Before tracing the growth of the new army group any further, we must turn aside for a moment to consider the problem of the departing formations. Naturally 21 Army Group wanted to appear to the Germans to be as weak as possible in the Normandy bridgehead so as not to draw fresh forces against them. From that point of view it was therefore clearly undesirable to say that any of the old FUSAG formations had gone to Normandy. Even to admit that they had left their old locations might lead the Germans to suppose that they had gone overseas as reinforcements. On the other hand, if agents were believed to be living in a particular district and had reported every troop movement in that district for months past, a sudden failure to do so would be almost certain to excite suspicion. The problem was one of timing.
As a rough basis of calculation it was agreed that a formation would be likely to be identified in battle a week after its advanced elements had landed in France. It was also agreed that before such identification took place a ground spotting agent should at least be allowed to say that the formation in question had left his neighbourhood even if he could say nothing as to its destination. Although this concession provided adequate protection for the lesser agents, it still left GARBO, and to a lesser extent BRUTUS, in a difficult position, for it obliged them to keep silence about many of the old FUSAG formations whose activities they had hitherto kept under almost continuous observation. It was clear that it would simplify our problems enormously if both these agents could temporarily be put off the air altogether.
There was another reason which made it very desirable to put GARBO out of communication with the Germans. He was being asked some very awkward questions about the new secret weapon V. 1 with which the Germans had started to bombard London on 13th June. To explain how this arose we must go back six months. In December 1943 the Germans set up a new organisation at Arras known as the 68th Corps to control the bombardment of this country by means of flying bombs. The local Abwehrstelle had helped the 68th Corps to organise its signals communications. In doing so it had made arrangements whereby GARBO’s messages from Madrid could go direct to Arras without having to be re-enciphered in Berlin. These facts became known to us through Most Secret Sources, so that it was already apparent before the New Year that the Germans intended to use GARBO as an ‘observation post’ for the secret weapon. This was confirmed by a message which GARBO had received on 15th December, 1943. ‘Circumstances dictate that you should carry out your proposition with regard to setting up your home outside the capital. This warning is strictly confidential for you and, in taking the necessary measures, the collaborators must on no account suspect your reasons. Should the threatened action commence, in making your preparations, leaving to your judgment their execution, you must ensure that your collaborators maintain their contact with you.’1 GARBO did not lose the opportunity that this gave him of trying to find out more about the secret weapon, and during the spring he sent a number of fishing questions. On 22nd February, for instance, announcing that agent Four’s lodging had been bombed in a recent air raid, he added: ‘I should be grateful if you would let me know immediately that these are the preliminaries of other, more intense attacks so that I can take immediately protective measures for the Service. Let me know immediately, therefore, whether one is to expect other, graver developments such as, for example, the rocket, as if this were so I would remove the present radio apparatus to a safer place, taking the precaution to make it appear as if the present bombardments were the motive for my doing so, thus avoiding comment by the agents and, at the same time without alarming them, being able to make them change their residences.’2 When, four months later, the storm broke GARBO did not receive the promised warning for as his German masters explained: ‘We had not been informed by headquarters about this project, owing no doubt to the fact that all attention has been absorbed in the operations in France.’3 However, they went on to tell GARBO that it was of the utmost importance that he should inform them of the effects of the bombardments.
Without some direction from those in authority it was impossible for GARBO to know what to answer, and such direction was not forthcoming. He could not deny the fact that V. 1s were dropping in London; equally, he could not send accurate reports. He might, by a systematic programme of false reports, succeed in deflecting the mean point of impact from one part of London to another, but clearly he could not make himself personally responsible for sparing, let us say, Westminster at the expense of Paddington or Southwark. Here therefore was another strong argument for removing GARBO temporarily from the scene.
As the Germans had told him to report flying bomb damage, the idea suggested itself to his case officer that he should be arrested while carrying out their instructions. Not only would this have the desired effect of putting him out of the way, but it might even make his masters realise how dangerous this type of work was and so induce them to tell him to confine himself to military reports in future.
