Even if there now seemed to be no future for strategic deception, we still had in the United Kingdom a full complement of imaginary formations as well as a team of controlled agents actively engaged in operational deception. If the final scene of this lengthy drama was now drawing to a close, and the curtain was about to fall, some means would have to be found of disposing of the actors and the stage properties. Let us cast our minds back to the beginning of September. At that time the end of the war seemed very near. In a fortnight’s time the enemy’s Rhine defence was to be breached at Arnhem, leading to the encirclement of the Ruhr from the North and so to the total surrender of Germany. To assist these operations FUSAG had been reconstituted as an amphibious force comprising Fourth British Army and the First Allied Airborne Army which was to threaten an attack against the North-West German ports, thus drawing German reserves away from the line of the Allied advance across North-West Germany, while the Ninth and Fourteenth Armies had been withdrawn to form a strategic reserve which could support the overland advance of the Allies.
The failure of the Arnhem operation to achieve a major breakthrough and the subsequent stabilisation of the German line effected a radical change in the situation. As has already been stated, with the end of the war only a few weeks away one could send imaginary formations to France without much risk of the Germans finding out that they were being deceived, but if the war were going to drag on for many months these risks would be greatly increased. In the changed circumstances we therefore had to decide whether it was still worthwhile sending overseas imaginary formations which had been used in FORTITUDE. It also became necessary to reconsider the role of FUSAG. Since we had not succeeded in crossing the Rhine at Arnhem and since the capture of the Ruhr remained the first Allied objective, the continued exercise of a threat by FUSAG against the Dutch or German coast might draw German reserves into the Northern sector which was where we least wanted them.
Of the two armies comprised in the fictitious SHAEF strategic reserve, the Ninth, being real, had gone overseas at the beginning of September and was thus no longer at our disposal. The Fourteenth Army, it will be remembered, was last heard of in the Southampton area awaiting embarkation. On 14th September GARBO had reported: ‘The Fourteenth US Army is remaining on the SHAEF reserve in southern embarkation areas pending further developments in the battle against Germany. 4 (3) does not think there is any likelihood that this army will go overseas for the present as all supply routes which have had to be monopolised by SOS are already working to capacity.’1 That was a temporising measure. The effect of Arnhem and the stabilisation of the line upon deception policy was not immediate. A little time passed before the danger of reinforcing groups of armies in France with FORTITUDE formations was fully realised. At a meeting in Brussels on 25th September army groups were invited to state their requirements in respect of imaginary reinforcements. 21 Army Group asked for 2nd British Corps, while Twelfth Army Group applied, as a first instalment, for XXXVII Corps with under command the 25th US Armoured Division and the 59th US Infantry Division.2 The rest of fourteenth Army would follow later. In compliance with this request, GARBO, at the beginning of October,3 reported the departure of the American formations. This message found its reflection in the German Intelligence Summary of 7th October. ‘The 59th American Infantry Division and the 25th American Armoured Division as well as the staff of the XXXVII American Army Corps are said to have been transferred to France.’4 On 9th October BRUTUS reported: ‘I have just heard that the headquarters of the 2nd British Corps, which was at Tunbridge Wells, left two weeks ago to take command of divisions already in France.’5
Early in October the decision to use FORTITUDE formations overseas was reversed. The question which now presented itself was how to get rid of Fourteenth Army. At the time that this reversal of policy occurred the 2nd British Corps was already operating under 21 Army Group in Belgium. On the other hand permission to employ XXXVII Corps and its two subsidiary divisions in the forward area had not yet been given to Twelfth Army Group. The ultimate destination of XXXVII Corps was never resolved. It had sailed from Southampton with the 25th Armoured and 59th Infantry Divisions at the end of September, apparently for France, but after that was never heard of again. Perhaps it was transferred to another theatre.
Shortly afterwards XXXIII Corps was disbanded and its three divisions were placed under command of the British Base Section.6 The 11th and 17th Divisions were moved to South Wales at the end of October, where they were given a draft-finding role. ‘According to a report from a credible source the 11th and 17th American Infantry Divisions are confirmed afresh as being in England and are said to be at the moment being drawn upon for reinforcements for the American divisions engaged in France. Both divisions are said to have been moved to the areas of Gloucester and South Wales where the training areas were repeatedly occupied by American troops before the invasion.’7 It was not so easy to destroy imaginary formations as it had been to create them, for the summary goes on to say: ‘The fact that the 11th and 17th American Infantry Divisions, which have been for some time located in Great Britain, have not been used on the Western front, finds it explanation in the report of a good agent according to whom these divisions are being used for draft finding. It must, however, be pointed out that repeated experience shows that so called “draft finding divisions” can, if necessary, often be made ready for battle by the Americans at short notice and can then be sent to the front. These two divisions must therefore continue to be regarded as an operational reserve in the hands of Eisenhower.’8 The 48th Division continued to carry out the airborne training upon which it had now been engaged for some months. ‘The 48th American Infantry Division, also accepted in Great Britain, has been repeatedly reported as “airborne”.’9 Now that XXXIII and XXXVII Corps had been dispersed, Fourteenth Army Headquarters became redundant. It was never specifically disbanded since it would have been unrealistic for the controlled agents to discover everything. On 31st January, 1945, GARBO was asked: ‘Can you find out what has become of the Fourteenth US Army, last reported by 7 (4) several months ago. Please give to this question your special attention, instructing your agents accordingly. An early reply will be highly appreciated.’10 On 12th March he replied: ‘Despite diligent enquiries no traces found of Fourteenth US Army.’11
