threat to the Pas de Calais should be accelerated, so that what could in any event no longer be concealed might at least be wrongly interpreted. This proviso was repeated in the introduction to the Joint Commanders’ Plan, where the original FORTITUDE story was recited, but here the remedial action was qualified and was specifically allotted to Special Means. Should the need arise, ‘the imminence of the attack will be confirmed by Special Means, but the area of the attack will be the Pas de Calais’. Supposing that 21 Army Group judged that the security of OVERLORD demanded the exercise of such a threat by Special Means on the eve of the invasion, it would have been difficult for the Special Means Staff at SHAEF to plead that it formed no part of QUICKSILVER], since the proviso was embodied in the SHAEF plan of 23rd February. Thus there was a danger that the double-cross agents might be forced once more into the position of having to say things that would be belied by events at a time when it was all important that their credit should stand high. Early in May the deus ex machina intervened, which was to remove this last potential source of embarrassment.
Although its full consequences were not realised at the time, the episode of ARTIST’s arrest was of such importance to the ultimate success of the cover plan that a somewhat detailed account is given. When TRICYCLE had his first meeting with his German masters in Lisbon at the beginning of March, he received, according to his own account, a rather cold reception. On the following day, when the contents of his brief had been telegraphed to Berlin and their comments had been obtained, the atmosphere changed to one of trust and confidence. He gained the clear impression that his reports had been well received by the higher authorities. Some further light was thrown upon these events by an interview which took place on 28th April between ARTIST and the SIS representative in Lisbon. ‘Abteilung III has announced that in their opinion TRICYCLE’s material is not controlled by the British. This judgment is entirely on the basis of TRICYCLE’s latest report, and Abteilung hold to their opinion that at one period of his career TRICYCLE was under Allied control. They explain the change as follows: The Allies provided poor material; ARTIST complained to TRICYCLE that he was not earning his keep; TRICYCLE then decided to collect material himself, and the result has been his last report – so good that Abteilung III is in entire agreement with the General Staff that it is inconceivable that the British should have deliberately fed it.’ The SIS memorandum continues: ‘From ARTIST’s point of view, the outcome is a complete triumph, and he is sure that whatever happens, now, these two departments3 – whose confidence it it hardest to win – will never reverse decisions so categorically expressed. To crown it all, ARTIST has been awarded the “Kriegsverdienstkreuz, 1st Class’, an honour shared by no one in Lisbon; Schreiber in particular is envious.’ To all appearances ARTIST’s credit could hardly have stood higher. In reality, though neither he nor we knew it, disaster lay very near. Protracted negotiations had been going on for some time between Berlin and Lisbon regarding certain payments which were due to TRICYCLE. On 17th April Kuebart, the head of the Eins Heer in Berlin, instructed Schreiber and ARTIST, the former being head of the Abwehr in Lisbon, to meet Major von Bohlen, the financial administrator of the KO’s, in Biarritz on 21st April to discuss the matter. Kuebart chose Schreiber and ARTIST because he thought they were the two who understood TRICYCLE’s mentality best. ARTIST sensed danger and pleaded as an excuse for not going that it would spoil his cover vis-à-vis the British. Should not he appear to the British as being a discontented German ‘skulking in the Peninsula’ and surreptitiously helping Germany’s enemies to arrange for the escape of Yugoslav airmen through the port of Lisbon? For he, like TRICYCLE, was concerned in the ‘escape route’. On these grounds he declined the invitation and Schreiber went alone. On 29th April, under highly secret arrangements made between Berlin and Schreiber personally, ARTIST was kidnapped at his house in Lisbon. It is to be presumed that the award of the KVK was a hoax. On 2nd May Schreiber was able to inform Berlin that Plan DORA, as the kidnapping operation was called, had been completely successful, that ARTIST had arrived at Biarritz at 3 o’clock on 1st May, having been conveyed across the Franco-Spanish frontier in a Corps Diplomatique motor-car, and that he would be sent on to Berlin with all speed.
What precisely led to ARTIST’s downfall has never been discovered. From fragmentary MSS data the following conjecture is made. ARTIST’s inquisitive nature had led him to probe, perhaps unwisely, into the activities of one Brandes. Brandes was an uncontrolled agent employed by the Abwehr in Lisbon. Fearful that ARTIST’s curiosity might show him up, there seems little doubt that Brandes sought to protect himself by taking the offensive against ARTIST. As will be readily appreciated, ARTIST’s own position was even more vulnerable that of Brandes.
