APPENDIX XIV

JOSEPHINE and FUSAG

The following is an extract from a German document bearing the reference Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab Ic, Fremde Luftwaffen West, Nr. 109/45 g. Kdos (A), dated 6th January, 1945, which suggests that JOSEPHINE’s messages about FUSAG were inspired by the Allies.

‘JOSEPHINE’S Reports on the First American Army Group (FUSAG)

1. FUSAG’s existence was first notified on 9th January, 1944, and was regularly mentioned with certainty up to 17th June. In the spring of 1944 it was increasingly reported by agents and by the press.

2. In assessing JOSEPHINE’s reports, the purport of all reports on FUSAG may be noted as follows:

(a) The Allied Armies under FUSAG’s command kept on changing. Finally it was stated that one English and one Allied airborne army were under the command of FUSAG, i.e. of an American Army Group.

(b) Changes in the command of FUSAG were reported quite as frequently as changes in the formations subordinate to it.

(c) When the invasion began, FUSAG was generally put down as being a second great group of forces, for a second landing operation north of the first.

(d) After the continued withdrawal of divisions from the armies under FUSAG’s command, to reinforce the invasion forces, reports were also received as to movements of FUSAG into Central and Northern England, in connection with landing operations against Jutland and Southern Norway, and later against the Heligoland Bight.

3. It may be seen from (2) that FUSAG was certainly used by the enemy as an “army in being”.*

Technical adviser’s personal impression is that FUSAG existed simply for this purpose.

4. During the second half of the year, reports from the agent JOSEPHINE conform to the enemy’s decoy activities. Until the middle of October 1944, they did much to uphold the ‘fiction’ of FUSAG as a strong group of forces intended for further landings.

The first reports came in very late – according to records on file, not until 6th August. Like other agents JOSEPHINE reported (German Security H.O.Mil (RSHA Mil) B/L 11102/8 of 8th August, 1944):

(a) “FUSAG was originally to have been used for a second large-scale landing operation. As the timing of the Normandy invasion went completely wrong, it was decided not to undertake this second landing, which had been planned for the end of June; and formations from FUSAG were steadily transferred to France.”

(b) As there was no longer any practical likelihood that FUSAG would be employed for a second landing, it was now mentioned in connection with a landing operation against Southern Norway and Denmark. (German Security H.O. Mil B/L 13869 of 29th August, 1944): “Increased troop transports from Southern and Central England to Northern England are being associated with movements of parts of FUSAG. Operations in Northern and Central Norway, starting from England, are not expected, but landings in Jutland and S. Norway.”

Replying to further enquiry he stated (German Security H.O. (RSHA) 10031 of 1st September):

“I was expecting your further enquiry (!), as my own suspicions had already been aroused at once. All sources however confirm that FUSAG formations have been stationed as far as the Humber. In addition there are individual reports about troop transports to Northern England/Scotland. As reported, these were not observed previously. Resumption of Swedish air traffic to England refused, although conceded at end of August. It is quite clear that either a large-scale decoy manœuvre is planned, to cover the employment of FUSAG in Belgium–Holland–Heligoland Bight, or that an operation against Denmark is actually intended.”

(c) Later on, the idea of connecting FUSAG with the movements of troops to Northern England was withdrawn, but the increasingly doubtful FUSAG was reported to be destined for a large-scale landing in the Heligoland Bight (GAF Ops Staff Ic. Attache Group 88087 of 15th September): “FUSAG continues in Eastern England as far as Humber. Formations in Northern England and Scotland do not belong to FUSAG. Employment of FUSAG in Eastern Holland and Heligoland Bight after strong airborne landing has been carried out in Eastern and Northern Holland.”

5. In conclusion, it must be pointed out that JOSEPHINE was thus a participant in the enemy’s decoy plans, which were aimed at holding down strong German forces for as long as possible at various points from Norway to France.’

It is of interest to note that the Germans, however nearly they came to appreciating the nature of the FORTITUDE deception, never seemed to realise that the threat relied upon the use of misplaced or else of wholly fictitious forces. The foregoing document, while suggesting that a large-scale deception had been put into effect by the Allies with the object of containing the Fifteenth German Army in the Pas de Calais, assumes that this was achieved by sending real troops into the Eastern and South-Eastern counties.

All the interrogations of senior German officers, which took place in Nuremberg after the war was over in order to assist in the writing of this report, were conducted on the basis that information was being sought on behalf of the official war historians. Dr Percy Schramm, the chronicler of the OKW War Diary, more astute than the rest, eyeing his interlocutor quizzically during the course of his interview, suddenly interposed the question: ‘All this Patton business wasn’t a trick, was it?’ ‘What do you mean by that?’ came the reply. ‘What I mean is this. Were all those divisions sent to South-East England simply to hold our forces in the Pas de Calais?’ ‘I certainly imagine’, answered his interrogator, ‘that if you had denuded the Pas de Calais, they would have been used to attack that place, but since you did not do so, they were equally available to reinforce Montgomery.’ ‘Ah, that is what we always thought,’ said Dr Schramm with evident relief.