At the beginning of 1944 B1A controlled fifteen agents of whom seven had the use of wireless transmitters, the rest having to rely upon communication by letter. Complete biographies will be found in the records of MI5. It is only necessary here to give short accounts of those who played a sustained part in the execution of FORTITUDE.
GARBO, a Spaniard by birth, was a political idealist. Service under Franco during the Spanish Civil War had convinced him that both sides in this quarrel were equally hostile to his own Liberal sympathies. It was to England, so he felt, that Europe must look for the maintenance of Liberal principles. In 1940 he approached the British authorities in Madrid and offered to work for them as an agent either in Germany or Italy. His offer was rejected. He then turned to the Germans, who accepted his services and placed him under the control of Kuehlenthal, head of the Abwehr in Madrid. Armed with an espionage mission supplied to him by his new employers he again approached the British. Being still unable to attract their interest, he settled down in Lisbon after the manner of other uncontrolled agents and from there kept up a correspondence with the Germans upon the footing that he was in England actively engaged in espionage on their behalf. At last, in the spring of 1942, after many vicissitudes, the British agreed to employ him and in April of that year he came to England. Being totally unacquainted with this country, he had during his sojourn in Lisbon committed himself to statements which required some ingenuity on the part of his Case Officer to explain away or weave into the subsequent development of the story. When giving the Germans an account of a visit to Glasgow he had remarked, ‘There are people here who would do anything for a litre of wine.’
The most notable feature of his correspondence from Lisbon was the introduction of imaginary sub-agents. This system was greatly developed after his arrival in England and, indeed, became an underlying characteristic of the case. The imaginary sub-agent has some decided advantages in the world of deception. He can be created at will in any guise to suit any requirement. In building his character, one is not tied by the enemy’s knowledge of his previous life and circumstances. If the sub-agent turns out to be wrong, the agent himself can blame the former’s stupidity and so exonerate himself. This technique was brought to perfection by GARBO, who would seldom engage a new imaginary sub-agent without having previously consulted his German masters on the subject. He would also set them intelligence tests, in which they were not always successful.
By February 1944 GARBO had no fewer than twenty-four fictitious sub-agents each clothed with a character and a story of his own. Let us work our way round the chart entitled ‘The GARBO Network’. Of the four agents, One, Two, Three and J(1), whom GARBO had recruited when he was still in Lisbon, only Three and J(1) remained. One had resigned after having become embroiled in STARKEY during the late summer of 1943. Two had died of a lingering illness in November 1942 because his place of residence at Bootle, near Liverpool, gave him inconvenient opportunities for watching the Allied convoys sailing to North Africa. Three, a Venezuelan of independent means, plays an important part in our story. Appointed Deputy-Chief by GARBO at the end of 1943, he had been let into all the secrets of the organisation. As he lived in Glasgow, GARBO relied on him for reports from Scotland. In order to cover the ground, Three decided to set up his own small network in the North. Of the three sub-agents that he recruited, only one took any active part in FORTITUDE, namely 3 (3), a Greek seaman deserter and an ardent Communist whom Three engaged on the pretext that he would be assisting Russian espionage against this country. 3(1), the aviator, can be passed over as he played no part in the story. 3 (2) was a young officer in the 49th British Infantry Division whom Three had met in the train. During the autumn of 1943, when the 49th Division was still in Scotland, it had been proposed to represent it as an assault division for FORTITUDE SOUTH. As this was changed later, 3 (2)’s usefulness automatically ceased. This officer was an unconscious agent, that is to say, he had no idea that Three was working for the enemy, and the latter had to rely upon his indiscretions for information.
