The original FORTITUDE story, no matter how firmly believed on 3rd July, was now being overtaken rapidly by events. The real formations which had been used to build up the false FUSAG were about to leave for Normandy. Had nothing more been done their appearance in the bridgehead could hardly have failed to open the eyes of the enemy to the truth. In consequence the pressure which we had hitherto been exerting on the Pas de Calais might have been removed altogether within the space of a few hours, thus releasing the whole of the Fifteenth Army for service in Normandy where the enemy was suffering so acutely from a shortage of infantry divisions.
More than three weeks before this time, however, steps were being taken to meet such a situation. The new plan, known as FORTITUDE SOUTH II, had been initiated, partly because the indications which we had observed during the days immediately following the invasion had convinced us that there was a chance of prolonging the threat beyond the period originally stipulated, partly to protect our deceptive machine by preparing a satisfactory explanation which could be offered when events belied our previous statements.
What were the requirements of the plan? An explanation had to be found for the appearance of all the FUSAG formations in France, a reason had to be given for Patton’s decline from army group to army commander, a new commander had to be found to take his place and finally East and South-East England had to be replenished with forces to continue the threat.
After several variations had been proposed the following story was agreed upon1: General Eisenhower, having been obliged to reinforce the present bridgehead with formations immediately available, namely, the formations under command of FUSAG, had decided that it was necessary to form another American army group. For reasons of ease of command and administration General Bradley, who had more than proved himself in the previous few weeks, had been promoted to the position of army group commander and had been instructed to form an army group headquarters to be known as Twelfth US Army Group. He had been authorised to call upon the existing FUSAG for officers. Meanwhile General Patton, the Commander of FUSAG, had objected strongly to being deprived of so many formations under his command. A sharp difference of opinion had arisen between him and General Eisenhower with the result that the former was deprived of his command and placed in command of Third Army. In the meantime new formations, British and American, were to be introduced into East and South-East England and placed under the command of the old FUSAG staff to carry out the attack on the Pas de Calais at a later date. For this purpose the British Fourth Army would be moved from Scotland to take the place of the First Canadian Army in Kent, and a newly landed American army, the Fourteenth, would replace Third Army in East Anglia. These two armies would provide the assaulting force, while the Ninth Army2 at Bristol would also be included in the Order of Battle and would supply build-up formations only. A high-ranking general would be sent from America to take command of the reconstituted FUSAG.
In the true course of events the First American Army Group which had existed in skeleton form in the United Kingdom since the beginning of the year was to go abroad at the beginning of July and take command of the American forces in Normandy. In accordance with the new deception requirements this army group was now redesignated the Twelfth, a title which it retained until the end of the war. Until after the invasion started Bradley, it will be remembered, had held the dual command of the real American Army Group and of the First US Army. At the end of June he relinquished the latter command to General Hodges. Here therefore no further explanation was required, and he thus appeared in Normandy with a single function, that of Commander of Twelfth Army Group.
In making up the new Order of Battle a continuation of the system of misplacing real divisions in the South-East of England was considered, but the proposal was abandoned, the objection being that the formations available for the purpose would for the most part be American divisions staging here for a few weeks only on their way to France, so that FUSAG would soon appear to be nothing more than a holding organisation. It seemed essential that at least the spearhead of the assault should not change. The necessary quality of permanence could only be achieved by creating imaginary forces over which deception could claim an undivided control. On the British side, the Scandinavian threat having run its course, we had the Fourth Army ready to hand. Some of its formations had already gone to Kent, and so it merely meant bringing down such of the remainder as could be moved south. For the American part in the assault a new and wholly imaginary army had to be created. It was considered, on the other hand, that frequent changes in the composition of the reserve would in no way detract from the realism of the picture. This was held to justify the inclusion of the real Ninth Army to command the later build-up formations. With these considerations in mind the new FUSAG was constituted in the following way:
The names of departing FUSAG formations are shown in italic, in cases where the same locations were chosen.
Imaginary formations are printed in black type.