We have now seen how the SHAEF strategic reserve was disposed of. The other problem which faced us was the future employment of FUSAG. The most obvious solution was to disband it too. Mention has already been made of the adverse effect which its continued presence in England might have upon the disposition of German reserves. There was a second reason for wishing to do away with the imaginary formations which still remained in the United Kingdom. British frontline divisions, such as the 50th and 59th, were being broken up to replace casualties, while American divisions were being used to reinforce 21 Army Group, yet in German eyes a whole British army remained uncommitted in the United Kingdom. In addition the imaginary airborne formations stayed at home while the real ones engaged in successive operations. This created a very unreal situation which was liable to provoke the Germans to ask why these British divisions were being withheld. In these circumstances it seemed best to disband all the remaining FORTITUDE formations and rely upon newly created ones should the need for strategic deception ever arise in the future. An extract from the Intelligence Summary for 27th October shows that this estimate of enemy reactions was not wide of the mark. ‘With the efforts of the English Command to keep the existing field formations fully reinforced even during heavy campaigns we may conclude from these reflections that the formation of new divisions is not to be anticipated. It has, on the contrary, become evident that existing formations and units have been disbanded for the purpose of supplying other formations with battle experienced reinforcements to keep them up to strength. The recent engagement of an American division (104th Infantry) in the area of the First Canadian Army, as well as the continued presence of the 82nd and 101st American Airborne Divisions on the Second English Army front, are further proofs of the limited state of the English strength, and also of the anxiety to economise so far as possible with the forces still available and to spare English blood where possible. There is, so far, no information regarding the proposed use of the fourteen active English divisions (exclusive of independent brigades) which are known with certainty still to be in Great Britain. It is, however, to be assumed that the English Command is at pains, in view of the exacting requirements in personnel which are to be expected, to keep these last reserves in the home country for so long as possible.’12 The solution which they found a month later, without any assistance from us, for this wholly incomprehensible state of affairs, must be regarded as an unmerited piece of good fortune. ‘There are still no reports or other indications of the transfer of fresh British units to the Continent or of preparations for embarkation. The British formations assumed to be in Great Britain must, therefore, all continue to be accepted there. The striking retention of these forces can now only be explained by psychological–political factors. Noteworthy in this connection is Churchill’s White Paper, published in recent days, in which the British war effort in all military and civilian spheres is set out in particularly impressive form, and in which the conclusion is made that the contribution of the British Empire to the war so far is greater than that of any other belligerent country. This statement can, in a sense, be regarded as justification for the retention of troops which we now observe.’13
In spite of the arguments put forward by Ops (B) for the disbandment of all the remaining imaginary formations in the United Kingdom, the Operations Staff at SHAEF was unwilling to agree to the dispersal of the entire force. It was felt that a time might come in the near future when the amphibious threat across the North Sea might be played again with useful results. At the same time it was considered that for this purpose an army corps and an airborne task force would suffice. This decision enabled us at least to carry out a partial disbandment. All that we now had to do was to scale down the Fourth Army to the size of a corps, and First Allied Airborne Army to that of an appropriate task force, retaining Fourth Army Headquarters to command the two.
With Fourteenth US Army disposed of and Fourth Army thus reduced, FUSAG itself could now go. Before the end of October the Germans had learnt of its disbandment: ‘A proven source reports from Great Britain that the staff of the First American Army Group (FUSAG) has been disbanded. The same source reports that the English Fourth Army, which has hitherto been under the command of FUSAG, is now directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied invasion forces (General Eisenhower).’14
The reduction of Fourth Army and of First Allied Airborne Army was effected in the following manner. 2nd British Corps had already been sent to France. The 55th and 61st British Infantry Divisions, being real formations, were allowed to revert to their factual role as training divisions under command GHQ, Home Forces, while the survivors, that is to say 7th British Corps, the 58th and 80th British Infantry Divisions and the 5th British Armoured Division, all imaginary, were retained for future use. The 58th Infantry and 5th Armoured Divisions were already under command 7th British Corps and were located in the Eastern counties. The 80th Infantry Division, it will be remembered, had, in the September reorganisation, been obliged to remain at Canterbury owing to its dependence on the signals of the 61st Infantry Division, and for this reason it had been brought under command of the 2nd British Corps at Tunbridge Wells. Now that low-powered wireless traffic had been dispensed with, it was free to move, and about the middle of October it reverted to 7th Corps and transferred to Claydon in Suffolk. ‘A proven source confirms the 7th English Army Corps Headquarters and the 80th English Infantry Division, the latter now believed to be in the area of north of London.’15
To complete this regrouping of forces, the First Allied Airborne Army and the real formations belonging to it reverted to SHAEF, while the fictitious increment remained to form the new airborne task force. The imaginary airborne formations which thus became available to Fourth Army comprised one British and one American corps, the 19th and XVII. The former contained the British airborne divisions, that is to say the imaginary 2nd and the real 6th, which was still in England at that time; the latter contained the two imaginary American airborne divisions, the 9th and 21st, as well as the real 17th, which had not yet gone to France. Even this reduced force was felt to be larger than the circumstances demanded. It was therefore decided to disband the American element, thus making the Fourth Army wholly British. When this decision was made the existence of the XVII Airborne Corps had not yet been disclosed to the Germans. The 17th US Airborne Division was shortly to engage in real operations. It only remained, therefore, to dispose of the 9th and 21st US Airborne Divisions. Of these BRUTUS said on 29th November: ‘Nottingham: I was able to learn that the 9th and 21st Airborne Divisions have been greatly reduced by reinforcements for other divisions and that from these two divisions they are going to form a single one. I was also told that there is now a new division in the Order of Battle of the Allied Airborne Army, namely, the 13th Division, and I can suppose that it is this division which has been formed from the other two divisions which left this region some time ago.’16 The 13th US Airborne Division had in fact just arrived from America.