For some unexplained reason the enemy told GARBO to use a map of London published by Pharus of Berlin for plotting the falls of the flying bombs. The only map which could be found to answer that description was one published in 1906 and the only known copy in London was in the British Museum. This gave GARBO an excellent opportunity of playing for time. Meanwhile he had sent agent Three to collect information, though he remarked rather discouragingly: ‘The area affected is so extensive that it embraces a semi-circle from Harwich to Portsmouth.’ As Three did not take very kindly to the work, GARBO saw that he would have to undertake it himself. ‘As Three is a little timid I am going to do this work myself and make the observations starting from tomorrow.’4 Meanwhile the Germans had evidently realised that there was some danger of GARBO’s military reporting suffering in consequence. ‘I wish to repeat again that news about troop movements, units, locations, &c., continues to be your principal mission and you should add information about the objectives hit only to the extent that circumstances permit.’5 But GARBO was not now to be deterred. On 5th July agent Three reported: ‘GARBO did not turn up yesterday; he also has not appeared for daily meeting today … to avoid delay am sending reports which have not yet been sent by him.’6 The next day matters looked serious; his wife had no news of him. ‘I fear that any investigations of the Police or Civil Defence might turn out disastrous as knowing his methods it is quite likely that he has gone off on some new crack which has taken him to a prohibited area from where he cannot communicate.’7 Madrid replied on the 7th: ‘I am very much puzzled indeed about what you told me about GARBO. Of course it might be possible that he left London on a special mission, although it appears rather strange that in this case he should not have informed either you or his family.’8 Then rather unhelpfully: ‘It is very difficult for me to advise you as there are a lot of details which I ignore as regards the inner construction of the Service. I think the first condition is to keep calm and quiet and to give anything you may undertake the fullest consideration. If the worst has happened and GARBO has been arrested Three must do what he can to save the Service and take all measures to protect its members and prevent clues of any kind from falling into the hands of the Police.’9 This message crossed with one from Three containing the fateful news: ‘Widow reports alarming news just learnt from wife of GARBO. Police went to Taplow today to investigate and collect Red documentation.10 GARBO was arrested on Tuesday. No details known. Consider situation critical. Am immediately breaking communications to and from all agents.’11 There we will leave GARBO for the moment.
The case of BRUTUS was not so difficult because he had no sub-agents like 7 (4), 7 (2) and 7 (7) living among the old FUSAG formations. Even so we thought it prudent to send him on a week’s visit to Scotland after he had sent his message about the Fourteenth Army on 10th July.
We must now go back a week or two in order to examine in greater detail the manner in which the news of the departing formations was handled. With the knowledge that the two principal actors were to retire from the scene, the one on 4th July and the other on the 10th, our problem was greatly simplified. The first formation to go was the 83rd US Infantry Division, hitherto represented as being stationed at Wye in Kent and forming part of XII Corps. Permission having been obtained to announce its departure, TATE reported on 23rd June: ‘Convoy of the 83rd US Infantry Division passed through Wye in a westerly direction. A driver said that they had come from Elham and many had gone ahead of him.’12 This was confirmed by agent 7 (2) on 28th June.13 By now the 28th Division had left Tenterden and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division at Dover was about to move. Furthermore the 43rd, 53rd and 59th British Infantry Divisions, which were all stationed in 7 (2)’s area but which belonged both in fact and in fiction to 21 Army Group, were already departing for the bridgehead. 21 Army Group, however, rightly insisted that none of these should be alluded to in any way. On 30th June GARBO had reported that his agent 7 (2) had tried to visit Tenterden, where the 28th US Division and the 43rd British Division were stationed, but was unfortunately turned back at the station as he was not in possession of the correct pass.14 On 5th July GARBO had been allowed to send a message from 7 (2) with the news that: ‘Many troops of the 2nd Canadian Division have been leaving the area. Have seen large convoys of this division moving North on the London road. The 28th US Division is said to be leaving Tenterden.’15 The idea behind this message, apart from protecting the agent, was to suggest that the formations might be about to embark in the Thames Estuary. The Germans did not react quite in the way that they were intended to. They thought that these two divisions must have gone to join the Third American Army north of the Thames and suggested that ‘this transfer of forces may be a result of the V.J attacks and may be a way of dispersing forces in the area under fire’.16 After that GARBO’s sub-agents were saved from any further trouble by the arrest of their master. The information which they continued to collect was not despatched until the beginning of August, by which time it was wholly innocuous.