3. Assault formations.
Let us analyse the constituent parts of this Order of Battle in greater detail. We will first examine Fourth Army. The composition of 2nd British Corps was to remain as it had been when it came south at the beginning of June. In view of its previous training in Scotland, this corps was chosen to carry out the British assault, the 35th British Armoured Brigade, a real formation then stationed in England, being added to provide the DD element. The only other point to note here is that the 55th British Infantry Division had now in fact returned from Northern Ireland so that its imaginary location in Sussex also became its real one. On the other hand, as has already been explained the two divisions comprised in the 7th British Corps, namely the 52nd Lowland Division and the 55th US Infantry Division, could not be used. The former was a real formation and had to remain in Scotland to complete its training, the latter was supposedly in Iceland and it was thought inadvisable to move it from there. So the 7th British Corps came alone and was given command of three divisions not hitherto included in Fourth Army, the 61st and 80th British Infantry Divisions and the 5th British Armoured Division. A few words of explanation must be given to show how these became available. The brigades of the real 61st Infantry Division had in fact been employed both in Suffolk and in Kent as ‘hotel staffs’ to assist in the embarkation of troops leaving for Normandy. All that was necessary here was to give the division a higher establishment and represent it as concentrating in Kent.4 The controlled agents had already thrown out several hints that it might be upgraded in the near future. The 5th British Armoured Division was purely imaginary and had no previous history. The 80th British Infantry Division rose from the ashes of the disbanded 80th Reserve Division in the following circumstances. In the summer of 1944 the War Office decided to disband three Lower Establishment Infantry Divisions, the 38th, the 45th and the 47th. As they had been well-known territorial formations before the war whose numbers were familiar to the public and were therefore of recruiting value, it was decided to renumber three surviving home service divisions, namely the 76th and 80th Reserve Divisions and the 77th Holding Division, as the 47th, 38th and 45th respectively, so as to keep alive the familiar designations. The Deception Staff had already made considerable play of the 38th, 45th and 47th Infantry Divisions. Thus if the proposed renumbering could have been avoided the three better known numbers would have been available for deception purposes. The War Office was asked if it would be willing to allow the 76th, 80th and 77th Divisions to retain their original designations so that the other three might be included in the new FUSAG, but held to the view that the renumbering would be necessary for the reason given. Special Means therefore fell back on the story that as the war was now nearing its end the 38th, 45th and 47th Infantry Divisions were reverting to their peacetime territorial function in order to prepare for recruiting after the war and that the resources and equipment so released were to be given to the 76th, 77th and 80th Divisions which would now receive a higher establishment in order to fit them for operations overseas. This gave us three imaginary infantry divisions, though admittedly not the three we should have liked best. Of these, the 76th Infantry Division was given to 21 Army Group for employment overseas, the 77th was held in reserve and the 80th5 now went to the Fourth British Army.
Let us now turn our attention to the new American Fourteenth Army. The only formations which will be recognised here are XXXVII Corps and the 59th US Infantry Division which had been introduced during June to fill gaps in the old FUSAG. All the others had to be drawn from our reserve list of imaginary formations. Washington supplied a detailed record of the imaginary previous activities of each division, which proved to be of great value to the controlled agents but which need not be repeated here.
The three airborne divisions included in the force were placed directly under command of the Army Group. Of these the 2nd British Airborne Division is already familiar to the reader; the two American formations were newly created.
The Fourth British Army was to move from Scotland to South-Eastern Command between 11th and 21st July. The Fourteenth US Army, which was supposed to have landed at Liverpool in May and June, was to move to East Anglia during the same period. Ninth Army, a real formation, was to remain at Bristol both in fact and in fiction. The new nets were to be fully established by 26th July. 3103 Signals Service Battalion was to provide the wireless links for FUSAG and the Fourteenth Army, whilst the improvised force6 which had executed the FORTITUDE NORTH wireless programme would continue to supply most of those required by Fourth Army. The 55th and 61st British Infantry Divisions, however, being real formations, could be made responsible for producing their own traffic. The wireless representation of the 5th British Armoured Division and the 35th British Armoured Brigade was to be provided by the following rather confusing arrangement. The 5th British Armoured Division was a new and fictitious formation. The 35th British Armoured Brigade was a real formation under command of GHQ, Home Forces. The latter formation would go to Newmarket to represent the 5th Armoured Division, while the Yorkshire Hussars, the Armoured Car Regiment belonging to the 61st Division, would go to Hailsham to represent the 35th Armoured Brigade. Thus the 35th Armoured Brigade would be in one place representing the armoured division while the armoured car regiment would be in another place representing it.