Apart from having incurred the displeasure of his masters through being engaged in certain dubious currency dealings, ARTIST was also known to have had periodical meetings with the English. He made no secret of these meetings, but explained that they were connected with the escape route. Nevertheless, Schreiber’s office in Lisbon thought it necessary to send a telegram on 24th April to Schreiber in Madrid, then on his way back from Biarritz, to say that ARTIST ‘was receiving at his urgent desire a visit from an Englishman from Madrid on 25th’.
Only a short time before the Abwehr had been severely shaken by the defection of one of their most important agents, Vermehren, in Turkey. ARTIST happened to be a friend of Vermehren. He also knew Vermehren’s mother, who lived in Portugal but was recalled to Germany when her son went astray. The most likely explanation of the whole affair is that while Brandes had raised doubts as to ARTIST’s reliability, the Germans could not, in fact, pin anything on him, but feared that he might at any moment follow in Vermehren’s footsteps and thus deprive them of the valuable services of TRICYCLE. For in spite of all this, German belief in TRICYCLE’s veracity seems to have been quite unshaken.4 That being so, it would be only prudent to place ARTIST in protective custody.5
The effect of ARTIST’s arrest upon the cover plan will readily be seen. ARTIST knew that TRICYCLE was working under control and we had cause to believe that he had some knowledge of the GARBO case. Even if ARTIST had been arrested on a trumpery charge, there was every reason to fear that in the hands of the Gestapo inquisitors he might reveal the true state of affairs and so compromise the entire network of controlled agents in this country. From now onwards the Germans might, at any moment, tumble to the fact that all their spies in England were under Allied control. They would then conclude that the messages which they were receiving were the opposite of the truth. Moreover there could be no guarantee that we should be able to discover when ARTIST had revealed the true state of affairs. Now it was generally accepted that there could only be two reasonable objectives for the cross-Channel assault, namely, the Pas de Calais and Normandy. If the Germans perceived that we were trying to induce them to believe that we were coming to the Pas de Calais, the true objective would thus be automatically disclosed. So far no irreparable damage been done.6 But for the future it was evident that no operational demand could justify a course of action which might reveal the OVERLORD objective. This, in effect, meant that reports of an imminent attack against the Pas de Calais by Special Means before D Day would no longer be permissible and that the energies of the controlled agents would now have to be confined to building up the Orders of Battle of the two independent army groups. The only remaining threat to the Pas de Calais so far as the controlled agents were concerned would be that which was implied by the location of the FUSAG forces. This development, it may be added, was viewed with comparative equanimity for, the invasion being now less than a month away, the opinion was gaining ground that German dispositions were made to meet all contingencies and however strongly they suspected that we were coming to Normandy, they would be unlikely to denude the Pas de Calais. Any intensification of the latter threat might, therefore, merely be seeking to secure certain dispositions of German forces which had, in fact, already been dictated by their own natural sense of caution.7 Thus good came out of evil and the controlled agents, relieved of their last embarrassment, were now free to mobilise their full strength for a supreme deceptive effort in June after the invasion had been launched.
