Form was already beginning to tell among the sub-agents of Seven’s network. While 7 (2), 7 (4) and 7 (7) were improving their reputations daily, 7 (3), 7 (5) and 7 (6) were falling by the wayside. 7 (3), having finished her preliminary training at Mill Hill, had been sent about the middle of the month to a WRNS camp near Newbury, where she had already passed an examination in Hindustani. ‘She thinks that she will be sent to India.’1 The services of this imaginary sub-agent had already been offered to SEAC, and it was therefore thought best to leave her out of our calculations altogether. 7 (5) had never taken kindly to espionage. His nervous disposition unfitted him for the work. In his very first message, despatched on 19th April from Taunton, he confessed that he had found it impossible to establish himself in the protected zone. On 17th May he wrote from Exeter: ‘I entered this prohibited area where vigilance is extremely strict. I do not see any possibility of remaining here owing to the continual demands for documentation which up to the moment I have been able to evade.’2 On 2nd June he ran into trouble. A message reached GARBO through 7 (6) in Swansea, which revealed that 7 (5) had been arrested for being in Exeter without permission. No doubt his guilty looks had betrayed him. He had been sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. ‘Apparently there is no indication that any suspicion exists regarding the mission with which he was entrusted to me and that it was only a routine case for not having complied with the present restrictions.’3 With 7 (5)’s retirement from the scene we were relieved of the ungrateful task of having to send military reports from Devonshire.
For the sake of realism GARBO and his case officer thought that at least one of the sub-agents should prove to be a complete failure. This role was allotted to 7 (6), who resided in South Wales, an area upon which FORTITUDE was not dependent for reports. ‘I received a long letter from 7 (6)’, wrote GARBO on 28th April, ‘with reports, the majority of which were stupid. We can therefore discount the ability of this agent as an informant in spite of the repeated instructions given. His usefulness to the Military Information Service is nil.’4
And now a word about GARBO himself. As with BRUTUS, it was felt that for an agent of his stature an appointment should be found which would enable him to penetrate more deeply into the inner councils of those who were directing the Allied war effort. It will be remembered that as early as February GARBO had stolen from the office of (3) the specimen of a pamphlet which was to be dropped in France in the event of the Germans’ voluntary withdrawal from that country. Describing this exploit as ‘a master stroke’, Madrid had added, ‘Very important facts can be obtained in that Ministry since they prepare all the propaganda for the countries in which they are interested for their projected offensive’.5 An opening had already been made by the Germans themselves.
The head of the Spanish section at the Ministry of Information was, in fact, on a visit to Madrid at the beginning of May. Certain previous suggestions of GARBO had already led the enemy to suspect that this individual was no other than J (3). On 2nd May GARBO casually threw out the observation: ‘J (3) has left England.’6 It was fairly certain that the Germans would connect this remark with the Ministry official’s visit to Spain. Meanwhile, the latter, at the instance of MI5, was requested to return to this country and arrived home at the middle of the month. On 22nd May GARBO reported: ‘Result of interview today with J (3). He returned from Madrid for reasons connected with propaganda preparations for the Second Front. He proposed that I should help him, offering good remuneration for work which I could do at home. I accepted provisionally, telling him that I wished to consult my wife, in order to allow time to receive approval from you since it concerns work for the enemy which I would only accept as a sacrifice to be compensated by getting important information.’7 Madrid was prompt in its reply. On the next day the following message was received: ‘Have studied carefully the question of J (3). Am of the opinion that you should accept the offer, as apart from his being able to facilitate good information, this work assists your cover in every respect.’8 The latter was an advantage which not even GARBO and his case officer had thought of. On 24th May GARBO was able to say that he had definitely accepted the proposition and had been made to sign the Official Secrets Act: ‘I attach much importance to this because I learnt that only people who may get to learn details which may compromise secret plans are obliged to sign this.’9
The object of giving GARBO an appointment at the Ministry of Information was in order that he should gain access to the Allied propaganda directives. By reading these ‘in reverse’, he would learn the Allies’ intentions. Thus supposing that, after the invasion had begun, these directives placed an emphatic veto on all speculation as to the possibility of a second Allied landing, it would be reasonable to suppose that such a landing was intended. The first few days were spent in studying the propaganda directives which had been prepared in connection with the African landing and the campaign in Italy. Speaking of the latter: ‘What I was clearly able to get out of it and what I consider to be of the maximum importance is the intention to hide the facts in order to trick us.’10 The same report contained a detailed and more or less accurate exposition of the functions of the Political Warfare Executive. ‘It is the executive body for all foreign propaganda and it co-ordinates directives issued which are based on policy recommendations of the Foreign Office, War Cabinet Office and Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces. The latter is known by the initials “SHAEF”. Thus PWE is the propaganda mouthpiece of Eisenhower, Eden and the British Chiefs of Staff. … In view of the fact that this department’s work is secret it is very possible that Berlin is not aware of these important facts and I therefore recommend that steps should be taken to notify the competent chiefs in Berlin so that experts can evaluate and interpret the strategic plans behind the propaganda directives which are issued, hitherto unknown to us but which, through my present position, will be available to you in future. I am convinced that, knowing the intentions behind these directives, together with the reports from my agents, we will know the future intentions of the enemy.’11
GARBO’s new appointment, and the greatly increased volume of traffic now passing between London and Madrid, made it essential for him to find personal assistants to relieve him of a part of the burden which he carried as head of the organisation. At the middle of May, therefore, the widow of Two, the agent who had died at Bootle in 1942, was called in to help with the enciphering, while GARBO’s deputy, agent Three, was summoned from Scotland and assumed responsibility for collecting all messages and arranging for their despatch. When he took over, GARBO asked the Germans whether they would mind his sending the traffic in English. To this they readily agreed.