GARBO was involved in this difficulty solely by virtue of the fact that he had sub-agents in the coastal areas. He was therefore able to protect himself merely by reporting the movements of individual formations. BRUTUS on the other hand could hardly fail to know something about a major regrouping of forces under the command of the army group to which he was attached. On 6th July he had told the Germans that the 83rd US Division, recently reported by him at Elham, had been removed from the FUSAG Order of Battle,17 and on the 11th he stated ambiguously: ‘The 2nd Canadian Corps moved from FUSAG but the 2nd British Corps remains in FUSAG in the region of Kent. Will try to discover the reason for the move; probably connected with the movement reported of the Fourteenth Army.’18 Four days later, having sent his report on Fourteenth Army to which reference has already been made, he went to Scotland.
The advantage which we had derived during June from the German over-estimate of forces in South-East England has already been pointed out. At the beginning of July, however, we began to pay the penalty. The 15th, 43rd and 53rd Divisions, which had been located in Sussex and Kent, were identified in the bridgehead, and this was taken, for reasons already given, to imply a reinforcement from Patton’s group of armies. The Germans, however, were still unwilling to accept the fact that any actual reduction in the latter’s forces had been made and they preferred to believe that Patton’s numbers had been made up from Montgomery’s reserve. They also concluded that this reinforcement from the 21 Army Group reserve was going to the Third US Army in East Anglia rather than to the First Canadian Army in Kent and Sussex. This led them to modify their opinion as to Patton’s objective. ‘There are no concrete indications of an alteration in the grouping of forces in Great Britain. The fact that individual formations of the First Canadian Army have appeared in the bridgehead (15th, 43rd and 53rd English Infantry Divisions) can be accounted for by other divisions hitherto assumed to be in Montgomery’s Army Group (e.g. 38th and 54th Divisions) having been put under the command of Patton’s Army Group. In all, we must therefore continue to reckon that the latter army group comprises some thirty to thirty-two divisions including the airborne divisions destined for its use. The recognised great strength of the formations in the area between the Thames and the Wash (some sixty divisions)19 is remarkable. It causes one to wonder whether the enemy command may actually be disposed to carry the bulk of these forces through the Straits of Dover as part of an undertaking against the Somme and Seine gap. The considerable risk which is unquestionably bound up with this suggests the possibility that part of this force might perhaps be used as part of a diversionary operation in the area between Dunkirk and Calais. Such a decision may doubtless have been encouraged by the thoroughly disturbing effect of the V. 1.’20 Three days later this newborn expectation of a ‘diversion’ between Dunkirk and Calais had grown to the fear of an ‘operation’ in that region. ‘On the basis of evidence received up to now the American Third Army probably disposes of at least seventeen divisions. The view already expressed that an operation against the central Channel area (Dunkirk–Calais)21 may also have been planned from the area north of the Thames is again emphasised by the foregoing evidence, because the shipment of this strong group of force in its entirety through the Straits of Dover is regarded as particularly risky.’22 It will be remembered that it was at this time that we made our first reports of the departure of Canadian formations from their locations in Kent, the Germans suggesting on their own initiative that they had gone to Third Army to escape from the flying-bombs. Here was yet another argument in support of Calais–Dunkirk, for the strength of the forces north of the Thames was thereby still further increased and that to the south correspondingly weakened. Although belief in a landing near Dieppe was never abandoned, the possibility of a second one further to the east now seemed greater. ‘Particularly striking is, however, the continued reinforcement of Third American Army which seems even to have received some formations from the First Canadian Army (28th American?, 2nd Canadian?) which has led to the American Army being practically double the size of the Canadian. This transfer of forces may be a result of the V. 1 attacks and may be a way of dispersing the forces in the area under fire. In this case the measure would point away from an early beginning of the second landing operation. It can, however, also denote a change in the operation plans in connection with the V. 1 attack and create the necessary conditions for a special undertaking against the V. 1 sites. In any case the area Dunkirk–Boulogne deserves increased attention in view of the existing picture. The view of this department that the enemy command would hardly decide to ship a force of seventeen to twenty divisions through the Straits of Dover without striking a blow against the German coast is maintained.’23
This state of affairs, however, did not last long. Although ‘the greatly increased enemy strength in the Normandy beach-head (about thirty divisions) must not be allowed to deceive us into forgetting that the enemy still has at hand all that is required for carrying out a new landing operation’, there could be no denying that Patton’s group of armies had been sensibly weakened and even if he were receiving some reinforcement from the 21 Army Group reserve, he would scarcely be in a position to launch two attacks. So we find that the Calais–Dunkirk assault loses favour and Dieppe is accepted once more as the single objective. The Intelligence Summary for 10th July gives a clear impression of the views held at that time.