The GARBO Network
The origins of the sub-network of Agent Four, a Gibraltarian waiter, are bound up with a rather mysterious story concerning the caves at Chislehurst. For many months GARBO had been hinting at strange developments in these caves which were in some way connected with the coming invasion. Four worked underground in the NAAFI there and one of his sub-agents, 4 (2), was employed as a guard at this great depot.2 Four’s other two agents, who were in no way connected with the caves, were of greater value to the network. Agent 4(1), the wireless operator, provided the organisation with its sole means of wireless communication with the German control in Madrid. This man, a peace-time amateur and strong friend of the Republican Party in Spain, believed that the encoded messages which he sent and received were passing between Dr Negrin in London and the Spanish Communists. GARBO pointed out that by this device he and his network would be protected if the transmitter were found. 4 (3), the third member of Four’s sub-network, was an American sergeant employed in an unspecified military headquarters in London. Though playing his part unconsciously, he made an important contribution to FORTITUDE and disclosed military secrets not often vouchsafed to soldiers of his rank. GARBO described him as being ‘sociable, jocular and fairly talkative’. His political outlook was said to be ‘anti-Communist and, to a lesser degree, anti-English Imperialist, following in part the ideas of Randolph Hearst, sustaining an admiration for Franco as Catholic crusader and first leader in the struggle against the Bolshevik’.
Agent Five, a brother of Three and therefore also a Venezuelan, had gone to Ottawa in the summer of 1943 after having exposed himself to danger on a mission to the Isle of Wight and South Wales during the previous year. His cousin, 5 (1), lived across the border in Buffalo, USA. It was hoped that they might be useful for reporting invasion preparations on the other side of the Atlantic. In fact, this was never found necessary. In the later months of the war, however, Five provided a valuable refuge for members of the network who were escaping from the law. Agent Six, having been killed in North Africa in July 1943, does not concern us.
The sub-network of Agent Seven, the largest in the organisation, was specifically recruited to support the threat to the Pas de Calais.3 Seven was an ex-seaman who lived in Swansea. He was described as ‘a thoroughly undesirable character’, his incentive for working being purely mercenary. Foreseeing that it would be necessary to post agents along the south and south-east coasts as observers for the coming invasion, GARBO had asked Seven to find suitable candidates from amongst his Welsh friends. On 6th December Madrid was informed that Seven had had the good fortune to meet the leader of a small subversive organisation in Swansea whose members felt that by helping the enemy they would be advancing their own cause. ‘A friend of Agent Seven’, wrote GARBO to his master, ‘has been a member of the “Welsh Nationalist Party”, but he had advanced ideas and he was not pleased with the Liberal sentiment of the Party, maintaining that the emancipation of his country would depend entirely on the establishment of what he calls “Aryan World Order Movement” to collaborate with all the Aryans all over the world. On account of this he left the Party more than two years ago and joined an Indian, a friend of his, who has lived for many years in this country, forming a group which he calls “Brothers in the Aryan World Order”. As its position, owing to being clandestine, is very dangerous, they have had little success, as only about twelve revolutionary members are affiliated, and their activities are very limited and rather ridiculous.’ The members were said to spend most of their time in making lists of names of Communists and Jews who must be eliminated when their aspirations were achieved.
Besides the leader of Aryan World Order, whom GARBO designated 7 (2), and his Indian friend, now called 7 (4), four other members of the group agreed to join the spy ring. These were 7 (3), the secretary and mistress of the Indian, lately enlisted in the WRNS, and 7 (5), 7 (6) and 7 (7), who were merely described as Welsh Fascists, 7 (5) being a relative of 7 (2). None of the sub-agents working under Seven knew at this time of GARBO’s existence. At the same time Seven believed that he controlled the whole of GARBO’s spy system in this country and had no knowledge of the rest of the organisation.