Towards the end of May, as the result of certain changes in the German dispositions in France,8 21 Army Group judged that the circumstances foreshadowed during the previous January had now come to pass and that the threat to the Pas de Calais should accordingly be intensified forthwith by Special Means. ‘On account of various factors, in particular the concentration of photo recce flights in the NEPTUNE area, the enemy appear to have appreciated that area as the most likely point of attack. He has accordingly made troop dispositions unfavourable to the NEPTUNE assault.’ The Seine bridges had just been destroyed by the Air Force, and it was proposed that the controlled agents should suggest that this had been done to prevent forces in Normandy from reaching the threatened area north of the Seine. In view of the ARTIST debacle it was now possible for SHAEF to resist this proposal on security grounds alone. Mention of the Pas de Calais might be treated by the enemy as Allied deception. The broader argument which lay behind this refusal is summarised in a memorandum submitted by the Special Means officer to the Chief of Ops (B) Sub-Section on 30th May, at the time when this proposal was made. ‘Apart from the temporary crisis caused by ARTIST’s arrest the reasons for not overplaying the threat against the Pas de Calais before D Day have been as follows: (a) There is no certain evidence that the target area has been compromised. But even if it was compromised … it is thought unlikely that they (i.e. the Germans) would alter their dispositions to any great extent before D Day. Their present dispositions represent the HCF of insurance against all possible risks. (b) In view of (a) it has been felt from the start that the object should be to keep German divisions away from the target area after D Day, rather than to attempt to influence their disposition before D Day. To attempt the latter would be unlikely to succeed and might prejudice our chances of action by Special Means after D Day. (c) The reason why an over-dose of the Pas de Calais before D Day is likely to prejudice the position after D Day is this. Once the NEPTUNE assault has gone in, it would be idle to try and keep up the story for any length of time, that it is a mere diversion. If we are to threaten the Pas de Calais after D Day, we can only do so by saying that the invasion comprises two major assaults. We cannot for security reasons talk about NEPTUNE before D Day. Yet it would be unreasonable for all our agents to find out everything about the Pas de Calais when they could find out nothing about the NEPTUNE assault. (d) We can so place them, and we have done so, that they get more early information about the Pas de Calais assault than about the NEPTUNE assault, and to that extent we can play up the Pas de Calais before D Day; but to that extent only. After D Day we can go absolutely all out.’
When the news of ARTIST’s arrest first arrived, some held the view that it would be necessary to prohibit the double-cross agents from taking any further part in FORTITUDE. Although it was ultimately decided that so long as the precautions already described were strictly adhered to, such drastic action would be undesirable, it was agreed that the further employment of TRICYCLE and FREAK for deception would not be justified. It therefore became the policy of MI5 to allow the two cases to run on in a normal manner until the ARTIST crisis had receded a little into the background and then to find some excuse for closing them, if no clear evidence of the Germans’ continued confidence in them could be obtained. No such evidence came, but a very convenient excuse for bringing their activities to an end did. It came to the knowledge of the British Security Service about the middle of May that an informer had made a report to Mihailovic’s headquarters suggesting that FREAK might be working for the Germans. This report was intercepted by the enemy and caused some stir in Berlin. It being natural that such intelligence would sooner or later reach British ears, the Germans were allowed to know that this had, in fact, occurred. On 20th May TRICYCLE wrote: ‘Yesterday I was called to the War Office for an interview. I was asked for a lot of information about FREAK’s political views and why and how he had been brought to this country. I found out that the reason for this was a message from a British Intelligence officer in the Middle East, passing on some adverse report about FREAK which had, apparently, come from some Mihailovic circles in Yugoslavia. I do not know exactly what this report said but, from the questions put to me, it was clear that someone had suggested that FREAK had collaborated with the Germans. In view of FREAK’s high position now, the British are not likely to take any strong steps against him unless they have definite proof but they may be making further investigations. That is the reason why FREAK and I decided to dismantle the radio set and hide it in a safe place for the time being in case the house is searched. So far as I can judge, no suspicion has fallen on me; on the contrary, the English seem to expect me to help them find out the truth about FREAK. I think this as I was asked not to mention the interview to FREAK. I think the British consider the source of the accusation a not very reliable one and very weak, as practically every third or fourth Yugoslav has, at some time, been accused by some Yugoslav source of being pro-German, so I do not see a very great danger in the accusation. FREAK expects that people in the highest positions will adopt a shocked attitude towards any accusation against him and will help to brush it aside. In the meantime please do not write to me in case my mail is being watched. Keep listening for the radio.’9 The Germans continued to listen for more than two months. After a silence of six weeks FREAK, on 30th June, sent the following message: ‘Had to stop for reasons given in TRICYCLE’s letter 20th May. Have since had to travel with my master. Am just back but may be sent away on further unavoidable mission for him at short notice. Thanks to him, English doubts of me mostly overcome but some still exist.’10 A petulant answer from the Germans on 4th July: ‘Do not understand sudden and unnotified interruption of work in present critical times. Letter TRICYCLE 20th not received in view of postal restrictions’,11 brought the cases of TRICYCLE and FREAK to a close. All this helped to convince us that ARTIST had kept faith, that the two agents were still believed in and that, in consequence, this danger to the whole double-cross system had passed.