XXXII

Arnhem

It has already been explained how Dr Kraemer, the German journalist who ran the twin agents JOSEPHINE and HECTOR in Stockholm, had access to the German intelligence reports, which were now so largely based on information supplied by British-controlled agents, and how he used them when making up their traffic. It does not matter very much whether Kraemer himself believed in FORTITUDE. The point is that he knew the Germans believed in it and that it was therefore safe to dish it up a second time. It will be remembered that before D Day we avoided, as far as we could, making any very concrete prophecies regarding the invasion, preferring to confine ourselves to building up the false army group. Consequently the uncontrolled agents held the stage at that time. Between 1st January and 6th June, 1944, Krummacher’s two files contain sixty-five messages from JOSEPHINE, twelve from OSTRO and only one each from GARBO and BRUTUS. All through May GARBO’s and BRUTUS’s detailed reports were filling the OKH Intelligence Summaries, but neither Krummacher nor the RSHA found such minutiæ appropriate for inclusion in a body of documents which was evidently compiled for Hitler and his immediate advisers. Strategic intentions and matters of high policy were what they required and before 6th June only the uncontrolled agents could provide such things. In the month immediately following D Day the position changed. Now GARBO and BRUTUS had entered the field of high strategy. During this short period Krummacher’s two files are found to contain twenty-five messages from JOSEPHINE, ten from GARBO and nine each from OSTRO and BRUTUS. But whereas JOSEPHINE’s and OSTRO’s messages had hitherto been vague and contradictory, GARBO’s and BRUTUS’s were precise and consistent. They would therefore have had no difficulty in having their views accepted in preference to those of the uncontrolled agents had the latter continued to report as erratically as they had done during the first six months of the year. But now they had FORTITUDE to guide them and JOSEPHINE, at any rate, far from contradicting our story, was confirming it in ever-increasing measure. His notable message of 9th June foretelling a second assault was presumably no more than a reasonable deduction from the reports of troop concentrations in South-East England which we had given to the Germans during May and the first week of June. On 19th June he gave Patton as the Commander of FUSAG. By the beginning of August he seems to have acquired a thorough grasp of the plot. ‘FUSAG was originally to have been used for a second large-scale landing operation. As the timing of the Normandy invasion went completely wrong, it was decided not to undertake this second landing, which had been planned for the end of June; and formations from FUSAG were steadily transferred to France.’¹

Like ourselves Dr Kraemer saw that something would have to be done with FUSAG after the Fifteenth Army had left the Pas de Calais. He also saw the likelihood of the Allies carrying out an amphibious attack on the German right flank. Or was it the threat of such an attack that he foresaw? Accordingly he made FUSAG move, but he made it move rather too far. ‘Increased troop transports from South and Central England to Northern England are being associated with movements of parts of FUSAG. Operations in North and Central Norway, starting from England, are not expected, but landings in Jutland and Southern Norway.’² When Dr Kraemer sent that message our Fourth Army had not started to move. We have no record of the German answer, but they appear to have found it necessary to make some further enquiry which slightly shook the doctor. ‘I was expecting your further enquiry, as my own suspicions had also been aroused at once. All sources however confirm that FUSAG formations have been stationed as far as the Humber. In addition there are individual reports about troop transports to Northern England/Scotland. … It is quite clear that either a large-scale decoy manœuvre is planned, to cover the employment of FUSAG in Belgium, Holland and the Heligoland Bight, or that an operation against Denmark is actually intended.’³ The German Intelligence Summary of 9th September, having alluded to the withdrawal of Fourteenth US Army to the south coast, goes on to say: ‘There are at present no reports of transfers or movements of British formations so there is no concrete evidence provided by the distribution of forces in England to support the reports which have been accumulating about imminent landings in Jutland or the German Bight. It must, however, be emphasised that such reports can, in general, only be checked by detailed air reconnaissance of the relevant invasion ports.’⁴ The first British-controlled report of the move of British formations was not made until after this passage had been written.⁵ So it looks as if Dr Kraemer’s story had not been accepted even though he had modified it in his second message by suggesting that the FUSAG formations had not gone further than the Humber and by hedging his bet on Jutland and Southern Norway with the suggestion that the whole business might be deception.