The Navy also had its part to play. Force ‘F’, it will be remembered, was already in being and had become associated with the 59th US Infantry Division at Harwich. With the release of the CLH units from the Clyde it now became possible to create two more imaginary assault forces. These were named Forces ‘M’ and ‘N’. It was arranged that the former should train at Portsmouth and Newhaven with the 55th British Infantry Division now reconstituted as an assault formation, and that the latter should train in the Southampton and Studland area with the 17th US Infantry Division. Assault exercises were to take place on the brigade level during the latter part of July and on a divisional scale at the beginning of August. The whole force would be ready to sail on 5th August.
The Allied Air Forces agreed to lend their support by continuing to bomb targets in the Pas de Calais while Special Means was to suggest that a part of the fighter force attached to the Eighth US Air Force in the Eastern counties would be available to support the attack.
While the Supreme Commander retained overall control of the execution of the plan, responsibility for giving effect to the bulk of the wireless arrangements was allotted to ETOUSA.
Finally a suitable commander was required. On 6th July the Supreme Commander sent General Marshall the following telegram: ‘OVERLORD cover and deception plan (FORTITUDE) has proved remarkably effective. Reliable intelligence indicates that enemy is preparing for decisive Allied effort by First US Army Group in Pas de Calais area under the command of Patton.
‘Since under existing plans the enemy will unquestionably soon learn of the presence in the Lodgement area of First US Army Group and Patton with his Third Army, it has been necessary to devise a new and plausible plan for continuing the cover threat. The new cover plan involves retention First Army Group nominally in United Kingdom, redesignation of First Army Group in France under Bradley’s command as Twelfth Army Group, downgrading Patton from his fictitious status as Commander of First Army Group to actual command Third Army, and naming suitable well-known commander of high reputation as the commander of the proposed fictitious First Army Group comprising assumed United States and British divisions in the United Kingdom. The designation of “Twelfth Army Group” has been selected for Bradley’s Army Group to obviate confusion in mail and other communications resulting if a number identical with one of the armies in this theatre were to be selected.
‘All arrangements to implement the new cover plan can be made here except that a suitable notional commander for the First Army Group is not available in this area. Desire therefore to suggest for your consideration that some well-known officer such as McNair, de Witt, or another of corresponding reputation be ordered to this theatre without delay. He would be required here for a considerable period, probably at least three months, the exact period being determined by the length of time the new cover plan remains effective. During his stay the officer would be usefully employed, and he would have unusual opportunities for observation.
‘The names I have given you are suggested because they have been fairly well advertised throughout the world. While I had thought of using Simpson7 for this purpose, I feel that his name will not be of sufficient significance to the enemy. If you find it impossible to comply, I will have to start immediately to build up Simpson as well as I can.
‘I would be most grateful for a radio reply as time is pressing and I cannot overemphasise the great importance of maintaining as long as humanly possible the Allied threat to the Pas de Calais area, which has already paid enormous dividends and, with care, will continue to do so.’8 On 9th July General Marshall replied that Lieutenant-General L. J. McNair, Commander in Chief of the Land Forces in the United States, would leave the United States in three days’ time to take command of FUSAG.
