BODYGUARD had given SHAEF the task of making the Germans believe in the ‘reoccupation’ operations, in the attack on Norway and in a postponed cross-Channel assault. It had also called for a cover plan to deceive the enemy as to the ‘timing, weight and direction of OVERLORD’, when invasion preparations could no longer be concealed. FORTITUDE had translated these requirements into the terms of an operational plan, while the FORTITUDE directive had allocated responsibility for executing each part of the plan. FORTITUDE SOUTH, the cross-Channel threat, had gone to the Joint Commanders. In the execution of FORTITUDE NORTH, the threat to Norway, SHAEF and Scottish Command were to collaborate. Both these threats were to be supported by Special Means, operating under SHAEF control. This still left the ‘reoccupation’ operations and the ‘postponement’ policy. The latter, having been embodied in the Pas de Calais threat, would not, under the terms of the FORTITUDE directive, come into operation until the Joint Commanders felt that the time was ripe. Yet BODYGUARD had introduced it as a feature of the strategic programme to which effect should be given at once and which should not have to wait until the Joint Commanders’ plan was set in motion. In the event it fell to the lot of Special Means, after the New Year, to see that these two requirements of BODYGUARD were satisfied.
When it came to the test, the task of informing the Germans that ‘balanced forces are being held in readiness to occupy any part of North-West Europe in the event of German withdrawal or collapse’ was not so easy as might have at first appeared. As GARBO succinctly commented when first reporting the matter to the Germans: ‘It does not require a very wise man to deduce that should the way be left free they would not hesitate to take advantage of it.’ However, he was able to give convincing proof of the existence of such plans by stealing from the office of his friend, J(3), at the Ministry of Information a document, prepared for issue after a German withdrawal from France, calling upon the population to co-operate with the Allied occupying troops.1
Let us remind ourselves of the methods suggested by BODYGUARD for encouraging a belief in a later target date. Shortage of landing craft, a belittling of the strength of Allied forces in the United Kingdom and delayed long-term preparations were to create the illusion of unpreparedness. An exaggerated scale of assault was to make the necessary state of readiness appear to be more difficult of attainment than was in fact the case. The task of spreading these stories was shared between the double-cross agents and the diplomatic channels in the hands of the London Controlling Officer. Only a few cursory examples can be included here from the large and varied range of stories which were planted on the enemy in order to make him believe in a late summer invasion.
The method most favoured for indicating a shortage of landing craft was to play up the strikes in America. ‘Labour troubles in the United States’, said TATE on 20th January, ‘have curtailed production of invasion barges to such an extent that the dates of future operations may be affected.’2
The backwardness of training was mainly associated with General Montgomery’s recent assumption of command. ‘There is an opinion held amongst us’, said BRUTUS on 23rd January, ‘that Montgomery will probably, as in Egypt, train all the troops over again.’3
The delay in long-term preparations was applied equally to real activities in the South and to invented ones in the South-East. For example, METEOR4 on 2nd March wrote that work on widening and improving roads in the Portsmouth and Southampton area was continuing but ‘without any signs of hurry’, while TRICYCLE in his conversations with his masters in Lisbon was told to refer to such things as the proposed sinking of artesian wells at embarkation camps in Kent. Any attempt to convey to the enemy the impression that we intended to employ an augmented striking force for our late summer assault was necessarily deferred until more was known about the Pas de Calais operation. Before that time arrived, as will presently be seen, ‘postponement’ had been abandoned. In consequence this part of BODYGUARD was never put into effect.
A passing reference must be made to two other themes not so far mentioned because under the terms of BODYGUARD they remained the responsibility of the London Controlling Officer, but which had a direct bearing on ‘postponement’. One of these sought to link the invasion date with the Russian summer offensive and suggested that the Western Allies would not attack until after the Russian offensive had been launched. The other carried ‘postponement’ as far as it could be carried by suggesting that the invasion would not take place at all since the Allies relied on bringing Germany to her knees by bombing alone.5 Both stories were supported by the controlled agents as well as by diplomatic means. The Russian theme was never pursued with much vigour owing to the uncertainty that prevailed regarding the real Russian plans.
As the spring advanced, many good reasons were being adduced for dropping the ‘postponement’ policy, but what probably dealt it its death-blow was the decision to hold Exercise FABIUS, an invasion rehearsal, in the Channel early in May. We could hardly hope to conceal such a large-scale manœuvre from the enemy, since all the assault divisions and their associated naval forces were due to take part in it, while the Germans would be most unlikely to believe that we proposed to give our invasion forces a trial run over the course as much as ten weeks before the invasion was due to take place. After the beginning of March it will be found that these stories of a late summer invasion no longer find a place in the Special Means traffic.
Before leaving the subject of ‘postponement’, it will be convenient to refer to FOYNES, the plan initiated by the London Controlling Officer to conceal the transfer of the eight battle-trained divisions6 from Italy to this country, a movement which had been proceeding since November 1943, for this plan was designed, not only to exaggerate our strength in the Mediterranean, which Allied strategy then demanded, but also to belittle our strength in the United Kingdom as part of the policy of ‘postponement’. To achieve this end the formations concerned were placed on wireless silence after their arrival in this country,7 and other normal security precautions were taken. At the same time their mention was forbidden to the controlled agents. This involved the latter in large-scale evasion, for by the New Year German suspicions were already aroused. Such well-known formations as the 50th British Infantry and 51st Highland Division had disappeared from the Italian front. Fishing for information, they asked BRUTUS on 11th January: ‘What are the British divisions which have been withdrawn from Italy and have come back to Britain?’8 The sudden outcrop of Africa Star medals which was to be observed in all parts of the country led us to the conclusion that it would be difficult to conceal from the enemy that a large number of troops had, in fact, returned from the Mediterranean. Feeling that it would be wise to meet trouble half-way, we accordingly made the agents say that these were key-men, trained in battle, who had been sent home to act as instructors for the invasion armies. ‘English troops wearing the Africa Star have been seen and it is presumed that these have returned from the Mediterranean to help in the training of the less experienced units.’9 ‘On New Year’s Eve I met some officers of the Eighth Army who were wearing the new yellow-red ribbon of the African campaign. They said that they had been exchanged for officers from this country to lecture and teach the troops.’
At the middle of March, since ‘postponement’ was being dropped and since the ban on the use of wireless was interfering with signals training, SHAEF proposed that the operation should be concluded. The Commander ‘A’ Force, however, was unwilling to do so, because it remained his task to exaggerate the Allied strength in the Mediterranean and for that purpose FOYNES was of value to him. A compromise was reached whereby the FOYNES divisions were released one by one from 1st April onwards. When the invasion took place the 7th British Armoured Division and the two airborne divisions alone remained subject to the ban.
This disposes of two out of the three demands which BODYGUARD made upon SHAEF in respect of the ‘overall’ strategic programme. There remains the Norwegian threat to consider.