We had no idea at the time that Kraemer was playing with our toys. Having built up the whole of FUSAG from nothing we naturally supposed that we had the undivided control of it, and on this assumption a plan was devised for the future employment of Fourth Army and the First Allied Airborne Army. About this time the airborne operation against Arnhem was decided upon. The Deception Staff were asked to cover that operation by suggesting an airborne drop on the same date but in a far removed area. If in the process we could increase the threat to the German northern flank which the policy directive of 8th September required, a double advantage would be gained. In his original message about the First Allied Airborne Army sent on 21st and 22nd August, BRUTUS had suggested that airborne divisions would be taken from the Airborne Army and ‘attached to armies or groups of armies for particular tasks, as for example in our Order of Battle there are three airborne divisions, notably the 9th and 21st American and 2nd British’.⁶ On 10th September BRUTUS reported: ‘The Allied Airborne Army is now under FUSAG. Confirm that airborne divisions can be detached and that a task force consisting of four airborne divisions⁷ has already been posted to take part in the operation in conjunction with the Fourth Army…. From these changes one can suppose that the FUSAG operations will be preceded by an airborne attack which can be carried out even at long range. An attack against the North of Germany in the region of Bremen or Kiel is not excluded.’⁸ We now have Fourth Army operating with a task force comprising four imaginary airborne divisions. The next move in the game was to induce a belief in the existence of a second task force. Once the Germans were told that there were two airborne task forces, one could assume that they would draw the conclusion that the second force consisted of the real airborne divisions in England about which they already knew. We were already required to say that a large airborne attack was impending elsewhere; all that BRUTUS now, therefore, had to do was to report that Kiel was about to be attacked by the fictitious task force. (Let us call this Task Force ‘A’.) This provided a cover for the real attack. After the real assault had been made BRUTUS would merely have to point out that the assault on Arnhem by the real task force (Task Force ‘B’) had taken place before the attack on Kiel with Task Force ‘A’. He had supposed that the operations would have been carried out in the reverse order. But he had at least given the date of the first operation correctly. Seeing that the formations comprised in the real Task Force ‘B’ would be identified in battle at Arnhem, and would coincide with BRUTUS’s previous descriptions of the First Allied Airborne Army, the Germans would, after the assault, be likely to have their belief strengthened not only in the existence of the false Task Force ‘A’, but also in our intention to carry out a subsequent attack on the more remote objective. In pursuance of this plan BRUTUS on 14th September, three days before the Arnhem assault, sent the following message: ‘I have just learnt that there has recently been great activity at the headquarters of the Allied Airborne Army and that they have even formed a second task force. In view of the general situation, there is talk in our headquarters that in three or four days one should expect an airborne attack against Denmark, Kiel Canal or against ports in Northern Germany. This appears to confirm my own opinion, already transmitted several days ago, especially when I learned of the move of the Fourth Army into the Essex–Kent region. In my opinion the attack can be undertaken by the special task force which I have already reported as being attached to the Fourth Army.’⁹ And on 20th September, three days after the Arnhem landing: ‘Regarding the airborne attacks: I have learnt that it is a question of the 1st British Airborne Corps and the XVIII American Airborne Corps and not the task force as supposed by me. As far as I know, this task force is still ready for the operation with the Fourth Army. It includes the 9th, 17th and 21st American Airborne Divisions and the 2nd British Airborne Division.’¹⁰

Before examining the German reactions to BRUTUS’s plot, let us see how Dr Kraemer was taking it. BRUTUS’s message of 10th September had told the Germans that an attack might be expected against the North of Germany in the region of Bremen or Kiel. Dr Kraemer had given Jutland and Southern Norway. It seems fairly clear that he must have seen BRUTUS’s message of the 10th and felt a desire to fall into line, for on the 15th he told the Germans: ‘FUSAG continues in Eastern England as far as the Humber. Formations in Northern England and Scotland do not belong to FUSAG.’ And a little later: ‘Air Vice-Marshal Trafford stated in London on 11th and 12th September to a reliable informant that FUSAG is not to be employed in Jutland, Southern Norway, but that it is to be used in connection with operations of the Second English, First American and First Canadian Armies. The Second English Army will be advanced on a broad front as far as the Meuse and if possible even as far as the Waal by 24th September. After that the employment of powerful airborne forces in Eastern and Northern Holland and the German frontier region is planned. Immediately on completion of the air-landing action, which is intended to eliminate German river positions in the rear, it is intended to use FUSAG in Eastern Holland and the Heligoland Bight.’ Finally, in order to explain away his previous references to Norway and Denmark: ‘In the entourage of the exiled Norwegian and Danish Governments information is being deliberately given out to the effect that a FUSAG operation is projected in the North; moreover, in Denmark and Norway these reports are also being given by the said Governments to their own resistance movements.’¹¹ Dr Kraemer’s new operation was more detailed than anything we had offered and his airborne drop was now unpleasantly near to Arnhem, but his main FUSAG objective of Eastern Holland and the Heligoland Bight might be said to approximately to BRUTUS’s Kiel–Bremen target. The first German reports on Arnhem suggested that British divisions only were being employed. An airborne landing which began at mid-day on 17th September in the area of the Dutch Lower Rhine comprises, according to reports so far available, some two to three presumably British airborne divisions. All available English airborne divisions from England are believed to have been engaged…. If the assumption is confirmed that all the airborne formations employed were English then the enemy command still has some four American airborne divisions at its disposal and their employment may well be expected in the sector of the American army group. Nevertheless, the employment of the First Allied Airborne Army as a whole in the present landing area is not to be excluded. Concrete evidence for this is not available.’¹² For some reason JOSEPHINE’s message of the 15th had not reached Berlin until the early afternoon of the 17th.¹³ The Intelligence Summary of the 17th continues: ‘In connection with the air landings which have taken place, particular attention is deserved for an agent’s report which has only just come in and which predicted these air landings correctly. In this report we are told that immediately after the air landing a landing operation by Fourth English Army (some fifteen divisions) would take place against Holland and the German Bight. The agent mentioned above considers that reports emanating particularly from diplomatic circles about landing intentions against Norway and Denmark are deliberate camouflage. Although the latest photographic reconnaissances of the Southern England ports showed no landing ships, we must reckon on their arrival at short notice in the presumed invasion ports of the Fourth English Army. Continuous watch from the air is required.’ By the next day the correct Order of Battle had been established: ‘The confirmation of the forces engaged, namely so far about three airborne divisions, shows that they are composed of two battle-tried American airborne divisions (82nd and 101st) and the 1st English Airborne Division in action for the first time, to which the Polish and Dutch parachute units, which are also engaged according to the English wireless, may belong…. The fact that the only two battle-tried American airborne divisions were dropped in front of the English sector makes it seem improbable that a second large-scale airborne operation is planned for the American sector. Rather we must deduce that the main effort of the whole operation lies in the sector of the Second English Army. According to our present picture of the battle, the main objective of the airborne operation is the capture of the crossings along the Eindhoven–Arnhem line in order to facilitate a quick thrust by the main forces of the Second English Army through Holland to form a bridgehead at Arnhem. This confirms the intention already suspected to cut off the German forces in Holland and at the same time to win a base from which to continue the operation east of the Rhine.’¹⁴