Lest it should ever be suspected that the Deception Staff were taking liberties with the reputations of distinguished American generals and particularly with the name of Patton, whose role in the FORTITUDE story was such an unhappy one, the following memorandum of 10th July to General Bedell Smith, the Chief of Staff, written and personally initialled by General Eisenhower, is quoted in full. ‘I have just received a telegram to the effect that General McNair is soon to be here. You will note from the telegram that General Marshall intends to say in Washington that McNair has left to take an important command in the field. Please send a short wire to General Marshall saying that I fully concur with his idea in making such an announcement. Through a “leak”, I think we should let out something about as follows:
‘(a) Certain information which we are sure the enemy can check up on as authentic, thus giving an atmosphere of plausibility. I suggest something like identification of certain units in France.
‘(b) A story that Patton has lost his high command because of displeasure at some of his indiscretions, and that he is reduced to Army command.
‘(c) That the most capable and most experienced senior American commander has been brought in to take over Patton’s Army Group.
‘(d) That due to damages to landing craft inflicted by the storm some weeks ago, the next expedition has been slightly delayed and it is now estimated that it will take a certain length of time to launch it. (This time should not be so long as to make the enemy believe he could bring divisions into the NEPTUNE area and get them back to the threatened point, but should be long enough to help assist in carrying on the deception.)
‘(e) The location of McNair’s headquarters should probably be given and he should be directed to make a tremendous show of activity.’
FORTITUDE SOUTH II was not approved until 19th July,9 but it was necessarily in operation before that date, for the planting of a story by means of controlled agents is bound to be a gradual process. Thus it fell to the lot of the Special Means Staff to anticipate these future requirements. The establishment of Fourteenth Army was begun before the invasion had been launched. When agent Seven visited Liverpool at the beginning of June to investigate agent 7 (6)’s unsubstantiated report of an impending attack on Bordeaux,10 though he had found nothing to confirm these rumours, he had noticed much activity in the district and ample evidence of the continuous arrival of American troops in the port. This information was sent on by GARBO11 on 15th June, and on the 17th we read: ‘Further evidence of the arrival of a new American formation over and above the number already mentioned is at present lacking. Nevertheless reports of the arrival of fresh American transports deserve attention. We must therefore reckon with an early increase in the number of American divisions in England.’12 On 17th June BRUTUS reported: ‘I have heard that a new American army is in process of being formed in the West of England and is coming under the command of FUSAG. I am looking for details.’13 Three days later GARBO carried the story a little further. ‘In conversation with 4 (3) I today learned some very important news. I casually asked him in which division his uncle was. He replied in the 48th US Division. To my question as to whether this division belonged to the First US Army Group, he replied that it did not, nor did it belong to 21 Army Group, thereby drawing the conclusion that there are many American troops here who belong to other large units. As is natural, I will investigate this matter as much as possible,’14 and on 2nd July: ‘Today I lunched with 4 (3) and brought the conversation round to the subject which interested me, which is to say about the American units which have recently arrived in England. He told me that FUSAG will undertake a more important task and that in order to be able to accomplish it, four American divisions have recently arrived in this country under the command of another American army. These divisions are stationed in the Liverpool area. He insinuated that the war was about to enter a new and decisive phase. In view of this interesting news, I intend to send Seven immediately to investigate what is going on in the Western area, which I am not controlling at the moment. I intend to clarify this matter and will invite 4 (3) out frequently.’15 By 10th July BRUTUS had most of the facts. ‘I have obtained details about the American Army in the region of Liverpool. It is the Fourteenth Army; there is also, in the West, another army, already reported, namely, the Ninth American Army, Commander-in-Chief General Simpson; both under the command of FUSAG. No details about the Ninth. The Fourteenth Army, headquarters at Mobberly in Cheshire; composition XXXIII Corps and another, number unknown. I hear that it is due to move to the East or South-East of England in the near future. The XXXIII Corps at Marbury in Cheshire; composition 11th and 48th US Divisions and an American armoured division. The 11th and 48th Divisions arrived during the month of June, well trained.’16 A short time before this BRUTUS had been able to offer some additional air support for the operation. ‘I have learnt that FUSAG will receive during the assault, very strong support from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, composed of heavy bombers. This last appears to indicate an attack against a strong position and the possibility of an attack across the Channel is discussed.’17