In addition to those agents already described, it will be seen that there were five more bearing the letter ‘J’ followed by a number. J(1), as already stated, had been invented by GARBO before he came under British control. When, in 1941, he was pretending to be in England, he had to explain how he was still able to communicate with Madrid. He therefore told them that he had persuaded an official of one of the airlines, who travelled frequently between England and Portugal, to post his letters for him in Lisbon. At the same time he told the Germans to put their letters to him in a safe deposit at one of the Lisbon banks of which, he told them, this same official had the key and would collect them in due course. J(1) was the official who assumed this role of courier. As GARBO could no longer post and collect letters himself after he had come to England, the task was then undertaken by a British Secret Service representative in Lisbon, this arrangement being continued until the end of the war. Of the remaining four, J(2) and J (4) may be passed over as they played little or no part in FORTITUDE. J(3) and J(5), on the contrary, can claim a large share in the development of the story. A note written by GARBO’s Case Officer in February 1944 tells us that J(3) ‘could possibly be identified as the head of the Spanish Section of the Ministry of Information. For a time GARBO was employed by him on translation work for the MOI. He is suited for the passing of high-grade information of a political or strategic nature. He has frequently been quoted by GARBO as one of his best sources. He believes GARBO to be a Spanish Republican refugee and treats him as a close personal friend. He is an unconscious collaborator.’ J(5) he described as ‘a secretary in the Ministry of War, probably working in the Offices of the War Cabinet. She is carrying on an affair with GARBO, whom she believes to be a Spanish Republican. Unconscious collaborator who has already been very indiscreet and could pass on very high-grade political information. This source has been quoted by Madrid, when reporting to Berlin, as “The Secretariat of the Ministry of War”.’
In viewing the GARBO network as a whole, the most important thing to remember is that apart from GARBO himself every one of the characters was imaginary. The methods of communication were by wireless to Madrid with the aid of 4 (1)’s transmitter and by letter through the courier J(1). A second letter service by means of a courier was arranged by Seven, but was never used to any extent. If GARBO had been put out of action, the network could still have continued to operate through the deputy, Three, who knew all its ramifications. Had the system collapsed entirely at the centre, Seven could in all probability have continued to employ his sub-network, communicating with Madrid by means of the courier service that he claimed to have established. Thus the organisation was practically indestructible.
GARBO would never give the Germans the names of his sub-agents because, as he pointed out, this exposed them to an unnecessary risk of compromise. The Germans, on the other hand, gave them all pseudonyms for their own convenience; thus Three’s group of agents came to be known as the BENEDICT network, Four’s group as the CHAMILLUS and Seven’s as the DAGOBERT, each agent within the network having his own designation. It is not necessary to give all these code names,4 but the reader may care to remember that 7 (2), 7 (4) and 7 (7) were known respectively to the Germans as DONNY, DICK and DORRICK. These names reappear later in a highly significant context.
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We will now turn to the case of BRUTUS. Though less bizarre in his methods than the Spanish agent, he probably ranks equally with him as a channel for strategic deception. BRUTUS was a Polish officer who escaped to France after the end of the war against Poland in 1939. He set up an espionage network in that country, which continued to work with great success in the Allied cause until November 1941, when, as the result of treachery by sub-agents, he was arrested and his organisation rounded up. He was kept in prison for several months where tentative approaches were made by the Germans in the hope that they might persuade him to collaborate with them. In the spring of 1942 he allowed them to suppose that their efforts to convert him were gaining ground, and in July he accepted a mission to go to England as a German spy. He was provided with crystals for constructing a wireless set and given an escape story to explain his release from prison. On arrival in this country he immediately told the authorities about his mission, was accepted as a double-cross agent and soon afterwards established wireless contact with the enemy. Although there was reason to believe that he was highly regarded by the Germans, the Directors of Intelligence did not feel justified in allowing him to be used for deception. Not only did BRUTUS work in reality at Polish Headquarters, but the Polish Deuxième Bureau had knowledge of the true facts of the case and were in a position to monitor his traffic. In February 1944, as nothing untoward had occurred and in view of the great potentialities of the case, this decision was reversed and in March BRUTUS joined the FORTITUDE team. His chief characteristics were a keenly trained eye for military observation and an extremely retentive memory. In December 1943 he recruited an imaginary wireless operator, an elderly retired member of the Polish Air Force. BRUTUS informed the Germans that this individual, who was given the code name CHOPIN, had lost his family in Russia and would be working principally from idealistic motives.