BRUTUS’s message of 14th September seems to have suffered a similar delay; at any rate it was not until the 19th, two days after the landing, that any reference was made to it in the Intelligence Summary. ‘The possibility of a new landing operation in conjunction with planned airborne operations is suggested by a further report from a very trustworthy agent, according to whom the present airborne operations should be coupled with future plans for Fourth English Army; the agent mentions in this connection the already reported moves of formations of the Fourth English Army to the Essex–Kent area. There is still no sure evidence¹⁵ of such plans.¹⁶ There is little reason to suppose that BRUTUS’s message helped to divert the attention of the Germans from Arnhem, but that we emerged with the belief in our imaginary task force and in the impending attack on the German Bight enhanced, is shown by an appreciation of 23rd September. ‘From various reports by prudent agents, the following picture of the present airborne operations and of future plans emerges; it is shown that three airborne corps were included in the First Allied Airborne Army; the 1st English Airborne Corps and the XVIII American Airborne Corps so far engaged comprise the 1st English, 82nd and 101st American Airborne Divisions, one Polish parachute brigade as well as possibly the 17th American Airborne Division, and here it is not yet finally clear whether the last-named is the 17th American Infantry Division (Airborne) though there are some indications of this. The allotment of further formations and smaller airborne army units is probable. To the airborne corps still in Great Britain belong presumably the 2nd English, 21st, 9th and 11th American Airborne Divisions and possibly the 59th American Infantry Division equipped for transport by air. The last-named having repeatedly been mentioned in this connection should also appear as an “assault division”. This corps is said to be destined for employment as part of landing operations by Fourth English Army which are predicted against the German Bight in the sector Wiesemunde–Emden. The reports mentioned above make a convincing impression and have been partially confirmed by the course of operations and by troop identifications in recent days…. On the basis of the above reports, therefore, new landings, coupled with strong airborne landings must be expected in the area of the German Bight. We have so far no information as to the date of such undertakings. It must, however, be assumed that these intentions will only be capable of execution when a bridgehead has been successfully created at Arnhem and further operations from this bridgehead seem to the enemy command to be assured of success. The seasonal weather conditions in the Channel which are deteriorating will, however, set a time limit to these plans and will, therefore, tend to advance them.’¹⁷

It was important for the enemy to know what was happening in the east coast ports. On 29th September GARBO received these instructions: ‘Please send somebody to the principal ports of the east and north-east coast as soon as possible under the present circumstances in order to investigate movements and troops in these ports; also it would be interesting if you could get news about destination of forthcoming operations of British Fourth Army.’¹⁸ On the 30th TATE was asked: ‘What are the anchorages or bases of aircraft-carriers or auxiliary aircraft-carriers on the east coast of Great Britain between Thames and Scapa? Can you find out if and where on the English and Scottish east coast, invasion preparations are taking place? Are invasion materials being assembled?’¹⁹ On 3rd October BRUTUS also was asked to report on the ports of the east coast of England.²⁰