‘The distribution of forces in England shows broadly the following picture:
‘(a) In the rearward area of Montgomery’s Army Group there are at the most a further ten to eleven divisions. This does not include the airborne divisions in this area; they are included in Patton’s Army Group because they will presumably be employed in co-operation with it. Furthermore, the possibility must be reckoned with that a few divisions which on the map are still in the rearward area of Montgomery’s Army Group have been actually transferred unbeknown into Patton’s area. Briefly, therefore, we can say that Montgomery’s Army Group probably no longer disposes of large-scale reserves in its rearward area. Also the recourse which has several times been had of late to Patton’s formations to strengthen the beach-head points in the same direction and underlines, moreover, that the operations in Normandy could not be carried to success with the forces originally envisaged in the time intended.
‘(b) Patton’s Army Group disposes of about thirty divisions between Brighton and the Humber if we include four airborne divisions, and these forces have to an increasing extent their main concentration north of the Thames. Their strength might be increased by a few divisions if such were transferred unbeknown from the South-West of England. It is, however, particularly important to remember that this army group is undoubtedly inferior in quality to that of Montgomery.
‘(c) The mass of Montgomery’s Army Group engaged in the beach-head consists at present of at least thirty-two divisions and also represents from the point of view of strength, and above all of quality, the strongest concentration of force which the Anglo-Saxon Command possesses, hence the entrusting to this army group of the main task, the thrust towards Paris.
‘(d) The remaining groups of forces in Central and Northern England do not exceed three to four divisions each and, therefore, possess compared with the groups mentioned in (b) and (c) above no great significance. The massed concentration of Montgomery’s Army Group and its reinforcements from Patton’s Army Group suggests that the latter army group has not been given the decisive role, which again leads to the conclusion that it is intended to employ it with the idea of early co-operation with Montgomery’s Army Group and, therefore within the latter’s operational sphere.
‘The area hitherto suggested in the Central Channel zone retains therefore its validity.’24
No Allied deceiver could have taken exception to that appreciation, but we were drawing perilously near to the danger line. Reinforcement of the bridgehead from the South-Eastern counties was already suggesting that Patton’s Army Group had not been given the decisive role. During the next ten days the greater part of FUSAG, as the enemy then knew it, would be on its way to France. Furthermore, the uncontrolled agents, the loose horses in the race, constituted an added risk. Thus OSTRO reported from Lisbon on 6th July: ‘All indications point to the fact that trans-shipment to Normandy of divisions already assembled will proceed, other landings having been abandoned. Large-scale movements to South-East England have taken place, as transports by day however, so that they were obviously intended as deception manœuvres, especially as some of these troops have already been transported back to embarkation points area Bognor Regis–Weymouth.’25 On 19th July the same agent declared that ‘General Patton’s Headquarters was transferred to Dorchester, King’s Arms Hotel, on 11th July. Simultaneously, United States troops have moved from South-Eastern to Southern England. Patton’s Army has, since the beginning of July, been regularly supplying troops to the First US Army in Normandy.’26