The third controlled agent who stood in the first rank at this time was TRICYCLE. At the beginning of the war TRICYCLE was a Yugoslav subject and a lawyer by profession. His political sympathies were markedly pro-French and pro-Allied. He was recruited by the Abwehr in Belgrade in August 1940 through the intermediation of JEBSEN alias ARTIST, who has been described by TRICYCLE’s Case Officer as one working for the Abwehr on a half-commission basis. TRICYCLE immediately reported the approach which had been made to him to the British Embassy in Belgrade and thereafter acted throughout under British instructions. He was placed under the control of the KO in Lisbon and reached this country in December 1940. On arrival, he was made assistant to the Yugoslav Military Attaché and the Germans were informed of this. Unlike most of the British double-cross agents, he maintained direct personal contact with his German masters, giving them verbal reports and receiving lengthy questionnaires on his periodic visits to Portugal. As the Germans believed that TRICYCLE was making these journeys in their interest, he had to explain why the British authorities allowed him to go. He therefore told them that the British were organising an escape route for the use of airmen in Yugoslavia who were trying to reach this country. The journey would be made via Portugal. The British authorities had invited him to co-operate in the scheme. If he were willing to do so, they would arrange for his passage to Lisbon. TRICYCLE pointed out to his masters that this was an opportunity not to be missed and if they could, in fact, arrange from time to time for the escape of an airman from Yugoslavia his chances of repeating his visits would be improved. The Germans, appreciating the cogency of his arguments, fell in with the scheme. After TRICYCLE had come to England, ARTIST himself came over to the Allied side, but kept up his close relations with the Abwehr. When TRICYCLE was interviewed by his controller in Lisbon, ARTIST would attend the meeting, and if TRICYCLE seemed to be getting into difficulties, would throw in a question seemingly suspicious but, in fact, skilfully calculated to draw the conversation away from the dangerous topic. Besides being able to communicate by means of these personal reports and by secret writing, TRICYCLE had the use of a wireless transmitter. This transmitter was operated by another agent, FREAK. FREAK and TRICYCLE worked very closely together and can practically be regarded as a single channel.
Contemporary opinion would probably have placed TATE, another wireless agent, as next in degree of importance. TATE, a confessed Nazi, was dropped by parachute in September 1940. After his arrest he was imprisoned for some time, but when B1A had gained the impression that he was anxious to co-operate, he was released and allowed to live in a house to the north-west of London with a guard. Wireless contact with his German masters in Hamburg was established in October 1940 and had continued ever since. This was somewhat surprising because he had been given an extremely low-grade cipher; indeed, his traffic was constantly being reported to MI5 by the British Monitoring Services. This defect did not appear to strike the enemy. It did, on the other hand, lead some members of the XX Committee to think that the case was unsafe and should be closed. In 1943 an incident occurred which was even more damaging. Through an oversight, a German prisoner of war who knew that TATE was under British control was repatriated. The arguments for bringing TATE’s career as a double-cross agent to a close were strong. While the decision as to his continued employment still lay in the balance, the Germans provided him with a better code. This new mark of confidence had its effect and it was ultimately decided to retain his services and to include him as a member of the FORTITUDE team. Wireless agents were at a premium, their great advantage over the letter-writers being speed and certainty of communication. Furthermore, we knew that a ban on foreign mail was to be imposed in due course, which would make the letter-writers almost valueless during the weeks immediately preceding the invasion.
The only other wireless agent was TREASURE. She was never rated very highly and probably would not have been used at all but for the fact that she had a transmitter. TREASURE, a temperamental French lady of Russian origin, had lived most of her life in Paris, where she had gained a reputation at one time as an artist and later as a journalist. Before the war she had been approached by a German journalist friend, a member of the Abwehr, and asked by him if she would supply intelligence reports on the Civil War in Spain. This she had refused to do. After the fall of France she got in touch with this man again and told him that she was willing to work for the Germans. After receiving the usual training, a wireless set and a control in Paris, she was sent to Madrid en route for England. Here she made contact with the British authorities, disclosed her mission and put herself at the disposal of the Allies. She arrived in England in August 1943 and took up her residence in Bristol.
All the remaining agents employed in FORTITUDE were letter-writers only, and none of them occupied a position in the first rank. BRONX, the daughter of a South American diplomatist, lived in a smart cosmopolitan circle and was able to quote the opinions of those whose names and pictures appeared in the columns of fashionable newspapers.
GELATINE, an Austrian lady, also had a wide circle of friends. Her predilection for the company of the opposite sex made her useful for reporting such things as the stopping and reopening of Service leave. She was constantly being cheated of her assignations.
SNIPER, a Belgian Air Force sergeant-pilot and rather a drab character, worked at the Belgian Air Force Headquarters in London, a fact which was known to the Germans. His mission was to obtain technical Air Force information. He differed from the other agents inasmuch as; he received communications from his control in. Brussels by wireless but had to send his answers by letter.
To understand the case of MULLET and PUPPET, a little background history is required. HAMLET, a well-to-do Austrian Jew, had settled in Brussels before the war. In 1941 he received permission from the Germans to set up a company in Lisbon to exploit in Portugal certain inventions of which he held the patent rights. He also established relations with the Abwehr and agreed to supply them with intelligence reports, using his Lisbon business as a cover for espionage. He then proceeded to adopt the familiar expedient of establishing an imaginary network of agents and, by the end of 1942, he was able to convince the Germans that his organisation had representatives in England and the USA. HAMLET’s next step was to offer his soi-disant espionage organisation to the British. Arrangements were now made, with British connivance, for the appointment of two businessmen, MULLET, an Englishman, and PUPPET, an Austrian, to represent HAMLET’S commercial interests in London. These gentlemen were portrayed to the Germans as well-placed spies, with a good business cover, employed by HAMLET. Of course they were really British double-cross agents working back to the Germans through HAMLET. Communication was made by writing in invisible ink between the typewritten lines of MULLET’s business correspondence.
The other B1A agents who were operating at this time either took no part in FORTITUDE or such a minor part that their inclusion here has not been considered necessary.
In addition, there were two controlled agents in Iceland, COBWEB and BEETLE. As MI5’s jurisdiction was limited to British soil, the control of these agents came automatically under MI6. All matters affecting these two agents were therefore settled between SHAEF and an MI6 representative. COBWEB and BEETLE, both of them young Norwegians and both wireless agents, had been landed in Iceland by submarine. They worked independently and did not know of each other’s existence.
We had one triple-cross agent in the team. At the beginning of the war TEAPOT, a German who lived near Hamburg, was the manager of a co-operative food store with numerous branches all over Germany and a branch in Istanbul. While visiting the latter place he professed anti-Nazi sentiments and was recruited by the British as a straight agent at the end of 1943. It was soon afterwards discovered that he was in actual fact: a German counter-espionage agent. Nevertheless it was felt that he might still have his uses, and so the British, feigning ignorance of his treachery, continued to employ him. From the point of view of deception his value lay in the fact that the Germans might be expected to draw conclusions as to our intentions from the nature of our apparently unsuspecting questions. Communication was effected by means of a wireless link between MI6 and TEAPOT’s residence near Hamburg.
Finally, there was PANDORA, not strictly a double-agent channel at all but included here for convenience. It had long been suspected that HEMPEL, the German Minister in Dublin, provided the Germans with military intelligence. Anonymous letters were therefore written to him from time to time, ostensibly from the pen of some fanatical Irish anglophobe. Into these letters could be inserted occasional items of deception.